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ABSTRACT 
Brian Drohan: Rights at War: British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus, Aden, and Northern 
Ireland 
(Under the direction of Susan D. Pennybacker) 
 
 
This study analyzes the role of human rights activism during three post-1945 British 
counterinsurgency campaigns in Cyprus (1955-1959), Aden (1963-1967), and the Northern 
Ireland “Troubles” (emphasizing 1969-1976). Based on material gathered from 15 archives in 
four countries as well as oral history records and personal papers, this study demonstrates that 
human rights activism shaped British operational decisions during each of these conflicts. 
Activists mobilized ideas of human rights to restrain counterinsurgency violence by defining 
certain British actions as illegal or morally unjustifiable. Although British forces often 
prevented activists from restraining state violence, activists forced government officials and 
military commanders to develop new ways of covering up human rights abuses. Focusing the 
analytical lens on activists and the officials with whom they interacted places rights activists 
on the counterinsurgency “battlefield” not as traditional arms-bearing combatants, but as 
actors who nonetheless influenced warfare by shaping military decisions.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
Introduction 
The United States military expected a quick, “surgical” victory in the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq, but soon encountered what General John Abizaid, much to the chagrin of Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, described as a “classical guerrilla-type campaign.”1 A similar 
situation emerged in Afghanistan as the Taliban and Al Qaeda regrouped within Pakistani 
sanctuaries. Military practitioners and policy makers in the United States began to grope for 
conceptual answers to these unexpected wartime challenges. In their search for solutions, 
analysts turned to narratives of European counterinsurgency campaigns—especially Britain’s 
wars of decolonization. 
 Embedded within the legacies of these post-World War II campaigns were a series of 
assumptions about British counterinsurgency practices and cultural values. These 
assumptions coalesced around the notion that Britain was more successful in waging 
counterinsurgency than other imperial powers such as France. During the 1946-54 war in 
Indochina and the 1954-62 Algerian War, French forces embraced torture to obtain 
intelligence on insurgent activities and terror to cow civilian populations into submission. But 
in both conflicts, France suffered ignominious defeats. Likewise, many supporters of the 
“British approach” to counterinsurgency viewed the American defeat in Vietnam as the result 
of the United States’ reliance on overwhelming firepower and technological panaceas.2 These 
                                                            
1 Brian Knowlton. “Top U.S. General in Iraq Sees ‘Classical Guerrilla-Type’ War,” The New York Times. July 
16, 2003. http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/16/international/worldspecial/16CND-POLI.html. Accessed Feb 27, 
2013. 
 
2 For criticism of the “British approach” from within the American defense establishment, see Gian Gentile, 
Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency (New York, NY: The New Press, 2013); 
Douglas Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); “The Dangerous Myths and Dubious Promise of COIN,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 
22, no. 2 (2011): 239–57; “Writing History in the ‘End of History’ Era—Reflections on Historians and the 
2 
 
failures contrasted neatly with supposed British successes. Supporters of this view claimed 
that British forces’ counterinsurgency prowess derived from the British army’s military 
culture, including the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances and effectively operate in 
a decentralized manner. Furthermore, proponents of British exceptionalism insisted that 
Britain succeeded by using methods that aligned with liberal democratic values. According to 
this view, British forces succeeded because they achieved a kind of moral legitimacy. They 
won the “hearts and minds” of civilian populations by obeying the “rule of law” and using the 
minimum amount of force necessary against insurgents. Proponents of this narrative believed 
that unlike the French, British forces existed to protect, rather than harm, non-combatants.3  
This idealized image of past British victories proved particularly compelling for 
American policymakers because it appeared to offer a solution that was not only effective, 
but also aligned with American liberal democratic ideals and contemporary international 
human rights norms. In December 2006, the United States military released Field Manual 3-
24: Counterinsurgency, which wholeheartedly embraced the idea that Britain’s 
counterinsurgency approach was both effective and moral. The manual generated instant 
fanfare and unprecedented attention. Pundits immediately hailed the new manual as “ground-
breaking” and “paradigm-shattering.”4 Initially issued as a government document, the manual 
was downloaded 1.5 million times in the first month after public release. Within a year the 
                                                            
GWOT,” Journal of Military History 70, no. 4 (2006): 1065–79; and James Wirtz, “The ‘Unlessons’ of 
Vietnam,” Defense Analysis 17, no. 1 (2001): 41–57. 
 
3 Robert M. Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); John Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency 
Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Cassidy asserts that British 
military culture was particularly well-suited to the demands of counterinsurgency. Nagl argues that during the 
1948-60 Malayan Emergency, the British Army functioned as a “learning organization” capable of adapting its 
tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter a creative adversary. 
 
4
 For the manual itself, see U.S. Army and Marine Corps. Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2007. Also see Michelle Gordon. “Army, Marine Corps unveil counterinsurgency 
field manual,” U.S. Army News Archives. December 15, 2006. http://www.army.mil/article/1005/. Accessed 
March 17, 2014; and Sarah Sewall, “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition,” in U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps. Counterinsurgency Field Manual. xxxv. 
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University of Chicago Press published an edition that included an introduction written by 
Harvard University human rights professor Sarah Sewall. Sewall wrote that the new manual 
“heartily embraces a traditional . . . British method of fighting insurgency” and was “based on 
principles learned during Britain’s early period of imperial policing and relearned during 
responses to twentieth-century independence struggles in Malaya and Kenya.”5 The manual 
was also the subject of a glowing New York Times book review written by prominent human 
rights advocate Samantha Power. Scholars, security analysts, and policymakers across the 
political spectrum believed that the new field manual offered a viable alternative approach to 
the intractable problems facing American policymakers in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 
Counterinsurgency—or “COIN”—became a fashionable policy buzzword in Washington as 
the idea of British “exceptionalism” rapidly gained favor within both defense and human 
rights policy circles.7 
But in actuality, Britain’s post-1945 counterinsurgency campaigns involved a heavy 
dose of brutality and coercion against combatants and non-combatants alike.8 Against the 
Mau Mau in Kenya, British forces detained almost the entire Kikuyu population in a “gulag” 
system, depriving them of basic rights and subjecting them to physical and psychological 
abuse. When the International Committee of the Red Cross attempted to intervene, the 
                                                            
5 Sarah Sewall. “Introduction to the University of Chicago Press Edition,” in U.S. Army and Marine Corps. 
Counterinsurgency Field Manual. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007. xxiv. In fairness to Sewall, 
however, she recognizes that “Britain sanctioned tactics that would not pass moral muster today” such as the 
limitation of food rations (starvation), forced relocation of civilians, and torture. See p. xxxiv. 
 
6 Samantha Power. “Our War on Terror.” The New York Times, July 29, 2007. Also see Tom Hayden, 
“Samantha Power Goes to War,” The Nation, March 30, 2011. For another perspective on counterinsurgency as 
a “new approach” to the war in Iraq, see Sarah Sewall, “He Wrote the Book. Can He Follow It?” The 
Washington Post, February 25, 2007. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/23/AR2007022301741.html. Accessed March 17, 2014. 
 
7 See Cassidy, Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror; Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: 
Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam.  
  
8 See David H. Ucko and Robert Egnell, Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenges of Modern 
Warfare (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013) for a critique of the British Army’s contemporary, 
mythologized views of its counterinsurgency expertise. 
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colonial government refused to admit Red Cross delegates into the colony until 1957, when 
the tide of the war had turned decisively in favor of the British. Colonial authorities also 
manipulated the judicial system by changing rules of evidence and expanding the range of 
crimes that qualified for capital punishment. Ultimately, the government executed 1,090 
Kenyans for emergency-related offenses during the conflict, often with little evidence of 
guilt.9 Torture, forced relocation, collective punishment, and other forms of coercion also 
occurred or were alleged to have occurred during other colonial conflicts between 1945-1967 
such as the emergencies in Palestine, Malaya, Cyprus, Nyasaland, and Aden.10 
The terror and brutality of these wars stand in marked contrast to values that formed 
the core of the post-1945 edifice of international order. Supported by Western powers 
including the United States and United Kingdom, the post-Second World War world was 
supposedly built on foundations of international law, justice, liberty, and equality. Ideas of 
“collective security,” “self-determination,” and “human rights” received significant attention 
in international politics immediately following the Second World War.11  But this postwar 
                                                            
9
 David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2005); Huw Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in 
the Kenya Emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2012); Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold 
Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (Macmillan, 2005); Fabian Klose, Human Rights in the Shadow of Colonial 
Violence: The Wars of Independence in Kenya and Algeria (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2013). 
 
10 Caroline Elkins, “Archives, Intelligence and Secrecy: The Cold War and the End of the British Empire,” in 
Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence (London: Bloomsbury, 2015).; David French, The 
British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); John Newsinger, 
British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, 2nd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); Martin 
Thomas and Gareth Curless, eds., Decolonization and Conflict: Colonial Comparisons and Legacies (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2016). 
 
11 For discussion of many varieties of “internationalisms” on offer during the twentieth century, see Erez 
Manela, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Elizabeth Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision 
for Human Rights (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007); Mark Mazower, Governing the World: 
The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012); No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the 
Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Paul M Kennedy, The 
Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Vintage Books, 2007). For 
a sharp critique of the post-1945 international rights regime's effectiveness, see Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: 
Human Rights in History (Harvard University Press, 2010).  
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vision emerged alongside growing Cold War tensions and violent contestations over colonial 
rule. The post-1945 world was supposed to function according to an international politics of 
“rights,” yet these rights appeared to have been demonstrably absent during Britain’s 
counterinsurgency wars. 
This study explores the paradox of an international politics meant to advance rights 
and freedoms coexisting alongside the simultaneous employment of systematic, brutal 
counterinsurgency methods. No matter how much they may have wished, human rights 
activists did not impose a set of international rights norms grounded in a common vision of 
humanity on British counterinsurgency campaigns. But rights activism was far from 
irrelevant to counterinsurgency operations. Human rights formed the basis of political claims 
and counter-claims that tangibly affected military decisions. In this context, rights activism 
shaped British operational choices. Rights activists sought to expose British forces’ brutal 
treatment of detainees during interrogation and the use of violence against civilians, but 
British officials shielded their abuses from scrutiny by maintaining a façade of restraint and 
respectability. Although British forces often succeeded in preventing activists from achieving 
their objectives, rights activism forced government officials and military commanders to 
develop new tactics for hiding human rights abuses. British forces developed effective 
countermeasures by manipulating the law to their advantage, attacking the credibility of their 
accusers, and limiting the scope of official inquiries to keep knowledge of abuses out of 
public view. It was not until after the Northern Ireland “Troubles” began in 1969 that rights 
activists succeeded in generating a sustained public debate over issues such as detention 
without trial and torture during interrogation. Rather than abandon brutal methods, British 
forces developed dynamic responses to shield these increasingly unpopular practices from 
public knowledge. 
6 
 
Although rights activism occurred in many post-1945 counterinsurgency campaigns, 
this study examines three conflicts—Cyprus from 1955-59, Aden from 1962-67, and the 
Northern Ireland “Troubles” from 1969 to the early 1980s. In each of these conflicts, rights 
issues emerged as a significant dimension of the war because of activists’ efforts and 
international organizations. Rights activists came in many forms, but the British government 
and security forces were the most frequent and consistent targets. Rights-based advocacy lay 
at the heart of activists’ agendas. Some, like the Greek Cypriot legal elite and some Northern 
Irish civil society groups, were committed to one belligerent side or another. Other groups, 
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), strove to alleviate the suffering 
of vulnerable populations through the provision of humanitarian aid or, like Amnesty 
International (AI) in Aden, advocated for some form of civil and social justice. Organizations 
such as the ICRC and AI not only helped civilians, but also worked to improve conditions for 
captured combatants. 
The Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland cases also reveal that common trends in the 
relationship between rights activism and British counterinsurgency warfare persisted in 
different circumstances. The Cyprus Emergency occurred from 1955-59—a time when 
Britain was deeply engaged with large-scale counterinsurgencies in Malaya (1948-60) and 
Kenya (1952-60). This period marked the height of the colonial counterinsurgency era, as 
British forces contended with three simultaneous, large-scale insurgencies. Nor was Britain 
alone in combating the forces of anticolonial rebellion. Other European powers also waged 
major counterinsurgency campaigns during the 1950s, most notably the French wars in 
Indochina (1946-54) and Algeria (1954-62). The 1950s were therefore a particularly intense 
period of colonial counterinsurgency warfare.12  
                                                            
12 For recent studies on the violent end of empire, see Christopher Bayly and Tim Harper, Forgotten Wars: 
Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2010) and Martin Thomas, Fight 
or Flight: Britain, France, and Their Roads from Empire (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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By the time of the 1963-67 Aden Emergency, most British wars of decolonization had 
ended. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 1960 “Wind of Change” speech in Cape Town, 
South Africa, signaled his desire to avoid anticolonial wars whenever possible by proceeding 
quickly with decolonization. By the mid-1960s, the British Empire was rapidly contracting. 
Britain had lost many of its most profitable colonies to independence and was actively—and 
often chaotically—seeking to decolonize its remaining African colonies. Anticolonial 
nationalism was ascendant. The war in Aden came to symbolize the end of the imperial era as 
the so-called “Last Post” of the British Empire.13 In January 1968, as British troops withdrew 
from Aden, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced a full-scale strategic withdrawal from 
areas “east of Suez.” For many, this decision marked the end of Britain’s position as a global 
imperial power.14  
Pushing the temporal scope of this study beyond the end of the Aden Emergency in 
1967 creates an opportunity to analyze the impact of rights activism on counterinsurgency 
warfare in a another context—a war waged within the United Kingdom, but in a region of the 
UK bearing a distinctive colony-like legacy. The Northern Ireland “Troubles” formally lasted 
from 1969-1998, but the British military operation in Northern Ireland—Operation Banner—
lasted until 2007. Operation Banner was the longest single military operation in British 
                                                            
13 See, for instance, Julian Paget, Last Post: Aden 1964-67 (London: Faber & Faber, 1969). Aden gained a 
reputation as the empire’s “Last Post,” but Britain retained sovereignty over several Caribbean and Pacific 
island territories into the 1970s-1980s and transferred Hong Kong to China in 1997. 
 
14 Scholars have traditionally marked the Aden conflict as Britain’s last war for empire. David French follows 
this approach in his comprehensive study of post-1945 colonial counterinsurgency campaigns. For example, 
French includes the 1958-59 Oman campaign, but not the 1962-76 Dhofar Rebellion, which is not typically 
categorized as a decolonization war. See French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967. Other 
studies have located the supposed "end of empire" at approximately 1970. See, for instance, John Darwin, The 
Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009); Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 
(New York, NY: Longman, 1975). 
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history.15 Although it has officially ended, in many ways the issues at the heart of the 
Troubles remain relevant and unsettled today.  
An analysis of these three cases also reveals the extent to which British racism 
influenced counterinsurgency violence. Racism played a central role in the creation and 
maintenance of imperial systems of rule. But the different racial contexts of Cyprus, Aden, 
and Northern Ireland and the similarities in British counterinsurgency practices across these 
three locations suggest that while racism certainly influenced British attitudes, racism alone 
cannot explain the violence visited upon civilian populations during counterinsurgency wars. 
In Cyprus, British forces fought white European Greek Orthodox Christians. Aden was a 
predominantly Arab, Muslim colony with a large minority of South Asians and a small 
community of white settlers. Although part of the UK, many British officials drew a 
distinction between “Britishness” and “Irishness” with regard to Northern Ireland. Northern 
Irish, notwithstanding their political opinions or religious preferences, fell into the latter 
category. But the Irish were also seen as a white Western European people, unlike Arabs and 
the “Mediterranean” Greek Cypriots.16 Regardless of racial attitudes toward the local 
population, British forces employed remarkably similar techniques.17 Racism therefore could 
be said to have influenced counterinsurgency violence, but it cannot alone account for the 
brutality which characterized many British campaigns.  
Counterinsurgency practitioners have long recognized the importance of protecting 
and winning the support of the civil population.18 But both military historians and historians 
                                                            
15 For the army’s official history, see Ministry of Defence. “Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military 
Operations in Northern Ireland,” London, UK: HMSO, 2006. 
 
16 Peter Neumann, Britain’s Long War: British Strategy in the Northern Ireland Conflict, 1969-98 (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 17–21. 
 
17 French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967. 
 
18 For a good example of a practitioner’s “best practices,” see Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist 
Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York, NY: Praeger, 1966). 
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of human rights have largely ignored the role of rights activists in shaping wartime policies 
and practices. Focusing the analytical lens on activists and the officials with whom they 
interacted places rights activists on the counterinsurgency “battlefield”—not as traditional 
arms-bearing combatants, but as actors who nonetheless influenced the conduct of war by 
shaping public opinion and military choices. But what, exactly, did this battlefield look like? 
Counterinsurgency and the Post-1945 World 
The counterinsurgency battlefield of the postwar world was rapidly changing. The 
Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland conflicts occurred within the context of postwar 
transformations in British society, challenges to Britain’s great power status, the emergence 
of the Cold War, and the collapse of European empires. The Second World War had shifted 
British domestic politics toward social democratic policies associated with the Labour Party. 
The 1942 Beveridge Report outlined a platform built on social services that sought to abolish 
poverty through a “cradle to grave” welfare state. After winning the 1945 general election, 
the Labour Party under Clement Attlee instituted social reforms to reduce poverty and 
unemployment, rebuild and improve housing, provide universal health care, and improve 
access to education. Britain was heavily in debt and had suffered immense destruction from 
German bombing raids throughout the war—postwar Britain was desperately in need of 
reconstruction. But the new Labour government also remained committed to maintaining the 
UK’s status as a world power. After 1945 Britain extended military conscription into 
peacetime, developed the atomic bomb, took a permanent seat on the United Nations Security 
Council, and continued to cultivate close ties with the United States.19  
                                                            
19 For an overview of the challenges facing postwar Britain, see Paul Addison, The Road to 1945: British 
Politics and the Second World War (London: Pimlico, 1994); Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain, 1900-2000 
(New York, N.Y.: Penguin, 2004); David Childs, Britain since 1945: A Political History (New York: 
Routledge, 2012); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth 
Century (New York: Longman, 2000). For the European postwar experience more broadly, see Tony Judt, 
Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2006). 
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After World War II, tensions between the victorious Allies led to the emergence of 
the Cold War. According to historian Carole Fink, the Cold War became “a messianic 
contest” in which each side espoused a certain set of values.20 The Soviet Union cast itself as 
a revolutionary regime seeking liberation from political and economic exploitation and 
oppression, whereas the Western powers—particularly the United States—advanced an 
ideology grounded in free capitalist economic competition and individual political liberty.21 
Although the Western powers espoused principles of political liberty, democracy, and 
free markets, they also perpetuated European rule over colonized peoples—a pattern that did 
not align with these stated values. For example, colonial interests heavily influenced the 
structure and function of the United Nations—the institution which lay at the heart of the 
supposed new world order based on international freedom and justice. Jan Smuts, the 
prominent South African statesman and vocal proponent of white racial superiority, played a 
significant role in the creation of the United Nations and wrote the preamble to the UN 
Charter. Smuts saw the new organization as a means of ensuring white dominance in Africa 
through the continuation of the British Empire’s “civilizing mission.” The United Nations 
was, to Smuts, a means of buttressing empire rather than a path toward dismantling it.22 
Smuts’ vision contrasted sharply with the aspirations of many subject peoples. Postwar 
anticolonial resistance movements adopted a range of ideologies, from the socialism of 
Indian President Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno as an alternative to 
colonial exploitation, to Syngman Rhee’s embrace of capitalism as a force of development 
                                                            
20 Carole Fink, Cold War: An International History, 2014, 2. 
 
21 The literature on the Cold War is vast, but for an overview of recent works, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold 
War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005); Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (Macmillan, 2008); Fink, Cold War; Odd Arne Westad, The Global 
Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007); Vladislav M. Zubok, Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Univ 
of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
 
22 Mazower, No Enchanted Palace, 28–65. 
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and modernization. Others, most notably Frantz Fanon, advocated for the use of violence as a 
legitimate response to colonial oppression.23 Violent resistance to empire proliferated as 
colonial powers attempted to reassert their authority in the aftermath of the Second World 
War.24 The creation of a Non-Aligned Movement at the 1955 Bandung Conference reinforced 
a sense of community and solidarity among newly independent “Third World” states. Many 
leaders of postcolonial states sought to reinforce their independence, reduce their dependence 
on “outside forces,” and strengthen the norm of self-determination and equality of sovereign 
states.25 It was in this complex context of Cold War confrontation and anticolonial struggle 
that the myth of British counterinsurgency “exceptionalism” was born. 
Sir Robert Thompson’s 1966 book Defeating Communist Insurgency represents the 
mythologized British approach to counterinsurgency.  He advocated restricting violence to 
the minimum amount of force necessary and promoted political legitimacy by requiring 
colonial security forces to obey the “rule of law.”  Thompson’s argument reflected an 
analysis of historical events from which he determined “best practices” for conducting 
counterinsurgency.26 He did not write the book as a history of British counterinsurgency, but 
it contributed to the emergence of a historiography that presumed the professed liberality and 
humanity of British doctrine corresponded with actual wartime practices. In the 1980s, as the 
British government began declassifying official documents from the decolonization era, 
military historians turned their attention to counterinsurgency. Early studies supported the 
                                                            
23 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 2004). 
 
24 For two excellent histories of the violent end of empire, see Bayly and Harper, Forgotten Wars; Thomas, 
Fight or Flight: Britain, France, and Their Roads from Empire. 
 
25 See Chapter 3 in Westad, The Global Cold War as well as Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in 
World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011) and 
Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 2005). 
 
26 Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam. 
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belief that British forces consciously conducted counterinsurgency by obeying a given 
colony’s local laws and minimizing the use of force. This understanding contributed to the 
notion that the British waged “clean” campaigns whereas the French, Portuguese, and 
Belgians fought “dirty wars” in Algeria, Indochina, Angola, and the Congo. Comparison of 
the British experience with that of other European powers generated the idea of British 
“exceptionalism”—that is, Britain’s supposed ability to defeat insurgencies through minimum 
force, the rule of law, and political legitimacy rather than repression and coercion.27 
Since those early studies, revisionist scholars have convincingly overturned the notion 
of British exceptionalism by demonstrating that Britain actually waged extremely violent and 
repressive campaigns that failed to live up to the benign claims of practitioners like 
Thompson. These historians have recast the British counterinsurgency narrative to reveal the 
consistent and pervasive application of coercion, repression, torture, forced relocation, broad 
rules of engagement, and draconian laws. Although British Security Forces largely obeyed 
colonial governments’ emergency regulations, these laws routinely permitted a wide range of 
repression from population control measures such as food rationing to open-ended rules of 
engagement in which British soldiers could shoot any curfew violator who failed to stop 
when hailed. Under emergency regulations, “rule of law” proved quite severe.28 These 
scholars’ research findings and expert testimony supported a case in Britain’s High Court in 
                                                            
27 Thomas Mockaitis, British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60 (Macmillan, 1990). Some recent scholarship has 
echoed Mockaitis’s earlier views despite the wave of revisionist historiography produced since 2002. For 
example, see Victoria Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War 
Strategy since World War II. London: I.B. Tauris, 2012 and Huw Bennett’s review of it in the Journal of 
Military History, Vol. 76, No. 4, October 2012, 1294-96. For more on the British counterinsurgency debate, see 
Huw Bennett, “Minimum Force in British Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21, no. 3 (2010): 
459-475; Thomas Mockaitis, “The Minimum Force Debate: Contemporary Sensibilities Meet Imperial 
Practice,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, no. 4–5 (2012): 762–80; David Martin Jones and M.L.R. Smith, 
“Myth and the Small War Tradition: Reassessing the Discourse of British Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars & 
Insurgencies 24, no. 3 (2013): 436–64; Andrew Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British 
Experience of Irregular Warfare (Routledge, 2012); Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New 
Way of War. 
 
28 Anderson, Histories of the Hanged; Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau; Elkins, Imperial Reckoning; French, The 
British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967; Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency. 
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which several Kenyans, formerly held prisoner during the war, filed a lawsuit against the 
British government alleging that British authorities had tortured them. Three historians—
David Anderson, Huw Bennett, and Caroline Elkins—testified as expert witnesses.  Their 
testimony contributed to the High Court’s October 2012 decision to allow the case to go to 
trial.29  
The work of these new historians gained further momentum after the “discovery” of a 
large collection of colonial era documents held by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO). The facility housed approximately 1.2 million files that had been missing from the 
National Archives. Rather than being deposited in the National Archives at Kew, the FCO 
had retained the documents at its Hanslope Park facility. The Hanslope Park archive’s 
existence should have been declared after the passage of the UK Freedom of Information Act 
in 2000. Instead, it remained secret until April 2011, when the FCO faced judicial pressure to 
acknowledge what had happened to the files. Many of the documents held at this previously 
undisclosed archive should have been declassified under Britain’s Public Record Act, in 
which government documents are reviewed for public release 30 years after their creation. 
Many of these documents were also of strategic importance during the Cold War, as they 
addressed security matters such as intelligence reports on prominent political figures in 
former colonies. The Hanslope Park archive’s existence raised questions over the extent to 
which the British government had accounted for the “dark side” of decolonization.30 
                                                            
29 BBC News, “Mau Mau uprising: Kenyans win UK torture ruling.”  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-19843719. 
October 5, 2012. Accessed December 6, 2012. Several Malaysians also sought an inquiry into an alleged 
massacre during the Malayan Emergency, but the High Court rejected their appeals. See Richard Norton-Taylor, 
“Relatives lose court case for inquiry into 1948 Malaya ‘massacre.’” The Guardian. September 4, 2012. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/04/relatives-lose-inquiry-malay-massacre. Accessed December 6, 
2012. 
 
30 David Anderson, “Mau Mau in the High Court and the ‘Lost’ British Empire Archives: Colonial Conspiracy, 
or Bureaucratic Bungle?,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, no. 5 (2011): 699–716; 
Caroline Elkins, “Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice,” The 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, no. 5 (2011): 731–48. 
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According to historian Richard Drayton, “the root of these practices of secrecy appears to be 
a perverse kind of historical narcissism, a desire for a Whiggish gaze into an unblemished 
national past.”31 Laws such as the Public Record Act were enacted to curb the potential for 
government abuses of power. Many scholars criticized the government’s failure to release 
official documents when legally required because such actions can undermine the 
transparency with which democracies are supposed to operate.32  
The implications of historians’ work on British counterinsurgency extend beyond 
historical questions regarding the nature of the end of empire. Past counterinsurgency 
practices have shaped contemporary military debates while citizens of former colonies cope 
with the legacies of decolonization. Rights took on a renewed importance in international 
discourses after the Second World War, as the creation of the United Nations and the 
promulgation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) seemed to usher in an 
era in which international relations would be regulated through principles of equality, justice, 
and rights. This “new” international order was one articulation of many secular, utopian 
“internationalisms.” It shared with its earlier incarnations the common desire to build a better 
future for humanity.33  
                                                            
31 Richard Drayton, “The Foreign Office Secretly Hoarded 1.2m Files. It’s Historical Narcissism,” The 
Guardian, October 27, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/27/uk-foreign-office-secret-
files. Accessed August 14, 2015. 
 
32 Newly released documents from the Hanslope Park archive form a vital source base for this study. Other 
recently available documents are also included. In June 2015, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
publicly released archival material from 1966-75. Several underutilized collections of personal papers, such as 
those of Amnesty International co-founder Eric Baker and Aden land forces commander Major General Sir John 
Willoughby, also provide valuable insight. 
 
33 Mazower, Governing the World. The historiography of pre-1945 rights concepts is vast and includes early 
articulations of the law of nations, the rise of legal philosophies of natural rights and legal positivism, and the 
relationships between international law, civilization, and imperialism. For a small sampling of the literature see 
Geoffrey Best, Humanity in Warfare (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1980); Richard Tuck, The Rights of 
War and Peace: Political Thought and the International Order from Grotius to Kant (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2000); Stephen Neff, Justice Among Nations: A History of International Law (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise 
and Fall of International Law, 1870-1960 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
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Human Rights in Context 
Historians have created a thicket of competing interpretations surrounding the history 
of human rights. Many scholars adopt a triumphalist view of the origins of human rights, 
describing a story of steady progress from Enlightenment ideals toward the global realization 
of an ever-expanding international human rights regime.34 A more circumspect perspective, 
which seeks to return agency and contingency to a deterministic literature, explains the 
emergence of human rights as a social movement that rose to prominence only after other 
utopian projects failed.35  
In addition to debates over the rise of human rights, scholars disagree over when 
“human rights,” as such, originated. The post-1945 era looms large in the origins debate. One 
group of scholars sees the post-1945 creation of the United Nations and proclamation of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as the key moment in the emergence of international 
human rights norms and laws.36 Another group finds the origins of contemporary human 
rights in the 1970s because the 1970s marked social movements’ first widespread adoption of 
human rights rhetoric. Governments also linked human rights with foreign policy objectives. 
This dynamic was especially true of the United States under President Jimmy Carter. Rights 
rhetoric also shaped the course of the Cold War through the “moralization of dissent” among 
Eastern Bloc dissidents.37 
                                                            
34 Lynn Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2007); 
Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2004); Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: 
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35 Moyn, The Last Utopia. 
 
36 Borgwardt, A New Deal for the World: America’s Vision for Human Rights; Lauren, The Evolution of 
International Human Rights; Ishay, The History of Human Rights. 
 
37 Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, ed., Human Rights in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Barbara Keys, Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 
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Historians also argue over what “human rights” constitute. Samuel Moyn insists that 
the concept of human rights applies only to notions of universal individual rights that 
transcend the nation-state—an idea which gained prominence beginning in the 1970s. Civil 
and political rights accorded to citizens by virtue of their membership in the state therefore do 
not count as “human rights.” This understanding may accurately describe the emergence of 
contemporary international human rights ideas in Europe and the United States, but various 
conceptions of rights have coexisted throughout the twentieth century. Bruno Cabanes locates 
the emergence of “humanitarian rights” in the aftermath of World War I. Humanitarianism is 
the moral sentiment to alleviate human suffering because of a shared sense of humanity. As 
such, humanitarianism is not necessarily political, but Cabanes engages the political effects of 
actions motivated by moral sensibilities.  Activists, he argues, asserted that various groups of 
sufferers—from starving children to disabled veterans—had the right to receive care and 
assistance because of their common humanity.38 But Moyn does not include group rights 
claims in his conceptualization of “human rights.”39 Likewise, he excludes anticolonial 
movements seeking national self-determination based on the concept of the equality of 
peoples from his paradigm of human rights.40  
                                                            
 
38 Bruno Cabanes, The Great War and the Origins of Humanitarianism, 1918-1924 (Cambridge, UK: 
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Practice (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2016). 
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In contrast to Moyn’s insistence that anticolonial nationalists in pursuit of self-
determination were a separate phenomenon from the human rights movement, other scholars 
have adopted a broader view which incorporates both group and individual rights. This 
approach has also connected human rights with anticolonial nationalism and the Cold War.41 
For instance, international human rights discourses played an important role in defining 
anticolonial struggles in Algeria and Kenya during the 1950s. Algerian insurgents’ efforts in 
publicizing the French military’s widespread use of torture and public controversy in the UK 
over the Kenya Hola Camp massacre ensured that both conflicts became synonymous with 
brutality.42 Opposition to racism and a commitment to the equality of all peoples motivated 
organizations such as Britain’s Movement for Colonial Freedom to support anticolonial 
causes.43 Unanticipated links between European regional politics and the end of empire also 
emerged. The European Convention of Human Rights, which became a focal point for 
anticolonial politics during the Cyprus Emergency, had its origins in a politically 
conservative Western European desire for Cold War unity—at least of a rhetorical kind—in 
the face of the communist challenge.44  
                                                            
41 On the international history of self-determination and its relationship with human rights, see Roland Burke, 
Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
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International Politics and the Entangled Histories of Human Rights, Forced Deportations, and Civilizing 
Missions,” The American Historical Review 113, no. 5 (December 1, 2008): 1313–43.  
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Clarendon Press, 1993). Postwar politics of antiracism drew on ideas circulating during and before the 1930s. 
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During the 1950s and 1960s, processes of decolonization exerted a profound impact 
on the UN human rights agenda. As former colonies gained independence, they formed an 
increasingly numerous and influential voting bloc in the UN General Assembly.45 UN 
debates over self-determination and human rights merged as “Third World” postcolonial 
states spearheaded an effort which resulted in recognition of the right to national self-
determination. In 1960, self-determination became a kind of “first right,” enshrined in Article 
1 of the UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples.46 
Anticolonial nationalists’ claims for the right to sovereign statehood rested on the 
moral universalism of human rights, which anticolonial nationalists used to make political 
claims against their colonial adversaries. African nationalists such as Tanganyika’s Julius 
Nyerere argued that colonial powers’ denial of self-determination prevented colonized 
peoples from achieving the degree of human dignity inherent in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Once in power, many anticolonial nationalists jettisoned human rights ideals 
when it was no longer convenient for them to follow the Universal Declaration.47 
Anticolonial actors also used human rights rhetoric to highlight colonial hypocrisy in warfare. 
International humanitarian law and the establishment of a European human rights regime 
conflicted with the realities of brutal colonial counterinsurgency campaigns. In Algeria, the 
insurgent Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) ordered its fighters to obey the 1949 Geneva 
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Conventions at a time when the French Army refused to accept that the Geneva Conventions 
applied to colonial wars. In Kenya, the Mau Mau adopted “Rules of Conduct” on January 4, 
1954 which prohibited killing children, raping women, and attacking hospitals or schools.48 
Greek Cypriots, too, turned human rights concepts against the colonizers who professed to 
uphold such values.  
Rights appeals often derived from international law, but formal international legal 
mechanisms and informal norms concerning war changed over time. In Europe, legal 
constraints on war emerged through medieval Christian notions of “just war.” Just war took 
two forms—jus ad bellum, which held that the reasons for going to war must be just, and jus 
in bello, which articulated acceptable methods of waging war.49 During the eighteenth 
century, a consensus emerged among lawyers, theologians, and statesmen which recognized 
the necessity of waging war while also accepting the need to limit war’s destructive effects 
on humanity. This “Enlightenment Consensus” laid the foundations for the nineteenth and 
early twentieth century promulgation of two legal approaches to war.50 The creation of the 
International Red Cross Society and the 1864 signing of the first Geneva Convention on the 
protection of the sick and wounded reflected a desire to alleviate the suffering of war victims 
and formed the basis for contemporary international humanitarian law. Through the 1899 and 
1907 Hague Conventions, the second approach to emerge from the “Enlightenment 
Consensus,” governments sought to restrain the conduct of war by banning or restricting the 
use of certain weapons and military practices.51 This consensus, however, had its limits. 
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European legal restraints on warfare often did not apply to non-European peoples. During 
colonial wars, reprisals, punitive measures, and terror remained common methods for 
subduing supposedly “uncivilized” peoples.52  
The unprecedented devastation of the First and Second World Wars shattered existing 
constraints on warfare and inspired renewed efforts to restrain violence. After the First World 
War, the victorious great powers attempted to build a peaceful international system on the 
basis of collective security. The establishment of the League of Nations was supposed to 
promote international cooperation.53 Violators of international law could face punishment, 
but only through reparations, according to the Hague Conventions. After World War II, 
however, postwar international war crimes tribunals in Germany and Japan reflected a new 
approach to international law by holding individuals accountable for state violence.54 Led by 
lawyers such as Raphael Lemkin, the UN further codified international law with the 1948 
Genocide Convention, which formally prohibited the extermination of peoples based on their 
group identity.55 Protections for war sufferers and victims of violence were also strengthened 
through the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which established protections for civilians and 
strengthened provisions concerning prisoners, wounded soldiers, and the sick.56 
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The codification of international law did not necessarily translate into stronger 
enforcement measures. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could not force 
states to comply with the Geneva Conventions, but instead had to negotiate with belligerents 
for access to war victims and permission to provide humanitarian assistance. As anticolonial 
nationalist rebellions erupted across the world, colonial powers claimed that the Geneva 
Conventions did not apply to these conflicts. The British government insisted that colonial 
wars were internal security matters despite the inclusion of a brief, watered-down reference in 
Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions which stipulated that in “non-
international armed conflicts,” non-combatants and prisoners must be treated humanely. In 
practice, delegates from the ICRC prioritized gaining access to war-torn areas and providing 
humanitarian assistance over debating the interpretation of what constituted a “non-
international armed conflict.” In response to colonial powers’ efforts to deny the applicability 
of international law to anticolonial wars, national liberation movements invoked jus ad 
bellum: Their cause—that is, fulfillment of the right to self-determination—justified war.57  
 Although international legal initiatives remained stilted, Europe developed a regional 
human rights regime in the context of Cold War politics. The first binding agreement in 
European human rights law was the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, often shortened to the “European Convention on Human 
Rights” or “ECHR.” The European human rights regime emerged at a specific historical 
moment. From the mid-1940s to the late 1960s, European lawyers and diplomats did not 
perceive the spheres of law and politics—which were distinct, separate entities in domestic 
affairs—as separate entities in international relations. European human rights law therefore 
emerged as a kind of “legal diplomacy” which played out in a specifically European context. 
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Whereas UN human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration derived from 
universalist ideologies of peace and freedom, the European Convention was a response to the 
collapse of basic rights protections within European legal systems and the atrocities 
committed under Nazi occupation. As Cold War tensions heightened during the late 1940s, 
many anti-communist European statesmen and lawyers feared the threat of potential Soviet 
domination. For these leaders, the best way to prevent the emergence of future totalitarian 
regimes was through a binding, enforceable agreement that protected fundamental human 
rights within Western European states. Secondly, in Britain, influential statesmen such as 
Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin supported the notion of a pan-European human rights 
project due to their interest in closer European security cooperation.58 Lastly, domestic 
politics shaped British involvement with the European Convention. Conservative Party 
members sympathized with staunch anti-communists in the Labour government, but wished 
to restrict the Convention’s purview to civil and political rights as a means of limiting 
Labour’s ability to use the Convention as a means to transform domestic social and economic 
rights. Signed in 1951, the Convention came into effect in 1953. In 1953, the British 
government extended the Convention to apply not only in the United Kingdom, but also to 42 
dependencies including Cyprus.59  
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Legal regimes are dynamic and produced through contestation and interaction, as are 
notions of human rights.60 This study uses the idea of “human rights” as outlined in the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration classified rights 
according to three general categories: the integrity of the human being, political and civil 
liberties, and social and economic rights.61 Considering that many activists and government 
officials referred to the Universal Declaration, this definition would have been familiar with 
historical actors living during the post-1945 period. Other scholars have also employed the 
same definition when examining the period.62  
The use of the Universal Declaration’s broad definition encompasses the various 
manifestations of rights ideas employed by diverse actors in different times and places. This 
approach allows for the recognition of processes in which human rights concepts are 
appropriated and translated in local contexts—a phenomenon that anthropologist Sally Engle 
Merry calls “vernacularization.” According to Merry, vernacularization occurs as 
intermediaries—often human rights activists—articulate local experiences in language that 
will resonate with wider audiences. Rights activists therefore “translate” individual stories of 
injury or abuse into a broader human rights framework. Rights activists also “localize” 
human rights concepts by describing international norms and legal documents to victims of 
abuse. For example, Amnesty International helped to “vernacularize” human rights in Aden 
by categorizing individual detainee experiences with torture as human rights abuses while 
also helping torture victims understand their experience not only as an unjust instance of 
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British brutality, but as an internationally repugnant violation of widely held values. Activists 
connected local experiences with global human rights trends, thus creating a distinct, local 
“rights consciousness.”63 
This study focuses on the actions of rights activists and British officials while 
eschewing the need to artificially categorize various manifestations of “rights.” To historian 
Bonny Ibhawoh, the problem with concepts of human rights “is largely one of ontology—of 
labels that we choose to designate ideas rather than the ideas that underlie the labels.”64 The 
labels that rights activists use are far less important than the ideas their activism embraced. In 
the 1950s, Greek Cypriot lawyers invoked the European Convention of Human Rights to 
protect detainees’ civil and political rights. In the 1960s, the ICRC, aided by Amnesty 
International, asserted “humanitarian rights” when it requested that the British government 
permit the provision of humanitarian relief to refugees in the Radfan region north of Aden. 
Amnesty International, which perceived itself as a “human rights” group, acted on behalf of 
prisoners in Aden to prevent colonial authorities from committing torture. In the 1970s and 
1980s, a variety of civil society organizations, political parties, Members of Parliament, and 
journalists vocally opposed brutal interrogation techniques and protested the use of riot 
control weapons in Northern Ireland in ways which violated the right to life. Activists in 
Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland mobilized on the basis of a contested international 
politics of rights in which concepts of “individual,” “group,” “humanitarian,” and “human” 
rights overlapped.65  
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Rights Activism and “Restraint” in Warfare 
Rights activists played an increasingly central role in the processes of contestation and 
negotiation that shaped human rights concepts after 1945. By the 1970s, activist groups had 
sprouted on both sides of the Cold War divide. Many scholars have documented how 
organizations such as Amnesty International focused on freeing political prisoners and 
campaigning against torture.66 After the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, in which Western powers 
formally recognized post-1945 international borders in Eastern Europe while the Soviet bloc 
agreed to uphold domestic human rights provisions, activists established transnational 
networks such as the Moscow Helsinki Group and Helsinki Watch. These organizations 
monitored Eastern Bloc compliance with the Helsinki Accords’ human rights terms. 
Domestic groups such as Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia also formed to criticize human rights 
abuses under communist rule.67 In Activists Without Borders, Margaret Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink argue that advocacy networks comprising intergovernmental organizations, 
foundations, mass media, local social movements, and others often form to cooperate on 
behalf of people who are vulnerable to violence and lack opportunities for redress through 
legal systems. These activists typically apply up to four approaches: Information politics 
involves publicizing the cause; symbolic politics seek to frame issues using rhetorical 
symbols to influence public opinions; leverage politics attempt to win the support of another 
strong actor to add impetus to activists’ appeals; and accountability politics, in which activists 
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pressure politicians into public action to address the problem or criticize their failure to do 
so.68 Keck and Sikkink conclude that advocacy networks have shaped political agendas and 
state behavior. 
Although most studies of human rights activism examine peacetime advocacy, many 
scholars, jurists, and policymakers believed that human rights regimes can—and should—
restrain wartime violence in order to protect those who are outside the fight.69 “Restraint,” 
however, is a concept that requires elucidation. Wayne Lee’s framework for explaining 
extreme and restrained violence is based on four categories: capacity, control, calculation, 
and cultural values.  Capacity is an actor’s ability to destroy, as violence will necessarily be 
restrained when the capacity to apply force is absent. Lee describes control as “societal 
oversight that enforces the maintenance of normal social values.” The idea of military 
discipline is one form of this social oversight meant to ensure that soldiers behave in ways 
acceptable to the broader society. Calculation is a conscious process through which decision-
makers determine what they perceive to be the best way of achieving their objectives—i.e. 
“where to go and what to destroy.” In the minds of those wielding force, calculation links that 
violence to a purpose. Finally, Lee notes that cultural values shape “the levels or types of 
violence authorized by a society.” These values, however, are not static.  Individuals make 
decisions shaped by existing beliefs, knowledge, and assumptions, yet can deviate from past 
behavior. This improvisation contributes to a continuous revision of existing cultural patterns, 
resulting in cultural change.70 When viewed in tandem with Lee’s framework, it is clear that 
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rights activism can act as a shaping mechanism that influences the ways in which societies 
control armies, the cultural values which condition—but do not determine—military 
behavior, and the calculations guiding decision-makers’ choices. Rights activism can also 
influence the capacity to wield violence by influencing weapons development and use.  
To British officials, rights activists’ efforts mattered because of British self-
perceptions. It was a widely held belief in Whitehall, particularly within the Colonial Office, 
that Britain was a paragon of virtue when it came to upholding and protecting rights, both 
domestically and internationally. During post-1945 counterinsurgency campaigns, British 
authorities were sensitive to criticism from rights activists because officials thought of 
themselves as representatives of a “civilized” culture that respected liberty and the law. 
According to this view, Britain’s high degree of civilization made it well-suited to colonial 
rule based on the paternalistic notion that British “tutelage” would help improve native 
societies. But, belief in the virtues of British civilization meant that government officials 
were conscious of moral criticisms. The effects of this self-perception can be seen in Cyprus. 
In a 1957 meeting with a delegate from the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
Cyprus’ Deputy Governor Sinclair told his visitor that “the government of Cyprus is very 
conscious of preserving Britain's reputation as highly civilized.”71 Criticism of British 
colonial policies as cruel or repressive would undermine British self-perceptions and 
challenge the government’s legitimacy. In 1949, then-Colonial Secretary Arthur Creech-
Jones complained that documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights could 
easily become a “source of embarrassment” for colonial governments.72 
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Despite the ideals of British rule based on the protection of rights, the practice of 
colonial governance diverged from these noble principles—a contradiction which lay at the 
heart of the British imperial project. By the late eighteenth century, the “rule of law”—that is, 
the applicability of law to all imperial subjects regardless of status—had become a key moral 
justification for imperial rule.73 But such equality before the law did not occur in practice. 
Historians understand colonial legal systems as pluralistic spaces in which law often applies 
to different groups in different ways. In addition, various actors—including imperial agents, 
cultural intermediaries, and colonized subjects—could assert agency and contest the colonial 
order through legal processes. In this sense, “ordinary” colonial legal regimes could offer a 
degree of flexibility and room for negotiation between colonizer and colonized. As a result, 
colonial legal regimes were hybrid justice systems in which the application of law was 
always contested and based on mixtures of metropolitan and local ideas.74  
Yet as colonial officials claimed legitimacy from the rule of law, they simultaneously 
adopted wide-ranging executive powers on the basis that such powers were necessary to 
protect the colonial state. When faced with the imperative of preserving the colonial state, 
officials could exercise whatever discretionary authority was necessary to ensure the survival 
of the colonial regime. During the nineteenth century, British officials developed a series of 
imperial legal precedents which granted the state broad emergency powers.75 By the 
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twentieth century, colonial governments regularly employed coercive practices such as 
detention without trial, forced resettlement, curfews, and collective punishments. Such 
legally-sanctioned counterinsurgency practices resurfaced after the Second World War in 
territories such as Palestine and Malaya. By the time the Cyprus conflict began in 1955, 
British forces had been operating under harsh emergency legislation in Malaya since 1948 
and Kenya since 1952.76 
Contradictions between stated values and policies put in practice could also cause 
embarrassment and weaken colonial authority. One notable example is the enactment of 
discriminatory colonial legislation in Britain’s African colonies while British politicians 
simultaneously supported the creation of the European Convention on Human Rights. In 
colonies such as Kenya, Uganda, and Basutoland, colonial governors could control Africans’ 
freedom of movement and impose collective punishments, even in peacetime. Forced labor 
was common in the Gold Coast, Kenya, Nigeria, and elsewhere. Freedom of expression was 
also curtailed. Beginning in the 1930s, authorities in Cyprus passed particularly strict sedition 
and press censorship laws.77 In the 1950s, Greek Cypriot lawyers passed information to 
Greece in support of the Greek government’s formal applications under the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Greek government’s applications meant that Britain 
earned the dubious honor of being the subject of the first interstate allegation of human rights 
violations in the history of the Convention. In 1959, colonial officials’ draconian repression 
of a minor emergency led to an inquiry that labelled the government’s actions as similar to 
those of a “police state.” Similarly, the deaths of 11 Kenyans in British custody at the Hola 
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camp ignited another scandal. This time Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan’s 
government drew criticism from opposition politicians as well as members of his own party. 
Conservative MP Enoch Powell, for instance, famously told the House of Commons that “we 
cannot say, ‘We will have African standards in Africa, Asian standards in Asia and perhaps 
British standards here at home.’”78 In December 1960, newly independent former colonies in 
the United Nations formally censured European imperial powers through the passage of 
Resolution 1514, which demanded an end to colonialism and asserted the right to self-
determination for all colonies.79 
Such “embarrassment” necessarily occurred in public view through the efforts of 
international lawyers, anticolonial nationalists, and rights activists; mistakes, transgressions, 
or hypocritical actions that remained hidden could not cause controversy or criticism and 
therefore would not tarnish British prestige. But the media-saturated environments of Cyprus’ 
large newspaper-reading public, the predominance of radio in Aden, and the mass of 
newspapers, radio programs, and television stations covering the Northern Ireland conflict 
ensured that these wars were waged in public with global audiences.80 British sensitivity to 
media-generated publicity ensured that rights activists could easily find a platform from 
which to air their grievances against the British government, and ensure that the ensuing 
disapproval stung particularly harshly.  
 During the 1955-59 Cyprus Emergency, Greek Cypriot lawyers used public advocacy 
and private lobbying to continuously criticize the colonial administration’s emergency legal 
regime. Chapter one analyzes these lawyers’ struggle to impose “normal” legal procedures. 
                                                            
78 French, The British Way in Counter-Insurgency, 1945-1967, 234–5. Hansard HC Deb 27 July 1959, Vol. 610 
c.237. 
 
79 Burke, Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights, 39–58. 
 
80 For an analysis of this phenomenon during the 1954-62 Algerian War, see Connelly, A Diplomatic 
Revolution, 27-34, 133-141. 
 
31 
 
Colonial administrators codified a strict set of emergency laws designed to facilitate 
counterinsurgency operations by restricting the population rather than the Security Forces. 
Greek Cypriot lawyers contested this legislation through rights activism. These lawyers 
lobbied colonial officers in Cyprus and anticolonial British politicians. Greek Cypriot lawyers 
worked to limit repressive regulations, defended accused insurgents in court, and documented 
British abuses for use in the Greek government’s two applications to the European 
Commission of Human Rights. The Greek government applications alleged that Britain had 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights. By contesting the extent and 
applicability of emergency laws, Greek Cypriot lawyers forced British officials to justify 
their actions. Although the lawyers sought to undermine British political legitimacy, colonial 
officials held the advantage—executive powers trumped legal advocacy. Despite Britain’s 
advantages, Greek Cypriot lawyers achieved some modest successes such as securing the 
right of detainees to legal counsel.  
The second chapter examines the influence of the Greek government’s applications to 
the European Commission of Human Rights on counterinsurgency practices in Cyprus and 
the colonial administration’s response to international scrutiny. The British government 
fiercely resisted Greece’s claims that the colonial administration had violated Cypriots’ 
human rights and won most of the legal debates before the European Commission. 
Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriot insurgent group, EOKA, launched a propaganda campaign to 
exploit these atrocity allegations. Colonial officers adapted to this increased public scrutiny 
through a counterpropaganda campaign designed to shape public perceptions of military 
operations. One new initiative was the establishment of a Special Investigations Group (SIG), 
which investigated allegations of abuse committed by British forces. SIG investigations, 
however, were often nothing more than exercises in whitewashing. SIG existed to defend 
British actions rather than investigate the validity of Greek Cypriot claims. 
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 The trend of British violence against civilians continues in chapter three, which 
analyzes the 1964 Radfan campaign. Conducted during the 1963-67 Aden Emergency in the 
rural Radfan area north of Aden city, the campaign purposefully targeted civilian livelihoods. 
Colonial administrators and military commanders wanted civilians to suffer because they 
believed that civilian suffering would force Radfan leaders to surrender. British operations 
therefore involved driving the population from their homes, burning food stores, destroying 
crops, and killing livestock. British actions created a humanitarian crisis as thousands of 
refugees fled the violence. The ICRC wished to provide humanitarian relief in the Radfan, 
but British officials prevented ICRC access to the region because they did not want the 
devastation to become widely known.  
Detainee abuse is the central issue of chapter four. From 1966-67, Amnesty 
International advocated for a government investigation of torture allegations in Aden. The 
ICRC, which had been visiting prisons in Aden since 1965, had grown increasingly 
suspicious that British officials were torturing prisoners during interrogation. Some officials 
at the Aden High Commission also uncovered evidence of abuse and pressured the High 
Commissioner to order an inquiry. Torture, afer all, violated the European Convention on 
Human Rights, the 1962 Aden Constitution, and British domestic law. When senior 
government officials proved unwilling to investigate the allegations, Amnesty dispatched an 
investigative team of its own. British officials only agreed to order an inquiry after Amnesty 
threatened to publicize their scandalous findings. The subsequent inquiry, led by former MP 
Sir Roderic Bowen, determined that abuse had “likely” occurred and specifically implicated 
only three men. Upon publication of the report’s very tactful semi-admission of abuse, 
Amnesty proclaimed that their efforts had succeeded. Amnesty did not pursue the matter 
further due to a leadership crisis within the organization. In essence, Amnesty International 
had scored a “victory” by bringing allegations into the open and forcing their investigation. 
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But the government did not punish any of the three men and although Bowen’s administrative 
recommendations resulted in more invasive Red Cross inspections, the Bowen inquiry did not 
stop torture.  Despite their limited success, rights activists had shaped counterinsurgency 
operations: Activists’ pressure compelled British officials to develop effective measures for 
hiding their abuses from scrutiny. Torture during counterinsurgency wars, however, did not 
end in Aden. 
Chapter five examines how the British Army responded to rights activism in Northern 
Ireland from the army’s initial deployment in 1969 to the 1976 adoption of a new strategy 
which sought to abandon many of the counterinsurgency practices used during the war’s first 
seven years.81 Although officials viewed the Northern Ireland conflict in a very different 
context than colonial wars, the military responded to rights-based criticisms in a manner 
similar to its reactions in Cyprus and Aden. That is, the army denied many allegations, tried 
to create a legally permissive environment for military operations, and shielded soldiers from 
criticism. But the results of rights activism in Northern Ireland differed from the Cyprus and 
Aden conflicts. Due to the specific context of Northern Ireland—the growing prominence of 
human rights in public affairs, the pervasive presence of television and newspaper media, 
Northern Ireland’s position as a constituent member of the United Kingdom, and the Irish 
Republican Army’s ability to strike the British homeland—rights activism resulted in a more 
open and frank discussion of counterinsurgency practices than in past campaigns. Unlike in 
earlier counterinsurgencies, rights activism during the Troubles led to numerous government 
inquiries into various aspects of the war’s conduct. Whereas the results of some inquiries 
sought to justify or downplay British actions, others dug deeper into the issues and evidence. 
The result was, for the first time, a substantive and persistent public debate over rights issues 
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related to detention and interrogation. Because rights abuses could no longer be hidden as 
easily as before, British forces came under increasing pressure to abandon practices such as 
brutal interrogations and restrain violence toward civilians. 
In Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland, rights activists’ motivations were not always 
altruistic. They nonetheless appeared on the counterinsurgency “battlefield” as actors who 
shaped the conduct of war. These actors left an ongoing legacy that has not been sufficiently 
incorporated into histories of human rights, empire, or warfare. Most studies of human rights 
and warfare in the twentieth century analyze the development of law or emphasize the effects 
of major conventional conflicts such as the First and Second World Wars.82 This study 
explores the intersections of human rights, empire, and warfare in the context of the Cold 
War and end of empire.83 Imperial legacies did not stop with the end of territorial control. 
Instead, ideas and practices of colonial counterinsurgency were adapted and applied in 
different circumstances. The Troubles in Northern Ireland and twenty-first century 
counterinsurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq therefore cannot be divorced from colonial 
experiences in Cyprus, Aden, or elsewhere. In contemporary conflicts, human rights and 
warfare remain intimately intertwined.
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CHAPTER 2:  
A LAWYERS’ WAR – COUNTERINSURGENCY AND THE CYPRUS BAR COUNCIL 
Introduction 
On February 27, 1957, as the war in Cyprus raged, the Labour Party peer Lord 
Strabolgi rose during a heated debate in the House of Lords. Criticizing Britain’s colonial 
government in Cyprus, Strabolgi demanded, “What sort of State is this? Is it a police State? Is 
it a State like that set up by Nazi Germany, or a State which is trying to copy the methods of 
Soviet Russia? I think that there is a very great need for the Government to investigate these 
allegations.”84 Put forward by a group of Greek Cypriot lawyers, the allegations in question 
criticized the use of emergency legislation to permit widespread press censorship, detention 
without trial, and abuse of prisoners in order to defeat the Greek Cypriot nationalist 
insurgency.85  
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These emergency regulations, which the Cyprus government adopted with the onset 
of violence in April 1955, were based heavily on those used to combat insurgencies in 
Malaya and Kenya.  This draconian legislation facilitated counterinsurgency operations—
particularly in the realm of intelligence collection via brutal interrogation measures. But in 
Cyprus, Greek Cypriot lawyers’ rights activism transformed the legal system into a battlefield 
in which both sides sought to manipulate the law to their advantage. Greek Cypriot lawyers 
resisted the effects of the emergency regulations by defending detainees in court. But they 
soon realized that courtroom advocacy did not accomplish enough in the face of a judicial 
system stacked in Britain’s favor. The lawyers then organized through their professional 
association, the Cyprus Bar Council, to protect detainees’ rights. They lobbied colonial 
officials to establish and enforce the right of detainees to legal representation and the 
confidentiality of attorney-client relationships; publicized British cruelty when such standards 
were not met, including through complaints to Members of Parliament in Britain; and 
documented cases of prisoner abuse for inclusion in international legal proceedings at the 
European Commission of Human Rights. These lawyers turned advocacy for detainee rights 
into a form of resistance to colonial authority which they framed as human rights activism.86 
This chapter examines the origins of the conflict and how the contest over emergency laws 
shaped counterinsurgency policies and practices up to the spring of 1957. 
Enosis and the Cyprus Insurgency 
The Cyprus insurgency began on April 1, 1955 over the Greek Cypriot desire for 
enosis, or union, with Greece. Led by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters, known 
by its Greek abbreviation “EOKA,” pro-enosis Greek Cypriots waged a nearly four-year war 
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against their British colonizers. When the war began, British forces were unprepared for a 
large-scale insurgency. After eight months of fighting, British officials had replaced an 
ineffective colonial governor with an experienced military commander who declared a state 
of emergency and enacted a harsh set of laws.  
British forces had a difficult time subduing the insurgency in part because the 
overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots supported enosis.87 As over three-fourths of the 
500,000 people living on Cyprus were Greek Cypriot, British forces faced a difficult task in 
subduing the insurgency. By 1957, violence between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities had erupted as Turkish Cypriots, who comprised approximately 18% of the 
island’s population, asserted their desire for partition of the island rather than union with 
Greece. As the conflict descended into civil war, Greece and Turkey grew increasingly 
assertive in seeking to protect the interests of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities, respectively.88  
The involvement of Greece and Turkey ensured that an international settlement would 
be required to end the conflict. The war drew to a close after Greece, Turkey, Britain, as well 
as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities agreed to the establishment of an independent 
Republic of Cyprus in which political power would be shared between Greek and Turkish 
Cypriots. In February 1959, these parties to the conflict signed the London and Zurich 
Agreements. The London Agreement ended the conflict between Britain, Greek Cypriots, and 
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Turkish Cypriots. Britain, Greece, and Turkey signed the Zurich Agreement, which stipulated 
that neither union nor partition could occur without Greek and Turkish concurrence.89  
Enosis supporters did not achieve their goal of unity with Greece, but they waged an 
effective insurgency that killed 371 British soldiers. Organized as semi-independent cells, 
EOKA units conducted assassinations, bombings, ambushes, and ran a complex propaganda 
operation to maintain support for the war among Greek Cypriot civilians. Although British 
forces developed a sophisticated understanding of EOKA’s organizational structure, when the 
war began British troops had a difficult time countering the insurgency. In November 1955, 
with violence mounting, the Cyprus government declared a state of emergency.90 
The insurgency gathered momentum throughout the summer of 1955. EOKA attacked 
Greek Cypriot police officers, who Grivas deemed anti-nationalist “traitors.” Special Branch 
also emerged as a key EOKA target due to its intelligence collection mission. Without good 
intelligence, government forces would not be able to counter EOKA attacks. The Cyprus 
government, headed by Governor Sir Richard Armitage, had not expected a coordinated 
insurgent campaign. With the outbreak of violence, the British army arranged for Sir Gerald 
Templer, the officer who had served as High Commissioner and military commander during 
the successful counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, to visit Cyprus and assess the 
situation. Templer felt that Armitage’s government was not taking the situation seriously 
enough and criticized them for carrying on with “business as usual.” He decided that 
Armitage was incapable of handling the situation. Templer also discovered that Special 
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Branch, the organization responsible for intelligence collection, was woefully undermanned 
and unprepared. Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden shared Templer’s frustrations. Foreign 
Secretary Harold Macmillan likewise argued that “we cannot afford to give any impression 
that we are on the run in Cyprus” because of the island’s importance in British Middle East 
policy. Without the island as a base, Britain’s ability to project power in the Middle East—a 
vital region due to its oil reserves—would be severely compromised.91 
After Templer’s visit, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd decided to replace Sir 
Richard Armitage with someone deemed more capable of combating the insurgency. The 
sense in Whitehall was that the situation demanded a “military man” to coordinate political 
and military activities as Templer had in Malaya. Field Marshal Sir John Harding was the 
logical choice. At the time of his October 1955 appointment as Governor of Cyprus, Harding 
was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff—the highest position in the British military. He 
was one of the most senior officers in the armed forces and an experienced commander. In a 
previous assignment as Commander-in-Chief, Far East Land Forces, he had worked with 
Templer during the Malayan Emergency. According to one scholar, the idea that terrorists 
and insurgents should be dealt with harshly “was not just an assumption of Harding’s, it was 
one of his deepest feelings.”92 Harding approached his work in Cyprus with a hard-nosed 
determination to eradicate the insurgency through whatever means necessary.  
While Harding understood that military action alone would not solve the conflict, he 
believed that a political solution could only be reached if British forces first destroyed 
EOKA. His objective was to obtain a settlement in which Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed 
on a new constitutional framework of local self-government under British colonial rule.93 
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This conviction was based on two assumptions: Harding thought that only a minority of the 
Greek Cypriot community actively supported EOKA and that it maintained its influence by 
intimidating the rest of the more moderate population. To eliminate EOKA’s hold, Harding 
planned to capture or kill EOKA fighters while coercing the population into submission. To 
do so, Harding determined that “it will be essential to employ the sternest and most drastic 
forms of deterrent open to us.” He concluded that “one of the results of the various measures 
such as collective fines, curfews and other restrictions that have recently been increased is the 
restoration of respect” for British authority.94 If EOKA could intimidate the Greek Cypriot 
population into submission, so could the British.  
When Harding decided to declare a state of emergency in November 1955, Colonial 
Secretary Lennox-Boyd agreed but also sounded a cautionary note. Lennox-Boyd encouraged 
Harding, writing that “important though it is to seize any chance of a political solution [to the 
conflict], you must not let this hope interfere with firm action.” Lennox-Boyd concurred with 
Harding’s wish to eliminate EOKA, but worried that tough measures could cause public 
controversy that he was keen to avoid. Even so, Lennox-Boyd had known Harding for many 
years and trusted his judgment. He authorized Harding to use collective punishments and 
order judicial whipping of juvenile offenders, but urged Harding to be careful about using 
these powers. Lennox-Boyd did not want the Cyprus conflict to cause public controversy. He 
told Harding that “as you know, some forms of collective punishment have an ugly ring 
here.” Collective fines and punitive seizures of civilians’ property would “present real 
political difficulties” for the Colonial Office. Harding reassured Lennox-Boyd that he would 
“proceed as discreetly as the situation permits,” and declared a state of emergency in Cyprus 
on November 26. Harding knew that he had Lennox-Boyd’s support in taking tough 
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measures, but he also knew that there were limits as to what politicians in Britain would 
allow.95  
 
The Emergency Regulations 
Under the state of emergency, Harding’s powers were nearly absolute. He enacted 76 
new laws that permitted security forces—a term that British officials used in reference to both 
police and military units—to wield significant coercive powers. Security personnel were 
authorized to arrest without warrant any person believed to have “acted or was about to act, 
in a manner prejudicial to public safety or public order, or who had committed or was about 
to commit an offence.”96 Any officer in the rank of major or higher could approve the 
detention of an arrested person for up to 28 days without charges. Harding had the authority 
to sign a detention order extending any individual’s imprisonment indefinitely and to deport 
anyone from the colony. Based on a similar measure passed during the Malayan Emergency, 
the Cyprus legislation also designated certain “protected areas” off limits to all Cypriots 
except those with special government passes. Anyone in a “protected area” who fled from 
security forces could be shot.97 Harding intended to use the emergency legislation regime as a 
tool for facilitating the collection of intelligence and for separating the Cypriot population 
from the insurgents by disrupting communication and supply between insurgents and civilian 
supporters.98   
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These regulations severely hampered civilians’ freedom of movement and allowed the 
government to censor information available to the populace. Cypriots had to register with the 
government and obtain an identity card. Soldiers and police could demand to see this identity 
card at any time—failure to produce it when ordered could result in a fine or imprisonment. 
District Commissioners could ban civilians from congregating in public spaces, close shops, 
and requisition property. Censorship regulations permitted government censors to regulate 
mail sent to or from any person in the colony and to control the content of radio broadcasts 
and newspaper reports. Propaganda—such as signs, slogans, graffiti, banners, and flags 
bearing political messages—was prohibited.99 The Limassol District Commissioner also 
outlawed the use of bicycles without a permit because EOKA fighters often used bicycles as 
“get-away vehicles.” Other District Commissioners followed suit.100 Bicycle bans targeted 
teenagers and young adults—the primary demographic involved in EOKA attacks.101  
Harding authorized the use of curfews and collective punishment as means of 
coercing local populations into submission. Curfews restricted movement in towns and could 
last for several hours or several weeks. An army report completed at the end of the conflict 
concluded that “by varying the forms and timings of the curfews, it was possible to keep 
EOKA leaders guessing and to disrupt their plans.” But the report also asserted that punitive 
curfews “paid little dividend and tended to inhibit the police in their follow up action.”102 
Even so, security forces often employed curfews as a form of collective punishment. Other 
collective punishments included fines levied on entire towns and collected in the form of a 
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tax paid by each family or the closure of businesses and markets for a period of time 
determined by colonial administrators.103  
In a move which shocked many Greek Cypriots, Harding approved the use of judicial 
whipping for youths up to age 18 as a form of punishment for minors involved in “terrorist 
activities” such as the dissemination of propaganda or participation in civil disturbances. This 
measure meant that judges could sentence minors to a certain number of strokes with a cane 
rather than imprisonment. “Police Force Order No. 86” governed the application of whipping, 
instructing officers that “a light rod or cane should be used and the blows should be delivered 
on the bare buttocks. The whipping should be carried out in the presence of a second police 
officer who should, whenever possible, be an officer.”104 No more than twelve strokes could 
be applied.105 Harding believed that judicial whipping would offer a more humane 
punishment for juveniles than imprisonment and saw no problem with implementing it, as it 
was a common punishment in British public schools when he was a child. Greek Cypriots, 
however, viewed the practice as repugnant. A group of lawyers later complained that 
although whipping was employed in Britain, “in no circumstances can this practice be 
tolerated in countries of Graeco-Latin culture.”106 Although Harding sought to implement 
tough measures, he would soon realize that whipping was counterproductive. 
Harding also used the emergency regulations as a tool for improving the ability of 
British forces to conduct the vital but difficult task of collecting intelligence on EOKA. 
Finding and neutralizing EOKA fighters proved a less-than-straightforward task for the 
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security forces. The authority to impose curfews and bicycle bans limited insurgents’ 
freedom of movement. The designation of “protected areas” permitted British troops to use 
lethal violence with few restraints in mountainous areas where insurgents often sought 
sanctuary. Furthermore, frequent patrolling, house searches, and checkpoints for searching 
vehicle traffic would limit EOKA’s ability to move around the island and hopefully lead to 
arrests, but security forces required actionable intelligence to identify, track down, capture 
and interrogate or ultimately kill EOKA fighters.107  
Although it was vital to military success, the security forces were initially unprepared 
for intelligence collection and analysis. Conflicts arose between representatives from Special 
Branch, the primary intelligence organization in Cyprus, and army liaisons, who were both 
assigned at the district level to ensure proper synchronization of intelligence work and 
military operations. Disagreements over decision-making authority were exacerbated by 
disparities in rank—the army often assigned officers to these positions, whereas most 
divisional Special Branch representatives were sergeants. Moreover, Special Branch had been 
reinforced at the outbreak of the Emergency with officers from abroad who had little 
knowledge of local affairs. They lacked the local informant networks necessary for effective 
intelligence collection. EOKA quickly recognized the importance of experienced Special 
Branch officers and targeted them for assassination. Special Branch informants from within 
the Greek Cypriot population also became targets for assassination or intimidation.108  
Due to the lack of informant networks, interrogation emerged as the most important 
source of intelligence. Information gathered from questioning suspects could lead to further 
arrests, seizure of supply caches, or the prevention of attacks. Suspects who confessed under 
interrogation to having committed crimes could face trial and punishment, but they would 
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also sometimes turn against their fellow insurgents, perhaps in exchange for a reduced 
sentence or a pardon. British forces created plainclothes “Q-Patrols” in which these former 
insurgents patrolled with British police and soldiers to identify and capture EOKA suspects. 
These units worked in close cooperation with Special Branch and army intelligence.109  
Despite the abundance of emergency laws which regulated in minute detail who could 
legally ride a bicycle and outlined specific procedures for how youths were to be whipped 
and how many strokes could be applied, the Cyprus government never produced specific 
guidance concerning which techniques were permissible during interrogation. In April 1956, 
Harding considered issuing specific instructions. He suggested that “we should consider 
sending out a confidential instruction to those directly concerned on what is and is not 
permissible in the interrogation of suspects.”110 But the Commissioner of Police, Director of 
Intelligence, and the heads of Special Branch and the Cyprus Police Criminal Investigation 
Division (CID) unanimously opposed the idea of issuing written instructions to interrogators. 
These officials believed that coercive interrogation was the most effective method of 
intelligence collection and did not want to inhibit the flow of valuable information by 
cracking down on abusive interrogators. The failure to articulate such restrictions ensured 
that the limits of the law remained ambiguous. This ambiguity permitted interrogators to use 
whatever methods they deemed necessary as long as they did not leave physical evidence that 
they had harmed a detainee.111  
 Senior officials knew of these brutal methods, but maintained the public pretense that 
such treatment was forbidden and therefore did not occur. Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-
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Boyd admitted that he knew some interrogations were conducted with “questioning of 
unusual rigour,” but suggested keeping the information from emerging in the public 
spotlight.112 With Lennox-Boyd concerned that evidence of torture would embarrass British 
officials, Harding insisted that Cyprus Police “methods of interrogation follow the normal 
UK pattern. All forms of physical violence are forbidden by the Criminal Law and Police 
Force orders.” 113 Although Lennox-Boyd, Harding, and other senior Cyprus security officers 
knew that interrogators were using physical violence against detainees, they chose to quietly 
tolerate such brutality rather than face the embarrassment of a public scandal. 
Due to the operational advantages of ambiguous interrogation instructions and 
restrictions on Cypriots’ freedom of movement, the emergency laws gave the security forces 
room to maneuver. The wide-ranging powers of arrest and detention authorized by the 
emergency regulations helped to offset the challenges of intelligence collection by allowing 
security forces to apprehend suspects and hold them for questioning with few legal 
constraints. Soldiers and police could more easily track insurgent groups in “protected areas” 
where few civilians were permitted. Restrictions on civilian movement through curfews, 
bicycle bans, and the requirement that all Cypriots obtain an identity card enabled security 
forces to disrupt EOKA communications and interdict supply lines. The emergency 
regulations were therefore more than simply a tool of repression—they facilitated 
counterinsurgency operations by manipulating the law to the colonial government’s 
advantage. 
By 1956, the military campaign had begun to turn in Britain’s favor. In June, the army 
nearly captured EOKA leader George Grivas. Operation Pepperpot resulted in the capture of 
several weapons caches, the annihilation of two EOKA operational cells, and had inflicted 
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heavy casualties on a third. In December, British forces captured 52 guerrillas, including one 
of Grivas’ couriers and his second-in-command. Interrogations after each arrest operation 
generated new intelligence, which was then used to arrest more insurgents 114 The war was 
going well for Harding.  
Although the emergency regulations provided British forces with wide-ranging 
coercive powers, the rule of law technically remained in place, even if the law had been 
distorted to suit the demands of the counterinsurgency campaign. Officials revoked basic 
legal rights such as due process, the right to move freely, and the right to freedom of speech. 
Other traditional tenets of the justice system were ignored or reversed, such as the change to 
criminal proceedings on capital offenses that shifted the burden of proof from the prosecution 
to the defense. All of these changes had occurred legally—that is, at the governor’s discretion 
and with the Colonial Secretary’s approval. But throughout all of this, emergency laws never 
officially allowed the use of violence against a prisoner during interrogation. Unofficially, 
senior officials including Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd and Governor Harding knew that 
such brutality often took place. Despite the permissiveness of the emergency legal regime, 
security forces still had to obey its dictates. If members of the security forces were caught 
violating the law, they could face punishment. Any such violations would also embarrass the 
colonial government. Pro-EOKA lawyers sought to exploit this situation by using the colonial 
legal system to challenge the emergency regulations regime.  
EOKA’s Lawyers 
Historians understand colonial legal systems as pluralistic spaces in which law often 
applies to different groups in different ways. Various actors—including imperial agents, 
cultural intermediaries, and colonized subjects—could use this system to assert agency and 
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contest the colonial order through legal processes. Colonial legal regimes therefore operated 
with a degree of flexibility and room for negotiation between colonizer and colonized. In 
these systems, the application of law was always contested and based on mixtures of 
metropolitan and local ideas.115 Colonial powers relied on “imperial intermediaries” to 
navigate these legal spaces. Angered by Britain’s refusal to grant self-determination to Greek 
Cypriots and the subsequent enactment of Harding’s harsh emergency regulations regime, 
many Greek Cypriot lawyers chose to resist colonial rule. But the lawyers’ initial forays into 
the courtroom battlefield exposed the extent to which emergency laws had tilted the legal 
system in the colonial government’s favor. As a result, a group of Greek Cypriot lawyers 
mobilized their professional association, the Cyprus Bar Council, to disrupt brutal 
interrogation practices, protect prisoners’ rights, and publicize security force abuses.  
Before the insurgency, these lawyers often played key roles in the administration of 
law and order on the island. In fact, the colonial government would have been hard pressed to 
function without them. Colonial authorities used intermediaries’ local connections and social 
status to reinforce imperial administrative structures. Cypriot lawyers filled positions as 
government attorneys and acted as civic leaders. Many served as town mayors. A select few 
were appointed to positions on the colony’s Legislative or Executive Councils, in which 
select colonial elites advised the governor on local affairs. In exchange for their cooperation 
with colonial rulers, local intermediaries generally benefited from imperial connections to 
increase their economic status or social prestige.116  
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John Clerides, his son Glafkos, and Stelios Pavlides exemplified this class of imperial 
elites and became three of the most influential lawyers during the Emergency. All three had 
studied law in London at Gray's Inn. From 1946-49 John Clerides served as Mayor of 
Nicosia. In 1952 the Governor appointed him to the Executive Council. Clerides was also one 
of a handful of Cypriots to be named a Queen’s Counsel and awarded the title of Commander 
of the Order of the British Empire.117 Glafkos served in the Royal Air Force during World 
War II before returning to Cyprus in 1951 after completing his studies at Gray’s Inn.118 
Pavlides joined the Cyprus Government in 1916 as a civil servant and rapidly rose through 
the ranks, eventually receiving an appointment to the Legislative Council. From 1944-52, 
Pavlides served as Attorney-General of Cyprus. He was the first and only Cypriot to hold the 
post under British rule. Pavlides was also a Queen’s Counsel and a Companion of the Order 
of St. Michael and St. George.119 These lawyers and others like them had much to gain from 
Cyprus’ imperial connection with Britain, but British actions had alienated them from their 
imperial masters. 
To many Greek Cypriot lawyers, the draconian nature of emergency laws violated 
basic notions of justice that formed a core component of the “civilized” British self-image. 
“British justice is fair in England, but not abroad,” recalled Renos Lyssiotis, a lawyer who 
returned to Cyprus in 1955 after being called to the Bar at Gray’s Inn. To Lyssiotis, the 
emergency regulations perverted hallowed principles of “British justice”—innocence until 
proven guilty, the liberty of speaking and associating freely, and respect for the rights of the 
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individual citizen. In its place was erected a system of repression that undermined the most 
fundamental elements of human dignity and permitted the government to wield nearly 
totalitarian powers. After the insurgency began, Lyssiotis started defending EOKA fighters as 
an assistant to John and Glafkos Clerides. But Lyssiotis also supported EOKA by running a 
youth propaganda group of about 200 students who painted pro-EOKA slogans on buildings 
and walls and distributed leaflets.120 Another lawyer to return from Gray’s Inn, Lellos 
Demetriades, also joined EOKA and defended insurgents in court. Many lawyers who 
defended EOKA fighters were formally inducted into the organization, but kept this 
affiliation secret to avoid arrest. These and other Greek Cypriot barristers turned against 
British rule because of the contradictions that they saw between British ideals and British 
practice. They had learned “British justice” in the UK before returning home only to find 
political frustration. At a time when other British colonies such as India and Palestine had 
gained independence, many Greek Cypriots expected that their turn to assert their right to 
national self-determination would come next. But Britain’s insistence on maintaining colonial 
rule in Cyprus and the repressive legislation which followed EOKA violence appeared to 
these lawyers as hypocritical.121 Ironically, in the minds of many Greek Cypriot lawyers, 
British officials’ repressive reassertion of colonial rule damaged the very credibility that 
those officials hoped to maintain.  
Although the judicial system functioned throughout the Cyprus conflict, security 
imperatives often trumped legal procedure. Emergency legislation created a system of Special 
Courts to hear insurgency-related cases. British expatriate judges administered the courts. 
Single judges would rule in juryless trials, but death sentences were heard by three-judge 
panels at the Supreme Court in sessions chaired by the island’s Chief Justice. The trappings 
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of court procedure remained the same during the Emergency as in peacetime: Defendants 
could be represented by a barrister, evidence was submitted, prosecutors and defense 
counsels argued the merits of the case, and the judge came to a decision. But Harding had the 
power to order the immediate arrest and indefinite detention of anyone found not guilty in the 
courtroom. As the Manchester Guardian reported in July 1957, such arbitrary power 
fomented “public resentment” toward the government that was “stirred up by an apparent 
injustice.” Often, those found not guilty only to be immediately rearrested and imprisoned 
under a detention order were EOKA operatives who were not convicted either due to a legal 
technicality or lack of sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction.122 Greek Cypriot barristers 
were at a profound disadvantage when defending EOKA fighters in court. 
The EOKA lawyers’ highest-profile initial forays into the Special Court system ended 
in failure. The cases of Michelakis Karaolis and Andreas Demetriou seized the attention of 
many Greek Cypriots because they were the first capital punishment cases related to the 
Emergency. Demetriou’s case was straightforward. He was caught after shooting and 
wounding a British civilian businessman. In normal circumstances Demetriou would have 
faced charges of attempted murder that did not carry the death penalty, but under the 
emergency regulations he was subject to the death penalty.123 He was convicted and hanged. 
The Karaolis case, however, was a different matter. The prosecution alleged that Karaolis 
killed a police sergeant in October 1955. Defense attorneys Stelios Pavlides and Glafkos 
Clerides argued that it was a case of mistaken identity and submitted evidence that Karaolis 
had an alibi—he claimed that he was at his uncle's house when the murder occurred.124 
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Karaolis was found guilty, but his lawyers appealed to the Cyprus Supreme Court and then to 
the Privy Council. The Privy Council dismissed Pavlides’s and Clerides’s appeal. Harding, 
who had the power to issue a reprieve, decided “that the law shall take its course.” Karaolis 
was executed in April 1956.125 Regardless of the outcome of the case, Harding was 
committed to keeping Karaolis in custody. He wrote to Lennox-Boyd that if the conviction 
were overturned, he would have Karaolis rearrested and detained indefinitely, as was 
Harding’s prerogative under emergency laws. Even if Pavlides and Clerides had won the 
case, their client would not have gone free. The lawyers were battling against a system that 
inherently favored the British side.126 
Occasionally, Greek Cypriot lawyers obtained favorable verdicts through innovative 
legal arguments. The case of Michael Rossides illustrates the impact that Greek Cypriot 
lawyers could have. British forces arrested Rossides for killing one of the two soldiers who 
died as retribution for the Karaolis and Demetriou executions. Rossides confessed to the 
killing and was sentenced to death. His lawyers, Michael Triantafyllides, Stelios Pavlides, 
and Glafkos Clerides, turned to a common law precedent. They argued that Rossides had only 
killed the British soldier because other EOKA members threatened to kill Rossides if he 
failed to follow their orders. In a clemency submission to the governor, Clerides and 
Triantafyllides cited two sources of common law precedents which acknowledged that “if a 
man were placed in the agonising situation of having to choose between his own life and 
somebody else's and preferred his own no capital sentence would be carried out.” The 
argument succeeded—Harding commuted Rossides’s sentence from death to life in prison. 
Despite Cyprus’s repressive emergency legislation, Harding backed down when faced with a 
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legal argument based on English common law.127 Greek Cypriot lawyers used the rule of law 
to their advantage. But even in this situation, a defendant’s fate ultimately rested in Harding’s 
hands.  
Greek Cypriot barristers realized that the legal system was stacked against them, but 
their engagement in the courtroom helped them identify two British vulnerabilities that they 
could exploit. Colonial officials were averse to public criticism and judges proved willing to 
enforce the law regarding the use of coercion during interrogation—that is, coercion was 
illegal and any confession obtained through intimidation or violence was inadmissible in 
court. Executions of EOKA fighters inflamed Greek Cypriot public opinion and sympathetic 
foreign audiences in countries such as Greece and Egypt. During the month following the 
executions, the Foreign Office received nine petitions from organizations in Greece and one 
from Argentina denouncing the death sentences as well as several statements of support for 
the Greek Cypriot struggle from civic organizations in Egypt.128 The outrage that the Karaolis 
and Demetriou executions incited across the island and overseas demonstrated to that every 
execution would cause intense public outcry.129 Harding’s decision to execute Karaolis and 
Demetriou also invited criticism from home. In March 1956—one month before Karaolis’s 
execution—the House of Commons voted to suspend the death penalty within the UK. The 
resolution stated that “this House believes that the death penalty for murder no longer accords 
with the needs or the true interests of a civilised society, and calls upon Her Majesty's 
Government to introduce forthwith legislation for its abolition or for its suspension.”130 The 
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Commons’ decision put the Cyprus government on the defensive. Concerned that journalists 
or politicians in Britain might criticize Harding’s use of the death penalty, public relations 
officers in Cyprus designed talking points for the press which emphasized that “there is no 
inconsistency between the execution of Karaolis and the recent resolution in the House of 
Commons on the abolition of the death penalty.” The rationale was that “even when enacted 
into law, [the resolution] will have no validity outside the United Kingdom.” Harding had the 
authority to “take into account local circumstances in deciding how far he should go” in 
restricting capital punishment.131 The combination of Greek Cypriot outrage at the Karaolis 
and Demetriou executions and the Cyprus government’s response to the House of Commons 
vote on capital punishment in the UK revealed a key British vulnerability—public criticism.  
Although emergency laws permitted security forces to exercise wide-ranging powers, 
these laws did not permit the use of violence during interrogation, a fact which led EOKA 
lawyers to attack the admissibility of prisoner confessions as evidence during trials. 
According to one expatriate British judge in Cyprus, Justice Bernard Shaw, if a defense 
attorney alleged that a prisoner confessed as a result of any form of coercion, the law required 
Crown prosecutors to prove that the confession was “free and voluntary.” The burden of 
proof therefore lay with the Crown, whereas the defense needed only to establish “reasonable 
doubt” that the confession may have been obtained through coercion.132 In one such case, 
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EOKA fighter Nicos Sampson was arrested in September 1956 for the murder of a police 
sergeant. After arresting him, police officers told Sampson to remove his shoes and socks—
ostensibly to prevent an escape attempt—and forced him to lie in an open truck bed as a cold, 
steady rain poured down on him. Sampson only confessed to the crime after enduring this 
treatment. According to the head of the Cyprus Police Criminal Investigation Division, “the 
Special Branch man had taken [Sampson’s] original confession down in a way that would not 
stand up in court.” Sampson’s lawyers successfully argued that Special Branch had beaten 
Sampson’s confession out of him.133 The judge, Justice Bernard Shaw, concluded that 
Sampson may have admitted to his crime out of fear that he might receive further poor 
treatment. These circumstances were enough to establish reasonable doubt. 134 Greek Cypriot 
lawyers frequently succeeded in having confessions ruled inadmissible on these grounds.135 
After the declaration of a state of emergency, British security forces operated in an 
environment in which the Cyprus government could arbitrarily confer additional powers upon 
them with few legal restrictions. Greek Cypriot lawyers saw the emergency legislation as a 
sham, and they were not alone in that sentiment. In a protest letter, a group of Greek Cypriot 
mayors criticized the laws for being “enacted with utter disregard to the basic principles of 
Justice and human rights.” They went on to deride the colonial government for granting “a 
deceptive cloak of legality to the virtually criminal excesses of the Security Forces.”136 But 
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EOKA lawyers also sensed an opportunity to defend prisoners from punishment and 
undermine the impunity with which the Cyprus government could operate under emergency 
laws. In doing so, Greek Cypriot barristers turned the courts into part of the 
counterinsurgency battlefield. But they also realized that the courtroom was not the only 
place in which they should fight on behalf of prisoners. These lawyers found that they could 
pressure British officials by targeting the government’s aversion to public scrutiny. Toward 
this end, they transformed their professional association, the Cyprus Bar Council, into an 
activist organization dedicated to protecting prisoners’ rights to legal representation and 
publicly criticizing the excesses of the emergency regulations—including coercive 
interrogations.   
The Bar Council Goes to War 
Greek Cypriot lawyers used their professional association, the Cyprus Bar Council, to 
organize resistance to the emergency regulations by protecting detainees’ rights to legal 
counsel, criticizing the colonial government for tolerating torture during interrogations, and 
lobbying politicians in Britain to oppose the Cyprus government’s repressive policies. To 
ensure that detainees had access to legal representation, Bar Council lawyers negotiated a 
memorandum of agreement with the government and ensured that security forces followed 
the terms of the memorandum. 
The Cyprus Bar Council existed as a forum for professional discussions and as a body 
for regulating professional standards and conduct. According to the 1955 Advocates Law, 
which was enacted before the Emergency, all practicing barristers were required to join the 
Bar Council. It oversaw five local Bar Associations, each representing one of Cyprus’ five 
districts. Despite its formal independence from the government as a professional society, the 
Bar Council maintained a close association with the colonial administration. The Solicitor-
General had a seat on the Council and the Attorney-General served as the Council’s titular 
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head. The Council was led by a committee elected by the Council members. The committee 
included 15 barristers, including two members each from Nicosia, Paphos, Limassol, 
Famagusta, Kyrenia, and Larnaca, as well as three at-large members.137 But the majority of 
Bar Council members—and particularly its leadership committee—were Greek Cypriots with 
pro-EOKA sympathies. The Bar Council’s close association with the Cyprus government 
meant that the Bar Council’s Greek Cypriot leaders were well-placed to lobby British 
officials.138  
Although the Cyprus Bar Council also included Turkish Cypriot members, they did 
not take part in the organization’s activism because they objected to Greek Cypriot political 
aspirations. After the outbreak of violence in April 1955, Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük 
told the governor that “any direct or indirect means of bringing about Enosis will meet, as 
hitherto, with the bitter and determined opposition of the Cypriot Turks.”139 In general, 
Turkish Cypriots supported the Cyprus government against EOKA—a trend that continued in 
the courtroom. Turkish Cypriot barristers often worked on behalf of the colonial government 
as prosecutors and civil servants. Rauf Denktaş, for instance, studied in London at Lincoln’s 
Inn before joining the colonial administration as a Crown Counsel. During the insurgency, he 
prosecuted EOKA fighters and, in 1958, founded a Turkish Cypriot resistance group which 
fought against EOKA.140 In late 1956, as Greek Cypriot barristers began to transform the Bar 
Council into a platform for activism, Turkish Cypriot members withdrew from Bar Council 
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proceedings altogether.141 The Bar Council’s Greek Cypriot leadership claimed that the 
organization was a professional association without political affiliation, but the absence of 
Turkish Cypriot involvement indicated the extent to which the Bar Council had become an 
activist organization supporting the enosis struggle.142  
The Bar Council sprung to action to protect detainees’ rights to legal representation, 
but also to gain advantages for EOKA. As British forces began to strike back at EOKA 
throughout 1956, the number of detainees rose steadily from 169 in March to 447 in August 
and 623 by November. At the end of the year, there were 735 detainees in British custody.143 
As the number of arrests increased, lawyers demanded to know who had been detained, 
where they were held, and how they had been treated. As soon as barristers could obtain this 
information, they could take the necessary legal steps to best protect their clients from an 
emergency legal system that was stacked in Britain’s favor. But there were other, military 
advantages to be accrued from ensuring that prisoners could hold confidential discussions 
with their legal representatives. EOKA commanders wanted to know who had been captured 
or killed in order to reorganize and reconstitute their forces. Lawyers could gather this 
information in their confidential meetings with captured insurgents and pass it on to EOKA 
leaders. For these lawyers, protecting detainees’ rights went hand-in-hand with aiding EOKA. 
 To many attorneys the best way to protect detainees’ rights and support EOKA was 
by ensuring that the government respected prisoners’ right to legal representation. But British 
forces grew suspicious of the lawyers’ motivations and often prevented or delayed attorneys 
from speaking with detainees. Denying a prisoner the right to see an attorney was illegal 
                                                            
141 TNA FCO 141/4593 Notes from Meeting at Government House with Representatives of the Bar Council, 
December 17, 1958. 
 
142 TNA FCO 141/4360 Notes of a Meeting Held at Government House at 4 P.M. on Thursday, the 3rd of 
January, 1957. 
 
143 French, Fighting EOKA, 140–141. 
 
59 
 
under ordinary Cyprus law—emergency regulations had not changed this fact. As a result, 
Stelios Pavlides and George Chryssafinis, the Bar Council leadership committee’s Nicosia 
representatives, complained to the Attorney-General’s office in February 1956. Deputy 
Attorney-General Nedjati Munir responded by reaffirming the right of detainees to consult an 
attorney. To prevent security forces from obstructing this right in the future, Munir informed 
the Chief of Staff that “I think this principle [of detainees’ right to legal representation] and 
the statutory provisions in our law, should be drawn to the attention of Area and Unit 
Commanders.”144 On February 18, Brigadier J.S. Aldridge, the Chief of Staff, circulated a 
memorandum to his subordinate commanders conveying Munir’s instruction that arrested 
persons had the right to see an attorney if the detainee wished. Aldridge also ordered that 
when an interview between an attorney and detainee occurred, guards were to locate 
themselves within eyesight of the meeting, but not within range of hearing. This procedure 
was intended to satisfy the right of confidentiality in attorney-client discussions. The 
memorandum further proclaimed that powers of arrest and detention without warrant “do 
NOT override the ordinary law of the colony in one important respect, namely that any 
arrested person must be given reasonable facilities for obtaining legal advice.”  Soldiers and 
police who inhibited this right were therefore acting “contrary to the spirit of the law.”145  
Munir’s response to the Bar Council complaint underscores British officials’ complex 
and somewhat contradictory conceptualization of the rule of law during the insurgency. On 
the one hand, Munir asserted the primacy of law by reminding security force units that 
detainees had a right to legal representation. He wrote that “it is a fundamental principle of 
British justice, almost dating back to the Magna Carta, that a person in custody must be given 
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reasonable facilities for obtaining legal advice and for arranging his defence.” Munir insisted 
that the denial of an arrested person’s right to meet with a lawyer was illegal and could result 
in charges against the government. But on the other hand, Munir acknowledged that the 
EOKA insurgency permitted deviations from “normal” principles of justice. He admitted that 
“it is in the public interest to stretch, and in some cases to modify, some of the basic 
principles which we all like to see operating in normal peaceful conditions.”146 Like many 
officials, Munir wanted to uphold the law but was willing to compromise on legal principles 
in order to end the insurgency. The survival of the state mattered more than justice for the 
state’s subjects.147 The subsequent August 17, 1956 memorandum on detainee legal 
representation reflected these competing priorities.  
The August 17 memorandum amounted to a government guarantee that detainees 
could exercise their rights to legal representation, but it also included a compromise which 
permitted Special Branch officers to interrogate detainees before the detainee met with a 
lawyer. Chryssafinis, Pavlides, the Assistant Commissioner of Police, a representative from 
the Chief of Staff’s office, and Munir confirmed the details of their February discussion. In 
addition, the Assistant Commissioner of Police agreed provide a liaison officer at a central 
office available to answer all calls and inquiries from lawyers regarding a detainee’s 
whereabouts and legal representation. From the perspective of the Greek Cypriot lawyers, 
this memorandum clarified and codified some important detainee rights, but did not go far 
enough. To collect vital, time-sensitive intelligence, security force commanders believed it 
necessary to interrogate detainees during the first 48 hours following capture. They insisted 
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that lawyers should only be allowed to meet with detainees after interrogation was complete. 
The memorandum also included an ambiguous caveat: “there may be cases where it will not 
be practicable” to allow advocates to interview detainee clients. Security forces could still 
prevent an attorney-client interview if the officer-in-charge of a police division believed that 
an interview “would be likely to hinder urgent enquiries or to prevent further arrests.”148 
Although the August agreement curbed some government powers for arrest and detention, 
officials retained the power to limit lawyers’ access to clients based on suspicion rather than 
evidence. 
The compromise inherent in the August 17 memorandum represented an attempt by 
British officials to balance their concerns with upholding the rule of law and maintaining 
security, but undermined both. By granting interrogators 48 hours in which to question 
detainees, detainees were expected to provide information before receiving legal counsel and 
potentially incriminate themselves. This measure undermined the perception of “fairness” 
that was a hallmark of how British and Cypriot lawyers perceived the judicial system. The 
48-hour rule suggested that the preservation of standard legal proceedings were of secondary 
importance to security considerations—the rule of law only mattered insofar as it supported 
counterinsurgency operations. On the other hand, by permitting detainees to have legal 
representation at all allowed their lawyers to use the legal system against the security forces. 
Lawyers’ accusations that interrogators had abused detainees during questioning hampered 
the security effort by making convictions more difficult to obtain. Despite the memorandum’s 
contradictions, Greek Cypriot attorneys used the terms of the document to their advantage. 
Bar Council barristers successfully attacked the government for holding detainees 
longer than permitted under the August 17 agreement and often insinuated that interrogators 
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abused prisoners to obtain confessions. When they met with detainees, lawyers sometimes 
passed messages from EOKA and could determine what information the detainee provided to 
the British during interrogation. The fact that the lawyers often claimed that their detainee 
clients had been abused in custody succeeded in reducing the number of cases which went to 
trial. The Attorney-General’s office would not press charges if a detainee was held in Special 
Branch custody for too long because of the likelihood that defense attorneys would claim that 
interrogators had coerced the detainee into confessing. The government could have countered 
these allegations by ordering interrogators to appear in court as witnesses. But rather than 
order interrogators to testify, the head of CID noted, British officials “dared not make a case” 
due to the potential risk to interrogators. Security officials were concerned that interrogators 
would be in danger of assassination if EOKA discovered personal information or travel 
schedules, such as the dates and times when interrogators would make court appearances.149  
Some security officials resisted the rules outlined in the August 17 memorandum by 
simply ignoring them. When this occurred, Bar Council lawyers lobbied Attorney-General 
Sir James Henry. Throughout the conflict, Henry regularly received complaints from Greek 
Cypriot lawyers when British forces failed to follow the memorandum’s guidelines. In 
October 1956, British paratroopers captured 31 insurgents including the leaders of two 
EOKA cells and members of four additional groups.150 Following the operation, security 
forces denied lawyers Demetrios Demetriades, Stelios Pavlides, and Michael Triantafyllides 
from meeting with the captured insurgents. The Cyprus Police also refused to identify who 
had been captured and where they were held. Under the terms of August 17 memorandum, 
the lawyers were entitled to know all of this information.151 Demetriades asked for Henry’s 
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immediate intervention. As Attorney-General, Henry’s priority was to uphold the law, which 
included the procedures outlined in the August 17 memorandum. Within 24 hours, Henry 
provided the Bar Council with a list of 90 detainees and their place of detention152 Henry 
consistently instructed police and prison staff “not to hold up [attorney] visits longer than is 
absolutely necessary in the cases of persons detained for interrogation” and reminded the 
security forces that “persons should be enabled to see advocates as soon as possible.”153 
Greek Cypriot lawyers’ appeals to the Attorney-General helped enforce the terms of the 
August 17 agreement. 
Bar Council activism resulted in the August 17 memorandum, which the lawyers used 
to chip away at the edifice of the colonial state’s emergency powers by defending the right of 
detainees to legal representation. Bar Council lawyers could also rely on Attorney-General 
Henry’s willingness to uphold the agreement some security officials ignored it. The lawyers 
had made some progress toward protecting prisoners’ rights, but they faced a new challenge 
when Harding decided to issue a new set of emergency laws in November 1956. 
Courting Controversy: The Expanded Emergency Regulations 
During the second half of 1956, Harding had to balance two parallel military crises. 
Within Cyprus, he faced the EOKA insurgency. The second crisis, however, involved the 
British government’s plan to attack Egyptian forces occupying the Suez Canal. In July 1956, 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which had been under 
French and British control. British Prime Minister Anthony Eden viewed Nasser’s act as a 
threat to the use of the canal as a vital conduit for Middle Eastern oil. Eden coordinated with 
France and Israel to seize the canal. Cyprus became a key staging ground for the assault. 
Although Harding was not involved in the attack, he received orders to divert two brigades 
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from counterinsurgency operations in Cyprus to prepare for the Suez invasion. Throughout 
the autumn, Harding was shorthanded. But in November, after the Suez intervention ended, 
Harding heard good news—his two brigades returned to Cyprus and he received 8,500 
additional reinforcements, bringing Harding’s total troop strength to 31,000.154 Without the 
Suez intervention siphoning his resources, Harding could redouble his efforts against EOKA. 
After Harding subsequently widened the scope of emergency legislation, EOKA lawyers 
expanded their activism to include Opposition politicians in Britain.  
On November 22 and 23, 1956, Harding launched a legal offensive. He expanded the 
emergency regulations by passing a series of laws designed to stifle dissent, protect 
interrogators and other intelligence officers, and induce prisoners to provide information. An 
earlier measure already included a broad prohibition against the publication of “any report or 
statement which is likely to cause alarm or despondence.” The new censorship regulation 
allowed Harding to ban publications deemed “prejudicial to the successful prosecution of 
measures taken or to be taken to forward the termination of the state of emergency.” Exactly 
which statements were “prejudicial” to the security effort was, of course, determined by the 
colonial administration. Furthermore, the new law prohibited the publication of anything that 
fell under the vague description of a “disturbing report.” Finally, possession of prohibited 
publications “without a lawful excuse” could result in six months’ imprisonment. 155 Harding 
had the power to prohibit virtually any publication that he did not like.  
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Another new law, the public officers’ protection regulation, was intended to shield 
Special Branch interrogators from charges brought by EOKA lawyers. The regulation 
dictated that private citizens could not file civil or criminal proceedings against any 
government official unless the Attorney-General consented to the charges. Detainees may 
have been able to identify their interrogators, but under this law their lawyers could not take 
interrogators to court unless they could first persuade the Attorney-General to allow the case 
to proceed. This law empowered the colonial government to act as a filter for charges against 
members of the security forces, preventing cases of abuse during interrogation from going to 
court. As one EOKA leaflet complained, the public officers’ protection meant that “if you 
have been unjustly treated or ill-treated, if you are the victim of a theft or of the English 
justice [sic], you have no right to take the persons responsible to court.”156 The public 
officers’ protection regulation limited Cypriot subjects’ right to seek redress through the 
courts and protected interrogators from prosecution.  
The expanded firearms law was perhaps the most notorious emergency regulation 
enacted during the conflict. The original law prohibited the use of firearms, bombs, or any 
other form of explosive “with intent to cause death or injury.” Anyone violating this law 
could face the death penalty. The law also stipulated that anyone in possession of a firearm, 
bomb, grenade, or other explosive could face imprisonment for life. The expanded 
regulations of November 1956, however, took these punishments further. The new law 
prescribed a mandatory death sentence for anyone caught using or possessing firearms or 
explosives, as well as a mandatory death sentence for anyone “consorting” with persons 
possessing or using firearms or explosives. Anyone carrying an “incendiary article” other 
than a bomb, grenade, or ammunition was liable to a life sentence. In addition, the law 
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reversed the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defendant. Now any individual 
charged with possession or use of a firearm would have to prove his or her innocence beyond 
a reasonable doubt.157 These harsh sentences were intended to convince captured EOKA 
fighters to trade information for their lives. Unburdened by the need to prove that a suspect 
had actually used firearms or explosives, interrogators could offer a reprieve from the 
mandatory death sentence—granted by the governor on the security forces’ 
recommendation—if a suspect provided useful intelligence. The mandatory death sentence 
became a tool in the intelligence collection effort.158 
 This manipulation of the law to facilitate counterinsurgency operations incensed 
Greek Cypriot lawyers, who used the Cyprus Bar Council as a means of registering their 
complaints with government officials. Stelios Pavlides and John Clerides called for a meeting 
of the Bar Council’s general membership on December 8, 1956. As the President and Vice-
President of the Bar Council, Sir James Henry and Ned Munir were also invited. During the 
meeting, Pavlides introduced a resolution stating that the members of the Bar “strongly 
deprecate and condemn” the mandatory death sentence for firearms offenses, the new 
censorship regulations, and the public officers’ protection legislation. The lawyers argued 
that the mandatory death penalty removed the “discretionary power of trial judges of the 
Special Court to impose a sentence of imprisonment in the case of certain offences (which 
ordinarily would not carry a capital sentence),” instead “leaving no alternative to the judges 
than to pass a sentence of death upon every person convicted for any such offence.” The 
members of the Bar also objected to the structure of the Special Courts, where a single judge 
determined the verdict. The lawyers insisted that “no court should have power to pass a death 
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sentence unless composed of three judges as in the case of Assize Courts,” which before the 
Emergency had presided over the most serious cases in the colony and consisted of a panel of 
judges. The lawyers’ ire also extended to censorship, in which the Bar Council members 
asserted that “Emergency or no Emergency, there can be no excuse or justification for the 
promulgation of provisions which strike at the very root of matters connected with the 
administration of justice and the freedom of the press.”  Finally, the lawyers wrote that the 
public officers’ protection regulation would “prevent free access to the Courts of the Colony 
by persons having a grievance against public officers for offences committed against them 
and ill-treatment applied to them.” The new regulations were therefore “contrary to well 
established principles and policy of law.”159 Bar Council members voted overwhelmingly to 
pass the resolution. Only Henry and Munir, in their capacities as colonial officials, voted 
against it because it criticized government policy.160 Through the December 8 resolution, 
Greek Cypriot lawyers asserted that the expanded emergency regulations violated Cypriots’ 
civil rights. But they did not limit their activism to lobbying local officials. 
Beyond Cyprus, Bar Council attorneys found a receptive audience among anticolonial 
left-wing British politicians. A key connection was made when a British lawyer named Peter 
Benenson arrived in Cyprus. Although he would later gain renown as a co-founder of 
Amnesty International, in 1956 Benenson was a member of the Society of Labour Lawyers—
a group of attorneys who belonged to the Labour Party—and chaired its Foreign Relations 
Sub-Committee.161 He first visited Cyprus in 1956 as a war correspondent for The Spectator. 
Benenson was supposed to cover the Suez Crisis, so he was flown to Cyprus while British 
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troops staged for the assault on Egypt. Being a barrister, he wandered into the Nicosia law 
courts and began speaking with Greek Cypriot lawyers. In December, Benenson joined the 
legal team retained by Charles Foley, who owned the Times of Cyprus, a newspaper that was 
highly critical of Harding’s repressive policies. Benenson worked alongside John and Glafkos 
Clerides to defend the newspaper against libel charges filed by the Cyprus government. Foley 
described Benenson as “red-haired, rabidly energetic, and had a warm heart for lost 
causes.”162 At some point between October and December 1956, Benenson met John and 
Glafkos Clerides, who told him of their problems with emergency legislation and allegations 
of prisoner “ill-treatment”—the colonial government’s preferred euphemism for torture.163 
Benenson decided to help by raising awareness of these problems in Britain.  
In December 1956, Britain’s Conservative Party government was under siege from 
Opposition MPs over the Suez Crisis, but the Opposition quickly expanded its critique to 
include Cyprus policy. On December 4, spearheaded by Labour MP Lena Jeger and Liberal 
Party leader Jo Grimond, a group of 27 Labour and Liberal MPs tabled a motion in the House 
of Commons condemning the “ruthless severity” of Harding’s expanded emergency laws, 
particularly the extension of the death penalty and the Governor’s power to censor the 
press.164 Grimond argued that the curtailment of free speech in Cyprus amounted to a “sad 
day for this great liberal country.” In the House of Lords, Lord Listowel criticized the new 
press restrictions. He found the public officers’ protection regulation particularly repulsive, 
calling it “contrary to our ideas of justice that a citizen should be unable to go to law without 
the consent of the Attorney-General, himself a member of the Government.” Lord Jowitt 
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lamented that “I do not think I have ever seen a more draconian set of rules than these 
regulations.”165 Lord Jowitt’s point was clear—harsh laws fed resentment and created new 
enemies, which only made Britain’s colonial problems worse. 
The debate continued throughout the month as Harding’s expanded emergency laws 
faced further criticism. On December 21, several Labour backbench MPs criticized Harding’s 
new regulations as overly repressive. Labour MP Kenneth Robinson condemned the 
“repressive government and draconian legislation” as an “almost total denial of civil 
liberties.” He rebuked Harding over press restrictions, telling the Commons that the Cyprus 
regulations amounted to “a fantastic interference with the rights of free speech and freedom 
of expression.” Robinson also decried the public officers’ protections, saying that based on 
the law “the Government become judge and jury in their own case.” Lena Jeger linked 
repression in Cyprus to the dynamics of other colonial rebellions: “We have had enough 
experience in Cyprus and in other parts of the Colonial Empire to know that repression of this 
kind is simply a sowing of dragon's teeth and that, in fact, violence in Cyprus has increased in 
direct relationship to the severity of the Regulations.”166 Harding’s decision to expand the 
emergency regulations incited Opposition politicians’ ire at the very moment when Benenson 
began corresponding with Greek Cypriot lawyers. This combination would soon put Harding 
under intense political pressure.  
Cyprus Bar Council lawyers sent Benenson evidence that security forces regularly 
used torture during interrogation—evidence which Benenson passed to Labour MP James 
Callaghan. On December 17, 1956, John Clerides penned a letter to Benenson containing a 
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spate of complaints that he had recently filed with the Cyprus government. On November 1, 
Clerides filed six allegations of ill-treatment. The Administrative Secretary pledged that 
investigations would occur, but Clerides had not yet received news of the investigation 
results. By the end of November, Clerides claimed that he had filed an additional 30 
complaints which colonial officials failed to answer. “I have been submitting complaints,” he 
wrote to Benenson, “for the purposes of remedying a situation which discredits the prestige 
of British Administration.”167 In a direct reference to Stelios Pavlides and John Clerides, 
James Callaghan told the House of Commons of his concern over “examples—I think I am 
not putting it too highly—of torture”: 
[I]nvestigations were made by persons of the highest repute in Cyprus, namely, a 
former Attorney-General, who I believe is well esteemed by the Administration, and 
another former member of the Governor's Executive Council. They have sent the 
Administration 30 documented cases of prima facie brutality by Security Forces. 
 
The colonial government in Cyprus, however, had thus far failed to investigate the 
complaints. “There is a responsibility upon the Administration,” Callaghan asserted, “to 
ensure that every complaint of this nature is investigated.” Until then, “we are under a cloud 
of suspicion.”168 Due to Cyprus Bar Council activism, British MPs called for a formal inquiry 
into torture allegations.  
At Callaghan’s behest, Benenson returned to Cyprus on December 28 with a series of 
informal proposals to reform detention and interrogation procedures. Benenson suggested 
that the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) interrogate suspects—a measure that 
revealed his personal understanding of the purpose of police questioning. To Benenson, 
interrogation was designed to gather evidence that would determine whether a case should go 
to trial, not to collect intelligence in support of military operations. Because CID was the 
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police organization best equipped to prepare case evidence for trial, it made sense to have 
CID conduct the interrogation. Benenson also disagreed with the stipulation that interrogators 
could prevent detainees from meeting with their lawyers during the first 48 hours after 
capture. Instead, an accused person should be allowed to communicate with an attorney “as 
soon as he is handed over for interrogation” but certainly “no later than 48 hours after his 
arrest.” A lawyer, Benenson continued, “should be allowed to see his client at any time after 
notification of the arrest of his client,” although he conceded that this measure did not mean 
that an attorney must be present during interrogation or that interrogation should be delayed 
until the lawyer arrived.169 Benenson saw interrogation as part of the trial process—a mindset 
which explains his preference that CID conduct interrogations and his desire to allow 
suspects to meet with an attorney immediately after arrest. 
At the time, however, interrogations were conducted by Special Branch rather than 
CID. Special Branch officers perceived interrogation differently from Benenson. For them, 
interrogation provided intelligence that would enable security forces to disrupt EOKA 
operations by interdicting supplies and capturing or killing insurgents. Special Branch’s 
priority was to collect vital, actionable intelligence rather than meticulously documenting 
evidence for eventual use in a court of law to convict captured EOKA members. Because of 
their emphasis on intelligence collection, Special Branch officers avoided testifying in court, 
whereas CID officers routinely provided testimony during criminal trials.170 Special Branch 
officers viewed interrogation as a security operation against the enemy, not part of a process 
for the administration of justice.   
Attorney-General Henry’s perspective on interrogation procedures aligned with 
Benenson’s. Henry supported Benenson’s suggestion to assign CID officers to interrogation 
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duty “both as a safeguard and because he will be at hand if any information useful in the 
investigation of the particular offence is obtained.” CID’s involvement would help gain 
convictions as well:  
[D]ifficulties are frequently occurring over cases in which alleged confessions have 
been made to C.I.D. officers at the end of a period of 14 days detention during which 
the accused had been in the custody of the Special Branch. The onus is on the 
prosecution to prove that the confessions are voluntary, and it will not be possible to 
do this unless the Special Branch officers in whose custody the accused was held are 
called to give evidence. The Judges insist on this. 
 
Henry continued, writing that when a confession is introduced during a trial, “it is invariable 
that allegations of beating and ill-treatment are made in respect of the period during which 
the accused has been held by Special Branch.” Special Branch officers’ aversion to appearing 
in court “nullified any chance of securing a conviction on a capital charge” in one recent case 
“and there are several other similar cases now pending.”171 This internal interrogation debate 
resulted from the Cyprus Bar Council’s activism, which led several Opposition MPs to 
scrutinize Harding’s harsh security policies such as the expanded emergency legislation. 
Harding did not want Benenson’s interference—or anyone else’s, for that matter—to 
disrupt the successes achieved due to the new laws. When he learned of Benenson’s return to 
Cyprus in December 1956, an angry Harding ordered Deputy Governor George Sinclair to 
“keep Benenson on the rails.”172 As Sinclair tried to control who Benenson could talk to and 
where he went, Harding cabled Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd to explain the value of the 
new regulations: 
For your private information . . . you may wish to know that the new Regulations 
extending the death penalty are believed to be responsible in great measure for recent 
successes in the liquidation of terrorists at Limassol. One youth, who was plainly 
aware that he was liable to the death penalty declared his intention of implicating 
others as well and proceeded to make a 26 page statement admitting his complicity in 
earlier murders and giving material which has led to the arrest of many terrorists in 
the area and the break-up of a number of killer groups. The same occurred also, to a 
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lesser degree, in Famagusta and was also attributable to the knowledge of the death 
penalty. For these reasons I consider that the new measure has justified itself although 
of course it will be kept constantly under review. 
 
According to Harding, the application of mandatory death sentences for firearms possession 
had led to an intelligence boon. Interrogators could use the threat of the death penalty as 
leverage to obtain a confession in exchange for a reduced sentence.  
Expanding the death penalty also proved strategically useful because it enabled the 
government to convict more insurgents. Security forces often lacked evidence to try EOKA 
fighters for serious crimes such as murder, yet had obtained sufficient intelligence to know 
that an insurgent was probably guilty. Such circumstantial evidence would not produce a 
murder conviction in court, but regulations such as the firearms law allowed the government 
to severely punish insurgents for lesser offences. Harding described an example in which 
members of an EOKA cell that “had probably been responsible for several murders” faced 
charges for the possession of firearms rather than murder because the prosecution lacked 
sufficient evidence to win a murder case. Before the extension of capital punishment to 
firearms possession cases, the members of this cell could not have been sentenced to death. 
After broadening the application of the death penalty, Harding noted, such cases required 
judges “to impose the punishment such conduct deserves.”173 These laws permitted the 
government to implement serious punishments without the need to assemble enough evidence 
to prove that had committed serious crimes.  
Harding’s decision to expand the emergency regulations encountered resistance not 
only within Cyprus, but also at home. By December 1956, the Cyprus Bar Council’s 
overtures to British politicians had brought detention and interrogation issues into public 
view. Faced with pressure from Parliament, Harding’s primary concern was to avoid the 
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establishment of formal limitations on interrogation practices. His resistance to Benenson’s 
presence on the island reflected this priority. He would remain committed to this course of 
action through 1957. 
Harding Under Pressure: “Ill-treatment” and Interrogation 
The winter of 1956-57 was a difficult time for Britain’s Conservative government. Sir 
Anthony Eden resigned as Prime Minister in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis and was 
replaced in January 1957 by Harold Macmillan.174 In Cyprus, a series of factors had put Sir 
John Harding’s administration under pressure. Parliamentary criticism, stimulated by the 
Cyprus Bar Council’s efforts, continued into 1957. In the wake of the Suez Crisis, new Prime 
Minister Macmillan committed the government to a political settlement in Cyprus. Finally, 
the government of Greece had sponsored a complaint—or “application,” in legal language—
at the European Commission of Human Rights. From December 1956 to the spring of 1957, 
Harding remained steadfast in his desire to preserve emergency laws that facilitated 
intelligence collection.   
Throughout the first months of 1957, Harding continued to face censure from 
Opposition politicians in Britain over the expanded emergency regulations. On February 19, 
Labour MP Lena Jeger criticized the Cyprus government’s press restrictions by questioning 
the case against Charles Foley’s Times of Cyprus. “I have been reading all the cuttings from 
The Times of Cyprus very carefully, including those articles which have brought down such 
wrath on Mr. Foley's head,” Jeger told the Commons. “If one reads his articles and then reads 
the Government's reproof of him,” she continued, “one is surprised and dismayed. One is left 
                                                            
174 On Eden’s role in the Suez Crisis, see Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to 
Decolonisation, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221-240; Jonathan Pearson, Sir 
Anthony Eden and the Suez Crisis: Reluctant Gamble (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); David Reynolds, 
“Eden the Diplomatist, 1931-1956: Suezide of a Statesman?” History 74, no. 1 (1989): 64-84; and David M. 
Watry, Diplomacy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana 
State University Press, 2014). 
 
75 
 
with the conclusion that the Government do not want newspapers at all.”175 A February 20 
article in the Manchester Guardian reported James Callaghan’s condemnation of Cyprus 
policy as “lost in a blind alley.”176 On March 8, Jeger asked Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-
Boyd if the government would set up an independent inquiry into “irregularities in the 
administration of justice in Cyprus.”177 Finally, the Cyprus Bar Council leadership also wrote 
to Lennox-Boyd asking for the appointment of a Parliamentary Committee to investigate 
allegations of prisoner ill-treatment. He demurred.178 The Bar Council’s connection with 
British politicians ensured that the Opposition was well informed of the state of the 
emergency regulations in Cyprus. 
 Harding also faced geopolitical concerns as the Macmillan government adopted a new 
political course in Cyprus. The Suez Crisis had severely damaged Britain’s relationship with 
its primary ally, the United States. When Macmillan met with U.S. President Dwight 
Eisenhower in March 1957, Eisenhower suggested that Macmillan release Archbishop 
Makarios from exile in the Seychelles. Macmillan agreed, hoping that Makarios’s release 
would pave the way for a political settlement to the conflict. The Macmillan government also 
presented a new plan for self-government in Cyprus and invited Greece and Turkey to a 
three-power conference with Britain to negotiate a solution. Peace in Cyprus was especially 
important given the April 1957 release of the Defence White Paper, which signaled the end of 
conscription and the consequent reduction of the army to half its size over the next five years. 
Cyprus’s airfields were still considered vital to British security, but the new Minister of 
Defence, Duncan Sandys, was not convinced that retaining sovereignty over the entire island 
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was either necessary or practical.179 Meanwhile, the United Nations General Assembly 
debated the island’s fate, with a weakly-worded resolution calling on the parties involved to 
resume negotiations toward a solution.180 Diplomatic momentum had turned toward a 
negotiated settlement. 
Although Harding could anticipate the change in British policy, neither he nor the 
Macmillan government foresaw Greece’s decision to submit an application to the European 
Commission of Human Rights on behalf of Greek Cypriots alleging that Britain had violated 
the European Convention on Human Rights through its conduct of the war in Cyprus. The 
European Commission of Human Rights, based in Strasbourg, France, oversaw the 
implementation of the Convention. The Convention contained 18 Articles protecting civil 
liberties such as the right to life, privacy, marriage, and a fair trial; and the freedom of 
expression, thought, assembly, and religion. Of particular relevance to the Cyprus 
Emergency, Article 3 prohibited torture and “inhuman or degrading treatment” while Article 
15 permitted states to derogate from the Convention if three conditions were met: The 
existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the measures taken in 
response to an emergency must be “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and 
those measures must be consistent with the state’s other obligations under international 
law.181 The Convention also allowed, but did not require, its signatories to accept individual 
or group petitions. Britain rejected the right of individual petition, but accepted the right of a 
fellow state party to the Convention to petition the European Commission. The implication 
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for Cyprus was that only states could formally complain over British actions, not the Cypriots 
themselves.182 But Greece proved a willing international patron. 
The Greek application of May 1956 was a reaction to allegations of abuse during 
interrogation and the executions of Karaolis and Demetriou, which contributed to a sense 
among many Greeks and Greek Cypriots that British forces operated with impunity. By filing 
the application, the Greek government entered uncharted territory—this case marked the first 
inter-state complaint under the auspices of the European Convention of Human Rights. At a 
June 1956 hearing in Strasbourg, British legal officers, the Commission members, and the 
Greek delegation settled on the scope of the application. The Greek representatives agreed to 
limit the proceedings to a general inquiry into whether the state of emergency and its 
associated legislation constituted a breach of the European Convention. The Commission, 
however, permitted the Greek government to submit a second application addressing 
individual cases of abuse at a later date if it so desired. With the terms set, the European 
Commission appointed a Sub-Commission to oversee the proceedings of the case.183 
Although the Convention was an international agreement, it generated highly localized 
consequences for the colonial administration in Cyprus. 
To support the Greek application, the Cyprus Bar Council established a local “human 
rights committee” in Nicosia in October 1956. Their objective was to document evidence of 
torture and other forms of abuse for use in local legal proceedings and inclusion in a potential 
second Greek application under the European Convention. John Clerides and Stelios Pavlides 
led the effort, receiving support from approximately a dozen other barristers, many of whom 
were also involved in defending captured EOKA fighters. The Bar Council’s island-wide 
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activist network facilitated the creation of human rights committees in other cities and 
towns.184  
Human rights committee lawyers found that most complaints concerned mental and 
physical abuse during interrogation.  In the case of Ioannis Christoforou, the lawyers called 
on the Attorney-General to investigate what their private inquiry had disclosed as “an 
overwhelming prima facie case of grievous bodily harm” committed against Christoforou.  
Maria Lambrou, who was pregnant when taken into custody, claimed to have been beaten at 
the Kyrenia police station and alleged that her interrogator told her to confess or else he 
would beat her so hard that she would miscarry.185 Another prisoner, Takis Kakoullis, held at 
Omorphita Police Station, reported that guards threw salt on the floor and forced him to lick 
it.  They subsequently placed a tin can on his head and beat it for fifteen minutes.  George 
Koursoumbas alleged that police officers ordered him to raise his arms, then punched him in 
the armpits.  They then ordered him to lie down, placed his feet on a chair, and beat the soles 
of his feet with a leather bandolier.  In Nicosia, Konstantinos Ionannou endured a mock 
execution. Ionannou alleged that an interrogator pointed a revolver at his head and said “I 
will count to seven. If you do not confess you will die.”  The interrogator counted to seven 
and pulled the trigger.  The pistol clicked—the chamber was empty.186  
Suspicious deaths in custody also attracted scrutiny. The Times of Cyprus routinely 
published reports on inquests and criminal procedures. In one, an inquest in to the death of 
Nicos Georghiou, the newspaper reported that the Coroner determined Georghiou’s cause of 
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death to have been “intercranial haemorrhage and purulent bronchitis ‘occasioned by some 
unknown external agency of which there is no direct evidence.’” Georghiou died at Akrotiri 
hospital in January 1957 after four days in British custody. Dr. Clearkin, a government 
pathologist who testified at the court hearing, reported that Georghiou’s death “was 
unnatural.” The lack of “direct evidence” meant that the mysterious circumstances of 
Georghiou’s death were not pursued further. No one was convicted for causing his death.187  
The Cyprus government did not officially sanction physical cruelty—in fact officials 
cited the conviction of a police officer in Limassol on “ill-treatment” charges as well as the 
March 1956 court-martial of two army intelligence officers on assault charges as “proof of 
the resolution with which Government and the military authorities deal with such cases.”188 
As of March 1957, the Cyprus government had punished four additional members of the 
security forces for ill-treating Cypriot civilians. Three police constables were charged with 
assault, fined from £10-£25, and forced to resign. One police auxiliary was found guilty of 
inflicting grievous bodily harm on a civilian and was sentenced to three years 
imprisonment.189 In June 1957, a UK Police Sergeant Gash assaulted a Greek Cypriot civilian 
over a private quarrel unrelated to detention or interrogation. The Nicosia Special Court 
convicted Gash on July 5, 1957. He was reprimanded and fined £5.190 The colonial 
administration proved willing to punish security forces if the evidence against them was 
overwhelming, but the punishments were far from severe. 
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As the Strasbourg inquiry progressed, British officials in Cyprus and Whitehall 
realized that they required a coordinated policy response to the Greek application. Britain 
could not simply ignore or dismiss the application because, as one official noted, it “falls too 
clearly within the ambit of the Convention, which we have signed, to be brushed aside.”191 
Led by Foreign Office legal adviser Sir Francis Vallat, officials devised a strategy to slowly 
give ground on issues that the Cyprus human rights committees and the Greek government 
found objectionable while continuing to contest the application before the Sub-Commission. 
Vallat described this approach as a “policy of gentle co-operation and the gradual whittling 
away of the sting of the Greek application by one means or another.”192 Harding applied this 
strategy to good effect in Cyprus while simultaneously preserving laws that he deemed vital 
to the counterinsurgency effort.  
As a result of Parliamentary criticism, the Greek human rights applications, and out of 
a desire to win Greek Cypriot support for the Radcliffe constitutional proposals, Harding 
revoked collective punishment and juvenile whipping regulations in December 1956.193 
These laws had proved more burdensome than useful.194 They had little impact in practice on 
the security forces’ efforts to kill or capture EOKA fighters, but proved particularly 
controversial and infuriating to many Greek Cypriots. Harding needed to preserve laws that 
allowed the security forces to gather intelligence, like those on interrogation practices, 
deemed vital to the counterinsurgency effort. Appearing to give ground on the collective 
punishment and juvenile whipping regulations would assuage angry Greek Cypriots and 
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Opposition critics at home without sacrificing legal powers that were actually useful for 
countering EOKA.195  
Among the regulations that Harding designated as essential to the success of 
counterinsurgency operations, however, were the public officers’ protection regulation and 
the firearms law. He left these laws in effect. When explaining this decision to the Colonial 
Secretary, Harding wrote that he preferred for the regulation to “remain in force at least until 
it has been possible to garner the results from the interrogation of persons arrested in the 
course of recent operations. There is no doubt that far more information is coming in than 
ever before, and this has assisted towards recent successes.” Harding argued that the public 
officers’ protection regulation “had an extremely limited object, to protect Government 
servants whose anonymity was necessary for their personal safety while performing their 
duties during the present emergency.” This “limited object,” however, had broad 
ramifications—it shielded interrogators from scrutiny, ensuring that they could continue 
without concern for the actions of EOKA lawyers.196  
Militarily, by the spring of 1957, the Cyprus campaign was going well for the British 
thanks to operations conducted under a legal framework designed to facilitate intelligence 
collection and security operations. Captured documents and prisoner interrogations had 
reduced EOKA’s mountain gangs and town-based assassination squads to a shell of their 
previous strength. Intelligence estimates indicated that only 40% of EOKA’s most 
experienced and dedicated fighters remained at large. The rest had been killed or captured. 
Logistically, EOKA had also suffered losses as British forces seized several major arms 
caches and disrupted the organization’s Limassol-based smuggling network. EOKA’s leader, 
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George Grivas, was on the run and had almost been captured.197 He ordered a unilateral 
ceasefire so that EOKA could regroup. On April 4, 1957, with the desire for a political 
settlement driving policy in Whitehall, Harding further relaxed the emergency regulations. 
He decreed that the death penalty would only apply in cases where the defendant was charged 
with discharging or carrying firearms and bombs with the intent to cause bodily harm. 
Furthermore, Harding removed all restrictions on the use of taxis and bicycles and cancelled 
the 1956 orders controlling the sale and circulation of publications. He portrayed these 
actions as generous steps toward peace and hoped to placate the Sub-Commission in 
Strasbourg.198 Harding had preserved the laws that were most useful to the intelligence effort, 
but activism from the Cyprus Bar Council and the resultant Parliamentary criticism pressured 
him into revoking some repressive regulations. 
Conclusion 
When first enacted, the emergency regulations regime tilted the balance in the 
colonial government’s favor. This legislation granted security forces wide-ranging powers of 
arrest, detention, and interrogation. British officials sought to wield the law as a weapon that 
could restrain their enemies’ freedom of action while enabling the security forces to operate 
with fewer restrictions. Through courtroom advocacy, Greek Cypriot barristers undermined 
the emergency regulations by turning the judicial system into a battlefield in its own right, but 
they also shaped the war beyond the courtroom. 
By transforming the Cyprus Bar Council from a professional society to an activist 
organization, Greek Cypriot lawyers protected detainees’ rights to legal representation, 
appealed to sympathetic British politicians, and documented torture allegations in support of 
the Greek government’s application before the European Commission of Human Rights. 
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Although the firearms law and public officers’ protection regulation remained in place, the 
Bar Council lawyers forced Harding to eliminate some of the most repressive laws such as 
those concerning collective punishments, juvenile whipping, and press censorship.  
The colonial government sometimes responded to Bar Council activism out of 
concern for rights or justice, but officials’ actions were more often motivated by a desire to 
avoid embarrassment. Attorney-General Sir James Henry and Justice Bernard Shaw refused 
to allow security forces to operate outside the law and tried to enforce standards of conduct 
such as the right of detainees to legal representation and the inadmissibility of prisoners’ 
confessions obtained through coercion. But they were in the minority. Most officials, 
including senior officials such as Harding—reacted to Bar Council activism not out of a 
desire to safeguard human rights, but out of an interest in shielding Britain’s reputation from 
harm. Ultimately, for both Greek Cypriots and the British, human rights activism and the law 
were instruments of war—instruments that would continue to be applied as the war dragged 
into the second half of 1957. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
“THE SHADOW OF STRASBOURG”:  
INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY AND BRITAIN’S RESPONSE 
Introduction 
By mid-1957 the Cyprus government faced public criticism from domestic politicians 
and local lawyers over harsh emergency laws, but colonial officials encountered additional 
scrutiny internationally. Diplomatic wrangles at the United Nations, squabbling among North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and ministerial-level negotiations between 
Britain, Turkey, and Greece defined much of the political and diplomatic history of the 
Cyprus Emergency. But the government of Greece’s sponsorship of two complaints at the 
European Commission of Human Rights on Greek Cypriots’ behalf shaped the conduct of the 
war in new ways. In what were the first two inter-state applications lodged before the 
Commission, Greece alleged that Britain violated the terms of the European Convention of 
Human Rights. Although Britain won the case regarding the first application, the European 
Commission compelled British officials to permit an international human rights investigation. 
Greece’s second application accused Britain of torturing prisoners in 49 individual cases. The 
evidence used in this application was based largely on documentation collected by Greek 
Cypriot lawyers associated with local human rights committees. This chapter examines 
Greece’s applications under the European Convention of Human Rights, EOKA’s concurrent 
“atrocity campaign,” and the influence which these efforts had on British counterinsurgency 
operations.  
For proponents of human rights, rights pressures generated unintended—and 
undesired—consequences: rather than ending abusive practices, British officials grew more 
adept at hiding them. Greece’s ECHR applications raised the possibility of international 
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investigations discovering British interrogation procedures’ reliance on brutality and 
coercion; these proceedings, combined with the concurrent “atrocity campaign,” convinced 
the Cyprus government of the need to devise a coherent, effective response to human rights 
activism. Colonial officials established a Special Investigation Group (SIG) charged with 
investigating ill-treatment allegations. But SIG did not investigate allegations concerning 
Special Branch interrogations, nor was SIG truly an independent oversight body. SIG was a 
counterpropaganda unit which existed to whitewash allegations and provide British officials 
with plausible deniability or an alternative narrative to undermine EOKA propaganda efforts. 
In addition to SIG, colonial officials sought to restrict public knowledge of British forces’ 
culpability in two 1958 incidents in which grave rights violations occurred—the Geunyeli 
massacre and the army’s unsanctioned reprisals after the murder of Catherine Cutliffe in 
Famagusta. Senior military and civilian officials aided the whitewash, including Sir Kenneth 
Darling, Director of Operations in Cyprus, Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary 
of War Christopher Soames, Chief of the Imperial General Staff and hero of the Malayan 
Emergency Sir Gerald Templer, and Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Land Forces 
Lieutenant General Sir Roger Bower.199 
The International Arena 
International diplomacy played an important role in the conflict, both as a site of 
confrontation between the protagonists and, eventually, the forum in which Britain, Turkey, 
and Greece arrived at a satisfactory agreement that ended the insurgency. Beginning in 1954, 
the United Nations became the venue for an annual diplomatic battle between Britain and 
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Greece over whether the “Cyprus Question” qualified as an international issue. Britain argued 
that since Cyprus was a colony, its affairs were a domestic issue; the island’s international 
status should not be a topic for discussion. In contrast, from 1954-1956, Greece periodically 
raised the Cyprus issue for discussion at UN General Assembly sessions. Britain then shifted 
its strategy by undermining support for the Greek position among other UN member states. 
Yet other member states, particularly former colonies of the emerging “Third World” such as 
India and Indonesia, advocated a broader UN mandate that included self-determination for 
colonies. Britain attempted to gain American support on the Cyprus issue with the argument 
that Cyprus was strategically valuable and therefore essential to Cold War defense. British 
diplomats argued that self-determination for Greek Cypriots would alienate Turkish Cypriots 
and inflame relations between Greece and Turkey, both of which were vital NATO allies.200 
Within Cyprus, EOKA was highly conscious of the impact that its actions could have in the 
international arena. As historian Robert Holland noted, “where Cyprus was concerned, 
discussion at the United Nations and local violence usually went together.”201  
 Greek Cypriots unsuccessfully invoked international agreements when protesting 
allegations that British interrogators tortured Greek Cypriot prisoners. In 1956, the Cyprus 
Bar Council complained to Governor Harding that “physical and mental ill-treatment” during 
interrogation constituted a breach of the 1949 Geneva Convention. The 1949 Convention 
required all signatory governments to “pledge themselves to leave unaltered and unrestricted 
the existing processes for the vindication of civil rights.” Emergency regulations, the lawyers 
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argued, violated this stipulation.202 Although Britain signed the Convention, Her Majesty’s 
Government deliberately avoided ratifying the treaty until 1957 due to the concern that the 
Convention would restrict British forces’ options for dealing with insurgents as law-breaking 
rebels rather than as internationally recognized combatants. Once the British government 
ratified the Convention, government lawyers identified and exploited legal loopholes to 
ensure that the Convention did not restrict British freedom of action.203 Common Article 3, 
which stipulated that the Geneva Conventions applied to “non-international armed conflict” 
as well as inter-state conflict, therefore did not apply in Cyprus until 1957. Even after 
ratification, Common Article 3 was largely ignored or states insisted that “non-international” 
did not mean “anticolonial rebellion.”204 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which worked to improve 
conditions for prisoners, also proved ineffective at recognizing and stopping British abuses. 
Throughout the conflict, the International Committee of the Red Cross conducted visits to 
British detention camps. In one March 1957 visit to the Nicosia Central prison, Red Cross 
representative David de Traz was allowed to interview many detainees without oversight 
from camp officials. A British report on de Traz’s visit noted that de Traz heard “numerous 
complaints concerning harsh treatment suffered during questioning by the police. In many 
cases the delegate saw actual traces of such treatment.” All of the detainees claimed that they 
had sustained their injuries during interrogation, not at the detention camp. De Traz raised the 
issue with Deputy Governor George Sinclair, reminding him of Britain’s obligation “for the 
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detainees to be treated with humanity in all circumstances.” De Traz asked to be allowed to 
visit the police interrogation centers on his next visit to Cyprus.205 He believed that brutality 
had probably occurred, but was limited: “My personal opinion is that at no time did the top 
British officials order or tolerate deliberate ill-treatment of prisoners. However, I think it 
quite possible that in moments of exasperation, lower-ranking police officers will get carried 
away to excess.”206 When he visited Omorphita interrogation center in August 1957, de Traz 
reported that he did not see any suspicious marks or signs of abuse on detainees’ bodies. He 
spoke with only one detainee and used a British interpreter. Unsurprisingly considering the 
dialogue was in the presence of a British official, the detainee stated that he had no 
complaints about his treatment. De Traz concluded that “nothing untoward is happening 
there.”207 As the war continued, de Traz regularly visited detention camps. But Greek 
Cypriots perceived the interrogation centers as the source of abuse rather than detention 
camps. By November 1958, Greek Cypriot opinions had hardened, believing that the Red 
Cross was biased in favor of the British.208 
Despite the existence of international agreements and humanitarian organizations, 
EOKA sympathizers had few formal legal avenues for addressing British brutality. Decisions 
made at the United Nations conveyed international legitimacy, but were not necessarily 
binding on member states. Britain also rejected the notion that the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
applied in Cyprus, even after ratification. But one option remained—the European 
Commission for Human Rights, created under the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, France.  
                                                            
205 FCO 141/4673 Nicosia Central Prison report on de Traz’s second visit, 22 Mar 57. 
 
206 ICRC B AG-202-049-001 de Traz to Gaillard, 21 Aug 57. 
 
207 ICRC B AG-202-049-003.01 de Traz to ICRC, 23 Aug 57. 
 
208 ICRC B AG 225-049-002 de Preux to de Traz, 26 Nov 58. The ICRC was not biased toward Britain, but de 
Traz was largely put off by the “atrocity campaign” and did not wish to be fooled by either side. 
89 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights contained 18 Articles protecting civil 
liberties such as the right to life, privacy, marriage, and a fair trial; and the freedom of 
expression, thought, assembly, and religion. Of particular relevance to the Cyprus 
Emergency, Article 3 prohibited torture and “inhuman or degrading treatment” while Article 
15 permitted states to derogate from the Convention if three conditions were met: The 
existence of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, the measures taken in 
response to an emergency must be “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,” and 
those measures must be consistent with the state’s other obligations under international 
law.209 The Convention also allowed, but did not require, its signatories to accept individual 
or group petitions. Britain rejected the right of individual petition, but accepted the right of a 
fellow state party to the Convention to petition the European Commission. The implication 
for Cyprus was that only states could formally complain over British actions, not the Cypriots 
themselves.210 Greek Cypriots soon found a willing international patron—Greece. 
“Human Rights Committees” and the Greek Applications 
When the Greek application arrived at the Foreign Office on May 8, 1956, British 
officials in Cyprus and Whitehall realized that they could not simply ignore or dismiss the 
application because, as one official noted, it “falls too clearly within the ambit of the 
Convention, which we have signed, to be brushed aside.”211 At a June 1, 1956 hearing in 
Strasbourg, British legal officers, the Commission members, and the Greek delegation settled 
on the scope of the application. The Greek representatives agreed to limit the proceedings to a 
general inquiry into whether the state of emergency and its associated legislation constituted 
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a breach of the European Convention, but the Commission also acknowledged the Greek 
government’s right to submit a second application addressing individual cases of abuse at a 
later date. With the terms set, the European Commission appointed a Sub-Commission to 
oversee proceedings.212  
British officials slowly gave ground on issues that the Cyprus human rights 
committees and the Greek government found objectionable. This move was part of a strategy 
outlined by Foreign Office legal adviser Sir Francis Vallat, who described his approach as a 
“policy of gentle co-operation and the gradual whittling away of the sting of the Greek 
application by one means or another.”213 Following this strategy, in December 1956 Harding 
revoked collective punishment and juvenile whipping regulations. On April 4, 1957, Harding 
decreed that the death penalty would only apply in cases where the defendant was charged 
with discharging or carrying firearms and bombs with the intent to cause bodily harm. 
Furthermore, he removed all restrictions on the use of taxis and bicycles and cancelled the 
1956 orders controlling the sale and circulation of publications. Considering that Grivas had 
recently declared a unilateral truce, Harding was able to relax the emergency legislation 
without appearing to do so as a reaction to the Sub-Commission hearings. British officials 
could claim that Harding was responding solely to conditions on the island while 
simultaneously placating the Sub-Commission. Even when the Sub-Commission directly 
intervened, such as in the case of Nicos Sampson, British officials acquiesced. In this case, 
the Greek representative in Strasbourg called for a reprieve on the grounds that Sampson had 
been sentenced to death under a law that the Sub-Commission was currently reviewing to 
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determine its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. When the Sub-
Commission formally requested a reprieve, Harding granted it.214 
Whereas the first application amounted to a general inquiry into the justifiability of a 
state of emergency in Cyprus, Greece’s second application concerned specific allegations of 
torture. Submitted on July 17, 1957, Application No.299/57 included 49 individual cases of 
torture.215 Most accusations involved Special Branch police interrogators using brute violence 
to extract information. Techniques included beatings with fists and canes, whips, or belts; a 
form of “water torture” meant to simulate drowning; a “helmet torture” in which a detainee's 
tormentors held a steel helmet onto his head and hit the helmet until the man fell 
unconscious; and the twisting of male genitals.216 In two cases, prisoners died. One died 
when attempting to escape. According to colonial officials, the man died when he hit his head 
on a rock after being tackled by a British soldier. The other man died from inter-cranial 
hemorrhage. There was no evidence indicating that the man had been mistreated in custody, 
but there was also no evidence indicating how he had developed a head injury. The fact that a 
seemingly healthy man died in custody without evidence to indicate how he had obtained a 
fatal injury was in itself suspicious.217   
 Much of the Greek government’s evidence for the second application came from a 
group of Greek Cypriot barristers connected with the Cyprus Bar Council leadership. In 
October 1956, these barristers established a local “human rights committee” in Nicosia. Their 
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objective was to document evidence of torture and other forms of abuse for use in local legal 
proceedings and inclusion in a potential second Greek application under the European 
Convention. John Clerides and Stelios Pavlides led the effort, receiving support from 
approximately a dozen other barristers, many of whom were also involved in defending 
captured EOKA fighters. After Clerides and Pavlides created the Nicosia committee, other 
cities and towns established local human rights committees.218  
Human rights committee lawyers found that most complaints concerned mental and 
physical abuse during interrogation.  In the case of Ioannis Christoforou, the lawyers called 
on the Attorney General to investigate what their private inquiry had disclosed as “an 
overwhelming prima facie case of grievous bodily harm” committed against Christoforou.  
The attorneys’ memorandum also cited two cases from October 1956 of Maria Lambrou and 
Charolambos Kremnos, who were beaten during interrogation at the Kyrenia police station. 
Lambrou, who was pregnant at the time, also alleged that her interrogator demanded that she 
confess or else he would beat her so hard that she would miscarry.219 In addition to being 
beaten on numerous occasions, Kremnos also claimed that guards forced him to “dig his own 
grave.”  He dug for a while before the guards pulled him out of the hole and forced him to 
hold two large stones and run circles around a tree for two hours.  Another prisoner, Takis 
Kakoullis, held at Omorphita Police Station, reported that guards threw salt on the floor and 
forced him to lick it.  The guards then placed a tin can on his head and beat it for fifteen 
minutes.  George Koursoumbas alleged that police officers ordered him to raise his arms and 
punched him in the armpits.  They then ordered him to lie down, placed his feet on a chair, 
                                                            
218 Author interview with Renos Lyssiotis, 8 Jan 14 and Dimitrios H. Taliadoros, An Album of Lawyers Who 
Defended EOKA Fighters, 1955-1959. (Nicosia, Cyprus: Department of Education and Culture, 2002). 
 
219 FCO 141/4310 Governor, Cyprus to Colonial Secretary, 19 Feb 57. Lambrou’s situation was documented 
upon her October 13, 1956 arrest. She was pregnant but unmarried, aborted while in custody, and was taken to a 
hospital. A Cypriot doctor stated that she had a septic abortion and that her genital organs were dirty and 
infected. The doctor was unable to say what had caused the abortion. 
 
93 
 
and beat the soles of his feet with a leather bandolier.  In Nicosia, Konstantinos Ionannou 
endured a mock execution.  Ionannou alleged that an interrogator pointed a revolver at his 
head and said “I will count to seven. If you do not confess you will die.”  The interrogator 
counted to seven and pulled the trigger.  The pistol clicked—the chamber was empty.220  
Suspicious deaths in custody also attracted scrutiny. The Times of Cyprus routinely 
published reports on inquests and criminal procedures. In one, an inquest in to the death of 
Nicos Georghiou, the newspaper reported that the Coroner determined Georghiou’s cause of 
death to have been “intercranial haemorrhage and purulent bronchitis ‘occasioned by some 
unknown external agency of which there is no direct evidence.’” Georghiou died at Akrotiri 
hostpital in January 1957 after four days in British custody. Dr. Clearkin, a government 
pathologist who testified at the court hearing, reported that Georghiou’s death “was 
unnatural.” The lack of “direct evidence” meant that the mysterious circumstances of 
Georghiou’s death were not pursued further, and no one was convicted for causing his 
death.221 Upon reviewing Application No.299/57, the European Commission for Human 
Rights appointed an additional Sub-Commission to investigate.  
The Cyprus government, however, did not officially sanction physical cruelty—in fact 
officials cited the conviction of a police officer in Limassol on “ill-treatment” charges as well 
as the O’Driscoll and Linzee court-martial as “proof of the resolution with which 
Government and the military authorities deal with such cases.”222 Officially, Cyprus Police 
“methods of interrogation follow the normal UK pattern. All forms of physical violence are 
forbidden by the Criminal Law and Police Force orders.” As of March 1957, the Cyprus 
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government had punished four additional members of the Security Forces for ill-treating 
Cypriot civilians. Three police constables were charged with assault, fined from £10-£25, and 
forced to resign. One police auxiliary was found guilty of grievous bodily harm and 
sentenced to three years imprisonment.223 In June 1957, a UK Police Sergeant Gash assaulted 
a Greek Cypriot civilian over a private quarrel unrelated to detention or interrogation. The 
Nicosia Special Court convicted Gash on July 5, 1957. He was reprimanded and fined £5.224  
Although the Cyprus government punished some members of the Security Forces, it 
had difficulty responding to human rights inquiries in part because the administration lacked 
policy guidance for systematic medical examinations of detainees. Greek Cypriot human 
rights committee lawyers routinely photographed or x-rayed individuals who alleged that 
British forces had used physical brutality or torture. Attorney-General Sir James Henry, after 
reviewing one such complaint, called the photographs “a very dangerous form of 
propaganda.” Henry suggested that the Security Forces should medically examine detainees 
as a means of refuting allegations. The idea was to examine detainees to test whether their 
actual bodily injuries—or evidence thereof—matched detainees’ allegations.225 In April 1957 
a system was finally created in which all detainees were required to be examined by medical 
personnel every two days. The results of each medical examination also had to be 
documented properly to forestall future complaints.226 
The “Atrocity Campaign” 
Greece’s second application built on what Cyprus government officials termed the 
“atrocity campaign.” Officials often viewed ill-treatment allegations as nothing more than 
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propaganda. EOKA waged a sophisticated propaganda campaign designed to ensure Greek 
Cypriot support for enosis and discredit the Cyprus government. Toward this end, EOKA 
established a dedicated propaganda wing, Politiki Epitropi Kypriakou Agona (PEKA). PEKA 
distributed leaflets, painted slogans on buildings, organized demonstrations, and coordinated 
other propaganda activities. Given the prominence of torture accusations in the press, PEKA 
eagerly compared British counterinsurgency practices to “the Nazi methods of Hitler.”227 
EOKA leader George Grivas ordered his subordinates to collect reports of vandalism 
committed by the Security Forces, physical brutality toward civilians, torture of prisoners, 
and any other abuses that could possibly be considered “ill-treatment.” Ill-treatment 
allegations became so prominent in the press that journalists from Cyprus, Greece, Britain, 
and the United States reported sordid tales of abuse. Publications could be found in 
prominent British, American, and Cypriot papers such as The Tribune, The Manchester 
Guardian, Newsweek, the New Statesman, the Spectator, and the Times of Cyprus. In Athens, 
the Panhellenic Committee for Cyprus Self-Determination printed millions of booklets, 
pamphlets, and leaflets for worldwide distribution.228    
In the eyes of Whitehall and the Cyprus government, journalists would have had far 
less derogatory material to work with had it not been for the efforts of Greek Cypriot 
attorneys. In November and December 1956, barrister John Clerides filed 36 ill-treatment 
complaints on behalf of detainees. “I have been submitting complaints,” he wrote, “for the 
purposes of remedying a situation which discredits the prestige of British Administration.”  
Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd, however, adopted a more jaundiced view. He 
suggested that Clerides and his colleagues simply wanted to obstruct the government’s 
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functionality. Clerides bristled at this suggestion: “It is a grave mistake of Lennox-Boyd even 
to think that a person of my standing would be putting up allegations of ill-treatment for the 
purpose of consuming the Administration’s time and energies.”229 Clerides, however, was not 
as naïve as his response suggested. Greek Cypriot lawyers who participated in the Cyprus Bar 
Council’s human rights committees and defended EOKA clients held political agendas of 
their own. Many—if not all—were sworn EOKA members. Barrister Renos Lyssiotis, for 
instance, joined PEKA and was responsible for coordinating the painting of propaganda 
slogans on buildings in Nicosia while simultaneously defending EOKA prisoners in court.230  
Although they defended the rights of EOKA fighters, the human rights committee 
barristers were not impartial actors. The rights of Greek Cypriot communists and Turkish 
Cypriots counted for little. Before accepting a case, the lawyers coordinated with EOKA to 
ensure that they prioritized key fighters or avoided defending anyone with past ties to AKEL, 
the Cypriot communist party. As a right-wing nationalist movement, EOKA held 
communism and communists in contempt. The lawyers’ human rights advocacy also did not 
extend to Turkish Cypriots. Instead, Turkish Cypriots were represented in court by Turkish 
Cypriot barristers.231 
Scholars and commentators have typically embraced the view that because human 
rights committee members were not impartial, their efforts made them little more than 
propagandists. Journalist Nancy Crawshaw assumes that politics and principle are mutually 
exclusive motivations. She writes that the lawyers were “motivated by political aims rather 
than a desire to establish the truth and to ensure humane treatment for their clients.”232 David 
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French agrees, writing that EOKA propaganda was exaggerated and the human rights 
committees “were not impartial bodies of lawyers intent only on the pursuit of the truth.”233 It 
is certainly true that the lawyers were partisan actors and the human rights committees were 
only concerned about the human rights of Greek Cypriot nationalists. But these insights do 
not mean that the lawyers were simply cynical peddlers of misinformation. 
The human rights committees’ partisanship should not automatically cast them into 
the realm of propagandists who promoted lies and misinformation. The critical flaw in both 
Crawshaw’s and French’s assessments of the human rights committee lawyers lies in their 
assumption that justice is somehow impartial. In Cyprus, the legal system was stacked in 
favor of the government as both Greek Cypriot lawyers and colonial officials sought to 
manipulate the law to their advantage. Advocacy on behalf of EOKA suspects satisfied Bar 
Council lawyers’ principles and politics. By stopping detainee mistreatment and undermining 
draconian emergency laws—the methods by which British forces secured confessions and 
obtained intelligence—Greek Cypriot attorneys could both support the war effort and assuage 
their consciences. For them, the choice was simple: Because they supported EOKA and 
British interrogators were torturing EOKA prisoners, stopping torture therefore served both 
the interests of justice and the enosis movement. British officials, too, were far from impartial 
in their quest for justice. The Cyprus government believed that they were also working on 
behalf of justice by enacting laws designed to facilitate counterinsurgency operations and 
intelligence collection. From the perspective of colonial officials, it could be said that 
subduing the insurgency legally, regardless of how oppressive those laws may have been, 
served the interests of justice by establishing order. In Cyprus, impartiality was impossible. 
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To counter the human rights committees, Governor Harding ordered the compilation 
and publication of an official government white paper entitled “Allegations of Brutality in 
Cyprus.” He intended for the white paper to serve as a weapon against atrocity allegations. 
Designed for widespread dissemination, copies of the white paper were dispatched to the UK 
delegations in Athens, Ankara, Washington, and New York.234 Harding wrote in the foreword 
that “I do not think any unbiassed [sic] person who has lived through the past two years in 
Cyprus could be in any doubt that the Security Forces here have been subjected to a darefully 
[sic] organised campaign of denigration.” Harding presented “evidence that this campaign 
has been a deliberate and organised conspiracy.”235 The white paper attacked the Cyprus Bar 
Council’s human rights committees as politically motivated EOKA supporters who abused 
their profession to serve the cause of enosis rather than the interests of justice. Bar Council 
attorneys issued a two-fold response. First, they charged that Harding’s white paper 
constituted an assault on the lawyers’ professional integrity and that they were merely 
defending their clients as any barrister would. This claim was partially disingenuous—pro-
EOKA lawyers used the courts for both purposes. Secondly, they asserted that the white 
paper did not adequately answer the ill-treatment allegations they had previously documented 
and called for an independent public inquiry.236 
In defense of the Security Forces’ conduct, Harding insisted that “it would be 
unrealistic, when men are fighting terrorism, to exclude the possibility of occasional rough-
handling of terrorists in the heat of the moment when their capture is being effected.” Even 
so, Harding argued, “I have made it clear that I will not tolerate misconduct by members of 
the Security Forces.” He cited evidence that the courts had “found fault with the Police for 
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the way in which evidence of terrorist offences was obtained” in “very few” cases. Harding 
wrote that when substantiated, his administration punished Security Force brutality, such as 
in the Linzee and O’Driscoll cases. Finally, Harding described an incident in which soldiers 
from the Gordon Highlanders were playing football in Lefkoniko when a bomb exploded and 
a soldier was wounded. The troops immediately searched the vicinity for suspects. After the 
search, “wild allegations of ill-treatment and malicious damage were made” against the 
soldiers. But a “very thorough” inquiry determined that the soldiers did not abuse villagers or 
cause serious damage to property. “The people of Lefkoniko,” Harding insisted, “have reason 
to be thankful that it was British troops with whom they had to deal on that day.”237  
But “rough-handling” at the point of capture was not the source of most ill-treatment 
allegations. Upon his July 19, 1957 return to Athens from detention in the Seychelles, 
Archbishop Makarios attacked the white paper during a press conference. Repeating 
allegations often made against interrogators, Makarios described sexual abuse—claiming that 
torturers would twist the genitals of male detainees, force women to strip naked before 
plucking their pubic hair, and threatened women with rape—and more “mundane” 
harassment such as the placement of a metal rubbish bin on a detainee's head, which Security 
Forces would beat with a stick; the metal amplified the noise and vibrated as it was hit, which 
created a disorienting effect.238  
 Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd publicly labeled the allegations “wild charges” 
that were clearly part of a pro-EOKA denigration campaign, but he privately considered 
ordering an inquiry.239 In the Colonial Office, D.J. Kirkness, Morris, Melville, and John 
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Martin debated the idea and weighed various arguments for and against an inquiry, including 
the potential that a special inquiry could forestall an international one related to Greece’s 
applications under the European Convention on Human Rights. Kirkness believed that “it 
must be admitted that there is a great deal of quite responsible opinion in this country which 
is seriously concerned about the allegations, largely from a feeling that there is no smoke 
without fire.” He referred to articles that appeared in The Manchester Guardian, the New 
Statesman, the Spectator, and “even the ‘Economist.’” Kirkness concluded that “we have to 
weigh the possible desirability of meeting the increasing concern in responsible circles about 
the allegations now current against the likely feeling of the Governor that, the administration 
and even his personal honour, would be called into question by any investigation.”240 
Lennox-Boyd chose not to order an inquiry because of the likelihood that at least 
some of the allegations were true. Kirkness identified the crucial factor:  
It seems increasingly probable that an investigation would unearth certain instances of 
brutality, probably by the Special Branch or by interrogators, which cannot be 
contained in the category of violence in the course of arrest of desperate men. I am 
not suggesting that we should refuse to consider investigation because we are afraid 
of what it might bring out; but we shall have to consider what we would do if it did 
bring out even one or two more discreditable incidents, after the Governor has stated 
repeatedly that all allegations are investigated and those found to be guilty of any 
misconduct punished.241  
 
On June 26, 1957 he informed Harding that “a special enquiry is unnecessary and would do 
positive harm.” Instead, Lennox-Boyd entered the counterpropaganda battle by resolving to 
“publish a White Paper with detailed answers to all specific allegations recently made.”242  
 Lennox-Boyd’s decision not to order an inquiry reflected the attitude that exposing 
Security Force misconduct would undermine rather than reinforce the Cyprus government’s 
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legitimacy. According to Lennox-Boyd’s thinking, an inquiry that uncovered valid instances 
of ill-treatment would damage the counterinsurgency effort. It was better to deny allegations 
than face the possibility of their validity. Within six months, however, Whitehall’s resistance 
to an inquiry eroded. But this time the inquiry was not conducted by British officials—it was 
international. 
“Embarrassing Nonsense”: The Sub-Commission Investigation 
Having rejected the potential for a government inquiry into the substance of the 
second Greek application, British officials also bristled at the Sub-Commission’s proposal to 
temporarily suspend emergency legislation in conjunction with the first Greek application. 
The final straw came when the Greek press published leaked reports of the Sub-
Commission’s supposedly confidential proceedings. Britain refused the Sub-Commission’s 
proposal, claiming instead that “the continuance of the emergency threatening the life of the 
nation in Cyprus requires the application or maintenance in force of a substantial part of the 
emergency measures.”243 In response, the Sub-Commission resolved to visit Cyprus to 
conduct an on-ground investigation into whether British emergency regulations were 
justified. On December 9, 1957, the decision made the front page of the Times of Cyprus: 
“’Human Rights’ probe begins on Jan. 13th.”244  
Many officials in Whitehall and Cyprus vehemently opposed the idea of an on-the-
ground inquiry. At the Colonial Office, A.S. Aldridge recommended rejecting the inquiry and 
recognized the implications of an investigation in Cyprus: “Thought has not yet ranged 
beyond Cyprus to the question whether the whole Convention is not an embarrassing 
nonsense if we can be put to trial over any of our colonial territories.”245 In Cyprus, Harding 
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was also frustrated. Previously, in February 1957, he had expressed dissatisfaction with the 
way in which the Foreign Office handled the Greek application. He was dismayed that “the 
Commission is allowing the Greeks constantly to extend and multiple their malicious 
accusations and to obtrude on supposedly judicial proceedings all manner of extraneous 
political matter.” Harding insisted that Britain's lawyers act more aggressively. They should 
launch a legal counterattack—an action that would be “bad law but good tactics.”246 
Administrative Secretary John Reddaway agreed with Harding and strongly condemned the 
Sub-Commission’s planned investigation as unwarranted interference in what he saw as an 
internal matter. “I trust,” Harding wrote on October 26, when the potential of a Sub-
Commission visit was discussed in Whitehall, “that Her Majesty's Government will be 
adamant in refusing to countenance such an invasion of our authority here.”247 
Harding, however, had already decided to resign from his position. He sensed that an 
intense military effort against the insurgency could no longer be sustained. Makarios’s 
release from exile and international pressure for a political solution—coming from the United 
Nations and the human rights Sub-Commission—indicated a shift in the political winds. At 
the 1957 Labour Party conference, MP Barbara Castle announced that if Labour won the next 
election, the new government would radically alter Britain’s Cyprus policy in favor of self-
determination. Harding had grown disillusioned at the lack of a political consensus at home, 
the explosion of communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the likelihood 
of troop reductions in the Cyprus garrison. Faced with these difficulties, Harding did not 
believe that the government in London would fully support the tough military measures 
necessary to defeat EOKA.248 
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Despite objections from within Whitehall, Foreign Office legal advisers determined 
that there were no legal grounds for rejecting the Sub-Commission’s request. At the Colonial 
Office, Lennox-Boyd and Minister of State Lord Perth concluded that Britain would stand in 
violation of the European Convention if it refused to permit the investigation. On November 
6, the Cabinet agreed to permit an on-ground investigation.249 After the decision, Deputy 
Governor George Sinclair expressed the sentiments of many within the Cyprus government 
when he wrote despondently that “London has failed us.”250 The investigators arrived in 
January 1958. Many Greek Cypriot interviewees raised the issue of ill-treatment even though 
it was beyond the Sub-Commission’s terms of reference.  British officials were livid that the 
Sub-Commission indulged witnesses by allowing them to describe and discuss ill-treatment, 
but they could not raise this issue with the investigators because, in Neale's words, “much of 
the material was culled from very delicate sources.” The Cyprus government had spied on the 
investigators’ confidential interview sessions.251  
On September 26, 1958, based on the Sub-Commission’s report, the European 
Commission determined that Britain had not exceeded its powers by implementing 
emergency regulations. The Commission’s report established three rulings. Legally, these 
decisions were non-binding. First, the report asserted that the Commission had authority to 
decide whether it could pronounce judgment on emergency measures that Harding had 
previously revoked—such as collective punishment, whipping, and some deportation orders. 
Secondly, the Commission ruled that it had the authority—the “competence,” in legal 
language—to determine whether “a public emergency threatening the life of the nation” 
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existed to the extent that justified derogation from the European Convention of Human 
Rights and the declaration of a state of emergency. The Commission determined that it was 
competent to make such a pronouncement. It also ruled that an emergency “threatening the 
life of the nation” did exist in Cyprus and therefore justified British officials' use of 
emergency powers. Finally, the Commission concluded that the existence of an emergency 
justified the regulations—curfews, detention without trial, arrest without warrant, and 
deportation—still in effect on the island.252  
The repercussions of the application could have been tremendous. If Britain were held 
to be in violation of the Convention, according to legal scholar A.W. Brian Simpson, “there 
would have to be a complete reappraisal of the mechanisms of repression which had been 
developed over the years, and which had never previously had to be justified in international 
proceedings.” Simpson notes that this doctrine reinforced the government's power over its 
citizens: “It can hardly be said that the outcome was a triumph for the international protection 
of human rights.”253 
Simpson is correct in point of law, but his focus on jurisprudence neglects broader 
implications of the Sub-Commission’s investigation on the conduct of war. The outcome of 
the application favored Britain, but this was not a clear-cut victory. The Greek application 
and subsequent investigation marked the first time that a group comprised almost entirely of 
foreigners—there was one British member of the Sub-Commission—formally investigated 
and judged whether a British colonial government had violated its subjects’ human rights. A 
precedent had been established that allowed for international oversight, intervention, and 
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investigation into alleged human rights violations under the terms of the European 
Convention. This precedent limited Convention signatories’ sovereignty in a way that did not 
previously exist in international law.254 Greek actions at Strasbourg therefore forced British 
officials to justify repression in Cyprus to an international audience before an internationally 
recognized human rights organization.  
Combined with Greek Cypriot lawyers' efforts to document abuses, file complaints, 
and defend clients in court, the Greek applications contributed to the emergence of an 
operational environment in which the legality of British actions faced constant scrutiny. As 
one report on interrogation procedures noted, “the shadow of the Committee of Human 
Rights, which sits in Strasbourg, looms large over Omorphita and over Police 
Headquarters.”255 The “rule of law” in Cyprus, far from reinforcing the legitimacy of British 
rule, came to represent British repression. Regardless of the legal outcome, Greece’s first 
application convinced British officials to respond to legal challenges by changing 
counterinsurgency policies and practices. 
Responding to the “Shadow of Strasbourg” 
Greece’s first application galvanized British resistance to a possible investigation into 
the second application and contributed to the Cyprus government’s “siege-mentality” 
regarding human rights abuses. At the Colonial Office, Aldridge worried that an investigation 
into torture charges would “hamstring the security forces.” In Cyprus, Deputy Governor 
George Sinclair deemed “the thought of a local enquiry” into the second application 
“intolerable.”256 The prospect of another international investigation unsettled members of the 
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Security Forces in Cyprus to such an extent that they did not wish to cooperate with 
representatives from Whitehall. In January 1958, the Foreign Office dispatched Hilary 
Gosling, a retired prosecutor, to prepare the government’s defense against ill-treatment 
charges. But members of the Security Forces were so suspicious of anyone outside the 
Cyprus government that many at first refused to allow Gosling to take statements. According 
to Sinclair, inquiries from the Colonial Office for details on the 49 torture cases “have 
inevitably caused deep misgivings in army, police and other Government circles.” Special 
Branch officers were especially disconcerted with “the fear that they may individually be 
brought before an international tribunal, either here, or in Strasbourg, on ludicrous but 
personally damaging charges.”257 Gosling only managed to convince these reticent officials 
to participate after promising that they could refuse to answer particular questions if they 
wished.258  
Cyprus officials were also concerned about the potential negative consequences of an 
investigation because of the likelihood that physical abuse had indeed occurred. Foreign and 
Colonial Office lawyers realized that “the political disadvantages of a breach of the 
Convention would be serious. It would receive widespread publicity and might seriously 
damage our reputation as one of the principal guardians of Human Rights. Many of our 
friends would be puzzled and dismayed, and our opponents elated.” Britain could expect to 
suffer most from such negative ramifications at the United Nations, where they depended on 
support for their Cyprus position from NATO and Commonwealth countries as well as 
abstentions from the United States and India. A negative verdict from the European 
Commission of Human Rights or a British refusal to cooperate with the Commission “might 
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even contribute to the adoption of a resolution hostile to us; it would also encourage the 
Greeks to call for a United Nations Commission of enquiry in Cyprus.”259  
The nature and ramifications of Application No. 299/57 also differed significantly 
from the previous Greek application. The Sub-Commission established to inquire into the 
first Greek application took evidence primarily from senior military and civilian officials in 
an attempt to determine whether Britain’s use of emergency powers in Cyprus was necessary 
and appropriate. The second application, however, would involve testimony from middle- 
and lower-ranking officials. At the War Office, the Chiefs of Staff strongly opposed the idea 
of another Sub-Commission inquiry. The possibility of soldiers testifying “as the alleged 
perpetrators of the ‘atrocities’” was particularly troubling. Sir Gerald Templer, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff and “hero” of the Malayan Emergency, was concerned that the Sub-
Commission might interview junior officers and enlisted soldiers rather than limiting their 
inquiries to a handful of senior officers. Such questioning before an inquisitive Sub-
Commission of foreign lawyers would, Templer believed, seriously damage soldiers’ 
morale.260 
 As law officers prepared Britain’s defense against the second Greek application, three 
additional human rights-related developments occurred in Cyprus: The renewal of EOKA’s 
atrocity campaign, the arrival of a new Governor, and the subsequent creation of a 
counterpropaganda force—the Special Investigation Group. In the first of these 
developments, Greek Cypriot human rights committees resumed their advocacy efforts in 
April 1958 as a result of ill-treatment allegations after a detention camp riot. On May 5, John 
Clerides held a press conference to chastise British troops for mistreating Greek Cypriot 
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civilians in the aftermath of an EOKA attack on two Military Police officers.261 Deputy 
Governor Sinclair declared that “a planned propaganda campaign to discredit the Security 
Forces is now under way.”262  
In its eagerness to discredit the Security Forces, EOKA publicized British misdeeds 
even when those “misdeeds” were false. Throughout 1958, British forces documented several 
instances in which pro-EOKA villagers purposefully destroyed property after cordon and 
search operations and claimed injuries by bandaging non-existent wounds. Greek-language 
newspapers often published inaccurate or exaggerated stories. In May 1958, Ethnos published 
the allegation that several young Greek Cypriot girls were “offensively searched” by a British 
soldier disguised “as a Turkish woman.” But British soldiers were not involved in this 
incident and the searcher was, in fact, a Turkish woman. Other stories proved more difficult 
to verify. In response to military police searches in Famagusta, the newspaper Eleftheria 
wrote of the “extremities embarked upon by the British Forces against innocent civilians” on 
what will be remembered as “a black day in the annals of a Christian nation.”263  
Such allegations, however, were difficult to prove. Even with the benefit of hindsight, 
it is difficult to establish the veracity of many accusations. It is equally difficult to disprove 
them. EOKA propaganda further complicated the picture. Fabricated claims, however, did 
not appear to have been included in the 49 cases submitted to the European Commission for 
Human Rights. In his exhaustive study, Simpson found that the allegations included in the 
second application “are not in the main implausible; what is alleged is the sort of thing which 
might well have occurred, given the situation in Cyprus and the importance of intelligence.” 
But prisoners also had reasons to claim that they had been tortured. Prisoners who were 
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released after interrogation—rather than being detained—were regarded suspiciously by 
EOKA. Released prisoners could claim that they had been tortured to avoid suspicion that 
they had informed on their comrades as a condition of their release. Simpson believes that the 
Greek Cypriot lawyers who handled the documentation for these cases must have realized the 
importance of selecting cases in which the evidence was strong enough to potentially sway a 
body of expert international lawyers such as the members of the European Commission for 
Human Rights. Unsubstantiated allegations therefore would not have been included.264  
 In the midst of controversy over human rights investigations and torture allegations, 
Cyprus received a new Governor—Sir Hugh Foot. Foot hailed from a well-known left-wing 
political family. His father Isaac was a prominent Liberal MP and former President of the 
Liberal Party Sir Hugh’s older brother, Sir Dingle Foot, was a lawyer and Liberal MP who 
switched parties to Labour in 1957. He later became Solicitor-General for England and Wales 
in the 1960s. John Foot was also an MP, but remained with the Liberal Party despite its post-
Second World War decline. Journalist and youngest brother Michael Foot was a Labour MP 
from 1945-1955, before assuming the post of editor of the Tribune during the 1950s. Michael 
was a sharp critic of the ruling Conservative Party and its repressive Cyprus policy. He 
lambasted the Cyprus government because it “fears the truth—or fears argument about it. 
That is how we teach the Cypriots democracy.”265  
Foot’s political orientation toward Cyprus differed tremendously from that of 
Harding. Foot was more reluctant to carry out death sentences, but that did not mean that 
capital offences were not committed under his tenure. Quite the contrary—those convicted of 
capital crimes such as murder or possession of firearms still faced mandatory death sentences. 
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Foot ordered his Solicitor-General to provide a fortnightly list of all pending capital cases. 
During 1958, the list usually included between 11 and 27 pending cases. Throughout the 
second half of 1958 there were 20-25 capital cases pending at any given time. Foot regularly 
granted reprieves—no Greek Cypriots were executed for emergency-related offenses during 
Foot’s governorship.266 The new Governor was also much less likely to ignore dubious 
interrogation practices. In his September 29, 1958 message to the troops, Foot insisted that 
“there must be no bullying or brutality.”267  
Tension between the new Governor and his Security Force commanders soon 
emerged over security policy. Director of Operations Major General Douglas Kendrew, A.J. 
Reddaway, and George Sinclair hoped to continue tough military measures against EOKA, 
whereas Foot intended to reach out to Greek Cypriots to find a negotiated settlement. Many 
within the army and police had given up hope that peace could be negotiated and believed 
that they had lost Greek Cypriot loyalties for good. Foot’s “peace” orientation meant that 
political decisions—such as the release of detainees—often trumped military considerations, 
which contributed to the growing rift between the Security Forces and the new Governor. To 
make matters worse, many senior Security Force officers blamed Foot for the European 
Commission on Human Rights investigation, even though he did not arrive until December 
1957 and had nothing to do with the British government’s decision to permit the inquiry.268 
Foot’s concern with ill-treatment rumors also did not ingratiate him with the Security 
Forces. Bothered by the persistence of abuse allegations, Foot asked Reddaway for advice on 
what to do. Reddaway said to make a short notice visit during the next military operation to 
see for himself how the troops conducted interrogation. Foot did, and did not see any 
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untoward behavior, but the “point was the deterrent effect of the Governor going out on the 
spot to see for himself.” Reddaway believed that this was beneficial, “although much 
criticized in Army and Police circles at the time.”269 Foot’s on-the-spot visits during ongoing 
operations, however, did not address the main problem. Allegations most often resulted from 
interrogation at Omorphita Police Station, not the point of capture. Nevertheless, facing the 
potential of a second Strasbourg inquiry and a renewal of the “atrocity campaign,” Foot 
wanted to prevent future accusations of brutality. Sinclair and Reddaway conceptualized a 
way to do so.  
The Special Investigation Group 
Sinclair, Reddaway, Director of Operations Major General Douglas Kendrew, and 
Henry collaborated to form the Special Investigation Group (SIG). SIG was established “to 
enquire into allegations against the Security Forces with a view to establishing the facts and 
disproving malicious misrepresentations.” Sinclair highlighted SIG’s importance to the 
administration’s counterinsurgency effort:  
Experience with the Human Rights Committee locally and in Strasbourg and in 
dealing with the smear campaign in the press abroad has shown us that we cannot 
afford to let the allegations pass uninvestigated and unchallenged. We therefore must 
make this investigating team an important unit in our campaign to defeat EOKA.270 
 
The group comprised military and police CID members able to “operate quickly and 
effectively” in response to allegations of Security Force abuses.271 The three permanent 
members of SIG were Chief Superintendent R.A.P.H. Dutton of the Cyprus Police CID, 
Detective G.E. Whitcomb, also of CID, and army Major M.F. Drake. They received 
temporary assistance from members of Cyprus Police CID, the army’s Special Investigation 
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Branch, and RAF CIS.272 Later, an additional eight police, army, and civil service officers 
were assigned as regional SIG liaisons to the Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos, and 
Kyrenia districts.273  
Sinclair and Reddaway viewed SIG as an important element of the British 
counterpropaganda campaign rather than an independent and objective investigatory arm. 
Sinclair informed Reddaway of his desire to “keep to the principle and practice, which we 
have followed for the last 2 ½ years, namely that if a properly supported complaint is made 
against the Security Forces it will be carefully investigated and those concerned will either be 
cleared or have the matter brought home to them.” Yet in the same letter he betrayed his real 
motivation:   
I am determined that, when the Security Forces are facing a most difficult and 
dangerous task, they shall be given the utmost support against the campaign of 
misrepresentation and false allegations which now seems to be developing.274 
 
SIG’s importance as a counterpropaganda tool was further emphasized during a May 8, 1958 
meeting at Government House between Sinclair, Henry, Reddaway, and Chief of Staff 
Brigadier Gleadell. They noted that “in countering the smear campaign Government should 
select the ground for its counter attack and make an all-out effort where the detractors of the 
Security Forces had obviously put themselves in a false position.”275 Gleadell made this clear 
in a June 12 memorandum to all area commanders. SIG’s duties were: 
to investigate immediately, and record, the facts in major cases of allegations against 
the conduct of the Security Forces, with a view to:-  
(a) issuing a prompt, positive and accurate denial of any false allegations. 
(b) Preparing the ground in cases where legal action could be taken against the 
offenders [meaning those individuals or organizations making false allegations], 
with minimum delay. 
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(c) Maintaining a record for use, if required, before the Human Rights Committee. 
(d) Forestalling subsequent faked or exaggerated allegations.276 
The correspondence produced by Sinclair and Gleadell indicated that SIG was designed to 
deny allegations and expose false claims, not to conduct objective, impartial investigations 
that could potentially expose Security Force misconduct. SIG’s leader, Chief Superintendent 
Dutton, also clearly understood his role: “The immediate tactical aim of SIG is to wrest the 
initiative from EOKA in the propaganda field relating to allegations. The over-riding and 
ultimate aim encompasses the prevention of any allegations arising from Security Forces’ 
action.” SIG existed to find false allegations, not to punish those who committed real abuses. 
 SIG investigations helped the Cyprus government defend Security Force actions. In 
September 1958 the Mayor of Kyrenia complained that British troops ransacked a nearby 
village. Foot acknowledged that “damage was done and personal injuries were caused,” but 
stated that “I am satisfied from the report of the special investigation team that, although they 
were extensive, the damage and injuries were minor.”277 More allegations of physical abuse 
followed the arrest of Georghios Panayi. The subsequent SIG report exonerated the 
Omorphita interrogators and assuaged Foot’s concerns. “Thank you,” he wrote, “I have been 
worried by some of the accounts given of interrogation methods at Omorphita—and I am 
therefore glad to see this report.”278 Though personally averse to the cruel treatment of 
civilians, Foot made excuses for the soldiers’ conduct and used the SIG report to explain 
away the “extensive” damage and injuries. He continued: “When their comrades are killed, 
troops are naturally angry and roughness can and does take place in the heat of the pursuit of 
the murderers.”279 Foot therefore, perhaps unwittingly, excused the Security Forces for 
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brutality committed in the “heat of the pursuit.” Over the course of its existence, from June 
1958-February 1959, SIG investigated a total of 191 incidents.280 Rapid investigation of the 
most serious allegations enabled SIG to compile the British narrative of events and present it 
to public relations officials for public release. According to SIG’s first quarterly report, “the 
resulting statement, often published within 24 hours of the incident occurring, has forestalled 
major and protracted allegations.” SIG Chief Dutton concluded that SIG’s efforts “have 
begun to have a telling effect on EOKA propaganda in this particular sphere.” 281 
On other occasions, SIG served its counterpropaganda purpose by identifying and 
documenting false or exaggerated allegations. On August 7, 1958, Security Forces searched 
the village of Pano Panayia. After the search, villagers alleged that soldiers had stolen money 
or were “brutally ill-treated.” Within a week, SIG documented the allegations, investigated, 
and determined that “in practically all cases, the allegations of damage to property and 
furniture could not in any way be substantiated by the complainants.” Furthermore, “in two 
cases where damage to radio sets was alleged, both sets were actually found to be in working 
order.” As for the brutality accusations, SIG’s investigation revealed contradictions in the 
villagers’ stories. Twelve villagers alleged that they had been forced to stand for three hours 
facing a wall with bayonets pointed at their chests, but “failed to explain how the bayonets 
were pointed at their chests when they were facing a wall.” None of the villagers were able to 
“show any marks of ill-treatment whatsoever.” There was one allegation, however, which 
rang true: “All the villagers complained that troops used insulting language toward their 
priests and themselves.” SIG recommended that “great advantage would be gained by the SF 
if troops could at least partly restrain their language towards the local inhabitants.” The two 
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village priests told SIG investigators that “had the soldiers not used insulting language 
towards them there would have been no trouble.”282 In another case, a sixteen-year old girl 
alleged that two Women Police Constables beat her for 25 minutes. She claimed that after the 
beatings, the police officers “applied an ointment to her body which thereupon removed all 
traces of ill-treatment!” The fact that, upon questioning, none of the girl’s fellow villagers 
reported seeing two Women Police Constables further undermined her claims. Even so, SIG 
officers reported, “the local Greek press printed her tale in full.”283  
SIG counterpropaganda tactics evolved to include photographic documentation, 
which made exaggerated claims more difficult to sustain. In the aftermath of one cordon and 
search operation, SIG officers surmised that “villagers have been taught to exaggerate 
damage” and “apply for heavy compensation from Government.” Subsequent Greek Cypriot 
claims of damages exceeded those documented by SIG, and SIG reported that one villager 
was “caught in the very act of disarranging the furniture of a house” which “proved beyond 
any doubt the purposeful ‘rigging’ of certain premises after the Security Forces had 
withdrawn.” To forestall such problems in the future, SIG determined “to take photographs of 
all premises likely to be used as a basis for allegations of serious damage.” SIG 
recommended that military units “should adopt this measure as a routine procedure” as 
well.284 Dutton extolled the tactic of photographing damaged property as “a psychological 
factor in that complaints of damage were not exaggerated when the owner/occupier was 
present to see his premises being photographed.” SIG’s use of photography spread to other 
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units, which, Dutton reported, “were issued with cameras and encouraged to carry out this 
practice as a matter of normal routine after a thorough search of any premises.”285  
False or exaggerated allegations, however, sometimes contained at least a kernel of 
truth. As EOKA began using pressure mines against British patrols and convoys, some troops 
started taking Greek Cypriot civilian “hostages” who the troops would force to ride on British 
vehicles with the soldiers. The idea was to deter EOKA from planting mines or attacking 
patrols when Greek Cypriot civilians were in danger. Greek Cypriots complained about the 
practice and SIG quickly investigated. According to Dutton, “investigation into a few cases 
revealed a measure of indiscretion in three instances,” but in general the troops “were well 
aware of the rules.”286  
SIG sought to deflect accurate “hostageship” allegations by focusing instead on the 
most egregious examples of false claims, such as the case of teenager Demos Xenophontos. 
On November 27, 1958, Xenophontos told his relatives and neighbors that British troops 
arrested him during the night and kept him as a hostage in a British patrol car. The Greek-
language newspaper Harvaghi quickly published his account. But when SIG contacted 
Xenophontos to investigate his claims, Xenophontos admitted to having concocted the entire 
story “to cover his amours and thus allay the cajolings of his co-villagers.” At SIG’s request, 
colonial public relations officials met with Harvaghi’s editor and demanded that he print a 
retraction, which was published on December 19.287  
To accomplish its counterpropaganda mission, SIG sought to cast the most ridiculous 
false or exaggerated allegations not as the extreme of Greek Cypriot behavior, but as the 
norm.  British officials treated ill-treatment allegations as enemy propaganda, part of a 
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“smear campaign”—a notion that EOKA often reinforced. One late-1958 EOKA leaflet 
called abuse allegations “a dynamic weapon against the British Forces in Cyprus in the 
international field.”288 By emphasizing the outlandishness of some Greek Cypriot allegations, 
British officials hoped to undermine all Greek Cypriot allegations. SIG was meant to 
highlight the worst excesses of exaggerated, ill-founded Greek Cypriot torture and abuse 
claims while documenting an “official” British narrative of each incident so that the Cyprus 
Government could shield its soldiers and police from local or international scrutiny. SIG 
therefore formed a shield against the encroaching “shadow of Strasbourg.” 
Besides exposing false or exaggerated allegations, SIG sought to protect the Security 
Forces’ public reputation. In August 1958, during Operation Swanlake, SIG investigations 
provided the material for four press statements. Labour MP Barbara Castle publicly criticized 
the Swanlake operation, which led Dutton to conclude in one of his reports that “the actions 
and alleged statements of Mrs. Barbara Castle, M.P., who visited the villages, only served to 
exacerbate the battle of words.” Dutton’s statement regarding a “battle of words” indicates 
his perception of himself as part of that battle. Dutton saw his role at SIG in terms of 
influencing the propaganda war, not as an impartial investigator. During operations around 
Paphos in September, SIG contributed to four additional press statements.  “It is true to say 
that a denial lacks the news-catching appeal of a sensational rumour or first report. It is a dull 
negative statement. Hence SIG have persistently avoided use of ‘flat denials’ and clichés such 
as ‘a tissue of lies.’”289  
SIG’s actions improved the Cyprus government’s ability to respond to atrocity 
allegations. Before SIG’s creation, British officials were on the defensive. News reports 
would often appear two or three days after an incident occurred. But SIG’s immediate on-the-
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spot investigations meant that the first reports about an event were British reports. SIG-
derived press releases “became news items and, at the same time, forestalled gross 
exaggerations and false allegations.”290 By October 1958, British forces in Kyrenia and had 
fully integrated SIG into cordon and search operations through “a set drill.” Troops would 
cordon an area, impose a curfew for the duration of the operation, and search the area. Once 
the search was complete, SIG would move in before the curfew was removed and investigate 
any major complaints. They would have a statement ready for release to the press soon after 
the operation concluded. “The resulting statements to the press,” Dutton wrote, “have, almost 
invariably, scotched the wild and exaggerated allegations that, hitherto, always used to appear 
in the local press after such operations.”291  
 Most SIG investigations resulted from army searches of civilian communities rather 
than the abuse of prisoners during interrogation. On the occasions when SIG addressed ill-
treatment during interrogation, the group reported what had become a standard line:  
In cases of ill-treatment alleged to have occurred whilst in detention—particularly in 
Omorphita cells, Nicosia—complainants talk of the ‘water treatment’; genitals being 
twisted or given electric shocks; receptacles being placed on the head and beaten 
endlessly; being made to stand up all night; and being deprived of food and water. 
  
The burden of proof, however, lay with the accuser. Chief Superintendent Dutton observed 
that in interrogation cases complainants were “unable to show any injury received as a result 
of these ‘tortures.’” But some of these abuses—“water treatment,” deprivation of food, and 
standing all night, for instance—would not have left visible injuries. SIG did not pursue these 
cases further.292  
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In 1956 and 1957, Greek Cypriot lawyers had raised credible allegations that British 
forces tortured detainees during interrogation, but by 1958 EOKA and its sympathizers 
broadened the scope of allegations too far. SIG discovered several occasions in which Greek 
Cypriots “faked” or exaggerated allegations against the Security Forces. SIG’s existence 
ensured that many of these accusations were identified and discredited. EOKA’s atrocity 
campaign was based on tangible evidence and reasonable suspicions of abusive British 
practices, but the fact that the campaign also involved instances of fabricated or exaggerated 
accusations indicates that EOKA appropriated human rights rhetoric to serve its propaganda 
objectives. EOKA’s actions, however, did not exonerate British forces from having to answer 
for their worst excesses. British authorities established SIG to prevent allegations of ill-
treatment, not to prevent ill-treatment itself. This desire to whitewash criticism of the 
Security Forces can be seen through the government response to two incidents at Geunyeli 
and Famagusta.  
The Geunyeli Massacre 
The Geunyeli massacre of June 1958occurred against a backdrop of escalating 
tensions and intercommunal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Violence broke 
out in response to international developments. In May, Foot convinced Prime Minister 
Macmillan to advance a solution for the Cyprus conflict on the basis of “partnership” 
between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Such a measure would provide the Turkish 
Cypriots with wide powers of autonomy—but not the preferred Turkish Cypriot solution of 
partition—while Greek Cypriots would retain Cyprus as a single political entity, but one in 
which they would have to share power with Turkish Cypriots. The plan also made allowances 
for Turkey and Greece to each appoint a “representative” to the Cyprus government. A 
statement to this effect was due in the British Parliament on June 17. But extremists from 
both communities responded with a wave of killings and rioting. On the night of June 6, 
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Turkish Cypriots looted and burned Greek Cypriot houses. The Security Forces reacted 
slowly, failing to place a curfew on Turkish Cypriot neighborhoods until two days later. 
Suspicious Greek Cypriots believed that the British had colluded with Turkish Cypriots by 
allowing them to harm Greek Cypriot neighborhoods. The communal divide grew so sharp 
that British officials compared the situation to Arab-Jewish violence that preceded British 
evacuation from Palestine in 1947.293 
Several days later, outside Geunyeli village, eight Greek Cypriots died at the hands of 
Turkish Cypriot attackers. The British inquiry into the incident produced a straightforward 
and honest draft report authored by Chief Justice Sir Paget Bourke, but his rather mild 
critique of the British Army triggered a concerted effort to whitewash criticism of the 
Security Forces. Senior military and civilian officials in Cyprus and Whitehall took exception 
to Bourke’s opinion and intervened to remove the offending language from Bourke’s final 
report. 
On June 12, a police patrol encountered 35 Greek Cypriots congregated around two 
buses in a dry river bed near Skylloura village. The men were armed with sticks, shovels, 
stones, and pitchforks. The policeman on scene, Sergeant Gill, believed that the men were 
planning to attack Skylloura’s Turkish Cypriot community. Gill arrested the men and loaded 
them into the nearby buses. Escorted by two army armored cars, the buses drove toward the 
nearest police station to process the prisoners. But after a radio message instructed the troops 
not to bring the prisoners to the police station, the armored car escorts received orders, in the 
words of the official inquiry report, “to send the prisoners out of town into the country and 
make them walk home.” The armored car squadron leader, Major Redgrave, decided to drop 
the prisoners off north of Geunyeli village. They could walk the 10 miles to Skylloura and the 
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additional three and a half miles to Kondemnos, where many of the prisoners lived. The 
convoy drove through Geunyeli and stopped 400 yards north of the village. The patrol 
released the prisoners and told them to walk home. Several soldiers stood behind the 
prisoners with bayonets fixed—a not-so-subtle threat that the prisoners should begin their 
“walk.” The soldiers remained on the road and watched as the “walkers” crested a ridgeline 
and were out of sight. During the “walk,” a group of 50-100 Turkish Cypriots armed with 
sticks, axes, knives, and a few firearms attacked the Greek Cypriots. They “cut and 
bludgeoned” several Greek Cypriots. The British armored car patrol responded to the attack 
within five minutes. By the time the troops intervened, a large crowd of Turkish Cypriots had 
gathered outside Geunyeli and four Greek Cypriots lay dead. Four more later died of their 
wounds. Five others were severely wounded. Greek Cypriot survivors testified that had it not 
been for the returning British armored car patrol, “we would all have been slaughtered.”294 
The event caused uproar within the Greek Cypriot community, leading to a special 
inquiry into what Greek Cypriot newspapers now called the “Geunyeli Massacre.”295 Many 
Greek Cypriots believed that British troops had purposely deposited the unarmed victims in 
an area where they were sure to face a Turkish Cypriot attack. Foot immediately ordered 
Chief Justice Bourke to lead an inquiry into whether British forces were culpable for the 
Greek Cypriot deaths and announced that Bourke’s findings would be made available to the 
public.296 On June 20 Bourke began taking evidence from witnesses. Attorneys representing 
four concerned parties attended the hearing—Sir James Henry represented the government, 
George Chryssafinis, John Clerides, and Stelios Pavlides led a team of five other lawyers 
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representing the Greek Cypriot survivors of the incident and relatives of the deceased; 
Colonel J. C. Hamilton represented the military, and Turkish Cypriot attorney Rauf Denktash 
appeared on behalf of four Turkish Cypriot police and auxiliary police officers. Over the next 
eight days, attorneys called 37 witnesses.297 After completing the hearings, Bourke 
established that British troops did not intend to cause a massacre, but he criticized the 
practice of bussing recalcitrant civilians to isolated areas and forcing them to “take a walk” 
home.298 
 Bourke noted that it was an “accepted practice” among the army for arrested persons 
“to be brought off some distance and caused to walk back to their homes.” According to 
Bourke, the “walking home” tactic was an unofficial practice which Security Forces used “to 
give troublesome persons ‘a little exercise’ so that they should behave themselves and have 
‘time to meditate upon their doings.’ It was a way of teaching people a ‘lesson.’” Major Roy 
Redgrave, commander of the armored car squadron, said that “it was quite a normal thing.”299  
Senior police officers, however, found the practice repugnant. Two senior police 
officers—the Assistant Chief Constable for Nicosia District and the Assistant Superintendent 
responsible for Geunyeli—said that they had never heard of the practice before the June 12 
incident. The Assistant Superintendent tartly observed that he was not aware of the technique 
because “I think irregularities of that nature would not be brought to our attention, that is the 
reason.” Although soldiers used the practice regularly, all of the army witnesses who testified 
at the Geunyeli hearing concurred with Major Medlen’s frank concession that “I think to be 
perfectly honest, it is an unlawful practice.”300 
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Based on his inquiry, Bourke concluded that he could not in good conscience 
exonerate the Security Forces for their actions. He noted that “I have been invited by Colonel 
Hamilton, representing the Military, to find not only that everyone acted in good faith, which 
I have had no difficulty in doing, but also that the order given and action taken upon it were 
reasonable. I am unable to do so.”301 Bourke concluded that although the army did not intend 
to cause harm, the commander’s decision to release the Greek Cypriots between two Turkish 
Cypriot villages and force them to walk out of sight of the Security Forces was both poor and 
unlawful. Given the recent spate of communal violence, the commanding officer should have 
realized the potential dangers facing his former prisoners.  
  But some influential military officers and civilian officials rejected Bourke’s findings 
and tried to shape the content of Bourke’s report. General Sir Roger Bower, Commander-in-
Chief of Middle East Land Forces, declared Bourke’s assessment of the Security Forces’ 
conduct to be “a non sequitor quite unsupported by the facts.” Bower believed that Bourke’s 
criticism would “cause some comment if the Report is published as it stands. I hope that it 
will not be.”302 Bower’s main objection was Bourke’s condemnation of the soldiers’ decision 
to release the prisoners in the vicinity of a Turkish Cypriot village during a time of communal 
violence. Specifically, Bower wanted Bourke to delete two sentences and the record of 
questions that Bourke asked Major Redgrave. Bourke wrote that “The only conclusion I can 
reach is that the course adopted was unimaginative and ill-considered.” He followed that 
sentence with “It was also, in my opinion, unlawful.”303 Major General Kendrew agreed with 
Bower. Kendrew wrote that “although this particular action [the “walking home” practice] 
has been technically ruled unlawful, under the circumstances it was justified.” Kendrew 
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insisted that the practice “had been most effective” in averting civil war between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. The section of the report containing Bourke’s criticisms—paragraph 38—
was, to Kendrew, “unacceptable in its present form.” Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir 
Gerald Templer concurred with Bower’s and Kendrew’s assessments.304  
In Whitehall, senior civilian officials also objected to Bourke’s findings and, like their 
military counterparts, tried to shape the content of Bourke’s report to avoid any admission of 
Security Force culpability in the massacre. Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd insisted 
that publication of the report could “further exacerbate inter-communal feeling and I fear that 
particularly the statement in paragraph 38 that the course adopted was ‘unlawful’ would 
produce worst possible reaction amongst Security Forces themselves.” Lennox-Boyd and 
Secretary of State for War Christopher Soames lodged their “strongest objection to 
publication.” More worryingly, they declared that “publication of report in [its] present form 
might well lead to civil action against individuals and even pressure for prosecution.” Soames 
preferred for Bourke’s report never to be published, but Lennox-Boyd thought that it might 
be possible to convince Bourke “that he should draft a shorter statement of conclusions which 
could be published with less embarrassment.”305 In Cyprus, George Sinclair concurred with 
his superiors in London, recognizing that Bourke’s criticism of the “walking home” practice 
could carry significant consequences with the European Commission of Human Rights: “The 
local ‘Human Rights’ organisation no doubt intend to use this incident as part of their 
campaign of vituperation of the Security Forces at Strasbourg and possibly the U.N.”306 
In the midst of debate over the report’s publication and content, Governor Foot 
adamantly maintained that “I would see objection to not publishing the report in full.” He 
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believed that Bourke’s report fulfilled the purpose of the inquiry, which was to investigate the 
“terrible accusation” levied in the Greek-language press that Security Forces “acted in 
collusion with Turks to destroy the Greek villagers.” Foot concluded that “the Chief Justice’s 
report provides a very able and clear and fair account of what took place.” “I myself,” he 
continued, “consider that the practice of putting down arrested people a long way from their 
villages and making them walk home at a time of inflamed intercommunal feeling was 
wrong. I cannot disagree with the Chief Justice when he said that the course adopted was 
‘unimaginative and ill-considered.’”307 Foot ordered the Security Forces to stop using the 
practice.308 Although he disagreed with the army commanders and his Colonial Secretary 
over the report’s publication, Foot assured them that “since all concerned acted entirely in 
good faith there is no question of taking any disciplinary action against any members of the 
Security Forces.”309   
Officials in the Colonial Office continued to push Foot and Bourke on the issue of 
publication. Conveying the Colonial Secretary’s sentiments, J.A. Peck and J.D. Higham 
suggested that Bourke prepare a short statement for publication that did not include a 
reference to “the opinion that the action of the security forces was unlawful.”310 In early 
September, Bourke met with Peck and Higham in Whitehall. Peck explained his concern that 
“publication of the full report might, however, create certain difficulties and embarrassment, 
in particular the opinion given in paragraph 38 that the action of the Security Forces was 
unlawful. This opinion might make it difficult for Greek Cypriots not to take criminal or civil 
proceedings against the members of the Security Forces concerned.” Higham added that “it 
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had been officially stated on a number of occasions, in a ‘human rights’ context, that 
misconduct by members of the Security Forces would not be tolerated and that offenders 
would be punished. If the Chief Justice’s opinion was made public, there might be a good 
deal of pressure on the Cyprus Government itself to prosecute those concerned.”311  
Peck and Higham attempted to convince Bourke to remove his statement that the 
“walking home” practice was unlawful on the grounds that Bourke’s comments represented a 
legal opinion, not an official finding. Peck pointed out that Bourke’s inquiry was established 
to ascertain the events that occurred on June 12, 1958 in Geunyeli and whether British forces 
bore any responsibility for the deaths of eight Greek Cypriots. The inquiry was not designed 
to pronounce judgment on the “walking home” practice. Bourke agreed that he would omit 
the sentences in which he deemed “walking home” unlawful. Bourke also agreed to remove 
Major Redgrave’s evidence in paragraph 32 because it was “merely an extract of evidence, 
and not a finding.” But Bourke refused to eliminate all of paragraph 38 from the record. 
Based on the law, Bourke insisted, “it was doubtful whether a Commissioner, having heard 
his inquiry and submitted his report, had the power to alter or amend it.”312 Echoing Peck’s 
rationale, Solicitor-General Ned Munir argued that Bourke’s assertion about the unlawfulness 
of the Security Forces’ decision to make their prisoners “walk home” was not a “fact” in “the 
strict sense of the term.” It was, instead, the Chief Justice’s opinion. As such, Munir argued, 
Bourke’s opinion could “properly be omitted from the findings to be published.”313  
In November, Foot helped to mediate a solution in which Bourke agreed to delete the 
sentences to which Bower and Darling had originally objected while Bower and Darling 
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acquiesced in principle to the publication of Bourke’s report.314 Foot convinced the generals 
that “much more harm will be done if we refuse to publish than if we do. Refusals to publish 
the findings may well be taken as indicating that there is some foundation for the terrible 
accusation that British Security Forces acted in collusion with Turks to bring about the 
murder of the Greek villagers.” Foot also believed that he could not delay the report’s 
publication much further—over four months had already elapsed since the Geunyeli incident. 
During this time, the murders and the inquiry faded from public view, but Foot expected “that 
the matter will be raised again before long—possibly in the U.N. debate or at Strasbourg.”315 
But Bower preferred to publish the report only after deleting the entire paragraph in which 
Bourke criticized the “walking home” practice. Bourke refused to remove the paragraph. Foot 
supported Bourke: “There surely could be no justification for publishing the findings with the 
omission of one of the findings because we disliked it.”316 The paragraph stayed, but the 
offending sentences did not. 
The omission of key sentences regarding the “walking home” practice’s legality 
constituted a manipulation of the commission of inquiry’s findings. On November 22, 
Lennox-Boyd finally authorized Foot to publish Bourke’s report, “with omission of 2 
sentences of para. 38 agreed by Chief Justice” and the exclusion of “[Major] Redgrave’s 
evidence in para. 32.”317 One week later, with the U.N. debate approaching, Lennox-Boyd 
recommended that Foot defer publication of the report until after the debate.318 Bourke’s 
report was finally published on December 9—almost six months after the incident and five 
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months after Bourke completed his inquiry.319 Pressure from senior leaders such as Lennox-
Boyd, Soames, Bower, and Darling resulted in the publication of a report that whitewashed 
British actions. Without Bourke’s condemnation, the Security Forces had little to fear from 
the report’s publication. Their conduct would not face further scrutiny either locally or in 
Strasbourg. 
“Cold Fury”: The Cutliffe Murder 
Officials also whitewashed criticism of the Security Forces’ brutal response to the 
murder of Catherine Cutliffe. On October 3, 1958, two sergeants’ wives from the Royal 
Artillery’s 29th Field Regiment, Catherine Cutliffe and Elfriede Robinson, along with 
Cutliffe’s 18-year-old daughter Margaret, visited the picturesque seaside Famagusta suburb 
of Varosha for a shopping trip. As they left a dress shop, two EOKA gunmen confronted 
them. The women tried to run away but were shot as they fled. Catherine Cutliffe died 
instantly while Robinson fell wounded. The gunmen shot Robinson two more times as she 
lay on the ground, but she survived. Margaret Cutliffe escaped unharmed. A Greek Cypriot 
shopkeeper phoned the police to report the murder. Upon hearing that the victims of the 
attack were the wives of two British soldiers, British soldiers reacted with tremendous fury. 
Royal Military Police units were the first to arrive on scene and ordered the arrests of 
everyone in the immediate vicinity of the murder and all males between the ages of 15-27 in 
the neighborhoods around Varosha.  
Soldiers and police rounded up the town’s inhabitants with little regard for niceties.320 
Civilian property damage compensation payments later totaled £14,223. One shop was 
looted, with the owner later receiving £91 in compensation. Several storefront windows and 
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car windows were also smashed. The troops made 1423 arrests in the vicinity of the 
murder.321 They were detained in three holding centers—the local police station, Karaolos 
Camp, and the government hospital. Soldiers moved with such fury that 258 people suffered 
injuries of varying severity, from bruises and scratches to fractures. It took the rest of the day 
and much of the night before the army had screened all detainees. The last detainees to be 
released were sent home at 3:00 AM on October 4.322  
As they were brought to holding centers on Security Force cantonments, many 
arrested persons suffered further abuse. By evening, Karaolos Camp—29 Field Regiment’s 
headquarters—held 396 of the 1423 detainees. Troops transported prisoners by truck to a 
drop-off point 70 yards from the entrance to the detainee holding center, which soldiers 
nicknamed the “snake pit.” SIG chief Dutton later recorded that the arrival of Greek Cypriot 
detainees “was soon common knowledge among soldiers not on duty in the camp, as, indeed, 
was the knowledge of the atrocious shooting of the wives.” Dutton concluded that “it cannot 
be denied that cold fury took a tangible form in goading the Greek Cypriots on their way as 
they doubled the 70 yards.”323 One 29 Regiment veteran described the events more candidly: 
All the other units in Famagusta were ordered out to arrest all males in Varosha 
between 14 and 60 and transport them to Karaolos Camp. We lined the roads from the 
Royal Ulster Rifles Gate. They were de-bussed and had to run the gauntlet to the 
Snake pit.324  
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Bill Packham, a 29 Regiment veteran, said that at the “snake pit” he “saw bodies laid out in 
rows, with the Medical Officer and medics attending to the injured Greek Cypriots.”325 
According to a hospital technician at the British Military Hospital, Nicosia, “the Ulsters had 
the reputation of being one of the roughest regiments on the Island.”326 Sixty-one of the 
Karaolos Camp detainees suffered injuries before British officers could restrain their men.327  
For Foot, the Security Forces’ anger at the murder of a family member was 
understandable, but their retaliation was counterproductive. When Governor Foot and 
General Kendrew visited the detainee holding sites, he found that “about fifty [detainees] 
were being given first aid for head wounds and other injuries and the nurses told me that 
another fifty had already been sent to hospital.” Foot admitted that “as I feared when the 
report of the shooting came in it was impossible to prevent the troops from dealing very 
roughly with many of those they arrested” because “for a number of reasons I am afraid that 
some troops and some Police too are inclined to deal very hardly with Greek Cypriots when 
they get the chance.” Yet he sternly insisted that “the very rough treatment of last night is 
quite inexcusable” and informed Whitehall that “I shall do my utmost to prevent it in future.” 
He understood that brutality could generate negative consequences at the United Nations, in 
Strasbourg, or in Britain. He quickly ordered SIG to investigate.328  
But Foot and Kendrew did not witness the Security Forces’ worst excesses. When 
word went out that Foot and Kendrew were on their way to Famagusta, soldiers began 
cleaning up the mess they had made. Lance Corporal Chas Baily of 227 Provost Company 
recalled that “we rounded up as many squaddies as possible and told them to pass the word 
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and got everybody cleaning up the main roads. We knew from past experience that no one 
would look down the side roads.” The side roads, however, “were a right mess. Blood, bits of 
clothing, odd shoes, shopping. . . . Ambulances were everywhere, the hospitals were full, and 
surgeries the same.” Regardless, “by the time HE [His Excellency, Governor Foot] arrived 
there was not much out of place.”329 
On the morning of October 4, after the “clean-up,” SIG began its investigation of the 
Security Force reaction to Cutliffe’s murder. For four days, SIG collected 44 statements, 
including 24 from Greek Cypriots alleging ill-treatment. In addition, SIG met with senior 
civilian officials—including the District Medical Officer and staff at the Famagusta 
hospital—and military officers “to gain as clear a picture as possible on the general discipline 
and conduct of all units involved on the operation.”330 In his report, Dutton stated that he 
sought “to present the facts, as revealed by a quick on-the-spot investigation, with which to 
counter false allegations or subsequent faked or exaggerated allegations.” The report “further 
serves as a record to refer to should the matter ever be raised at the Strasbourg Council.”331 In 
a second, routine quarterly update filed three months after the incident, Dutton wrote that 
“due to the swiftness of the operation at a time when the entire population were bent on 
getting home or out of Varosha on foot or in cars, it was inevitable that some force had to be 
used to detain, as a result of which a large number of persons sustained injuries varying in 
degree.” He further reported that “injuries, mostly superficial, were sustained by a large 
number of males.”332 
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Faced with significant evidence that Security Forces had committed brutal violence 
toward Greek Cypriot civilians, Dutton could not reconcile his instructions to both shield the 
Security Forces from scrutiny and report the facts. On October 14, as he finalized his report 
on the Famagusta events, Dutton visited Foot. He told Foot that he was “somewhat uneasy 
about attempting to record a conclusion.” Dutton explained that he could not in good 
conscience report that British forces had acted properly—because they had not—but SIG’s 
approach of documenting the “facts of the case” was supposed to protect the Security Forces 
from ill-treatment allegations. Foot provided the answer: “I told him that in my view it was 
not possible to say that the Security Forces carried out their duties with commendable 
restraint and I told him that to include this final sentence would, it seemed to me, detract from 
the value of the factual report which he had submitted.” In this case, Dutton was to record the 
facts, but neither defend nor accuse the Security Forces.333 The facts, however, were 
damning: Of the 258 Greek Cypriots injured, three died, two were wounded when soldiers 
fired on them, five suffered bone fractures, and 21 were hospitalized for further treatment.334 
The Inquest Debate 
Because three Greek Cypriot civilians had died under mysterious circumstances in 
British custody during the arrest operations which followed Cutliffe’s murder, several senior 
officials in the Cyprus government sought to avoid conducting inquests into their deaths. 
Major General Sir Kenneth Darling, Kendrew’s replacement as Director of Operations in 
Cyprus, was foremost among them. Cyprus law required that a coroner conduct an inquest in 
the event of an “unnatural” death. During the Emergency, inquests continued to be held on 
those who died as a result of security operations. Coroners therefore were required to hold 
inquests into the deaths of each of the three Greek Cypriots who perished during the October 
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3 arrest operations. Inquests served four primary purposes: To determine who died, when the 
death occurred, the place of death, and the circumstances of death. Inquests were not meant to 
determine who was responsible for an “unnatural” death, but because inquests established the 
cause of death in a particular case, inquests into deaths resulting from security operations 
could have important consequences for the Security Forces. Inquests were judicial 
proceedings in which soldiers and police could be called to testify in court. Family members 
of the deceased were permitted to attend the proceedings and entitled to legal 
representation.335 In Cyprus, the involvement of human rights committee lawyers ensured 
that members of the Security Forces would face intense questioning. Officials recognized that 
in this environment, inquest verdicts suggesting that the Security Forces bore responsibility 
for a civilian’s death would lead to public outrage among Greek Cypriots—outrage which 
would fuel EOKA propaganda. 
Darling sought to shield the Security Forces from legal action and public scrutiny by 
eliminating inquests. On October 16—while inquests into the Famagusta deaths were 
ongoing—Darling approached Attorney-General Sir James Henry and Solicitor-General Ned 
Munir with a suggestion: Amend Cyprus law to eliminate inquests in certain 
circumstances.336 Darling argued that inquests simply slowed the judicial system and 
needlessly involved soldiers in the legal process. Holding inquests “takes up a great deal of 
time” and many inquests were never completed because legal procedure instructed inquests to 
be stayed if criminal proceedings were pending—allowing the trial to determine the facts of 
the case. Darling’s most strenuous objection to inquests, however, was the involvement of 
soldiers in court proceedings. In a reference to the Cyprus Bar Council’s human rights 
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committees and EOKA’s “atrocity campaign,” Darling argued that soldiers “are very 
apprehensive of being brought up before the coroner and asked a great many questions about 
their actions by persons whose object was to make dishonest political capital and not just to 
safeguard the interests of deceased persons and their families.”337   
Chief Justice Sir Paget Bourke supported Darling’s view. Bourke, who had previously 
served as a justice during the conflicts in Malaya and Kenya, believed that “this whole 
inquest business is a nightmare. It was not allowed to worry us in the Kenya Emergency.”338 
Bourke had no problem with taking a hard line against insurgents. He informed Henry that 
“personally I would welcome the adoption of the Kenya and Malaya legislation substituting a 
procedure that would bring terrorists more speedily to trial.”339 
The issue of dispensing with inquests had been raised before. In 1956 Munir prepared 
a draft law that would dispense with inquests. The law was based on regulations previously 
enacted during the 1946-47 Palestine conflict and the Malayan Emergency. Munir’s draft 
stated that  
where the Coroner responsible for holding an inquest upon the body of any person is 
satisfied that such person has been killed as a result of operations by Her Majesty’s 
Forces or by the Police Force for the purpose of suppressing disturbances or for 
maintaining public order, the Coroner may dispense with the holding of an inquest on 
the body of such person.340  
 
If enacted, Munir’s draft would have allowed the Cyprus government to avoid conducting 
inquests into the circumstances in which three Cypriots died during the British reprisals on 
October 3.  
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Henry agreed with Darling and Bourke to an extent, but Henry also noted that in some 
circumstances an inquest might prove beneficial to the Security Forces. Henry told Foot that 
dispensing with inquests “might be the very strong factor in re-inforcing morale.”341 Inquests 
into persons killed during operations remained part of judicial procedure during the 
emergency because the inquest could help to dispel “otherwise unfounded and malicious 
allegations” against the Security Forces. In Avgorou, for instance, British forces opened fire 
on rioters and killed one bystander. Greek Cypriot newspapers criticized the soldiers’ actions, 
but the Coroner’s report determined that villagers had thrown rocks, sticks, and bottles at the 
troops, inflicting several injuries on British forces in the process. The soldiers fired one 
machine gun burst of 15 rounds. The Greek Cypriot bystander, a woman named Louka, died 
from a ricochet. Henry recommended a measure which would have allowed the “the Coroner 
or to some other authority such as myself” to conduct an inquest only “if it was thought 
advisable in the public interest.”342 
Foot ultimately decided to retain the preexisting inquest procedures.343 He wrote to 
the Colonial Office that “I very well understand how the Army feel about this and I should 
greatly like to help in shielding them from the public ordeal to which they are sometimes 
subjected at the inquests.” But Foot determined that inquests were necessary because “the 
fact that an inquest is to be held restrains Press comment and tends to prevent wild 
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accusations.” The elimination of inquests would result in allegations “of attempting to cover 
up evidence of ill-treatment or worse by Security Forces and such criticism would obviously 
be particularly damaging at this time following the inquests at Famagusta.”344  
Despite their concerns, army commanders need not have worried. Finalized between 
November 24 and December 3—as senior officials debated the necessity of holding inquests 
in the first place—the inquest reports exonerated British troops through masterful 
equivocation. The first detainee to die in custody was Panayiotis Chrisostomou, who 
collapsed as he was unloaded from an army truck. The coroner concluded that Chrisostomou 
died from heart failure brought on by “respiratory embarrassment caused by seven broken 
ribs.” The coroner determined that Chrisostomou’s ribs “were not broken before his arrest, 
and, consequently, they must have been broken whilst he was on the truck.” But the coroner 
did not go so far as to find British forces responsible for Chrisostomou’s injuries.345 Foot 
reported to the Colonial Office that “there is no sufficient or reliable evidence from which I 
can express an opinion on how the seven ribs came to be fractured.”346 The inquest succeeded 
in determining the cause of death, but did not identify a culprit. Law officers therefore could 
not pursue the matter further. 
The coroner likewise downplayed the Security Forces’ role in the death of Andreas 
Loukas, the second person to die in British custody on October 3, despite evidence to the 
contrary. According to SIG’s description of the coroner’s report, Loukas was killed “by a 
blow from a blunt instrument which fractured the skull.” Furthermore, the coroner stated that 
he “had not sufficient evidence to enable him to say when or by whom such a blow was 
struck.” SIG’s assessment of the coroner’s report was equally cautious and carefully 
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ambiguous: “it was obvious from this inquest that during the arrests or thereafter, there was 
used on some of those arrested a degree of force that would appear to be entirely 
unjustified.”347 Other evidence, however, suggested that an officer may have injured Loukas. 
At one point during the aftermath of Catherine Cutliffe’s murder, Royal Military Police 
Captain Blakesley struck Loukas on the head. But, as Foot reported to Whitehall, the coroner 
conveniently concluded that “he could not with any confidence say that it was Capt. 
Blakesley’s blow which fractured the deceased’s skull and that such being the case he did not 
propose to examine in detail the question of criminal liability or exoneration in so far as it 
affected Capt. Blakesley.” Grasping for a possible explanation for Loukas’ death, the coroner 
added that Loukas could have died “during his journey in the vehicle or when he alighted and 
was placed in the cage to which the arrested persons were taken.”348 
The third individual who died during the October 3 round-up was a young girl named 
Ioanna Zacharidou. British authorities insisted that she had not been touched by the Security 
Forces and her death had nothing to do with the military response to the Cutliffe murder.349 
After conducting an inquest, the coroner reported that Zacharidou “died of shock accelerated 
by status lymphaticus brought on by fear but there was insufficient reliable evidence to 
deduce what brought on the state of fear.”350 British officials appeared to eliminate the 
possibility that the Security Forces’ brutal response had anything to do with the “state of 
fear” to which Zacharidou eventually succumbed.  
Senior officials understood the damage done by the Cutliffe reprisals. “I must say,” 
Foot wrote, “that we should prevent any such actions ever taking place again.” George 
                                                            
347 FCO 141/4495 SIG Quarterly Progress Report, 1st October to 31st December 1958. 
 
348 FCO 141/4493 Governor to Colonial Office, 4 Dec 58. 
 
349 FCO 141/4493 Governor to Colonial Office, 1 Nov 58. 
 
350 FCO 141/4493 Governor to Colonial Office, 1 Dec 58. 
 
138 
 
Sinclair concurred that “much harm was done to our reputation at Famagusta on that day.”351 
Foot and Sinclair knew that the implications of events like the Famagusta reprisals could 
reverberate beyond Cyprus. The second Greek application under the European Convention on 
Human Rights was proceeding. From November 12-18, 1958, oral hearings were held in 
Strasbourg. The Sub-Commission eventually accepted 13 of 49 individual torture cases for 
further investigation. Foreign Office legal adviser Francis Vallat concluded that “we are now 
faced with the prospect of being called upon to fight the thirteen cases and to produce 
witnesses.”352  
Ultimately, officials’ attempts to cover up Security Forces transgressions were not 
necessary to defend British interests against the second Greek human rights application. The 
potential for a political settlement to the Cyprus conflict had emerged. From November 25-
December 4, Turkish and Greek diplomats agreed to begin negotiating an end to the Cyprus 
conflict. In mid-December, they met again in Paris. In February 1959, discussions between 
the Turkish and Greek governments in Zurich and between the Turkish, Greek, and British 
governments in London produced a political settlement between all three parties that was 
essentially imposed on Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike. Rather than achieving enosis or 
partition, Cyprus gained independence and remained a single political entity. As part of the 
settlement, the Greek and British governments agreed to jointly request that the European 
Commission terminate proceedings on Application 299/57. The Sub-Commission agreed.353 
The “shadow of Strasbourg” had receded.  
Conclusion 
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Greece’s applications before the European Commission of Human Rights forced 
Britain to respond to abuse allegations. Greek Cypriot lawyers and others who participated in 
the “atrocity campaign” were certainly partisan actors in the conflict, but in that regard they 
were no different from British authorities. Colonial officials manipulated legislation and the 
content of investigative reports to protect and enable the counterinsurgency effort. In Cyprus 
legal and human rights were not impartial entities. The realm of rights was a contested space 
populated by civilians, soldiers, journalists, politicians, and international jurists in which 
British authorities and pro-EOKA lawyers battled for primacy. Their struggle over laws and 
rights transformed rights issues into as much a part of the battlefield as the streets of 
Famagusta or the Troodos Mountains. British officials sought to wield the law as a weapon 
that could restrain their enemies’ freedom of action while enabling the Security Forces to 
operate with fewer restrictions. Greek Cypriot lawyers had an agenda, too—a pro-EOKA 
agenda—but it was an agenda that also included the protection of individual rights, at least 
for Greek Cypriot nationalists. 
 Abuse allegations led to the development of a “siege mentality” in which the Cyprus 
government sought to resist the notion that they had infringed on Cypriot rights. Colonial 
officials largely succeeded in this effort. They publicly defended their actions through a 
counterpropaganda campaign involving the documentation of false or exaggerated 
accusations which, once made public, would discredit the accusers. After its creation in June 
1958, the Special Investigation Group stood at the forefront of this effort. In addition, British 
officials stifled internal criticism of the Security Forces by intervening in the Chief Justice’s 
Geunyeli inquiry and attempting to dispense with inquests after the Cutliffe murder reprisals. 
Throughout the Cyprus conflict, colonial officials remained committed to protecting British 
forces from criticism by concealing evidence of their transgressions and undermining the 
credibility of their accusers. 
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Colonial cover-ups and scandals were not unique to Cyprus. During Kenya’s 1952-60 
Mau Mau conflict, British officials tolerated widespread violence against civilians and 
detainees during the war’s early years. Before 1956, this violence served a similar logic in 
Kenya as in Cyprus—coercive interrogation use to extract intelligence. Both Whitehall and 
the colonial government knew that such measures were widespread, but did little to stop 
them. After 1956, as government efforts to forcibly relocate hundreds of thousands of Kikuyu 
to detention camps gathered pace, torture emerged as a systemic practice which fed what 
historian David Anderson has called a “culture of impunity” among colonial Security Forces 
in Kenya.354 The most notorious atrocity to occur during the Kenya Emergency was the Hola 
massacre. Violence was systematic and pervasive at the Hola detention camp. On March 3, 
1959 guards beat 11 detainees to death for refusing to participate in forced labor. Opposition 
MPs and sympathetic journalists called for an inquiry and debate in the Commons. Labour 
MPs such as Barbara Castle joined with disgruntled Tories such as Enoch Powell to criticize 
the government’s Kenya policies in a Parliamentary debate. In 1959, Justice Patrick Devlin 
led a commission of inquiry into the colonial administration of Nyasaland’s actions during a 
state of emergency declared the previous year. The subsequent Devlin Report labelled the 
government’s actions as tantamount with that of “a police state.”355  
Greece’s applications under the European Convention on Human Rights inspired 
other anticolonial nationalists to follow suit in resisting the legalized repression that 
characterized Britain’s colonial counterinsurgencies. In February 1960, following the 
publication of the Devlin Report, a group of African lawyers traveled to Iceland in an attempt 
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to gain sponsorship from a state party to the European Convention. Iceland may have 
appeared an odd choice of sponsor, but at the time Iceland and the United Kingdom were 
involved in one of a series of fishing disputes called the “cod wars.” Led by Kenyama 
Chiume of Nyasaland and Kenya’s Joseph Murumbi, the delegation sought to convince the 
Icelandic government to submit an application protesting British violations of the Convention 
in Nyasaland and Kenya. Unfortunately for these anticolonial nationalists, their efforts 
proved fruitless. The Icelandic government expressed sympathy for the delegation’s 
intentions, but despite their animosity toward the UK, Iceland’s leaders ultimately declined 
the African delegation’s request.356  
British officials, too, learned from the Greek applications. Brigadier George Baker, 
who authored an after-action report on the Cyprus Emergency, concluded that the Security 
Forces’ experience with human rights complaints “was a bitter and distasteful experience.”357 
Deputy Governor George Sinclair later passed a copy of Baker’s report to the Governor of 
Aden. “Since then,” Sinclair wrote to Baker, the Governor of Aden “has sent to Cyprus two 
teams to study our arrangements for dealing with our Emergency. The officers who have 
come over have told me that your Report has been of the greatest value to them.”358 In Aden, 
rights activism and counterinsurgency policies collided again. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
“HUNGER WAR”: HUMANITARIAN RIGHTS AND THE RADFAN CAMPAIGN 
Introduction 
When Brigadier Baker’s report on the Cyprus Emergency arrived in Aden, it 
generated such interest that the Aden government decided to send a four-person liaison team 
to visit Cyprus in an effort to learn more about countering insurgencies.359 The Aden 
government would soon put theis new knowledge to work. By 1960, it was clear to British 
policymakers that the empire was crumbling. In February, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan 
gave his famous “wind of change” speech in South Africa, where he described the emergence 
of African anticolonial nationalism as “a political fact.” British withdrawal from many of its 
remaining African colonies was increasingly becoming a policy priority. Withdrawal from 
Africa, however, went hand-in-hand with the desire to maintain British influence “east of 
Suez,” meaning that Britain sought to maintain access to Persian Gulf oil. Three years after 
Macmillan’s speech, an anticolonial insurgency erupted in the colony of Aden—one of the 
three territories comprising the South Arabian Federation and a valuable base for securing the 
sea lanes between the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf. Within a decade, British forces had 
completely withdrawn from Aden in what many contemporaries viewed symbolically as the 
end of the British Empire.360  
In Aden, British officials used many of the same coercive tactics as their colleagues 
had in Cyprus, such as curfews, collective punishments, and abusive interrogations. Officials 
in Aden also tried to control the public narrative concerning brutal actions in order to protect 
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Britain’s reputation as a guarantor of human rights and justice. As the Emergency intensified, 
British officials faced scrutiny from the International Committee of the Red Cross and a 
newly established activist group called Amnesty International (AI). The ICRC’s interest in 
providing humanitarian assistance to refugees fleeing the Radfan violence and prisoners 
detained in South Arabian Federation jails was consistent with the ICRC’s support for what 
scholars called “humanitarian rights,” in which the ICRC asserted the right of all people to 
receive humanitarian aid.361 It was also similar to ICRC efforts during Britain’s colonial wars 
in Kenya and Cyprus.362 AI, however, added a new dimension to the Aden Emergency that 
was not present in Cyprus. Whereas most human rights activism during the Cyprus war came 
from partisan Greek Cypriot lawyers and their Greek government patrons, AI was a British-
based group dedicated to protecting the rights of individuals everywhere. The Aden conflict 
therefore exemplifies the growing influence of international non-governmental organizations 
in warfare—a trend that has become increasingly common since the 1960s.  
After the Aden Emergency began, British forced launched a massive operation in the 
Radfan, a mountainous region approximately 60 miles north of Aden city. British forces 
intended to wage a scorched earth campaign in the Radfan that was consistent with how they 
had handled “tribal” revolts in the past. British tactics harmed civilians and combatants alike, 
while also creating a refugee crisis. This humanitarian crisis, combined with the detention of 
many anticolonial nationalists in Aden, prompted ICRC efforts to provide humanitarian aid. 
The ICRC’s request was two-fold: They asked permission to provide humanitarian relief in 
the Radfan and to conduct periodic visits to South Arabian prisons to ensure that detainees 
were treated humanely. When British officials chose to block the ICRC from entering the 
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South Arabian Federation so that ICRC delegates would not discover the devastation caused 
by the campaign, the ICRC subtly forced its way into the Federation on an “unofficial” visit. 
The ICRC’s activism on behalf of humanitarian rights meant that during the Radfan 
campaign, British officials faced a difficult choice. They could either permit an ICRC visit 
that was likely to lead to private censure through the ICRC’s confidential reporting system, or 
they could refuse the ICRC’s request to enter the South Arabian Federation—a choice which 
British administrators expected would lead to public accusations that the government had 
“something to hide.” This chapter examines how Britain dealt with this dilemma.  
In contrast to Cyprus, where the British were often caught having to react to rights 
activists’ criticisms, colonial officers in Aden proactively shielded the brutal Radfan 
campaign from scrutiny. When the Radfan operation began in April 1964, colonial officers 
resisted calls by the ICRC to uphold humanitarian rights by preventing the ICRC from 
entering the South Arabian Federation. In February 1965, after the campaign had ended, the 
ICRC delegate forced his way into the Federation on an “unofficial” visit. High Commission 
officials recognized an opportunity to turn the ICRC’s presence into a public relations 
advantage for Britain. With the refugees having returned to their homes after the fighting and 
with the construction of a new, modern prison facility in November 1964 to house detainees 
in humane conditions, colonial officers realized that the ICRC was unlikely to find negative 
information to report. Officials could therefore benefit from the public image of allowing the 
ICRC to visit, but without the danger of this scrutiny leading to public criticism. By 
controlling the ICRC’s physical access to these sensitive sites, British officials sought to 
neutralize rights activists’ potentially reputation-damaging findings by restricting public 
knowledge of the Radfan campaign’s brutality. 
The Middle East Balance of Power and the Threat to Aden 
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The Aden insurgency was embedded in a regional balance of power in which Egypt 
challenged British influence in the Middle East. By the early 1960s, this struggle had 
expanded into a proxy war in Yemen which threatened the stability of the South Arabian 
Federation. For an important clique of Conservative Party policymakers, the maintenance of 
Britain’s great power status and geopolitical role in the Middle East depended on control of 
Aden.363 After losing control over the Suez Canal in 1956, Aden became the linchpin of 
British security in the Middle East.  
Aden was a key air and naval base for securing oil supply routes from the Persian 
Gulf to Britain. Persian Gulf oil was shipped from the Gulf to the Red Sea, through the Suez 
Canal, to Mediterranean and European markets. At the time, two-thirds of European oil 
traveled through the canal. To ensure that the British economy had access to the Gulf States’ 
vital oil resources, Britain established a series of defense treaties with states such as Kuwait 
and Oman. These defense arrangements influenced British policy in Aden. As one diplomat 
wrote, “if we were forced out of Aden our prestige in the Gulf would suffer severely.”364 
Maintaining a strong position in Aden would bolster Arab monarchies’ confidence in their 
British ally.  
Aden also played a valuable role in British Cold War strategy. It acted as a regional 
hub for deterring Soviet incursions into the Middle East and as a base for a potential 
deployment of Britain’s strategic reserve of ground forces. In 1963, the British signaled their 
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continued interest in bolstering their position in the Middle East when they merged the 
Crown Colony of Aden city with the Western and Eastern Aden Protectorates—rural 
territories governed by local Arab shaykhs, sultans, and emirs under British “protection”—
into the South Arabian Federation.365 Britain had essentially constructed a state of its own to 
counter the possible emergence of a pro-Nasser Yemen to the north. 
Under the 1963 merger, the South Arabian Federation became a hybrid polity which 
combined elements of direct colonial rule with limited local sovereignty. Local rulers 
retained sovereignty in the Federation territories of the Western and Eastern Aden 
Protectorates, but their rule was circumscribed by a series of “advisory treaties” with Britain. 
The original nineteenth-century treaty system consisted of a series of agreements between 
Britain and local tribal chiefs in which the chiefs received British protection in exchange for 
British political officers who would advise the chiefs on political and military matters. The 
treaty terms, however, mandated that local rulers obey this “advice.” In the 1930s and 1940s, 
new treaties extended this “mandatory advice” to welfare and development policies as a 
reaction to what the British perceived as Arab “misrule.” According to colonial officers, local 
shaykhs had done little to improve the lives of their followers. The new treaty terms gave 
British “advisers” control over internal governance, making “indirect” rule far more direct.366 
After the Aden Crown Colony merged with the two Protectorates in 1963, Britain retained 
advisory powers related to defense, foreign affairs, and internal security throughout the 
Federation.367 British officials could therefore make all key security-related decisions. 
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Middle East politics, however, were more complex than the Cold War struggle 
between superpowers as regional actors pursued independent agendas. The greatest threat to 
British primacy in the Middle East came from Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
Nasser represented a generation of anticolonial leaders who did not intend to maintain close 
ties with their former imperial masters. Instead, Nasser wanted to be rid of British 
influence.368 He opposed colonialism and advocated Egyptian nationalism, stating that “to be 
an Egyptian patriot was to struggle to cleanse Egypt of the British presence and to safeguard 
Egypt's territorial integrity.”369  In addition to his calls to rid Egypt of British influence, 
Nasser encouraged similar programs for all Arab territories. Under Nasser, Egypt adopted an 
aggressive foreign policy advocating pan-Arab solidarity, liberation from colonialism, and 
freedom from the interference of Cold War superpowers. In truth, Nasser’s relationship with 
each superpower was complicated. He cultivated close relations with the Soviet Union but 
did not embrace communism. In the United States, the Eisenhower Administration alternated 
between containing Nasser and trying to win his support.370 Britain, however, was Nasser’s 
implacable enemy. 
Throughout the 1950s, Nasser challenged Britain’s Middle Eastern supremacy.  In 
1955 Nasser took a leading role at the Bandung Conference in Indonesia, where he joined 
with delegates from newly independent states such as India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan, and 
China in denouncing colonialism.  The following year he nationalized the Suez Canal, which 
resulted in Britain’s failed Suez Canal intervention. In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, 
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Britain seemed to have reached a nadir in terms of its influence in the Middle East, but 
Nasser saw his popularity surge throughout the region. 371 
Nasser’s challenge to British primacy in the Middle East led to a series of 
confrontations between republican governments supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union 
against conservative Arab monarchies supported by the United Kingdom and United States. 
In September 1962 a coup d’état in Yemen installed a pro-Nasser republic in the country 
neighboring Britain’s Aden base. Republican conspirators failed to assassinate the ruling 
Imam of Yemen, Mohammad al-Badr, who fled to the northeast seeking refuge with 
supporters. The Yemen Revolution quickly descended into civil war. 372 
In response to the confrontation with Egypt and the 1962 Yemen Revolution, 
defeating Nasser became an obsession for British political leaders including Colonial 
Secretary Duncan Sandys, Minister of Aviation Julian Amery, MP Neil McLean, and 
Defence Secretary Peter Thorneycroft. Dubbed the “Aden Group,” these policymakers 
intended to strengthen British forces in the Middle East in order to curb Egyptian influence in 
the region.373  Prime Minister Macmillan supported the Aden Group and described the 
Egyptian threat in the gravest terms. Upon receiving a telegram urging reconciliation with 
Nasser, Macmillan furiously scribbled in the margins “for Nasser put Hitler and it all rings 
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familiar.”  Macmillan and the Aden Group were committed to resisting Nasser and refused 
any suggestion of “appeasement.”   
Obsession over the Egyptian threat drove the British government’s decision to 
intervene in the Yemen Civil War.  Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home, having replaced 
Macmillan, maintained an official policy of non-intervention in the civil war, but authorized 
covert military assistance to support Mohammad al-Badr’s Royalist side.  Code-named 
“Operation Rancour,” Britain waged a secret war against the Egyptian-backed Yemeni 
Republicans by supplying weaponry, financial aid, and building a mercenary organization in 
cooperation with French intelligence.  British and French intelligence organizations also 
collaborated with Saudi Arabian intelligence officials to hire private aircraft, purchase 
weapons and ammunition, and recruit experienced ex-soldiers.  Many of the organization’s 
recruits were former British Special Air Service commandos or French veterans of the 
Algerian and Indochina wars.  The South Arabian Federation played an important part in the 
effort—the mercenary force used Aden as a logistics hub and established a field 
communications center in Bayhan, along the border with Yemen.374  
In Aden, High Commissioner Sir Kennedy Trevaskis worried that the Yemen Civil 
War could lead to Nasser gaining influence in Aden.  “It became apparent,” Trevaskis wrote 
in his memoirs, “that the Yemen was not far short of being an Egyptian satellite.”375 He 
worried that Yemen would become a base from which Egyptian forces could subvert the 
South Arabian Federation. Trevaskis arrived as High Commissioner to Aden in 1963. By the 
time of his appointment as High Commissioner, he had served in the territories that had 
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become the South Arabian Federation for over a decade. Trevaskis knew the region, its 
customs, its rulers, and, perhaps most importantly for the leaders of Britain’s Conservative 
Party government, he shared their views on Aden’s strategic importance. To Trevaskis, 
Nasser “in effect declared a cold war on Britain, with the object of removing her from the 
Middle East.” Yemen’s increasingly intimate relationship with Egypt therefore “had sinister 
implications.”  “Aden Group” member Julian Amery agreed, labeling the Aden situation 
“potentially our most explosive Colonial problem.”376   
Trevaskis feared links between Aden’s well-organized labor movement and Nasser’s 
influence in Yemen. Connections between the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) and 
Yemeni labor organizations strengthened throughout the 1950s. Primarily comprised of 
Yemeni migrant workers, ATUC sponsored strike actions to protest arbitrary arrests, low 
wages, and discriminatory employment practices. ATUC members largely embraced Nasser’s 
message of pan-Arab unity, which spread rapidly in the South Arabian Federation through 
radio services such as Voice of the Arabs, a program broadcast from Cairo. In August 1962, 
ATUC established a political wing, the People’s Socialist Party (PSP). This move allowed the 
PSP to mobilize ATUC’s collective action networks toward political ends without violating 
colonial laws stipulating that labor unions could not strike for political purposes.377 The 
combination of Arab nationalist sentiment and labor militancy worried colonial 
administrators, who justified breaking strikes and imprisoning labor activists on the basis of 
political connections with Arab nationalism. Trevaskis saw the PSP and ATUC as pawns in 
Nasser’s quest for Middle Eastern supremacy—a perception which was reinforced by 
escalating violence between socialist activists and British security forces. Following the 
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September 1962 Yemen revolution, Trevaskis’s concerns multiplied as he fretted over the 
possibility that a pro-Nasser government in Yemen would exacerbate Aden’s labor problems:  
“The ATUC/PSP could expect to receive ready and active support from the new regime in the 
Yemen.”378   
To limit PSP and ATUC political influence, Trevaskis limited the voting franchise to 
8,000 people—mostly members of propertied, established Aden families likely to vote for 
pro-British candidates—banned labor strikes, shut down the ATUC weekly newsletter, and 
deported hundreds of trade union activists.379  Violence escalated throughout 1963, 
culminating in a December 10 grenade attack at the Aden airport in which Trevaskis was 
wounded and two others died.  The next day, Trevaskis and the Federal Supreme Council 
declared a state of emergency.380  
Unrest in the Radfan 
In addition to PSP agitation in the city of Aden, Trevaskis had to contend with an 
uprising in the South Arabian Federation’s hinterland. As Britain’s covert war in Yemen 
continued, Egyptian and Yemeni Republican forces increasingly sought to expand the anti-
colonial conflict into the Federation. They established a guerrilla force called the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), smuggled arms across the border, and trained sympathetic villagers. 
In 1962, Radfan rulers developed close relations with Yemeni and Egyptian forces supporting 
the spread of revolutionary Arab nationalism in the region. The Radfan, a mountainous 
region about sixty miles north of Aden city with a population of about 27,000 people, was 
dominated by the Qutaybi people. Yemeni troops began supplying automatic weapons, 
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grenades, land mines, and military advisers to these inhabitants in the Radfan. As the British 
had feared, civil war seeped beyond Yemen’s borders, finding a receptive audience among 
the Qutaybi.381 
 In 1963, a dispute between the Qutaybi and Federation forces led to open revolt. In 
October, an exchange of gunfire between a Federal Regular Army (FRA) patrol acting on 
behalf of the local Federation authority, the Amir of Dali, and Qutaybi residents resulted in 
the death of a Qutaybi shaykh. The Qutaybi complained that the Amir had been hoarding the 
state’s finances for himself, had changed the system of customary law, and favored some 
clans at the expense of others. Trevaskis dismissed the Qutaybis’ appeals, instead seeing the 
nefarious influence of Nasser, Yemeni Republicans, and the NLF as the true source of Radfan 
discontent. The NLF had, in fact, taught guerrilla warfare techniques to several Radfan family 
groups like the Qutaybi. Trevaskis also knew that Radfan peoples had also traveled to Yemen 
and returned with arms supplied by the NLF. By 1963, residents of the Aden hinterlands had 
spent a decade listening to broadcasts that spread Nasser’s vision of “Islamic World Power” 
and glorified anticolonial struggles in Cyprus, Algeria, and Kenya. Radio had a tremendous 
impact on isolated Arab populations. After the Second World War, the proliferation of 
portable wireless receivers enabled villagers to listen to broadcasts from Cairo Radio and the 
Egyptian-backed Sana’a Radio. During the 1950s, Cairo Radio’s Voice of the Arabs became 
the most popular radio program in the Middle East. Both stations’ anticolonial rhetoric 
proved popular in the South Arabian Federation. News traveled quickly and easily by radio, 
making it almost impossible for the British to control the flow of information in Aden. As 
one Sana’a Radio broadcast recognized: “Could the iron screen which the British imperialists 
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put around the Arab South prevent the spread of news about our struggling people?”382 The 
answer was a resounding “no.”  
Anticolonial propaganda, however, was not the sole reason for the Radfan revolt. 
Local politics also influenced tribal leaders’ competition with each other and their decisions 
to ally with Britain or its enemies. Radfan peoples’ grievances derived as much from local 
conflicts such as that between the Qutaybi and the Amir of Dali as the influence of Nasser’s 
pan-Arab nationalist vision. The NLF, however, perceived local tensions in the Radfan as an 
opportunity to organize sympathetic populations outside Aden city to harass British and 
Federation forces with raids and ambushes.383 On December 22, 1963, the FRA reported that 
convoys along the Aden-Dali’ Road, which ran through the Radfan, had come under attack. 
For Trevaskis, the situation was “now getting seriously out of hand.”384 As one scholar 
described, British officials were often keen to label local unrest “the result of ‘subversion’ 
cross-cut with ‘tribalism.’”385 
With the Qutaybis challenging British rule through open revolt, Trevaskis decided to 
launch a punitive operation to reassert British and Federal authority.  In January 1964, the 
FRA, supported by a small British contingent, attacked the Radfan. Dubbed “Operation 
Nutcracker,” three FRA infantry battalions and an armored car squadron assembled at the 
nearby village of Thumair. British support consisted of a tank troop, artillery battery, several 
helicopters, and RAF bomber support. Over the next three weeks, Federation and British 
troops drove deep into Radfan, using helicopters and air support to move from ridge to ridge. 
                                                            
382 Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen, 96. 
 
383 Victoria Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 80–
81. 
 
384 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 96–98; 
Trevaskis, Shades of Amber, 207. Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates 1955-67, 102–103. As 
quoted on p.102. 
 
385 Ibid., 98. See also 76-78. On radio in the Middle East, see Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution. 
 
154 
 
Each forward movement was followed with the construction of a gravel road to facilitate 
resupply. The NLF-trained Qutaybi rebels, nicknamed the “Red Wolves of the Radfan,” 
harassed the attackers with long-range sniper fire, raids, and small-scale ambushes, but as 
Federation forces drew near Qutaybi forces would withdraw. By the end of January, due far 
more to the rebels’ hit-and-run strategy than to the FRA’s skill, the Radfan was largely under 
Federation control and most rebel groups had negotiated peace. Still, NLF attacks against 
FRA forces continued sporadically into February. The campaign succeeded in driving the 
rebels out of Radfan, but as soon as the Federation withdrew its forces, the rebels returned.386 
Qutaybi raids resumed in March and April, but when Trevaskis outlined his plans for 
a harsh counteroffensive, Whitehall encouraged him to be mindful of the potential for 
international censure. 387  In response to the resumption of hostilities, Federation authorities 
requested that British forces lead a new offensive in the Radfan. Trevaskis sent his 
recommended courses of action to Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, who briefed Prime 
Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home. Sandys proposed that Douglas-Home should authorize 
“whatever methods are necessary to ensure the success of the operation while endeavouring, 
as far as possible, to minimise adverse international criticism.” Trevaskis also asked for 
£200,000 to “strengthen the loyalty of the tribes”—that is, bribe them into submission—
which “might well save expensive and embarrassing military operations later on.” In terms of 
propaganda, Trevaskis wanted £39,000 to support pro-British politicians in Aden as well as 
£44,000 to fund pro-British radio broadcasts and news services. Sandys called the initiative 
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“well worth this expenditure.”388 Acutely aware of how brutal counterinsurgency methods 
negatively affected Britain’s public image, Sandys prioritized the need to avoid criticism. 
Militarily, Trevaskis intended to strike hard through a scorched earth campaign.  The 
Political Directive issued to British forces outlined his expectations: “the effectiveness of 
punitive action” depends “on the firmness with which it is conducted.”  British troops, 
therefore, “must take punitive measures that hurt the rebels, thus leaving behind . . . 
memories that will not quickly fade.”  The idea was “to make life so unpleasant for the tribes 
that their morale is broken and they submit.”389  In line with Trevaskis’s directive, British 
troops employed “ground proscription” tactics in which they designated certain areas as off 
limits, or “proscribed.” All inhabitants, regardless of their status as civilians or combatants, 
were required to leave, turning virtually the entire population of a proscribed area into 
refugees.  Proscription tactics purposefully placed a severe burden on the Radfan population.  
Trevaskis’s strategy was to wage war against the entire community, without regard for 
individuals’ status as civilians or combatants. 
In preparation for the campaign, British military officers and colonial officials did 
articulate rules of engagement to regulate the use of violence, but the scope of actions 
allowed under these rules was immense. Regulations sanctioned the use of force against 
civilians and combatants alike. Rules of engagement stipulated that in proscribed areas “all 
movement of any kind in the open (i.e. human or animal) should be treated as hostile and 
engaged,” although with the tepid caveat that “deliberate casualties to women and children” 
should simply be “avoided.” And yet, British soldiers were ordered to destroy standing crops, 
“confiscate property, burn fodder, destroy grain, grain stores, and livestock.” Livestock and 
crops were sources of wealth and sustenance for Radfan peoples. Attacks against these targets 
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amounted to economic warfare waged with little distinction between civilian and combatant. 
By devastating villagers’ food stores, British troops ensured that women and children would 
suffer from malnutrition and starvation. In any areas where the villagers refused to surrender, 
British rules of engagement allowed commanders to use aerial and artillery bombardment “to 
the maximum extent necessary.” In such circumstances, the Directive bluntly stated, 
“casualties to women and children must be accepted.”390  
Still, Trevaskis thought that a successful campaign would require even harsher 
methods than ground proscription tactics. As British forces continued planning the offensive, 
Trevaskis wrote to Lieutenant General Sir Charles Harington, the Commander-in-Chief of 
Middle East Command, that “ground forces cannot deal effectively with rebels.” Trevaskis 
based this assessment on his experiences as a colonial political officer in the Middle East, 
where “tribal” rebellions were commonplace. Believing that he was far more of an expert on 
the “Arab mind” than Harington, Trevaskis insisted that actions such as “the taking of 
hostages, banning tribesmen from markets, dismissing members of rebel tribes from the 
security forces” were useful methods against rebels, but were not enough to end the rebellion 
entirely. Victory required “interfering with their livelihood and by doing and threatening to 
do damage to their property.” Trevaskis argued that damaging a population’s livelihood 
required persistent punitive action—it took time to generate an effect. Since it was often too 
difficult to sustain ground troops on long-term deployments to remote areas, Trevaskis 
insisted that “the only means which has proved effective has been air proscription with our 
other weapons employed in an auxiliary role.”391 He repeated this message to Colonial 
Secretary Duncan Sandys, describing punishment by air as “the only form of action” that had 
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been successful against past Arab revolts.392 The general commanding the Radfan operation, 
Brigadier Cecil Blacker, agreed with Trevaskis’s assessment. Blacker later told the 
Associated Press that “this is largely a political war and undoubtedly an economic squeeze is 
the most effective weapon against the dissidents.”393   
Trevaskis’s proposed air proscription was a resuscitation of a popular colonial 
policing technique called “air control.”  Developed by the Royal Air Force (RAF) during the 
1920s and employed throughout Britain’s Middle Eastern dependencies since then, the 
concept of air control rested on the notion that the act of bombing would inspire fear and 
terror among rebel groups.  Physical destruction was not the objective, but the means to 
achieving a psychological effect.  RAF air control advocates argued that policing the colonies 
by air was cheaper than maintaining large ground forces. Aircraft could also easily traverse 
mountain ranges and deserts, identify rebel troop movements from afar, concentrate quickly 
to attack rebel troops or villages, and deliver significant damage through bombs and machine 
guns.  A racist dynamic also fed the air control myth, as RAF and colonial officials felt it was 
best suited for use against “primitive” peoples and “certain stubborn races” in 
underdeveloped areas.394 The assumption was that such “semi-civilized” peoples would be 
over-awed by Britain’s ability to strike any target by air that these peoples would quickly 
submit to British authority. 
In a 1937 lecture at the Royal United Services Institution, an RAF senior officer 
described how air control functioned in practice. When “primitive” peoples—such as semi-
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nomadic Arabs in the Aden protectorates—upset the balance of British rule, a political officer 
would visit the community in question and deliver an ultimatum that usually instructed the  
shaykh to pay a fine or hand over the individual “miscreants” responsible for causing trouble. 
During the period before the ultimatum expired, the RAF would conduct aerial 
reconnaissance to identify key targets. If the shaykh failed to fulfill the terms of the 
ultimatum, “aircraft appeared all over the country and dropped a few small bombs in the 
principal villages.” The local population, who knew that the bombing raids were coming, 
would have usually evacuated their villages and relocated to the mountains. RAF aircraft 
would then patrol above the abandoned villages, bombing anyone who had remained behind 
as well as destroying crops and cattle until the shaykhs agreed to make peace. No matter how 
defiant, the officer concluded, eventually the shaykh would realize “that if they did not start 
ploughing soon they would lose their crop.”395 
Perversely, airpower advocates argued that air control was not only cheaper and more 
effective than maintaining large ground forces, but was also more humane.  They suggested 
that air control methods protected political officers, allowing them to travel into frontier 
zones without fear.  Guarded by the shield of airpower, political agents could safely immerse 
themselves in Arab society, gaining the familiarity and expertise necessary to understand and 
manipulate the “Arab mind,” thus minimizing further conflicts. Air control created a 
benevolent regime that promoted cooperation and understanding despite being built on 
coercive foundations.396  In this sense, air control served as the military equivalent of indirect 
imperial rule, offering control without occupation much like the maintenance of British 
political authority through “informal” collaboration with Emirs, Sultans, and other local 
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elites.397  Although air control doctrine gained an almost mythical reputation for 
effectiveness, in reality its effects were largely temporary and it appealed to policymakers 
due more to fiscal than military logic.398 
After the Second World War, aerial bombardment persisted as a common British 
response to local rebellions in the territories that eventually became the short-lived South 
Arabian Federation. Groups displaying “insolence” or “disobedience” toward colonial rule 
faced overwhelming force. In 1947, the RAF bombed the Mansuris of Lower Awlaqi. Over 
the course of three days in November 1947, the RAF pummeled Qutaybis with 66 tons of 
bombs and 15,000 pounds of rockets. Another community was bombed for failing to deliver 
its salt taxes.399 In 1957, the commander of British forces in Kenya, Lieutenant General Sir 
Gerald Lathbury, expressed his support for similar tactics.400 
As a colonial officer with a long history of service in the Middle East, Trevaskis 
enthusiastically promoted air proscription, but officials in London balked because of the 
consequences from a March 1964 attack on Harib, Yemen. The fort at Harib served as a 
distribution center for arms smuggling and the movement of recruits and advisers into the 
South Arabian Federation. On March 28, less than two months after the first Qutaybi uprising 
in the Radfan, with approval from the Cabinet Defence Committee, eight RAF bombers 
dropped leaflets on the fort as a warning for civilians to evacuate. A mere fifteen minutes 
later, however, the RAF attacked with rockets and bombs. When Yemeni forces claimed that 
the attack had killed 25 civilians, Nasser and all Arab League governments condemned it.401  
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The bombing generated a wave of international condemnation at the United Nations. The 
U.K. Permanent Representative reported to Whitehall that sentiment at the U.N. was 
overwhelmingly negative, with many claiming that the bombing represented “methods of the 
last century” that engendered “no public support” from the international community.402 
Trevaskis originally planned to initiate the Radfan offensive on April 6, but Sandys asked 
him to postpone the operation. A renewed offensive, in Sandys’ words, “could scarcely 
happen at a worse moment in relation to our United Nations position.”403 To launch a massive 
aerial bombardment so soon after the Harib incident would be a public relations nightmare 
for Britain. 
Concerned with international criticism following the Harib attack, British officials at 
the United Nations and Whitehall opposed Trevaskis’s appeals for air proscription.  From the 
U.N., the U.K Permanent Representative wrote of his surprise at the extent of hostility toward 
Britain following the Harib bombing and warned that by continuing air attacks “we shall 
constantly be playing into the hands of our enemies,” who made good propaganda use of the 
Harib strike.404  In London, Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys instructed Trevaskis not to 
proceed with the Radfan operation or air proscription until gaining his approval.405  Likewise, 
after consulting with Sandys, the Chief of the Defence Staff notified Harington, who had 
overall responsibility for Aden military operations, that “air strikes against the Radfan were 
politically unacceptable at present.”406  But Trevaskis resisted, listing a litany of problems:  
The resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and the Committee of 24, the 
hostility of the Arab League and most Arab Governments, the virulent propaganda 
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from Cairo and Sana [sic] Radios, the universally hostile and to some extent menacing 
tone of the Aden press . . . the critical tone of important sections of the British press 
on the Harib incident . . . our failure to deal with the rebellion in Radfan and the 
knowledge that [anti-colonial forces] are planning to provoke rebellions and disorders 
throughout the Federation.  
 
These British setbacks had “made a serious impact on the morale” of Federation rulers, 
Trevaskis argued. “They know only too well of our fear of criticism in the United Nations 
and the United Kingdom.”407 His protestations failed to entirely overcome Whitehall’s 
reluctance to employ proscription bombing, but Trevaskis’s superiors did authorize the use of 
air attacks in a close air support role to assist ground troops. Final instructions to Trevaskis 
specified that close air support “will be kept to the minimum necessary” and “will not repeat 
not include the use of bombs.”408 
Trevaskis yielded to the Colonial Office’s instructions and the campaign began 
without using air proscription. To carry out the attack, the military established a temporary 
organization—the Radfan Force, or “Radforce”—consisting of Royal Marines from 45 
Commando, a company each from 3rd Battalion, The Parachute Regiment and 1st Battalion, 
The East Anglian Regiment, two battalions from the Federal Regular Army (FRA), a Special 
Air Service (SAS) squadron, as well as armored car and artillery support.  Assessing the 
Qutaybis’ capabilities and available British forces, military planners expected the campaign 
to last three weeks.409 
British troops began the operation on April 30 with several night assaults to occupy 
key terrain features, allowing Radforce to isolate the Radfan from access to Yemen.410 The 
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greatest danger to British troops came from sniper fire. Radfan fighters who knew the terrain 
would occupy well-protected positions on high ground near villages or above mountain 
passes.  As British patrols moved into these areas, rebel snipers would fire on them at long 
ranges and quickly withdraw before the patrol or British air support could engage them.  
British troops grew frustrated with their enemy’s ability to initiate contact and quickly melt 
away, but the British also faced challenges unrelated to the enemy. The harsh terrain proved 
difficult for British logistics: front-line troops consumed ammunition, food, and water as fast 
as the supplies could be brought forward. Helicopters and animal transport by pack mule or 
camel ameliorated the supply situation, but frustration with logistics and the enemy only grew 
as the campaign ground on. After only three days, British commanders realized that they 
were embroiled in what had rapidly become a protracted operation.411   
Impatient with the campaign’s slow progress, Trevaskis again requested authorization 
for air proscription. In a lengthy personal memorandum to Sandys, Trevaskis condemned 
“half-measures” and “half-hearted action,” reiterating his conviction that success demanded 
“stern repressive measures undertaken thoroughly and with determination.”412 In a reflection 
of his growing sense of desperation, Trevaskis cabled colonial officials in London on May 2, 
calling the situation “every bit as menacing as I have believed.” He implored Sandys to 
reconsider the ban on air proscription and ominously warned that “failure to deal effectively 
with Radfan will, of course, enhance the possibility of serious trouble elsewhere.”413  
Lieutenant General Harington cabled the Ministry of Defence also requesting authority to 
begin proscription bombing.414 Still concerned with air proscription’s negative public image, 
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Sandys resisted withdrawing the embargo.415 For Sandys, public criticism remained a greater 
problem than the Radfan offensive’s slow progress. Trevaskis soon persuaded Sandys to 
change his mind.   
Airpower Unleashed 
Facing multiple, simultaneous security crises over Britain’s covert involvement in the 
Yemeni Civil War, labor unrest in Aden, and now a revolt in the Radfan, Trevaskis’s 
desperation to begin proscription air attacks only grew. Throughout the first week of May, he 
continued pressuring officials in London. Ground proscription, he argued, had been “slow 
and restricted” while also imposing “a terrible strain on our troops.” Trevaskis lamented that 
“quite frankly we cannot afford to go on like this much longer” because “if we are to forego 
the use of the most powerful weapon in our armoury, we shall have to pay for it with further 
loss of life and limb. . . without even a reasonable prospect of success.”  Only “proscription . . 
. and punitive action against the rebel villages” could win the campaign.  Trevaskis insisted 
that failure to quickly subdue the Radfan would lead to “three more Radfans” in the 
Federation territories of Dhala, Haushari, and Subeihi that could easily overwhelm Britain’s 
limited military capabilities.416 Besides, Trevaskis argued, British forces were already 
employing aircraft in a close air support role to assist ground forces pinned down by enemy 
fire. To him, using aircraft in any capacity would inevitably generate “all kinds of vicious 
criticism.” Air proscription tactics therefore would not “make a halfpenny worth’s difference 
internationally.”417 Trevaskis described the use of air proscription as absolutely necessary for 
the success of the operation. His lobbying worked. 
                                                            
 
415 DO 174/19 Sandys to Trevaskis, May 3, 1964. 
 
416 DO 174/19 Trevaskis to Sandys, May 7, 1964. 
 
417 DO 174/19 Trevaskis to Sandys, May 4, 1964. 
 
164 
 
Concerned with Trevaskis’s gloomy assessment that the offensive might fail and that 
violence might spread if the campaign was not successful, ministers in London approved air 
proscription on May 8. Sandys, however, remained anxious over a possible international 
backlash and decided to visit Aden immediately to discuss the implementation of air 
proscription with Trevaskis in person.418 Sandys arrived on May 11 and met with Trevaskis 
right away. At this meeting Trevaskis convinced Sandys that proscription bombing was 
necessary. After the meeting Sandys cabled the Prime Minister and Defence Secretary that 
“air proscription is absolutely unavoidable” and “the sooner we start it, the better.”419 
Concerned as usual with the potential for international criticism, Sandys reassured himself 
and his London-based colleagues that airstrikes could be justified publicly by stretching the 
circumstances. He wrote that since “tribesmen have been regularly firing at our aircraft and 
have hit several of them, we might be able to claim that our aircraft were shooting back.”420 
As Sandys approved the use of methods which he knew would garner criticism, he began 
coming up with cover stories with which to deflect the potential controversies. 
As with ground proscription, approval of air proscription came with certain restraints.  
During Sandys’s visit to Aden, he and Trevaskis decided that before an attack began, British 
forces should warn villagers to evacuate. The idea was to air-drop warning leaflets on 
villages at least 24 hours prior to bombing them.421 A written warning would be printed on 
each leaflet stating “the crimes of violence committed by the Radfan tribes, followed by a 
demand that they should . . . send a representative delegation to make submission to the 
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Federal Government.”422  But the typical leaflet message, according to the War Office’s 
official after action review, did not actually specify the consequences facing villagers who 
refused to leave. Instead they stated vaguely: 
Let it be known to you that for the maintenance of law and order the Federal 
Government has declared the district in which you live to be an area of 
military movement.  For your own safety you should therefore leave the 
district by dawn tomorrow, taking your women and children with you.423  
 
By dropping leaflets prior to an attack, British officials could claim that those villagers who 
failed to evacuate made a conscious decision to stay despite knowing the consequences. Yet 
by not including an actual threat of the consequences for remaining in a proscribed village, 
British forces could avoid condemnation in Arab media and at the United Nations.  As 
Sandys reported, “for international reasons it seemed to me desirable to avoid including in the 
leaflets any threat about the consequence of non-compliance.” He did not want to provide 
written evidence of British threats to destroy villages, kill livestock, or attack potentially 
unarmed villagers.  A leaflet threatening military action against civilians could become a 
propaganda tool in the hands of Arab nationalists.  Instead of written warnings, Sandys and 
Trevaskis proposed sending FRA soldiers of Radfan origin into the villages to “put the fear of 
death” into the population.  By word of mouth, “the message would quickly spread from 
village to village and would no doubt improve with the telling.”424 As the Sandys-Trevaskis 
proposal suggests, intimidation was the real benefit of forewarning the population. 
With the approval of air proscription, the Radfan population felt the full force of 
colonial coercion as the RAF bombed villages, slaughtered livestock, and destroyed crops. 
For the RAF, the approval of air proscription meant that “villages may be attacked with 
                                                            
422 DO 174/19 Sandys (from Aden) to the Colonial Office, May 11, 1964. 
 
423 WO 386/22 p.73. 
 
424 DO 174/19 Sandys (from Aden) to the Colonial Office, May 11, 1964. 
 
166 
 
cannon and grenades” and allowed pilots to shoot cattle, goats, crops, and people loitering in 
proscribed areas.425  It was a scorched earth campaign waged from the air.  In one attack, a 
single Shackleton bomber expended 600 20mm cannon rounds and dropped 60 aerial 
grenades—lightweight 20-pound bombs.  The pilot reported firing his cannon at a herd of 
goats and a wadi, while dropping six aerial grenades on another goat herd, eleven on “cattle,” 
eight on “people”—without specifying civilian or combatant—four on “people in Wadi,” six 
more on “people and four camels,” and an additional fourteen on “people under trees.”  In 
another instance, a flight of two Hunter Mk 9 fighter-bombers fired 370 rounds of 30mm 
cannon, reporting “cows attacked.”426  Later, two Hunter Mk 9s fired 1,040 cannon shells 
while strafing “houses and crops.”427  Such battle damage reports were commonplace. In 
early May, the RAF usually reported between three and five ground attack sorties per day, 
but this rate increased to between eight and fifteen sorties beginning on May 26 as British 
reinforcements entered the fight and the campaign’s intensity escalated.428 The Aden High 
Commission ordered the RAF to maintain “continuous harassment of the area by day and by 
night by: (a) attacking all signs of movement; (b) shooting up inhabited areas and agricultural 
areas; and (c) generally causing damage to property.”429 By the end of the campaign, the RAF 
had flown over 600 sorties, launched 2,500 rockets, and fired 200,000 cannon rounds.430 
Although senior leaders deemed harsh punitive measures necessary, British troops 
were often unenthusiastic about enforcing them.  One East Anglian Regiment lance-corporal 
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called the destruction “a bloody shame.”431 Soldiers’ hesitancy to destroy homes and burn 
crops was enough of a problem that the War Office’s official after action report specifically 
addressed the issue:  “Soldiers were reluctant to embark on punitive operations, which 
although mild in nature, seemed to them to be directed against comparatively innocent 
people.” Such operations “inevitably involve hardship for some, and the need was not always 
apparent to the troops and junior officers involved.”  
This resistance incensed political and military leaders like Ian Baillie, the British 
Agent in the Western Aden Protectorate. On May 8, Baillie received a radio message 
indicating that “very little was happening in the villages other than a thorough search of 
houses.” On May 11, he went to the front to see for himself: 
When I flew up to the forward areas and talked to our troops in a village . . . with my 
own eyes I saw many stacks of fodder and a grain store with grain in it (both these 
items are specifically mentioned in the political directive), but the forward 
commanders had specific orders to the effect that the relevant paragraphs of the 
political directive were in abeyance.432 
 
To his horror, Baillie discovered that the political directive had been ignored on orders from 
Middle East Command—the military headquarters overseeing the Radfan operation. Furious, 
he told the commanding general, Lieutenant General Charles Harington, that “Paragraphs 
B(iii) and B(vi) of the political directive attached to the Radfan Operation Order dated 29th 
April 1964 deal with the punitive activities of troops in abandoned villages and fields” and 
warned that “if they are not complied with, military domination of the area can have little or 
no lasting effect.433 Harington assured Baillie that he would reinstate the political directive in 
full. Political and military leaders overcame soldiers’ reluctance by cajoling them—as Baillie 
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had—and providing information briefings intended to create an appreciation among the 
troops for the “political requirement” of punishment.434 
Many troops may have been reluctant to destroy civilian livelihoods, but Radforce’s 
punitive tactics proved effective. By the end of July, British and Federation forces had 
captured all of their territorial objectives and had pushed the rebels out of the Radfan. British 
troops occupied the Radfan and continued enforcing proscription through air and ground 
patrolling. These measures effectively sealed access to the Radfan, preventing combatants 
and civilians alike from returning to their homes until after they agreed to peace terms with 
British and Federal authorities. With the planting season coming to an end, Colonial officials 
knew that denying access to the region would pressure rebels to make peace so that they 
could return “to their land before it is too late to grow a crop this year.” Unable to tend their 
herds or crops, Radfan fighters faced the agonizing choice of surrender or starvation.435  
The British were prepared to wait as long as necessary. On June 21, Trevaskis’s 
deputy, Timothy Oates, triumphantly reported that “ground and air operations in Radfan have 
been successful insofar as they have, up to the present moment, prevented the revolt from 
spreading and have effectively put a stop to attacks on the road.” Although he noted lamely 
that proscription “inflicted some casualties and much damage and inconvenience,” Oates 
cautiously observed that “the tribes of Radfan have already been taught a sharp lesson, but it 
cannot yet be said that we have reasserted our authority . . . any slackening of our pressure on 
the tribes may lead to renewed attacks.”436  
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The Refugee Crisis and Britain’s Response 
Proscription tactics had targeted civilians and combatants alike in order to break 
Radfan resistance, but these methods caused a refugee crisis, they elicited the very 
controversy that Colonial Secretary Sandys had hoped to avoid. This crisis stimulated the 
ICRC’s desire to protect the refugees’ rights to humanitarian assistance. But when the ICRC 
asked the British government for permission to aid the refugees, colonial officers in Aden 
tried to prevent the ICRC from entering the Federation.   
In what Britain’s Sunday Telegraph labeled a “hunger war,” British actions caused 
thousands of civilian refugees to flee the Radfan.437  The Arab League claimed that there were 
an astounding 30,000 people—a figure larger than British estimates for the entire Radfan 
population—fleeing “British aggression.”438 On May 25, the New York Times reported the 
official British line that “about 1,000 refugees from the Radfan area, mostly women and 
children, have left rebel territory.”439 Publicly, colonial officers downplayed the refugee 
crisis. In June The Guardian reported even more modestly that “earlier accounts of a 
thousand refugees arriving at Jaar, in the Yafai region south of Radfan, are now described 
here as greatly exaggerated,” while the Los Angeles Times indicated that British officials 
“counted no more than 500 refuges.”440 Private calculations, however, contradicted public 
pronouncements. In reality, the numbers were far higher. Hugh Hickling, Trevaskis’s Legal 
Adviser, visited the Radfan and recorded the relatively conservative number of 8,000 
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refugees.441  According to Don McCarthy, the Foreign Office’s liaison to Middle East 
Command (Aden), “when situation was at its worst in April and May perhaps ten thousand 
people had moved to Yafa, Abyan and elsewhere. Movement back to Radfan had started by 
August.” McCarthy also indicated that the humanitarian situation was not as dire as Cairo and 
Sana’a Radio reports indicated: “There is probably some malnutrition since area is poor, but 
no signs of actual starvation. Situation is being watched and some relief may have to be given 
before next harvest.”442 By November, most rebel groups had decided to agree to peace terms 
before their populations faced starvation.  
Punitive tactics had indeed proved their effectiveness, but the refugee crisis elicited 
sharp criticism internationally as many within the Middle East and “Third World” called for 
the refugees to receive humanitarian aid. In June, PSP leader Abdullah al-Asnag traveled to 
Cairo where he delivered a press conference decrying the ICRC’s failure to intervene on 
behalf of the people of South Arabia, who faced British “genocide” in the Radfan. Al-Asnag 
blamed the British, accusing the British government of opposing the entrance of ICRC 
representatives into the “occupied South.”443 In November, ten leaders of the Front for the 
Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), an armed insurgent group affiliated with al-
Asnag’s PSP, wrote to the Colonial Secretary decrying the Radfan campaign for “exposing 
the lives of the population to death and rendering them homeless after destroying their 
property.”444 Meanwhile, broadcasts on Cairo Radio and Sana’a Radio condemned the RAF 
for having “carried out brutal raids on peaceful citizens in Radfan.” Cairo’s “Voice of the 
                                                            
441 Hickling Papers 2, p.134. 
 
442 CO 1055/201POMEC to Foreign Office, November 10, 1964. 
 
443 CO 1055/154 Cairo to Foreign Office, June 29, 1964. 
 
444 CO 1055/155 Translation of letter from the South Yemen Liberation Movement, November 29, 1964. 
FLOSY and the NLF, despite their common British foe, remained at odds with one another throughout the 
conflict. See Clark, Yemen: Dancing on the Heads of Snakes, 83–84. 
 
171 
 
Arabs” program also reported on the Red Crescent’s efforts to aid the refugees with an initial 
installment of £1.25 million.445 Sana’a Radio, meanwhile, informed its listeners that “Britain 
left the rebels to die of hunger because they demand their rights in life in accordance with 
international laws and human rights issued by the United Nations.”446 Reactions in former 
British colonies were also negative. Indian newspapers criticized the damage done to 
cultivated land and the effects of the campaign on the civilian population.447 The British High 
Commission in Delhi reported that Indian newspapers “were generally unsympathetic” to the 
British campaign.448 In the UN Committee of 24, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and 
Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere co-sponsored a resolution condemning British 
operations in the Radfan.449  
This criticism was exactly what Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys had hoped to 
avoid before the Radfan operation began; now he had to justify British operations in the face 
of condemnation from Arab countries and at the United Nations. As they had done during the 
Cyprus Emergency, British officials prepared a public relations campaign of their own. On 
May 10, Sandys met with Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) officials to complain that 
“not enough is being done to put across our case” in defense of the Radfan operation.450 The 
strength of Radfan resistance meant that “the relatively simple security operation in Radfan, 
to which we wished to give minimum publicity, is assuming proportions which compel us to 
take stronger action locally.” On May 12, the CRO sent a telegram to High Commissions in 
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all Commonwealth states to notify British diplomats that “our objectives and motives are 
being misrepresented by undue publicity and unjustified criticism.” The intent of this 
initiative was to bolster Commonwealth states’ support for Britain at the United Nations. The 
CRO telegram included a series of approved talking points and instructions to “make positive 
use in publicity and other media.”451 Diplomats in some embassies, such as Cairo, were 
placed in the unenviable situation of having to explain British actions to a decidedly hostile 
public. The Foreign Office informed the Cairo Embassy that diplomats “should take the line” 
that “although every precaution is taken to keep hardship to a minimum it is inevitable that in 
such operations the civilian population should suffer some disturbance.” The Foreign Office 
instructions followed this apparent admission of civilian suffering with the denial of British 
culpability: “The responsibility for this [civilian hardship] lies with those who initiated and 
have sustained the revolt”—that is, with those who “compelled” the British to escalate their 
response.452 Seeking to manipulate the public debate over operations in the Radfan, British 
officials prepared to defend proscription tactics by denying that they had done anything 
wrong. 
In addition to the public relations campaign, commanders recognized that rebuilding 
the Radfan would also help to combat international disapproval of British actions.. In June, 
Lieutenant General Harington and High Commissioner Trevaskis agreed that “it is desirable 
to demonstrate that our military presence can be constructive as well as repressive.” Although 
he believed that “the time is not yet ripe,” Harington proposed to “provide direct assistance in 
the areas adjoining Radfan and in the Radfan itself.” But the purpose of economic assistance 
was not necessarily to win the Radfan population’s “hearts and minds.” Harington worried 
that focusing economic development efforts on the Radfan would send the wrong message—
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that is, rebellion results in economic assistance. Instead, Harington believed that economic 
aid should also go to neighboring rulers who had remained loyal “to demonstrate that it is not 
only the tribes that have misbehaved that we are prepared to reward” with assistance.453 
Unenthused, British Agent Ian Baillie reluctantly agreed: “We should probably find ourselves 
with little alternative but to make some contribution to the rehabilitation of Radfan. The only 
type of rehabilitation I was contemplating at the moment was the provision of wells and 
minor irrigation works, but the time was not yet ripe for such work in Radfan itself.”454 
Baillie’s reluctance to help the Radfan population reflected the cynicism with which British 
forces approached economic development in the Radfan. Colonial officers planned to 
terrorize the Radfan population into submission by destroying their economic livelihoods 
while simultaneously planning to demonstrate British “goodwill” by rebuilding the very 
livelihoods that British forces had destroyed.  
 Cynicism was rife in Britain’s response to the refugee crisis and subsequent 
international censure. British forces used the refugee crisis as leverage to compel Radfan 
leaders to negotiate peace settlements. Officials then crafted a public relations strategy which 
denied British culpability for civilian suffering and blamed the Radfan population for 
bringing this suffering upon themselves by rebelling in the first place. British methods in the 
Radfan amounted to a wholesale rejection of the population’s rights to receive care and relief 
from suffering. Civilian suffering, however, invited attention from the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and a recently established activist group called Amnesty 
International.  
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Asserting Humanitarian Rights: The ICRC and Amnesty International   
Helping victims of war lay at the heart of the ICRC’s organizational identity. This 
assertion of what scholars have labeled “humanitarian rights” included such vulnerable 
populations as the wounded and sick, prisoners, and vulnerable civilians. The ICRC also 
embraced a “rule of silence” in which the organization pledged not to publicize states’ 
violations of international humanitarian law. This provision was meant to encourage 
governments to permit the ICRC to provide humanitarian assistance in even the most 
devastating conflicts without fear of being criticized by the ICRC. Amnesty International, 
however, was founded as a human rights group that embraced public activism. By 1963, 
Amnesty International and the ICRC developed what AI co-founder Peter Benenson termed 
“a tacit agreement” in which AI lobbied governments on the ICRC’s behalf to obtain 
invitations for the ICRC to visit prisoners and report on their treatment.455 The ICRC and AI 
worked to protect two vulnerable populations during the Aden Emergency—civilians and 
prisoners. 
Swiss businessman Henri Dunant founded the Red Cross after seeing the horrors 
endured by wounded French and Austrian soldiers during the 1859 Battle of Solferino. 
Dunant’s subsequent memoir, A Memory of Solferino, amounted to a clarion call for the 
alleviation of human suffering during war. In 1863, the Genevan Society of Public Utility 
formed a committee of leading citizens that led to a conference of states and the 1864 Geneva 
Conventions as well as the establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross. 
All state parties to the Geneva Conventions agreed to recognize the ICRC’s mandate to 
protect victims of war and to permit the ICRC to carry out this mandate in wartime. National 
branches of the Red Cross emerged across Europe as volunteers embraced the ICRC’s 
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mission.456 From its inception, ICRC efforts focused on alleviating the suffering of those 
populations deemed most vulnerable to violence, such as prisoners, civilians, the wounded, 
and the sick.457 
The ICRC’s commitment to protecting victims of war amounted to an assertion of 
what historian Bruno Cabanes has called “humanitarian rights.” International organizations 
first employed the rhetoric of “humanitarian rights” in the aftermath of the First World War. 
Proponents of humanitarian rights claimed that all people had the right to receive 
humanitarian assistance and aid in ameliorating human suffering. These rights were usually 
applied to groups—such as refugees, veterans, or civilians—and claimed during or after a 
war.458 The ICRC was one of the most influential and long-standing of these organizations. 
For the ICRC, the interwar period marked a time in which the organization grew in 
confidence and asserted a general right to take “humanitarian initiative” in international wars 
and internal unrest.459 The ICRC’s humanitarian rights claims persisted after the Second 
World War as it advocated increased rights for combatants and protections for civilian 
victims of war through the expanded 1949 Geneva Conventions.460  
 The ICRC did not engage in political activism, even as it sought to provide 
humanitarian aid to victims of war and violence. As a rule, the ICRC did not condemn 
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governments for wartime decisions that caused suffering. The ICRC shared its reports and 
findings with the government concerned, but the ICRC kept those reports confidential. Each 
government, however, was allowed to publicly release ICRC reports if it desired. ICRC 
leaders believed that criticism would simply result in governments prohibiting further ICRC 
assistance. Such censure would result in continued human suffering; lives would not be saved 
if the ICRC could not provide aid. The ICRC was heavily criticized for this stance, 
particularly after the Second World War. For the organization’s detractors, the fact that the 
ICRC did not speak out about the treatment of Jews and other persecuted minorities in 
ghettos and concentration camps during the Holocaust marked a serious moral failing.461 
During the Aden Emergency and in other colonial wars, the ICRC remained committed to 
this principle of confidentiality. 
 Yet ICRC leaders insisted that the organization was not blind to government abuses. 
ICRC President Léopold Boissier later defended the organization’s position, writing that 
delegates’ impartiality “does not mean that these witnesses remain silent.” Instead, when 
delegates “observe a breach of the Geneva Conventions or acts contrary to morality or law 
they protest to the authorities and demand that such acts be stopped.” But, Boissier stressed, 
“these facts are not publicized” precisely because of the danger that any “indiscretion” would 
result in the loss of ICRC access to the war zone.462 The ability to immediately provide aid to 
those in need mattered more to the ICRC than legal accountability for violations of the 
Geneva Conventions. 
The ICRC’s reluctance to speak publicly about inhumane conditions continued during 
post-World War II colonial conflicts. The problem was that the ICRC espoused the idea that 
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victims of war had the right to receive humanitarian aid, and based on the Geneva 
Conventions, it was the ICRC’s responsibility to provide such aid. Despite their refusal to 
apply the Geneva Conventions to the Aden conflict, British officials had allowed ICRC 
delegates to provide humanitarian assistance during past colonial wars. During the Cyprus 
Emergency, for instance, the Red Cross periodically visited detention camps. But in Kenya 
during the 1955-60 Mau Mau conflict, British officials opposed ICRC attempts to visit prison 
facilities, detention camps, and resettled populations. But Britain eventually acquiesced in 
1957, when military operations began winding down and colonial officers had already 
decided to release most detainees.463 Based on the precedents of Cyprus and Kenya, as well as 
the ICRC’s commitment to confidential reporting, ICRC leaders expected Britain to permit 
them to work in the South Arabian Federation as well. 
Unlike the ICRC, Amnesty International did not embrace confidentiality and was 
committed to publicly chastising governments that failed to act humanely. Founded in 
London in 1961 by British Labour Party lawyer Peter Benenson as well as several colleagues 
such as Quaker peace activist Eric Baker, Irish international lawyer and politician Seán 
MacBride, and British lawyer Leon Blom-Cooper, AI embraced activism on behalf of the 
dignity of the individual. Although the group is often categorized as a human rights 
organization, AI’s activism overlapped with other concepts such as the humanitarian rights 
espoused by organizations such as the ICRC. For example, the protection of prisoners’ rights 
was central to the ICRC’s humanitarian mission, but it also formed a core component of AI’s 
agenda.  
Benenson’s experience working with the Cyprus Bar Council lawyers on detainee 
abuse allegations during the 1955-59 Cyprus conflict contributed to his desire to work on 
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behalf of prisoners.464 In 1960, he authored the foreword to the anonymously written book 
Gangrene.465 Gangrene was about torture committed by French and British forces in Algeria 
and Kenya, but Benenson’s foreword largely concerned similar allegations of abuse during 
the Cyprus Emergency. His discussion of torture allegations against British troops, the use of 
repressive legislation, and the obstacles that police and prison authorities placed in the way of 
lawyers seeking to defend their clients. The Gangrene foreword suggests that Benenson’s 
experiences in Cyprus profoundly affected his opinions on the ubiquity of government 
repression on both sides of the Iron Curtain as well as how best to promote human rights in 
the future.466 
These ideas found expression in Benenson’s 1961 “Appeal for Amnesty”—the 
document which marked the birth of Amnesty International.467 Published in the Observer on 
May 28, 1961, Benenson’s article called on governments to grant an amnesty “for all political 
prisoners everywhere.” The Observer article was republished across the world.468 Within the 
first six months of the organization’s existence, about 20 such groups had formed in Britain. 
Other branches formed in several European countries. In particular, AI focused on “prisoners 
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of conscience,” whom Benenson described as persons imprisoned for expressing an opinion 
which he or she “honestly holds and which does not advocate or condone personal 
violence.”469 AI worked for the release of such “prisoners of conscience,” supported the 
notion of a fair and public trial for all prisoners—even those who committed violence—and 
advocated for their humane treatment while in jail. Benenson wanted to shift the debate over 
political prisoners away from the beliefs that those prisoners espoused, instead focusing on 
the fact that they had been imprisoned for a belief.470  
To Benenson, public scrutiny was the solution to prevent governments from wielding 
power arbitrarily and secretly. In his “Appeal for Amnesty,” Benenson identified a “growing 
tendency all over the world” in which governments consistently concealed “the real grounds 
upon which ‘non-conformists’ are imprisoned.”  Such “cover-up charges,” Benenson wrote, 
suggested “that governments are by no means insensitive to the pressure of outside opinion.” 
The greatest implication of a government’s susceptibility to public pressures was that “when 
world opinion is concentrated on one weak spot, it can sometimes succeed in making a 
government relent.”471 Benenson believed that “human freedom depends on public opinion. 
So long as public opinion is prepared to accept arrests of people who have committed no 
crime beyond holding a certain belief, Governments can and will continue to make inroads 
into personal freedom.” The “re-awakening of conscience,” Benenson wrote, was the 
pathway to stimulate public interest and activism.472 Benenson continued: “There are few, if 
any states, totally immune from the influence of collective world opinion.”473 Amnesty 
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International would therefore place a premium on public activism to engage civic and social 
groups, individuals, and governments in the interest of unveiling injustice and ill-treatment. 
Given the declaration of emergency in Aden and subsequent large-scale detentions, it was no 
surprise that Benenson’s fledgling group of activists would soon find itself embroiled in 
Britain’s next colonial conflict on behalf of the ICRC. 
The 1963-64 Aden Detention Controversy 
Although the Radfan refugee crisis elicited the ICRC’s interest in protecting refugees, 
it was not the first occasion in which the ICRC sought to fulfill its humanitarian mission 
during the Aden Emergency. Both the ICRC and Amnesty International first became 
involved in the conflict in the immediate aftermath of High Commissioner Trevaskis’s 
December 1963 declaration of a state of emergency—over a year before the Radfan 
campaign began. Trevaskis’s subsequent crackdown resulted in numerous arrests and drew 
the attention of the ICRC and AI. 
After his 1963 declaration of emergency, Trevaskis targeted socialist anticolonial 
activists. Within a week, Trevaskis had ordered the arrest of 55 people associated with the 
People’s Socialist Party and deported 300 socialist activists, many of whom were Yemeni 
migrant workers residing in Aden.474 Trevaskis did not have proof of the PSP leaders’ 
complicity in the December 10 attack, but in a controversial move he held them without 
charges in Federation territories outside Aden city. The World Federation of Trade Unions 
(WFTU), which British officials perceived as a communist front organization, complained 
that many of those arrested were imprisoned “in bad conditions.” The head of the WFTU 
wrote to the Director General of the International Labour Organization to report that “there 
has been no attempt to provide any evidence that these arrested leaders had anything to do 
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with the grenade incident” and called the arrests “a pretext to repress the anti-colonial 
movement” in Aden.475 Colonial officers responded that “under the Emergency Decree, a 
group of five or more people constitutes an illegal gathering,” and this measure therefore did 
not discriminate against ATUC because it applied to all organizations and individuals.476 This 
excuse conveniently ignored the fact that PSP and ATUC tactics relied heavily on rallies and 
strikes. Trevaskis had clearly targeted the PSP and ATUC with these decrees.   
Trevaskis’s actions incited criticism in Britain. In Parliament, Labour MP Albert 
Oram raised concerns over whether the detainees’ civil liberties had been violated.477 
Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys insisted that no such abuse occurred. Sandys said that a 
British doctor visited the detention site three times. “I have the report from the British 
medical officer with me,” Sandys continued, “he examined all the detainees and, apart from 
minor ailments of a normal character, found no signs of ill-treatment of any kind 
whatever.”478 Peter Benenson, the Labour lawyer who took an active interest in ill-treatment 
allegations during the Cyprus Emergency, added his voice to the criticism by writing to 
Sandys with a request that the government “to permit a delegate of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross to inspect the prisons.” Benenson’s letter arrived at Whitehall on 
behalf of a recently-formed NGO called Amnesty International.479 Trevaskis’s crackdown on 
the PSP and ATUC raised concerns within the ICRC and Amnesty International. Both groups 
sought to ensure that detainees in Aden received humane treatment.  
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Trevaskis, however, rejected calls for an ICRC inspection of prisoners’ conditions. On 
December 20, in response to a complaint from ATUC, the British Red Cross Society 
requested that Trevaskis allow an ICRC delegate to visit the prisoners.480 But when colonial 
officers in Whitehall cabled Trevaskis to suggest that the Federation government “may wish 
to consider advantage to be gained by inviting impartial investigation of this kind, which 
could be expected to provide unimpeachable proof that A.T.U.C. allegations are false,” they 
received a curt reply.481 Trevaskis insisted that “I would prefer not to press Federal 
Government to agree to a Red Cross inquiry” in another telegram. Instead, Trevaskis chose to 
conduct an inquiry that he could control—he ordered a local investigation to be carried out by 
the colony’s Chief Justice. The subsequent report, Trevaskis conceded, would be released to 
the ICRC. Unsurprisingly, the Chief Justice found no evidence of ill-treatment.482 
Trevaskis’s reluctance to allow ICRC inspections struck Benenson as suspicious. 
Benenson made his concern quite clear: “Great Britain has regularly allowed such inspection 
in Kenya, Cyprus and Singapore; so has the Government of Southern Rhodesia. It would be 
gratifying to learn that the Colonial Secretary was prepared for a visit of the International Red 
Cross delegate.” While the Chief Justice’s inquiry was welcome news, Benenson was not 
satisfied. He pressured colonial officers further, writing that the local government inquiry 
“does not wholly deal with the point raised in my letter.” Regardless of whether the detainees 
had been mistreated in the past, Benenson insisted that “the important principle is that 
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wherever there are political prisoners held without judicial process, the International Red 
Cross should be invited to inspect their conditions.”483  
Peter Benenson sought to establish a mechanism for independently reviewing the 
treatment of prisoners. An ICRC mission to monitor prison conditions and the treatment of 
detainees would provide the independent, impartial oversight mechanism which Benenson 
desired. Toward this end, Benenson wrote to the Colonial Office again, this time asking for a 
private meeting to speak “off the record.” Benenson conveyed the news that “the 
International Red Cross are not ‘quite satisfied with the arrangements made by the High 
Commissioner’ and we ourselves feel that the role of the International Red Cross in Aden has 
not, perhaps, been considered as fully as it deserves.”484 On March 19, 1964, Benenson met 
with Minister of State for the Colonies Nigel Fisher and explained his views. Fisher agreed to 
pass the information to Trevaskis, requesting that he “consider the matter.”485 With the 
looming unrest in the Radfan, however, Trevaskis had other concerns.  
ICRC efforts to gain access to the South Arabian Federation received renewed 
impetus shortly after the Radfan campaign began. Brutal British tactics provoked 
international censure. On May 19, 1964, with the Radfan operation in full swing, the Arab 
League decided to act by formally requesting that an ICRC delegation visit the “occupied 
Yemeni South” to investigate the humanitarian effects of British military operations in the 
Radfan. The ICRC was willing to help. British officials, however, were less enthused. They 
knew that a request from the ICRC to provide humanitarian aid in the Federation would 
invite further scrutiny.  
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Britain Obstructs the ICRC 
Trevaskis’s large-scale detentions in the aftermath of the December 1963 declaration 
of emergency piqued the ICRC’s interest and stimulated Amnesty International’s lobbying on 
the ICRC’s behalf, but the Radfan campaign changed the ICRC’s priorities from inspecting 
prison conditions to caring for refugees. The ICRC was already providing humanitarian 
assistance in Yemen, having established a field hospital near the Yemen-South Arabian 
Federation border. Most Radfan refugees fled toward Yemen and no doubt some of them 
encountered Red Cross workers on that side of the border.486 For the ICRC, the conduct of the 
Radfan campaign reinforced the organization’s interest in gaining access to the South 
Arabian Federation. British officials, however, chose to obstruct the ICRC’s efforts in order 
to avoid criticism over the Radfan campaign’s brutality. 
On May 24, 1964, André Rochat, head of the ICRC delegation in the Arabian 
Peninsula, approached Britain for permission to visit the South Arabian Federation, 
ostensibly for a fundraising trip. 487 British officials delayed the ICRC’s request through June 
on the basis that “it was not possible to raise with Minister of External Affairs the question of 
visit to Federation of International Red Cross delegate on fund-raising mission” because all 
Federation ministers had traveled to London for a conference on the Federation’s future 
constitution.488 ICRC representatives accepted the explanation, but further delays soon tested 
their patience. 
By July, the ICRC still had not received a response to its visitation request. On July 
14, ICRC President Léopold Boissier wrote to British Foreign Secretary R.A. Butler. Boissier 
tactfully conveyed his exasperation, indicating that although the ICRC had been in contact 
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with the British government since May, Britain had not yet responded to the ICRC’s request 
to send a delegate to the Federation. The mission, Boissier reiterated, was “to visit the 
prisoners and wounded in the hands of the authorities concerned” and “to enquire on the 
needs, if any, of the civilian population.” He also expressed his desire to “avoid any 
undesirable publicity.” Finally, Boissier reminded Butler that the ICRC’s request to act “as a 
neutral intermediary between two parties to an internal conflict” was “in conformity with the 
stipulations of the Geneva Conventions. Article 3, common to all four Conventions, 
authorizes the Committee to offer its humanitarian services on behalf of the victims of such 
conflicts.”489 
Neither British nor Federation officials objected to the idea of an ICRC fundraising 
trip, but they still did not want ICRC delegates to investigate prison conditions. Mohammad 
Farid, the Federation’s Minister of External Affairs, told Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys 
that he saw no reason to object to an ICRC fundraising trip. He also agreed to allow a Red 
Cross representative to assess whether the ICRC could help “to alleviate any hardship 
suffered by the civilian population as a result of operations in Radfan.” On the issue of ICRC 
prison visits, Farid echoed British sentiments in saying that such an investigation “would be 
regarded as unwarranted interference.”490 To officials in Whitehall, the matter seemed 
straightforward and routine: Allow the Red Cross to raise funds and assess the humanitarian 
situation in the Radfan, but deny ICRC access to prison facilities.491 Duncan Sandys, 
however, urged Trevaskis and Federation leaders to allow the Red Cross fundraising visit. He 
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worried that blocking the visit of a reputable humanitarian organization such as the ICRC 
would suggest that British officials had something to hide.492 They did. 
Colonial officers at the Aden High Commission stridently opposed allowing the ICRC 
to visit South Arabia in any capacity due to the devastation that military operations had 
wreaked in the Radfan. On August 20, Timothy Oates, Trevaskis’s deputy in Aden, cabled 
Assistant Under-Secretary of State W.B.L. Monson at the Colonial Office’s Central African 
and Aden Department. Oates revealingly argued that “the Radfan operations were undertaken 
under British direction, and largely with British troops.” As a result, “the operations 
themselves and their repercussions on the civil population are therefore a British 
responsibility.” The repercussions were severe:    
H.M.G. has been obliged to take stern measures in Radfan. They have 
inevitably caused widespread distress and suffering and H.M.G. has come in 
for bitter criticism. Now that the situation is mending, I believe it would be 
directly contrary to H.M.G.’s interest to permit a factual exposé of the 
unfortunate side-effects of the Radfan campaign. Criticism of H.M.G. would 
be redoubled and our actions in Radfan would be used to belabor us in the 
councils of the world for months to come. 
 
Oates concluded by informing Monson that Mohammad Farid and other Federal 
ministers—who in July had not opposed the idea of an ICRC visit—had, after 
returning to the Federation, changed their minds. Oates proposed to help Farid “draft 
a reply to the letter from President of the I.C.R.C. politely declining to permit the 
visit.”493 
Oates’s opposition was not well-received in Whitehall. Colonial officers explained to 
Oates that they were “frankly puzzled at your criticism of our position.” W.B. Leslie Monson, 
Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies, told Oates that the “Red Cross have always been 
helpful to us in the past, their visits being conducted in a non-controversial manner.” Because 
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their reports were only shared between the ICRC and the government concerned, negative 
information remained private. “On the other hand,” Monson explained, “a refusal to permit a 
visit would be treated as evidence that allegations of brutality are true.” Monson suggested 
that ICRC attention could be directed toward improving living conditions in refugee camps if 
the High Commission did not want Red Cross delegates to spend time in the Radfan itself. 
Monson concluded that “unless there are overwhelming reasons against such visits, we are 
not in general opposed to I.C.R.C. missions.” But he also included a caveat: “We would not 
wish to strain relations with Federal Ministers if they should be firmly opposed to a visit.”494 
On August 29, Oates further explained the High Commission’s position by 
elaborating on the damage done in the Radfan. He wrote that “operations in Radfan, by their 
very nature, have involved the entire population.” Refugees made their way out of Radfan to 
neighboring territories within the Federation. Federation authorities, however, decided not to 
establish formal refugee camps, leaving the refugees to their own devices. Oates added a 
positive spin to the humanitarian crisis, insisting that refugees “have been able to enjoy health 
and other services not available to them in Radfan. In the context of Arabian tribal life” the 
refugees’ situation “does not present the same degree of difficulty or hardship that it would in 
more sophisticated urban societies.” He cautioned, however, that “to anyone not versed in the 
grinding poverty of Radfan in times of peace, the apparent side effects of our military 
operations might well seem distressing” and warned that “if Rochat visited Radfan there 
would be the very real risk that he would find himself unable to report in favourable 
terms.”495   
Oates also exploited Monson’s aversion to straining relations with the Federation. “I 
confirm,” Oates reported, “that Federal Ministers are firmly opposed to an ICRC visit” and 
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“they do not wish to create the impression internationally that their social services are unable 
to cope with the situation” in Radfan. But Farid, although “generally agreeing with his 
colleagues in not wishing to allow the visit,” was now reluctant to inform the ICRC of the 
Federation’s decision to refuse the Red Cross delegation.496 Farid wanted British reassurances 
that if he refused the ICRC’s request now, High Commission officials would not overrule his 
decision at a later date. On September 10, the High Commission received authorization from 
Whitehall to provide Farid with the assurance he desired.497  
The Federal rulers’ change of heart and Farid’s subsequent reluctance to notify the 
ICRC reflect the extent to which British High Commission officials controlled the 
Federation’s policy decisions. When approached by Foreign and Colonial Office 
representatives in London, Federation leaders did not object to a Red Cross presence in the 
Federation as long as the ICRC mandate did not include detention facilities. Their sudden 
change of heart upon returning to Aden could have been the result of Trevaskis’s and Oates’s 
influence. Farid’s hesitation to write to the ICRC and the subsequent “help” provided by 
High Commission officials in drafting a formal refusal—colonial officers heavily edited the 
content of the letter, if they did not write the entire document themselves—suggests that in 
practice, the High Commission held power in Aden by operating behind a Federal façade.498 
The Federation ministers’ change of heart concerning an ICRC visit can therefore be seen as 
the product of British colonial administrators’ influence. It was the High Commission that 
delayed the ICRC’s visit, not the Federation.  
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ICRC representatives were losing patience as the Radfan campaign wound down 
during the autumn of 1964. Farid, for instance, waited until mid-October before formally 
notifying the ICRC of his refusal to permit a visit.499 By November 1964, when Radfan 
peoples finished negotiating peace settlements and returned to their homes, the ICRC’s 
primary interest in the Federation shifted from aiding refugees to protecting detainees. On 
December 29, Sir Patrick Renison, Vice Chairman of the British Red Cross Society, informed 
the Colonial Office that a group of Aden political prisoners complained to the ICRC of 
torture and poor conditions.500 British officials promptly denied the allegations—and denied 
that the detainees were “political prisoners”—but Renison persisted.  
The ICRC reassured British officials that they were less concerned with the detainees’ 
legal status than with ensuring the prisoners received humane treatment. Renison 
acknowledged that “on no occasion has H.M.G. admitted that the Geneva Conventions were 
applicable in territories under its control” and explained to colonial officers that “the I.C.R.C. 
have no interest in the legal status of the detainees.” Furthermore, Renison argued that there 
was “everything to gain” by allowing an ICRC delegation to visit and “nothing to lose” 
because “if no visit is made it is all too likely that allegations of inhumane treatment will 
continue.”501 ICRC officials believed that such practical arguments might resonate with 
governments stretched by wartime crises better than overtures to uphold the spirit of 
international law. Even so, after the Colonial Office forwarded Renison’s letter to Aden, Red 
Cross representatives waited a further two weeks without receiving a reply. Meanwhile, 
ICRC delegate André Rochat decided to act on his own. 
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Forcing the Issue: The Red Cross Enters Aden 
In February 1965, as Renison attempted to break down government obfuscation in the 
UK, Rochat made an unexpected “private visit” to Aden—over eight months after the ICRC 
first asked to provide humanitarian assistance in the Radfan.502 By conducting a “private 
visit,” Rochat was not coming on a formal trip as an ICRC delegate. As a private citizen of 
Switzerland, he was entitled to fly to Aden on his own. He stayed for two weeks. Rochat met 
with Sir Richard Turnbull—who had replaced Kennedy Trevaskis as High Commissioner—
Mohammad Farid, and Sultan Saleh, visited hospital facilities, and received a helicopter tour 
of the Radfan areas affected by the previous year’s fighting.503 In the aftermath of Rochat’s 
sudden “private visit,” British officials realized that they could turn the ICRC presence into 
an advantage. By allowing the ICRC to provide aid and inspect prison conditions, colonial 
administrators could cultivate the public image that Britain was adhering to international 
standards of humane treatment.   
Although Rochat’s sudden appearance took colonial officials off-guard. Don 
McCarthy, a diplomat since 1946, had lived and worked in the Middle East for much of his 
career.  Having previously served in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, he was familiar with the 
region. McCarthy was an insightful commentator, provided honest and outspoken 
assessments, and at times criticized British policy in Aden. By 1964, McCarthy had been 
named Political Adviser to Middle East Command. He recognized the trouble that Rochat’s 
arrival in Aden could cause:  
On the main point we are in a jam. M. Rochat has forced the issue. I do not see how 
we could let him return without contact with the Federal Government if we are not to 
create a deplorable impression in Geneva and, very probably, in London. 
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Rochat had established personal relationships with several Federation ministers, which 
created the social expectation that he would be able to meet the ministers again on subsequent 
visits. McCarthy recognized that if Rochat was permitted to visit the Federation again, he 
would be able to meet with Federation officials and potentially influence Federal policy. 
Although Rochat’s visit seemed to cause a problem for the British, McCarthy also 
sensed an opportunity. “My feeling,” he reported, “is that with Radfan just about over we 
have less to be timorous about than we had last summer.” McCarthy recommended that the 
High Commission should instruct Farid to host Rochat, but “we should advise Farid against 
access to detainees at present because of the conditions in Aden prison and the tendentious 
and harmful political use which would be made of M. Rochat's access.” Later, McCarthy 
suggested, “when the new detention centre is ready and, perhaps, [constitutional] conference 
problems are less acute, it might suit us to facilitate access.” The Red Cross request therefore 
should be “turned aside rather than turned down.”504 By 1965, High Commission officials had 
begun to see the ICRC's presence as potentially advantageous, but not until the potential for a 
negative ICRC report had abated. The end of the Radfan campaign, return of the refugees, 
and the opening of a new prison with modern facilities meant that the ICRC was unlikely to 
find violations of humanitarian rights. If ICRC delegates did find and report abuses, the 
public would never know—it was the ICRC’s policy to keep its reports confidential. Besides 
the ICRC, only members of the British and Federal governments would have access to the 
reports.505 As a result, British officials allowed Rochat to file a formal trip report with ICRC 
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headquarters and granted permission for him to make official visits to South Arabia in the 
future.506  
As Rochat built a fledgling ICRC presence in the Federation, Amnesty International 
continued its lobbying efforts on the ICRC’s behalf. The October 1964 UK general election 
brought the Labour Party to power. As a well-connected barrister and member of the Labour 
Party, Peter Benenson used his connections to contact the new Colonial Secretary, Anthony 
Greenwood. In October 1965, several months following Rochat’s “private visit” to the 
Federation, Benenson asked Greenwood “for an invitation to the Red Cross to visit detainees 
in Aden.” He reminded Greenwood that “there was some difficulty about an International 
Red Cross delegate going to Aden at all” and that once the delegate finally arrived, “he was 
not able to visit any of the prisons.” Permitting such access would, Benenson argued, assist 
the ICRC and serve as “a useful political move for Britain.”507 Greenwood agreed. He 
believed that ICRC inspections would help Britain counter “the constant flow of false 
allegations about both the number of detainees and the conditions of their detention.” Fully 
expecting Red Cross visits to confirm the benevolence of British detention procedures, 
Greenwood wrote effusively to Turnbull that “I very much hope that you will agree that an 
invitation may now be extended.” From Greenwood’s perspective, Britain had “nothing to 
hide.”508 Benenson had won over the new Colonial Secretary. 
By the time Benenson met with Greenwood, the danger of an adverse ICRC report 
had already subsided with the November 1964 completion of the state-of-the-art Al-Mansura 
detention center. Deputy High Commissioner Timothy Oates noted that poor prison 
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conditions in Aden were no longer a problem: “This source of embarrassment, with the use of 
Al Mansura for detainees, has been removed. So in that respect we have nothing to fear from 
a I.C.R.C. visit.” In many Federation territories beyond Aden city, however, the High 
Commission’s concerns over prison conditions persisted. Oates suggested that “it might be 
politic to ask Ian Baillie to ensure that detainee conditions in the States would stand up just as 
Al Mansura would stand up to I.C.R.C. scrutiny.”509 But in terms of Britain’s reputation, 
ICRC inspections of Federation-administered prisons mattered little. Colonial officers wanted 
to avoid criticism of detention facilities managed by Britain, not the Federation. If anything, 
Colonial Secretary Greenwood noted, critical ICRC reports might provide enough 
“embarrassment” to persuade Federation ministers to improve substandard facilities.510 
Greenwood expected the supposedly less civilized “tribal” Federation rulers to fall short of 
ICRC standards, but he was convinced that Britain treated its prisoners humanely.  
With the ICRC now officially working in the Federation, colonial administrators used 
the ICRC’s presence to buttress British credibility. The Foreign Office wanted to use Red 
Cross visits to counter anti-British propaganda from Egypt, Yemen, FLOSY, and the NLF. 
They hoped that making Rochat’s visit public would help British and South Arabian 
authorities to “discourage those concerned from pursuing their original intention of making 
propaganda out of alleged inhuman conditions in the South Arabian territories”511 After 
Rochat’s February visit, the South Arabian Federation press service hailed the arrival of “the 
delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross” as if Rochat’s visit were officially 
sanctioned. Federal authorities published a press release that highlighted Rochat’s Radfan 
tour, meetings with government ministers, and time spent reviewing “the organisation of 
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medical services in the Federal territory.”512 Rochat was even allowed to make a second trip 
in May 1965. British officials seemed satisfied with the scope and substance of Red Cross 
reports on the South Arabian Federation because Rochat had not reported any negative 
findings. In August, the prevailing perception at the Aden High Commission was that Rochat 
has “established friendly relations” and indicated that “he was given everything he wanted in 
the way of reception and touring.”513 But High Commissioner Turnbull was skeptical. 
Formerly the Chief Secretary in Kenya during the Mau Mau conflict, Turnbull believed that 
tough measures were necessary to defeat colonial insurgencies.514 Based on this conviction, 
he explained that “I am rather doubtful whether we should stimulate the I.C.R.C.’s renewed 
interest gratuitously.”515 
 Ultimately, the propaganda potential of ICRC visits to the new detention facility 
outweighed Turnbull’s reluctance. On November 25, Greenwood instructed Turnbull to 
“secure [the] Federal Government’s agreement to an invitation being formally conveyed to 
Rochat through normal Foreign Office channels.”516 Whitehall official J.V. Mullin expressed 
the Colonial Secretary’s sentiments succinctly: A Red Cross inquiry “would help us to 
counter the constant allegations of brutality and torture in detention camps, the gross 
exaggerations of the numbers under detention, the damaging effect of hostile propaganda 
over our alleged refusal to permit the International Red Cross to visit the detainees.” He 
boasted that “we have nothing to hide: the detainees have now been transferred to the new 
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prison at Al Mansura where the conditions are excellent.”517 Officials in the Foreign Office 
believed that a formal request would be more beneficial than Rochat’s earlier informal visits, 
in which the lack of a formal report meant that colonial authorities “were unable to take any 
propaganda advantage of the very favourable impressions he [Rochat] formed of conditions 
in South Arabia.”518 British opinions had shifted from preventing ICRC visits to promoting 
formally documented prison inspections. Colonial administrators needed a way to counter 
torture allegations with credible evidence—positive ICRC reports provided that credibility.  
Rochat visited detention facilities on two occasions in 1965, but colonial officers did 
not allow him to interview detainees—he could only visit the facilities and speak with British 
officials.519 Despite this setback, prison inspections had finally begun. It had taken the ICRC 
over nine months since the beginning of the Radfan campaign and about six months since the 
rebels negotiated their return home. Over a year had elapsed since December 1963, when the 
first reports of detainee abuse surfaced and Benenson began his overtures on the ICRC’s 
behalf. This delay had allowed colonial officials to clean up the damage they had caused in 
the Radfan. By November 1964, most Radfan refugees had returned home and British forces 
had opened a new prison with facilities capable of satisfying ICRC humanitarian standards. 
Rochat’s initial visits produced positive assessments which British officials could use to 
defend themselves against allegations of abuse. By permitting ICRC inspections, Britain 
cultivated a public image in which they appeared to be playing by the rules. 
Conclusion 
The Radfan campaign and subsequent refugee crisis heightened the International 
Committee of the Red Cross’ involvement in South Arabia. British officials knew that their 
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Radfan operations intentionally created the need for humanitarian assistance. Homelessness 
and the threat of starvation, however, were clearly articulated and acceptable means for 
ending the conflict. The War Office’s official report on the campaign recognized as much by 
noting that “the policy of ‘big stick and no carrot’” had proved “to be the right one in South 
Arabia.”520 Officials also willingly perpetuated the humanitarian crisis by blocking ICRC 
access to the region. Going further, colonial officers also obstructed the ICRC’s attempts to 
visit detainees. British authorities in Aden did not want the ICRC involved because they did 
not want their actions scrutinized.  
When it proved impossible to prevent ICRC access to the Federation, colonial 
administrators tried to use the presence of the ICRC to their advantage. By early 1965, British 
officials had embraced High Commissioner Turnbull’s dictum that it was “better to avoid 
than win a public controversy.”521Colonial authorities dropped their objections to the ICRC’s 
presence in the Federation because they spied an opportunity to manipulate the ICRC’s 
presence to shield Britain from criticism. Aden officials prohibited ICRC delegates from 
visiting facilities that would not reflect positively on the British government. British officials 
controlled what ICRC delegates saw and who they could interact with to ensure that the 
delegates would provide positive reports. By limiting ICRC access to sensitive sites such as 
the Radfan and detention facilities, British officials restricted public knowledge of events 
which may have damaged Britain’s reputation. These restrictions were largely successful in 
containing Amnesty International and ICRC assertions of humanitarian rights for refugees 
and prisoners. 
The High Commission’s attempts to stifle public knowledge and criticism of the harsh 
measures taken during the Radfan campaign were largely successful. Colonial administrators 
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in Aden were far more proactive in shielding Radfan operations from scrutiny than their 
counterparts in Cyprus, where Greek Cypriots’ aggressive publicity efforts often caught 
British officials off-guard. During the Radfan campaign, British officials succeeded in 
waging a brutal campaign while avoiding public controversies on the scale of the European 
Commission of Human Rights investigation in Cyprus. Certainly the Radfan’s relative 
isolation helped the British to reduce the campaign’s public exposure; British officials simply 
denied access to the Radfan during the campaign in order to hide evidence of brutality. By 
the time that the ICRC was permitted to visit prisons in late 1965, British priorities had 
shifted away from the Radfan toward the insurgency in Aden city. But civilian and military 
leaders in Aden soon faced awkward questions as ICRC delegates—and suspicious colonial 
officers—began to uncover evidence of torture. 
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CHAPTER 5 
“THIS UNHAPPY AFFAIR”: INVESTIGATING TORTURE IN ADEN 
Introduction 
At two in the afternoon on July 28, 1966 Selahaddin Rastgeldi—a medical doctor and 
Swedish citizen born in Turkey of Kurdish parents—landed at Aden International Airport.522 
He traveled on behalf of Amnesty International’s Swedish Section to investigate persistent 
allegations that British interrogators had tortured detainees. AI became involved in Aden to 
prevent the use of torture by the British government. The decision to send an independent 
investigator in order to publicly pressure the British government into taking action against the 
abuse allegations represented a radical departure from previous involvement of international 
NGOs in war. AI acted independently—and against the interests—of the British government. 
Due to AI’s efforts, human rights activism played a key role in shaping British 
counterinsurgency practices during the Aden Emergency. 
This chapter examines the events leading to Rastgeldi’s mission and the consequences 
of his visit. British forces employed violent and degrading interrogation techniques to obtain 
vital intelligence because they lacked other means of collecting intelligence and continued to 
believe that coercive measures were effective. The High Commission’s Legal Adviser, Hugh 
Hickling, discovered evidence of these abuses. But senior civilian officials and military 
commanders in Aden adopted the same approach as their colleagues in Cyprus—they sought 
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to preserve the effectiveness of their intelligence apparatus by covering up the evidence. 
Where Hickling’s inquiries stalled, Amnesty International’s investigation was marginally 
more successful. British officials worried that AI’s inquiry would embarrass Britain by 
publicly exposing evidence of torture in Aden. The Rastgeldi visit prompted an internal 
investigation—known as the Bowen inquiry, ordered by Foreign Secretary George Brown—
which resulted in half-hearted reforms to the detention and interrogation regime. But the 
Bowen inquiry did not stop abuses. Unlike the ICRC’s “rule of silence”—in which delegates’ 
reports were shared only with the British government and South Arabian Federation—
Amnesty International intervened in the Aden conflict using a mixture of public activism and 
behind-the-scenes politicking. Although AI hoped to regulate and restrain wartime violence, 
AI’s activism forced colonial officials to find new ways of hiding detainee abuse.523 
“An Uncoordinated Mess”: Intelligence in Aden 
As in Cyprus, intelligence was vital to countering the Aden insurgency, but obtaining 
intelligence on local political allegiances and insurgent activities proved difficult. Insurgents 
targeted Special Branch, knowing that the most effective intelligence officers worked in that 
organization. Furthermore, intelligence efforts were hampered by poor coordination and 
ineffective leadership from the Director of Intelligence. Intelligence collection methods such 
as recruiting spies and wiretapping telephones also proved ineffective. British forces 
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therefore had to rely on the interrogation of captured suspects as the primary means of 
collecting intelligence on the insurgency.  
By the summer of 1965, the insurgency was gaining momentum, which included 
frequent assassinations of police informants and key security officers by insurgents.  The 
Aden Intelligence Centre was located in the Crater neighborhood, a hotbed of anti-British 
sentiment, which increased Special Branch officers’ vulnerability to attack as they traveled to 
and from to work each day. In July, insurgents killed the only two Arab officers in Special 
Branch.524 On August 29, gunmen assassinated Harry Barrie, whom Major General John 
Willoughby, Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Land Forces, called “the mainstay in 
Police Special Branch & the only one left who really knew the town.” Willoughby lamented 
that Barrie’s death “puts us back 6 months” in the intelligence collection effort.525 Due to the 
attacks on Special Branch, Willoughby decided that the intelligence center “simply must be 
moved.”526 On September 5, the Director of Intelligence, Brigadier Tony Cowper, relocated 
the Aden Intelligence Centre from Crater to the Post Office building near Steamer Point—
much safer due to its proximity to British military bases.527 But the assassinations continued. 
Willoughby recalled “another disgraceful murder” on September 14 in which the insurgent 
National Liberation Front (NLF) killed a Special Branch sergeant: “Tied up, 25 bullets, 
message pinned to the body.”528  
Relocating the intelligence center, however, did not automatically make collection 
and analysis more effective. Leadership was also an issue. One former Special Branch officer 
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with experience in Cyprus described Brigadier Cowper as “a big fat Zero” whose attempts to 
lead the intelligence effort were “an uncoordinated mess.”529 Cowper also proved unable to 
handle the growing number of detainees in his forces’ custody. Willoughby recorded that  
“bomb throwers, murderers & members of the National Liberation Front who cannot be 
brought to proper trial because of the intimidation of witnesses” were all housed “in the 
Central Prison—there are about 200—and will almost certainly escape before long. . . . The 
Assistant Commissioner has gone sick and the prison is more or less in the hands of the 
inmates.”530 The September 1965 opening of a new facility—the recently constructed 
Mansoura Detention Centre—solved some of these problems by ensuring that detainees were 
housed more securely.531  
Due to the general hostility of the local population, intelligence officers had a difficult 
time recruiting spies and developing knowledge of insurgent capabilities. NLF assassinations 
of many of the most experienced Special Branch officers deprived colonial forces of access to 
those officers’ informant networks. Wiretapping telephones proved ineffective because the 
insurgents did not often use telephones to send operational details. Surveillance operations 
were also unproductive—Aden’s dense urban landscape made it difficult for British troops to 
travel unseen or remain in hideouts without being noticed by the inhabitants. Colonial 
political officers could provide local context, but they lacked a nuanced understanding of the 
relationship between internal Federation politics and nationalist armed groups. High 
Commission officials continued to blame Egyptian interference for the problems they faced 
in Aden, rather than local conditions. 532  
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The interrogation of prisoners proved the most valuable intelligence collection tool 
available to British forces. Detainees knew the dynamics of local insurgent networks, but 
convincing them to divulge this information was another matter. Officials in Aden adopted a 
similar approach toward intelligence as their forebears in Cyprus—they justified the targeted 
application of physical and psychological violence on detainees as a necessary and effective 
measure for gathering intelligence on the insurgency.533 
With the assassinations of many experienced Special Branch officers, interrogation in 
Aden was largely conducted by military interrogators who were legally required to abide by 
the Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas. This 
directive had not existed during the Cyprus Emergency. Designed by Whitehall’s Joint 
Intelligence Committee in February 1965, the directive ordered military interrogators to obey 
the Geneva Conventions and the laws of the territory in which they were operating. It banned 
torture, but did not define what “torture” meant in practice.534 The laws of the territory in 
which they were operating included all emergency legislation in effect during the insurgency. 
Emergency laws authorized holding an individual for interrogation for up to seven days, but 
this could be extended to 28 days. To continue detention longer than 28 days, security forces 
were required to obtain a detention order approved by the High Commissioner. 535 In addition 
to the Joint Directive, a local High Commission regulation entitled “Instructions on 
Detainees” outlined the proper treatment of prisoners during interrogation and detention. 
Issued on September 30, the Instructions stipulated that despite the declaration of a state of 
emergency, Section 5 of the Aden Constitution remained in force. As a result, the document 
directed that “no person shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading punishment 
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or treatment” during interrogation and detention.536 These legal restrictions appeared to 
restrain interrogators from using violence against detainees, but the failure to define the 
practices that constituted “torture” meant that British forces could claim that they did not 
torture prisoners.  
Hugh Hickling, Legal Adviser to the High Commissioner, paid special attention to 
monitoring detainee treatment. The son of a police inspector, Hickling earned a law degree at 
Nottingham University and served in the Royal Navy during the Second World War. After 
the war, he worked in Malaya, where he drafted much of the legislation used during the 
Malayan Emergency. Later in life, he spoke of his concern that the postcolonial Malaysian 
government continued to use legislation that he drafted to arbitrarily detain political 
opponents and rights activists.537 He was intelligent, humane, and had a strong sense of 
justice. He would find these qualities sorely tested in Aden. 
The primary venue for monitoring detainee affairs was the Review Tribunal, which 
adjudicated detention orders and oversaw prisoners’ welfare. The Tribunal did not have the 
power to order release, but it could recommend to the High Commissioner whether to release 
or continue holding a detainee. Under the 1965 emergency regulations, detainees were not 
supposed to be held longer than six months unless the Tribunal had reviewed the case and 
recommended continued detention. Six months’ imprisonment without trial and without 
review of a detainee’s case file made a mockery out of due process, but according to Hickling 
“the detainee always had a right to appear in person before the Tribunal” to contest his 
detention or make complaints. In Hickling’s opinion, the Review Tribunal adopted “a liberal 
and humane approach.”538 It was the only appeal process available. Hickling’s desire to 
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ensure that detainees were treated in accordance with the law brought him into conflict with 
military commanders and civilian officials who were more concerned with collecting 
intelligence than abiding by the legal requirements regulating detainee treatment.  
Abuse Uncovered 
In October 1965, one month after the new Mansoura detention facility opened, 
Hickling learned of several reports that detainees had been abused while in British custody. 
But after Hickling recommended an inquiry, High Commissioner Sir Richard Turnbull and 
Major General Willoughby tried to minimize knowledge of the abuses, not only in public but 
also within government circles. When Lord Beswick’s visit brought unwanted scrutiny from 
Parliament, the High Commission deflected abuse allegations by convincing Beswick that the 
situation was not as bad as the allegations suggested. Over the next nine months, Turnbull 
and Willoughby successfully deflected additional pressure from Hickling and the ICRC. 
 Hickling first inquired into abuse allegations after the head of the Review Tribunal 
reported several instances. When Hickling visited the Mansoura detention center in October, 
an army medical officer notified him “that there was some evidence of physical maltreatment 
of detainees arriving at the centre.”539 Hickling raised his concerns with his superiors. In an 
October 19 memorandum to Deputy High Commissioner Timothy Oates, Hickling noted that 
“evidence of the physical maltreatment of detainees” required a judicial inquiry. But no such 
inquiry materialized.  Two weeks later, Hickling again wrote to Oates, saying that he was 
“very disturbed” by allegations of cruelty and torture during interrogation and expressing his 
conviction that every allegation of abuse demanded “a full inquiry.” Three weeks later, 
Hickling reiterated his assessment that “a case exists for an enquiry by a judicial officer,” still 
with no results. Hickling was not the only voice calling for an investigation.  On November 
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14, the army’s Director of Health Services wrote to Oates that “the injuries sustained by the 
detainees . . . indicate that their interrogation was assisted by physical violence.” Not eager to 
see the High Commission embarrassed by this assessment, Oates again chose not to pursue an 
inquiry.540   
During the Aden conflict, local lawyers played a different role from Greek Cypriot 
barristers in the Cyprus Emergency. Many lawyers simply did not share Arab nationalist 
aspirations. Most lawyers in Aden were of South Asian descent, having settled in the city 
when it was under the jurisdiction of the India Office during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. South Asian migrants settled throughout the Indian Ocean basin during 
the height of British imperial expansion, and Aden was no exception. The South Asian 
population in Aden had little incentive for supporting the avowedly pan-Arab aspirations of 
the PSP and ATUC. Many South Asian lawyers therefore opposed the insurgency.541  
When the few Arab lawyers practicing in Aden challenged British interrogation 
practices, colonial officials contained the attorneys’ influence. Although several cases 
concerning detainee treatment went before the Aden courts, records of proceedings have not 
survived. In one instance, colonial officials bribed the detainees into dropping their 
complaints. In 1966, the Chairman of the Aden Bar Council, Saeed Hassan Sohbi, agreed to 
defend several detainees who alleged that British forces had tortured them. But on the day of 
the High Court hearing, Sohbi arrived at the courthouse only to discover that his detainee 
clients had dropped their complaints after colonial officials offered the prisoners scholarships 
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to study in London. The detainees were released, stayed in London for three months, then 
settled in Cairo.542  
At the international level, local lawyers in Aden could not rely on the support of a 
state belonging to the European Convention on Human Rights, as Greek Cypriot barristers 
had during the Cyprus Emergency. Instead, the Aden Bar Council, PSP, and ATUC 
advocated for trades union rights protected under the umbrella of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). Since the Second World War, the ILO had sponsored several 
international initiatives to reduce forced labor, restrain penal labor, and protect workers’ 
freedom of association. For the ILO and Aden’s anticolonial nationalists, workers’ rights 
formed an important element of the emerging international human rights regime.543  
In practical terms, the PSP and ATUC believed that intervention from the ILO could 
force Britain to permit the mass mobilization of Adeni workers. Colonial legislation had 
banned public gatherings and strike actions because PSP and ATUC activists used mass 
workers’ strikes to further their political agenda. Between 1960 and 1962, hundreds of 
workers had been arrested for having participated in strikes and either imprisoned or 
deported. By lobbying the ILO, Aden socialists sought to restore workers’ rights to free 
expression and association. Aden socialists could not organize workers into a mass political 
movement if colonial laws criminalized the most useful forms of protest. Throughout 1964, 
Aden activists filed hundreds of pages of allegations with the ILO concerning British 
violations of workers’ rights. The ILO discussed the matter with the British government, but 
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British government lawyers convinced the ILO not to take action.544 Through bribery in Aden 
and persuasive legal arguments at the ILO, British officials avoided facing legal action.  
Despite Arab lawyers’ failure to effectively challenge Britain through legal action, the 
visit of Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and the 
Colonies, Lord Beswick, brought unwanted scrutiny of the detainee situation.545 Lord 
Beswick’s visit lasted from November 5-23 and much of the agenda involved meetings with 
Federal ministers. Discussion topics revolved around constitutional affairs and movement 
toward South Arabia’s eventual independence, but Lord Beswick also made a point to inspect 
the Mansoura detention center on three different occasions.546 Willoughby saw Lord Beswick 
as naïve and too accommodating toward the insurgents. He complained that “Lord Beswick 
who has come out here for 3 weeks to become an ‘expert’ for Wilson has given the terrorists 
a shot in the arm. He has enforced the release of 6 Trades Union Leaders who were ‘inside’ 
for dubious activities.”547 According to Willoughby, “almost the first action of Lord Beswick 
during his stay here was to visit the Detention Centre, which is exclusively for members of 
the National Liberation Front and included at that time amongst some 90 inmates.” 
Willoughby later fumed that Lord Beswick’s visits to Mansoura were “a marvellous 
satisfaction to the NLF, whose morale had been severely lowered by our successes in Aden 
State.” Lord Beswick declared the conditions in Mansoura “eminently satisfactory,” but after 
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hearing detainees complain about their treatment, Lord Beswick cautioned that “there is a 
strong case for an enquiry by a suitably qualified lawyer.”548 Hickling agreed. 
With his suspicions raised from Lord Beswick’s visit, Hickling searched for and soon 
found more evidence of torture. Hickling visited Mansoura again on November 24. 
Accompanied by an Arabic-speaking colleague, he heard detailed complaints in which 
prisoners described specific acts of violence and degrading treatment. Hickling recorded the 
allegations as “being compelled to stand in the sun for hours with arms raised,” having “pig’s 
fat smeared on the body,” and “having a wooden stick inserted in the anus.” He further 
reported that he had seen “evidence of violence having been applied to the bodies of some 
detainees, who anxiously presented scars, bruises and weals as additional testimony.” Despite 
his own biases—Hickling described the “native histrionic ability of the Arabs” and their 
“tendency to dramatise and exaggerate”—he found “a substantial body of evidence” pointing 
toward the systematic abuse of prisoners during interrogation.549 He then examined detainees’ 
medical records. The documentation he found led him to conclude that “there was prima 
facie evidence to the effect that the handling of detainees” at the Fort Morbut interrogation 
center “had been accompanied by physical violence.”550 On November 27, Hickling described 
his findings to the High Commission’s senior staff members. They did not take kindly to 
Hickling’s interest in detainee treatment. Concerned with the embarrassment that Hickling’s 
findings could cause, John Willoughby confided in his diary “Thank God Lord Beswick isn't 
here any more.”551 Exasperated, Willoughby called Hickling “a great ferret” who had been 
                                                            
548 CO 1055/276 Report by Lord Beswick, November 30, 1965, p.8. 
 
549 Hickling Papers 2, pp. 119-20. 
 
550 Hickling Papers 2, p.121. 
 
551 Willoughby Papers - diary entry, November 28, 1965. 
 
209 
 
“scouring around the Detention Centre” looking for evidence.552 Hickling had uncovered 
evidence that senior High Commission officials and military commanders wanted to keep 
hidden. 
Turnbull and Willoughby now faced uncomfortable scrutiny both within the High 
Commission and from London. On December 2, Colonial Secretary Anthony Greenwood 
informed Turnbull that the allegations of physical violence during interrogation required 
“immediate attention” and “cannot be ignored.”  Greenwood believed that “if the allegation 
of physical violence designed to extort confession were true the servicemen concerned would 
be guilty of a criminal offence triable by court martial.” Cautiously—and perhaps hoping that 
he could change Hickling’s mind—Turnbull asked Hickling to review the evidence and 
advise the High Commission on what to do next.553 Turnbull was under pressure. So was 
Willoughby. Because the abuse allegations implicated soldiers, Defence Secretary Denis 
Healey notified Greenwood that “whatever the character of the further investigations which 
are being made, I am sure the Commander-in-Chief should associate himself with them.”554 
Willoughby faced the prospect of investigating his own troops.  
Willoughby ordered RAF Air Commodore William Thorburn, the senior medical 
officer in Aden, to examine the medical records belonging to detainees who had complained 
of physical abuse. Thorburn investigated the claims of 21 detainees. In five detainees’ 
records, Thorburn found no evidence of injury. He identified seven detainees who were 
injured in transit from the Crater jail to Mansoura during an isolated incident that Hickling 
uncovered in October. Finally, Thorburn found that the records of nine detainees confirmed 
that they had been injured. He found “medical evidence that these nine men sustained injuries 
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at Fort Morbut, or Al Mansoura or in transit between these places.” Between October 12 and 
November 1, four of the nine detainees suffered ruptured eardrums, which Thorburn 
described as “consistent with being struck or pushed.” On December 11, Thorburn had a 
specialist from the RAF Hospital examine the four men with perforated eardrums.  The 
specialist “reported that the ears of each were healthy and showed no signs of perforation or 
scarring.” Six to eight weeks after reporting their injuries, the detainees had recovered. 
Dismissing the severity of the detainees’ injuries with circular logic, Thorburn concluded that 
“none of the injuries was gross since none persists.” Furthermore, since his investigation 
occurred well after the injuries were first reported, he claimed that it was not “profitable to 
speculate how the injuries came about.” And yet Thorburn declared that there was “no 
consistent pattern to suggest brutal interrogation” and therefore “the evidence does not 
support systematic ill treatment of detainees.”555 
After examining the same medical records, Hickling and Thorburn arrived at opposite 
conclusions. Hickling believed that the similarity of injuries among four of nine detainees and 
the type of injury—perforated eardrums were known to result from blows to the head—
suggested a “consistent pattern” worthy of a formal inquiry.556 Thorburn’s conclusion is 
evidence of a careful attempt to deflect Hickling’s call for an inquiry and clear the security 
forces of any potential wrongdoing. Thorburn did not want to speculate as to how four out of 
nine detainees received the same traumatic injury because the likely explanation was that 
perforated ear drums occurred during interrogation. But, Thorburn did speculate in 
concluding that “systematic” ill-treatment had not occurred. He may have felt that he could 
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reasonably claim that indications of abuse were not “systematic” if injuries did not occur in a 
majority of prisoners. The word “systematic” is critical to Thorburn’s assessment, because it 
removed the possibility that violent interrogation methods were a concerted British strategy. 
Thorburn’s assessment led Turnbull to believe that if he ordered a limited inquiry into 
detainee abuse, the investigator would not find sufficient evidence to conclude that torture 
had occurred.  
After Lord Beswick’s visit and Hickling’s unrelenting calls for an inquiry, Turnbull 
was forced to order a limited investigation. Air Commodore Thorburn’s medical report may 
have convinced Turbull that an inquiry would not find evidence of torture, but to Turnbull’s 
chagrin, the investigating officer confirmed Hickling’s suspicions of torture rather than 
Thorburn’s benign findings. Hickling suggested a judicial inquiry—a formal investigation by 
an officer of the court—but according to Hickling “no such inquiry was held.”557  Instead, on 
December 26, Turnbull ordered a police investigation. A British police officer was assigned 
to take statements from all detainees who had complained of abuse. The officer was 
instructed only to record detainees’ statements. Hickling viewed the inquiry’s limited 
parameters as evasive and deceptive: “No investigation, in any real sense of the word, had 
been ordered.” But the investigating officer stepped beyond his mandate by reaching a 
conclusion about his findings. In his final report the officer suggested that detainee 
complaints were “more or less localized to two rooms at the Interrogation Centre and 
circulate round three men.”558 When the investigating officer filed his report with Hickling on 
March 6, 1966, Hickling cross-checked the report with existing evidence and concluded that 
the detainees’ new statements, previous testimony, and documentation from medical records 
indicated “at least degrading and humiliating treatment, at worst vicious brutality.” The 
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evidence reaffirmed Hickling’s opinion that the “common pattern” of abuse at Fort Morbut 
established “a prima facie case” against several military interrogators. Hickling recalled 
sardonically that “after a lapse of several months, we appeared to have established the 
accuracy of evidence that had already been known.”559 
 While the police investigation was in progress, Red Cross delegate André Rochat also 
uncovered evidence that Fort Morbut interrogators had physically abused detainees. In March 
1966, Rochat visited Mansoura with Don McCarthy (the Foreign Office political adviser to 
Middle East Command), Major General Willoughby, and a delegation of camp officials 
including the camp commandant, medical officer, and an interpreter. Rochat asked the 
detainees to speak with him if they had been abused. Approximately fifteen complained that 
interrogators had beaten them. For two hours, Rochat asked detailed questions to probe the 
validity of detainees’ accounts. Ultimately he determined that about half of the complaints 
were invalid, but the other half appeared credible and accurate. In each case of the credible 
cases, detainees complained of brutal treatment during interrogation at Fort Morbut.560  
Willoughby recalled that “one detainee showed a thin 4'-5' scar behind one of his knees 
which he said had been made some months previously by a British soldier with a bayonet.” 
The detainee’s medical records corroborated his story, indicating that a “sharp instrument” 
had caused the wound. Another detainee reported being “stripped, beaten, kicked and burned 
with cigarettes and matches” while held at Fort Morbut. Willoughby noted, perhaps 
reluctantly, that “there were certainly marks on the man.” Rochat interviewed five additional 
detainees and concluded that British interrogators had physically abused some of these 
prisoners as well.561  
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As in Cyprus, interrogators used torture in Aden to gather intelligence rather than as 
punishment or retaliation for terrorist acts—and they had grown proficient at hiding evidence 
of torture. In his March 1966 report to ICRC headquarters, Rochat stated that detainees had 
been abused. He classified that abuse according to three categories. In the first category, 
Rochat indicated that approximately 25% of detainees appeared to have been “slapped 
around” during interrogation in a relatively “minor” manner. But 5% of detainees had been 
subjected to what Rochat considered “physical torture”—a category that included practices 
such as forcing the prisoner to strip naked; punching and kicking his body; and beating 
genitals with sticks. Interrogators did not mindlessly apply wanton brutality motivated by 
frustration or anger. A cold, calculated logic lay behind their decisions about which detainees 
should face torture. Rochat found that a detainee’s alleged crime did not determine whether 
interrogators tortured them. Many detainees had clearly been involved in bombings, murders, 
and other forms of violence, but they were not necessarily the ones tortured. Instead, Rochat 
wrote, “the use of torture is applied to those who are likely to know a lot.” Rochat’s findings 
suggested that physical abuse occurred regularly to specifically selected prisoners.562  
Interrogators abused prisoners in such a way that they could maintain plausible 
deniability when questioned about detainees’ injuries. After a May 1966 visit to Fort Morbut, 
Rochat concluded that among the interrogators, “many precautions are taken so that detainees 
cannot in any way prove that they have been maltreated.” When injuries were more obvious, 
prison officials simply claimed that they were self-inflicted—detainees wanted to convince 
the ICRC that they had been tortured when such allegations were clearly false. British 
officers also tried to insist that detainees had sustained injuries through such mundane 
activities as recreational football matches or when running up the stairs. In one instance, 
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prison officials attempted to explain how two detainees had developed similar bruises and 
sores on the soles of their feet. The detainees had apparently worn ill-fitting sandals during 
their exercise periods, when detainees were allowed a daily walk. Rochat found the officials’ 
explanations unconvincing. “Is it not a little strange,” he wondered, that on the same day, 
these two men developed “the same kind of injury on the soles of their feet?” He concluded 
“this problem [of ill-treatment] is serious” and wanted British officials to improve the 
situation.563  
Willoughby and McCarthy immediately denied the allegations. Willoughby declared 
that “it was not accepted that ill-treatment had taken place.”  He tried to undermine the 
credibility of detainees’ testimony, reminding everybody that these were individuals detained 
for “complicity in violent acts of terrorism.” Willoughby also suggested that detainees could 
have received bruises and scars as a result of “involvement in riots before arrest” or while 
resisting arrest.564 To shift the burden of proof onto the detainees, McCarthy asserted that 
“proving a negative is always difficult.” In a final passive-aggressive dismissal of the matter, 
McCarthy and Willoughby explained the High Commissioner’s willingness “to have Rochat 
visit Morbut at any time he liked.”565   
In keeping with the Red Cross’s desire to alleviate suffering and improve prisoners’ 
conditions, Rochat’s goal was not to punish Security Forces for allowing abuse to occur, but 
to prevent abuse from continuing. Rather than taking on Willoughby and McCarthy, Rochat 
proposed to delay visiting Fort Morbut so that British officials could stop abusive 
interrogations without receiving a negative ICRC report. He suggested to Willoughby and 
McCarthy that he was willing to keep the evidence quiet as long as they worked to prevent 
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future abuse. Rochat knew of the police investigation of Fort Morbut that finished on March 
6, but declared that he would file a positive report on Mansoura and would not directly 
implicate Fort Morbut before visiting it. He suggestively hinted to Willoughby and McCarthy 
that if he investigated at a later date, he would hopefully “find nothing to worry him.”566  
McCarthy believed that Rochat was providing a tactful “hint against recurrence,” but 
saw no incentive for stopping the abuses. Rochat’s and Hickling’s claims increased 
McCarthy’s suspicions that the allegations might have been true:  
I must say, nevertheless, that the allegations of ill-treatment under 
interrogation carry some degree of conviction and I think that they should be 
looked at again. The Legal Adviser [Hickling], who has not recorded other 
comment, has remarked that he is perturbed by the frequency with which 
allegations of being stripped naked for interrogation are made by detainees.567 
 
But McCarthy was less concerned with the validity of the detainees’ accusations than the 
confidentiality of them. McCarthy reminded Turnbull that Red Cross reports were only 
shared with the government concerned. Colonial officers would, at worst, only have to 
explain a negative ICRC report to the British government. As McCarthy explained to 
Turnbull, “what Rochat is doing is to give us time to create conditions in which he could then 
say that there was nothing currently wrong.” But without the specter of public humiliation, 
McCarthy believed, the confidentiality of Red Cross reporting meant “we have nothing really 
to fear from the International Committee.”568 
Turnbull knew that Rochat’s reports would not reach the public, but he still had to 
deal with the police investigation and Hickling’s constant calls for a judicial inquiry. Civilian 
authorities did not have jurisdiction over military personnel, so the decision to prosecute the 
“three men” belonged with the army commander, Major General Willoughby, and his 
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superiors. On March 28, Turnbull instructed Hickling to send evidence of abuse—detainee 
statements, medical records, and the police investigator’s report—to the Director of Army 
Legal Services. Writing on July 12, the Directorate of Army Legal Services informed 
Hickling’s deputy legal adviser that, in their opinion, the evidence “did not in the main 
appear to substantiate the allegations.” Army lawyers, however, were willing to question the 
“three men” if the Director of Intelligence in Aden, Brigadier Tony Cowper, consented.569 
But by June 1966 each of the “three men” had been reassigned outside Aden.570 Cowper, too, 
was on his way out. He had received orders reassigning him to Malaysia and was to be 
replaced in Aden by the highly experienced John Prendergast. July 19 was his last day as 
Director of Intelligence in Aden. Based on the surviving records, Cowper apparently never 
consented to the Army Legal Services request and neither Turnbull nor Oates decided to 
pursue the issue further.571  
Ultimately, Turnbull took the minimum action possible. He chose to not fully 
investigate the allegations and to not punish the culprits. On April 24, 1966, Turnbull wrote 
to the Colonial Office claiming that “I cannot put my hand on my heart and say that at no 
stage in the past was anyone under interrogation clouted or otherwise maltreated. It is simply 
not possible to check things many months old.” But he reassured them that “there has never 
been ‘torture’ and I am satisfied that . . . no maltreatment takes place” at Fort Morbut.572 By 
July 1966, Turnbull and other senior officials such as Oates and Willoughby had successfully 
sidestepped scrutiny of the interrogation system from Lord Beswick, Hickling, and the ICRC. 
Turnbull may have been satisfied, but Amnesty International’s leaders were not. 
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Amnesty International’s Intervention 
In March 1966, as Turnbull dismissed the detainee abuse allegations and Rochat 
agreed to delay his visit to Fort Morbut, an Amnesty International delegation visited Lord 
Longford, a Labour Party MP and the new Colonial Secretary, to demand greater government 
transparency over prisoner treatment in Aden. AI representatives asked that he either publish 
Red Cross reports on the treatment of prisoners or permit an independent investigation. 
Longford, however, delayed. When confronted with the British government’s obfuscation, AI 
leaders launched an investigation of their own and threatened to make the findings public if 
Britain did not take action to formally investigate the Aden torture allegations.  
It is unclear if this delay was due to Longford’s reticence to discuss the matter or the 
result of bureaucratic tangles. Administrative responsibility over Aden was in the process of 
transferring from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office, which could have contributed to 
officials’ slow to response to AI’s subsequent queries. Regardless, Eric Baker, the Chairman 
of AI’s British section, criticized the government’s “dilatoriness” and later complained that 
“it took seven weeks to get an answer to a simple question despite repeated letters and 
telephone calls.”573   
The AI delegation had reason to expect a faster response because of the organization’s 
close ties with the British government. The relationship began in 1962 under the Macmillan 
government when Amnesty leaders met with Peter Thomas, Conservative MP and Under-
Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, to discuss right of individual appeal under the 
European Convention on Human Rights. AI made the anticommunist argument that 
supporting individual petition and the European Court would “deprive our enemies of a 
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possible propaganda point.” This perspective left Thomas convinced that Amnesty 
International shared many of the government’s interests. In 1963 the Foreign Office notified 
its overseas posts that Amnesty International was to receive the government's “discreet 
support.” Peter Benenson developed a particularly close working relationship with Foreign 
Office and colonial officials in which he regularly corresponded and met with senior 
ministers.574 Many of Amnesty’s senior leaders had close ties to Harold Wilson’s Labour 
government. Peter Benenson was a long-standing member of the party, as were several other 
founding members including Peter Archer, an MP, and Elwyn Jones, MP and Attorney 
General for the Wilson government. Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor, was a Labour peer 
and Amnesty supporter. Robert Swann, Amnesty’s general secretary, was a former diplomat 
who understood the Foreign Office’s inner workings.575 The Labour Party’s 1964 electoral 
victory offered an opportunity for Amnesty to broaden its relationship with the government 
even further. 
AI used its close relationship with the government to advocate on behalf of detainee 
rights in Aden. Throughout June and July 1966, Robert Swann exchanged a series of letters 
with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Walter Padley. Swann explained that AI’s remit 
included the protection of “political prisoners” detained for expressing political beliefs 
contrary to colonial policies, even if prisoners participated in violence. 576 Eric Baker later 
clarified this position when he stated that Amnesty worked to prevent torture and support the 
right to trial of all prisoners—even violent ones—but would only advocate for the release of 
“prisoners of conscience” who did not advocate violence.577 He requested that the British 
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government take one of two actions: The government should publish the Red Cross reports 
on Aden or support an independent Amnesty International mission “to investigate the 
conditions under which persons are at present detained there under the emergency 
regulations.”578 Although the Red Cross kept its reports confidential, the ICRC did not oppose 
the public release of its reports as long as the British government agreed to publish them.  So 
far the government had refused to do so.  In arguing for an independent investigation, Swann 
noted that Britain already faced accusations at the United Nations that colonial authorities 
were holding political prisoners.  It would therefore be “in the best interests of Her Majesty’s 
Government that these allegations should be investigated by an impartial and experienced 
organisation like ourselves.”579  
Padley denied Swann’s request for an AI investigator to interview detainees. 
Although he expressed “considerable sympathy” for Amnesty’s work, Padley gave three 
reasons for the refusal.  First, he argued that an investigation into the reasons why authorities 
decided to detain particular individuals would “inevitably acquire the character of a judicial 
enquiry.” Padley claimed that it would be unacceptable for Britain to submit itself to such 
scrutiny by a non-governmental body. Secondly, Padley perceived Amnesty International as 
“being concerned only with the interests of political detainees.”  Padley denied that any such 
prisoners existed. Instead, he insisted that prisoners in Aden were terrorists jailed for acts of 
violence rather than political opinions.  He asserted that “none of the persons at present 
detained in Aden is held because of his political opinions” and therefore AI had no business 
interfering.580 The government would not publish the Red Cross reports nor would it facilitate 
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an AI visit to Aden. Ultimately, Padley refused to allow an Amnesty delegate to meet with 
detainees, but he assured Swann that High Commission officials would at least meet with the 
Amnesty International representative, discuss detainee treatment, and answer his questions.581 
Padley also rejected Swann’s request that the government publish the Red Cross 
reports. He reiterated the High Commission’s argument that the ICRC’s presence was enough 
to ensure prisoners’ well-being. Padley asserted that the Red Cross had already sent a 
delegate to Aden on multiple occasions. The delegate had investigated prison facilities and 
detainee conditions, but had found nothing untoward. To Padley, the fact that an esteemed 
international organization such as the Red Cross had already investigated prison conditions 
ought to provide “sufficient assurance to the world at large” that the government’s treatment 
of prisoners “is in fact as humane as possible.” Padley insisted that the government was not 
hiding anything by refusing to publish the Red Cross reports.  Instead, he argued that the Red 
Cross reports contained positive assessments of prison conditions. Despite the potential 
advantages of publication, Padley informed Swann, British policy held that the reports were 
confidential and therefore would not be made public.582  
Rather than backing down, AI leaders pressured the government into reforming the 
treatment of prisoners in Aden. First, Amnesty committed to launching an independent 
investigation. The organization’s Swedish section selected a delegate—Selahaddin Rastgeldi, 
the Swedish doctor—and the British section pledged to fund half the cost of Rastgeldi’s trip.  
Rastgeldi planned to travel first to London and Cairo before departing for Aden. He arrived in 
London on July 18.583 Publicly, Amnesty-affiliated Labour MPs shamed their party leadership 
in Parliament. Privately, however, Robert Swann offered a compromise.  
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On the day of Rastgeldi’s arrival in London, Labour Party MP Peter Archer pressured 
Padley during Parliament’s question time. Reiterating much of Swann’s private 
correspondence in the public domain of Parliament, Archer asked Padley “on what grounds 
he informed Amnesty International that he did not think it appropriate for them to send an 
observer to Aden; whether he will reconsider this and provide every facility for the Swedish 
observer who is going; and whether he will publish the recent International Red Cross reports 
on Aden.” Benjamin Whitaker, a first-term Labour MP, supported Archer. Whitaker 
suggested that Padley should “place a copy of the Red Cross report in the Library” so that 
other MPs could examine it. Facing dissent within the ranks of his own party, Walter Padley 
responded with the same explanation he had offered to Swann.  He argued that the detainees 
were held due to “their implication in terrorist activities” and that none of the detainees were 
political prisoners, “which is the kind of detention with which Amnesty International is 
usually concerned.” A visit by Amnesty International would therefore serve “no useful 
purpose.” Padley also claimed that the Red Cross reports were confidential and “Her 
Majesty’s Government are not at liberty to publish them.”  He said that “no report by a Red 
Cross representative on a visit to a detention camp or similar establishment in a British 
dependent territory has been published by the British Government.”  Archer pressed his point 
further, asking “if there is nothing to conceal, would not my honorable Friend agree that the 
sooner the fact is confirmed by an independent observer the better?”  Padley insisted that “the 
International Red Cross is the appropriate body” for monitoring the treatment of detainees.  
The answer to Archer’s question, apparently, was “no.”584 
  In addition to Archer’s public shaming, Swann wrote privately to Padley with the 
intention of using the threat of adverse publicity as leverage to change government policy.  
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“Should the High Commissioner not be able to alter the decision conveyed in your letter of 
18th July,” Swann wrote, “we feel it would be useful to set out our point of view in writing so 
that it can be published together with your reply as an appendix to Dr. Rastgeldi’s report.” 
Having established Amnesty’s willingness to publish, Swann created an escape for the 
government.  He proposed an arrangement similar to what Rochat offered to McCarthy and 
Willoughby:  
If Dr. Rastgeldi is given the facilities necessary to carry out a complete and 
impartial investigation of the conditions of detainees, we, on our part, are 
prepared to delay the publication of his report for a period to be agreed, so 
that, if there should appear from his visit to be any matters capable of 
improvement these can be attended to prior to publication. 
 
Swann insisted that the government’s only alternative to an independent Amnesty 
International investigation was to publish the Red Cross reports.  Until then, “public opinion 
both in Britain and at the United Nations will continue to accept prima facie the allegations of 
ill-treatment made on behalf of the detainees.”  More menacingly, however, Swann wrote that 
if Rastgeldi did not receive permission to visit detainees, “then the inference must be that 
there is something there which the authorities wish to conceal”—something embarrassing 
that Rastgeldi’s visit could uncover.585   
The Rastgeldi Mission 
Rastgeldi’s visit to Aden removed the shroud with which the High Commission hoped 
to hide the abuses committed during interrogation. Rastgeldi found evidence that British 
interrogators had used torture. Recognizing the British government’s concern with public 
embarrassment, Amnesty International used the threat of publicly releasing Rastgeldi’s 
findings to compel Whitehall into ordering an official inquiry. To avoid charges of bias, 
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Rastgeldi travelled to London and Cairo to meet with representatives from each side of the 
conflict.  
In London, Rastgeldi met with C.S. Roberts, assistant secretary at the Foreign Office, 
who reiterated to Rastgeldi that the Foreign Office would not allow him to meet with 
detainees or visit interrogation and detention facilities. At the Arab League office in London, 
Rastgeldi received a letter of introduction to the League’s Acting Secretary General, Sayed 
Nofal, in Cairo.586 Rastgeldi arrived in Cairo on July 24, where he met FLOSY founder and 
Aden Trades Union Congress leader Abdullah al-Asnag, who lived in exile in Egypt along 
with much of the NLF’s leadership as well as Sayed Nofal of the Arab League. Rastgeldi 
explained Amnesty’s commitment to helping prisoners and the organization’s abhorrence of 
violence. In response, Nofal claimed that Adenis and other Arabs supported the insurgency 
because it expressed Adenis’ desire for liberation from Britain. Terrorism, Nofal insisted, 
would continue in parallel with negotiations until the British withdrew.  Only then could the 
violence end.  Rastgeldi left the meeting disappointed.  In a letter to Robert Swann he noted 
disapprovingly “so you see the FLOSY terrorism is supported by the Arab League.”587 
Rastgeldi sympathized with detainees who had been subjected to torture, but he also objected 
to insurgents’ methods. After arriving in Aden on July 28, he concluded that FLOSY and the 
NLF “have injured many innocent people both among the British and the local people.” He 
told one journalist that “It is very regrettable that many Arabs accept this way of terrorism as 
a high esteemed form of fighting against the British.”588 Rastgeldi hoped to convey AI’s 
opposition to both torture and terrorism as a way to reinforce AI’s legitimacy as an 
independent third party. 
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 In Aden, Rastgeldi’s meetings with two civic groups and several former prisoners 
convinced him that an investigation was warranted. Representatives from the Graduates’ 
Congress, an association of university graduates, described the case of Adel Mahfood 
Khalifa, a law graduate of Hull University and member of a prominent Aden family serving 
as under-secretary to the Aden Chief Minister.589 One morning, British soldiers broke into 
Khalifa’s house, upended the furniture as they searched the premises, and threw him into the 
back of a truck.  The truck drove to a camp where soldiers forced Khalifa “to stand up for 
seven hours” before transporting him to the Fort Morbut interrogation facility, where he was 
physically and psychologically abused. He was beaten until he vomited blood, held in a room 
with the air conditioner set at its coldest temperature, and contracted influenza as a result.590 
Khalifa complained that “I have never been charged with any offence.  The treatment at Ras 
Morbut is like that of Nazis against the Jews and the French against the Algerians.” 
Representatives of the Civil Service Association of South Arabia (CSASA), a group of Adeni 
government workers, also told Rastgeldi about detainee abuse. CSASA representatives gave 
Rastgeldi the sworn testimony of Abdul Majid Mockbel Sabri, who “was made to undress 
completely and was kept in a room with the air-condition and ceiling fan switched on at 
maximum capacity.” Sabri also reported that “a wooden stick was inserted forceably in my 
anus causing bleeding” and that “the nails of my fingers and toes were forceably removed.” 
Other detained civil servants—teacher Foad Mohamad Ali, Municipal Council employee 
Gawad Kaid Abdo, and Adel Ibrahim Hadad, employed by the South Arabian Broadcasting 
Service—reported similar experiences of guards forcing them to stand naked in rooms with 
the air-conditioning at its coldest settings, beating them, and spitting on them. None of these 
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civil servants were charged with a crime.591 In addition to testimony from the Graduates’ 
Congress and CSASA, Rastgeldi heard the cases of thirteen detainees and met with former 
detainees.  He found some allegations unconvincing, but, like Legal Adviser Hugh Hickling 
after his earlier inquiries, Rastgeldi found enough evidence to conclude that British officials 
should order an investigation.592   
AI’s Robert Swann privately lobbied the Foreign Office to improve the administration 
of justice and treatment of detainees in Aden. Robert Swann called on Walter Padley with 
four proposals for improving the administration of justice and treatment of detainees in Aden. 
The proposals echoed many of the same issues that Peter Benenson had encountered during 
his trips to Cyprus in the 1950s. First, Swann suggested that every detainee should receive 
access to a lawyer within 48 hours of arrest. He recommended that the families of those 
arrested should be notified quickly because authorities’ refusal to do so “gives rise to rumours 
and lends credence to stories of ill-treatment.” Swann also endorsed the idea that British 
civilian police should replace military interrogators. Finally, he insisted that the government 
initiate an independent, external inquiry into the abuse allegations.593   
At the Aden High Commission, Turnbull bristled at Amnesty’s suggestions and 
argued that existing interrogation and detention processes were absolutely necessary to the 
security effort. He rejected each of Amnesty’s recommendations in turn, declaring that “there 
can be no question of lawyer’s access before interrogation has been completed.” Turnbull 
claimed that keeping a suspect’s family and colleagues in a state of uncertainty allowed 
security forces to collect intelligence from the detainee and act on it before his close 
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associates could warn insurgents. Turnbull likewise lambasted Swann’s idea to replace 
military with civilian interrogators. He labeled the implication that “military interrogators are 
brutal and civilians not” as “slanderous” and quipped that if the Foreign Office “could find us 
a body of civilian policemen from the United Kingdom trained in techniques of interrogation 
and fluent in Arabic we should be delighted.”594 But Turnbull’s most passionate rebuttal 
concerned AI’s recommendation for an independent investigation.  Such an inquiry, Turnbull 
believed, would fuel NLF and FLOSY efforts “to destroy our interrogation system.” 
Interrogators, he argued, carried out “an exacting, unpleasant and difficult task” worsened by 
the abuse allegations they faced in the past. Turnbull warned that if the British government 
allowed inspections from Amnesty International or supported a judicial inquiry, the 
interrogators’ morale “would be utterly destroyed.” The consequences, Turnbull insisted, 
would be severe: “Interrogation would either have to cease entirely or become a purely token 
procedure yielding nothing.” Without effective interrogation, security forces would have 
“virtually no forewarning against terrorism or information on its development.” British forces 
would lose “the only intelligence weapon we have.”595  
Military and Foreign Office leaders agreed with Turnbull’s dire assessment. Admiral 
Michael Le Fanu, the Commander-in-Chief of Middle East Command and Major General 
Willoughby’s direct supervisor, stressed that “unhindered operation of the interrogation 
centre in Aden is critical to all our operations.”  Le Fanu insisted that “interference” with the 
center “would result in a very sharp deterioration of the security situation” that would lead to 
“a more sophisticated and determined form of terrorism” if interrogation operations were 
disrupted.  Echoing Turnbull’s language, Le Fanu despaired that if the security forces lost 
access to “virtually our only avenue of intelligence,” the consequences would be 
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“incalculably damaging” to British interests in both South Arabia and the Persian Gulf.596  In 
the Foreign Office, assistant undersecretary for policy Frank Cooper wrote to the Ministry of 
Defense that “the Foreign Office are now going to advise the Foreign Secretary that the 
Amnesty International requests in any form should be refused.”597  
Due to a related set of events in Rhodesia, Foreign Secretary George Brown believed 
that the government could not “return a completely negative reply” to AI’s dogged insistence 
on an investigation.598 In 1965, Ian Smith, leader of Rhodesia’s white minority government, 
unilaterally declared independence from Britain in an attempt to prevent black majority rule. 
Rhodesia soon became an international pariah state. In 1966, Smith ordered the arrest of four 
British expatriate university lecturers.  In response, the British High Commission to Rhodesia 
formally protested against the Smith regime’s actions and requested the detainees’ release. 
Smith rejected the request.599 By September, he had authorized police to detain for up to 30 
days anyone believed to have committed—or who might commit—an act “prejudicial to the 
public safety.”600 Smith promptly jailed many black political leaders. Opposed to what they 
perceived as an illegal regime illegally detaining people for political purposes, the British 
government worked with Amnesty to provide financial and legal aid to the Rhodesian 
detainees’ families.601 Rejecting AI’s request would have made Britain vulnerable to 
accusations of hypocrisy and could have jeopardized the government’s work with AI in 
Rhodesia. 
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Brown did not wish to interfere with measures that senior military leaders believed to 
be necessary for the war effort, but he also did not want to ignore Amnesty. Brown asked for 
Turnbull’s opinion on which of Amnesty’s demands the government could accept that would 
inflict the “least harm” to military operations. Following the Foreign Secretary’s lead, John 
Marnham, the Foreign Office assistant under-secretary responsible for Aden and southern 
Africa, conceived of two options. The government could either allow an Amnesty 
representative to visit Fort Morbut or “agree to an independent investigation” led by 
“someone of judicial standing”—a British judge or lawyer.  Marnham also suggested that “an 
investigation of specific complaints would be better than an investigation of general 
allegations of ill-treatment.”602 On September 29 Brown met with Swann and Benenson. The 
Amnesty representatives suggested that Brown choose an external investigator suitable to 
Amnesty and government ministers.  Brown did not commit, but indicated that he would 
make a decision over the next week.603    
Predictably, Turnbull found the notion of Amnesty International’s involvement in an 
investigation to be “highly objectionable.”  He did, however, note that an inquiry headed by a 
“personal representative” of the Foreign Secretary “would of course be welcome.”604  
Turnbull did not want to invite scrutiny, but he knew that he had little choice in the matter.  If 
Brown chose a “personal representative,” Turnbull would have to comply with the 
representative’s instructions.  He was a colonial civil servant.  He could not openly defy a 
Cabinet Secretary.605  The decision to order an external investigation was therefore not 
Turnbull’s to make.  
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By October 10, Brown had made up his mind to order an inquiry by a “personal 
representative,” but who that representative might be and the scope of the investigation 
remained vague. George Thomson, as Minister of State in the Foreign Office, met with 
Defence Secretary Denis Healey to obtain Healey’s opinion on the matter. Thomson told 
Healey that the inquiry would examine only “the procedures for the arrest and detention of 
suspects.” The Foreign Secretary, Thomson said, “wished if possible to meet British Amnesty 
on this matter” but believed that “we had clearly no obligation towards the foreign members 
of Amnesty International.” For Brown, the issue of detainee treatment would remain a British 
matter. Healey expressed his “high regard for Mr. Benenson personally” and agreed with 
Brown’s decision. But Healey also voiced two reservations.  His first priority was to ensure 
that “efficient interrogation” continued.  He did not want the investigation to undermine 
intelligence collection efforts.  Healey was also concerned with the publication of the 
investigator’s report.  He suggested that Brown should not state in advance that he would 
publically release the report.  Publication would be dealt with later.606   
Swann and Benenson, frustrated that their private appeals had generated only the 
nebulous acknowledgement of a future inquiry, resolved to drive the government into action. 
They decided to publicize Rastgeldi’s findings. On October 11, Swann and Benenson were 
informed that Brown had agreed to appoint a representative to visit Aden but had not decided 
who the representative would be, when the investigator would travel to Aden, the scope of 
the inquiry, and whether the report would be released to the public.607 To Amnesty’s 
leadership, Brown’s offer was “a poor ‘concession.’”608 On the night of the 11th, Swann and 
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Benenson conferred with the head of Amnesty’s Swedish section and decided to publish 
Rastgeldi’s report.  On October 12 an official from the Foreign Office called Swann to ask if 
Amnesty intended to publish Rastgeldi’s findings.  Swann said yes.609  The following day the 
Foreign Office issued a press release that stated “the Foreign Secretary has decided to appoint 
a personal representative to examine the procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention of 
suspected terrorists in Aden.”610  
Amnesty’s publication of the report and subsequent press statements created a 
situation that could seriously embarrass the British government. On October 17, Amnesty’s 
British section issued a press release that deplored the British government’s refusal “to allow 
proper investigation” or improve existing detention procedures.611 The following day, Hans 
Göran Franck, Chairman of Amnesty International’s Swedish Section, wrote to Prime 
Minister Harold Wilson to formally condemn the “unlawful, inhuman practices of the British 
military personnel in Aden.” Franck argued that incarcerating individuals without trial 
amounted to “a violation of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights.” Likewise, the 
use of physical brutality and torture was “unworthy of a civilized nation.” He insisted that 
Amnesty would continue to monitor the treatment of political prisoners in Aden “until the 
day when they are released.”612  In an October 20 press conference, Amnesty blamed the 
government for its “procrastination and vacillation” in response to Amnesty’s private 
overtures. Public controversy could have been avoided, Amnesty representatives declared, if 
the government had simply “shown ‘a little bit of good will and intelligence.’” Instead, 
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“procrastination and vacillation” had been the government’s response to Amnesty’s efforts.613 
The New York Times reported that “Britain has been embarrassed by the actions of a Swedish 
doctor.”614 It was embarrassment that British officials would not take lightly.  
 Once publicity became inevitable, British officials tried to shape the narrative that 
emerged in the media. At a press conference, public affairs officers’ off-the-record comments 
indicated that officials wished to obscure the reason why the Foreign Office press statement 
coincided with the Amnesty Swedish section’s release of Rastgeldi’s findings.  Despite 
newspaper reports to the contrary, the Foreign Office’s announcement of Brown’s decision to 
send a personal representative to Aden resulted from Amnesty’s advocacy on behalf of 
detainee rights.  In its first story on the inquiry, The Times noted that “the decision to appoint 
a special representative was taken before it was known that Amnesty International was to 
publish Dr. Rastgeldi’s report.”615 This report, however, simply reproduced off-the-record 
comments that Foreign Office public relations personnel purposely conveyed to The Times.616 
In private, government officials admitted that Amnesty’s intent to publish details of 
Rastgeldi’s visit forced the inquiry.  A note from the Ministry of Defense to Le Fanu and 
Willoughby expressed regret that “the Swedes have forced the issue.”  Officials at the 
Ministry were “sorry we have not been able to prevent this.”617 Ultimately, Amnesty’s efforts 
compelled British officials into a course of action they had hoped to avoid. 
Publicly, British officials attempted to undermine the credibility of Rastgeldi’s 
inquiry. The Foreign Office insisted that “none of the allegations made by Dr. Rastgeldi 
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appears to be corroborated.”618 The MOD’s British Forces Broadcasting Station accused 
Rastgeldi of supporting Nasser and al Asnag because of his Cairo meetings. Newspapers such 
as the Daily Express carried the story as well. The Foreign Office’s Information Research 
Department prepared to release unattributed material indicating that communists had gained 
significant influence in AI’s Swedish branch.619 Some sections of the British press accused 
Rastgeldi of bias on the basis of his Kurdish-Turkish background. Government officials gave 
journalists “non-attributable” briefings in which they suggested that Rastgeldi was anti-
British and “naturally” preferred the Arab cause due to his Kurdish origins.620 This public 
smearing went so far that Peter Benenson felt obliged to comment publicly that Rastgeldi was 
“not an Arab” and that Rastgeldi’s Kurdish origins were not a source of pro-Arab bias 
because “the Kurds have been conducting a bitter war against the Arabs.”621 Rastgeldi also 
faced criticism in newspaper editorial columns. Lady Listowel, a former journalist and the 
wife of Labour peer Lord Listowel, found “the conditions under which Dr. Salahadin 
Rastgeldi carried out his investigation and reached his conclusions far less credible” than the 
allegations themselves. She claimed that Rastgeldi said he had investigated 300 torture cases 
during his seven-day visit and asked incredulously “How has he done this single-handed in 
seven days?” Rastgeldi never stated that he had investigated 300 cases, but Lady Listowel’s 
letter to the editor of The Times contributed to the emerging aura of disbelief that Defence 
and Foreign Office officials sought to create.622 
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Many officials in Aden blamed the Foreign Secretary’s decision to investigate 
detainee abuse on Amnesty International. Turnbull sought to undermine Rastgeldi’s 
credibility by criticizing his “Middle Eastern background.” According to Turnbull, Rastgeldi 
was an “unscrupulous little Levantine” who visited FLOSY and Arab League representatives 
in Cairo “to form his impressions before coming here.”623 Willoughby perceived the shadowy 
hand of Cold War Communism operating behind Amnesty’s façade. “As we suspected,” he 
confided in his diary after the Rastgeldi smear attempts began, “the Swedish Branch of 
Amnesty International which has started all this up is Communist controlled and hand in 
glove with Egypt.”624 Don McCarthy reiterated Willoughby’s perspective. In a telegram to 
the Foreign Office, he wrote that “as seen from here, Amnesty International have succeeded 
in carrying the UAR's objective of destroying our only major source of operational 
intelligence nearer to achievement than ever before.”625 In London, Gerald Gardiner was the 
only cabinet minister who supported AI’s position.626  
Finding Britain’s reputation in danger, officials attacked AI’s credibility, but their 
attacks did not change the effect of Amnesty International’s rights activism. Rastgeldi’s visit 
to Aden had succeeded. Rastgeldi’s independent fact-finding mission and AI’s threat to 
publish Rastgeldi’s critical report convinced Foreign Secretary Brown to preempt the 
possibility of negative publicity by ordering a formal inquiry.  
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The Bowen Inquiry 
AI’s activism resulted in the announcement that Roderic Bowen would lead an 
immediate inquiry into prisoner abuse. Bowen was a deeply religious Presbyterian, barrister, 
lifelong bachelor, and Liberal Party Member of Parliament for Cardiganshire, on Wales’ west 
coast.  Elected in 1945, he later fell out with Liberal Party leader Jo Grimond over the 1956 
Suez Crisis. Grimond opposed the Conservative government’s military intervention, whereas 
Bowen castigated parliamentarians like Grimond who criticized the government. Throughout 
the 1950s Bowen remained one of a handful of Liberal MPs in Parliament until a Labour 
delegate finally ousted him during the 1966 general election. Upon leaving Parliament 
Bowen became the National Insurance Commissioner for Wales, where he worked until 
Foreign Secretary George Brown requested that he conduct the Aden inquiry.627 On October 
24, two days before he left for Aden, the Foreign Secretary hastily brought Bowen to 
Whitehall and briefed Bowen on his terms of reference. Brown outlined a narrow purpose—
Bowen was to examine and suggest improvements to existing detention and interrogation 
procedures. Brown did not authorize Bowen to investigate or offer judgment on specific 
allegations. The inquiry was restricted in scope to avoid the potential for embarrassing 
disclosures that could result in legal action against colonial officials or security forces. Even 
so, Bowen produced a critical report which resulted in some, albeit limited, reforms.628 
 Bowen’s thoroughness worried Major General Willoughby. Willoughby complained 
that Bowen was “tapping the walls” of the interrogation center “to discover hidden torture 
chambers.” Bowen toured detention and interrogation facilities, reviewed interrogation and 
detention files, examined medical records, and interviewed military and civilian personnel. 
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Willoughby recalled that Bowen even insisted “on the drawer of a table that was stuck being 
forced open.”629 Bowen also received an unexpected piece of evidence from the editor of The 
Sunday Times. The Sunday Times had found a member of the British army who provided 
information to support Amnesty’s findings.  Corporal Glen Lennox served as a guard for a 
unit billeted near the interrogation center.  One of his duties, patrolling the perimeter fence, 
brought him in close proximity to the interrogation center, where he could occasionally hear 
“pathetic screaming and howling.”  Upon inquiring what had happened, soldiers assigned to 
the interrogation center told him “in boastful fashion, of the beatings and tortures which they 
had had a hand in.”  Lennox reported that on one occasion, he witnessed three interrogators 
drag a detainee into the exercise yard and beat him into unconsciousness.  The interrogators 
revived him with a fire hose and resumed the beating.630   
In his report, Bowen balanced praise with criticism. He commended the concept of 
oversight that lay behind the Review Tribunal and Committee of Inspection, but he also 
found ways to improve their work. He determined that members of the Review Tribunal did 
not always receive enough information about detainees to make a well-informed judgment on 
whether prisoners should remain in detention. The High Commissioner’s office also regularly 
failed to inform the Tribunal whether the High Commissioner agreed with the Tribunal’s 
recommendations. Ultimately, the decision to release or continue to detain a prisoner rested 
with High Commissioner Turnbull. But Turnbull frequently disapproved the Tribunal’s 
recommendations for the release of detainees. Bowen stated that he was “disappointed” 
Turnbull did not follow the Tribunal’s recommendations.  Bowen also criticized the practice 
of allowing detainees to remain incarcerated for long periods without the Tribunal’s review. 
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Following a detainee’s initial appearance before the Tribunal, Bowen concluded, a detainee 
might not appear before it again even though he could remain in detention “six, twelve, or 
even eighteen months” after his first appearance. The detainee bore the burden of ensuring 
that the Tribunal heard his case. Bowen considered the six-month detainee-initiated review 
process as an unsatisfactory protection of detainees’ rights.  He suggested that “the Tribunal 
should be required to examine each case every three months irrespective of the wishes of the 
detainee himself.”631 
The Committee of Inspection also appeared to Bowen as a useful entity for protecting 
detainees’ rights. Consisting of two civilian Arab officials, the Committee was responsible 
for monitoring detainee conditions and treatment at Mansoura. Bowen found that the 
Committee was efficient and that prison authorities took the Committee’s recommendations 
seriously. But the Committee lacked authority to monitor interrogations at Fort Morbut. 
Bowen believed that extending the Committee’s mandate to include Fort Morbut was 
necessary for enabling the Committee to “take note and report on allegations of cruelty and 
torture.”  In short, Bowen suggested the creation of a civilian oversight committee to monitor 
the treatment of detainees at Fort Morbut.632  
 Although Bowen found positive aspects of the Review Tribunal and Committee of 
Inspection, he criticized the length of time that detainees were held without charges. The 
High Commission’s failure to prosecute detainees in court gave Bowen “considerable 
concern.” After interrogation and after the High Commissioner approved a detention order, 
detainees simply sat behind bars to await the end of the conflict. Authorities in Aden cited 
several mitigating circumstances for why trials were not held. They argued that witnesses 
were “either too frightened or too hostile” to provide evidence required to convict suspects.  
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Bowen recognized the “considerable strength” of arguments against trying detainees in court, 
but he insisted that authorities should prosecute insurgents whenever possible. Bowen also 
censured the practice whereby interrogators continued to question detainees at the 
interrogation center after the High Commissioner granted a detention order. A detention order 
was supposed to result in transfer from Fort Morbut to Mansoura. Sometimes, however, 
detainees remained at Fort Morbut for further interrogation. On other occasions, security 
forces transferred prisoners confined at Mansoura under a detention order to Fort Morbut for 
additional interrogation. Bowen labeled both practices “highly undesirable.”633 
 Finally, Bowen saved his gravest condemnation for the way in which senior 
officials—particularly Turnbull and Deputy High Commissioner Timothy Oates—handled 
allegations of prisoner abuse that surfaced between October and December 1965. During his 
investigation, Bowen received 40 written complaints from detainees and several petitions 
from detainees’ family members and civic associations. He also interviewed colonial officials 
and received unrestricted access to interrogation records, medical records, and other official 
files. Like Hickling and the police investigator before him, Bowen concluded that the 
interrogation center was main site of complaint. Bowen’s review led him to believe that 
“there was a most regrettable failure to deal expeditiously and adequately with the allegations 
of cruelty.” Failure to take action occurred even though “the existence of serious allegations 
came to light” and “it was recognized that they should be investigated without delay.” Bowen 
surmised that early investigations of detainee complaints would have either disproved the 
allegations or identified problems that required corrective actions.634 
 Bowen concluded his report with seven suggested “improvements” to existing 
detainee procedures designed to “enable the investigation of allegations to take place with 
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greater promptitude and thoroughness.”  He proposed relocating the interrogation center to a 
special annex at the detention facility; to recruit civilian interrogators; to care for prisoners 
using civilian rather than military medical personnel; to assign a civilian High Commission 
official to the detention center with the responsibility of recording and investigating all abuse 
allegations; to conduct a daily medical examination of all detainees held at Fort Morbut to 
prevent physical abuse; to instruct the Review Tribunal chairman and Director of Health 
Services to report all detainee complaints “without delay”; and to have the High Commission 
prepare a monthly report on all complaints made, investigations carried out, and actions taken 
in response to the allegations.635  
   Foreign Secretary George Brown’s decision to publish the Bowen report led to a 
weeks-long bureaucratic battle with army and MOD officials. Although Brown 
acknowledged that the report contained “a number of criticisms,” he decided to publish the 
document “in its entirety” based on the Foreign Office consensus that the government would 
face strong public pressure to do so.636  Brown determined that publically releasing the entire 
report “will do less harm than the continuing cloud of allegation and suspicion.”637 Although 
they eventually agreed “to publication in full, reluctantly and with grave misgivings,” several 
senior officers objected to any hint of criticism toward the security forces.638 Major General 
Willoughby called Bowen “the Foreign Secretary's inquisitor.”  The inquiry itself struck 
Willoughby as “a disgraceful act of Political dishonesty.”639 He confided in his diary that “I 
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no longer trust our government to support us.”640 But what most irked Willoughby was the 
Foreign Secretary’s decision to adopt some of Bowen’s recommendations and publicly 
release Bowen’s report without waiting for High Commissioner Turnbull’s input—that 
decision was “inexcusable and unforgivable”641  At Middle East Command headquarters, 
Admiral Le Fanu also chafed at Bowen’s report and its potential publication, claiming that 
“the hands of our interrogators are clean. They need support not suspicion.” Le Fanu believed 
that an admission of torture or physical cruelty would provide Britain’s adversaries with a 
significant propaganda victory.642  Within the Ministry of Defence, officials worried that the 
report faulted “a number of authorities in Aden, including, for example, the Director of 
Intelligence,” Brigadier Tony Cowper.643  A few officials objected that some of Bowen’s 
comments were “not within his Terms of Reference” and hoped to restrict publication of the 
report to only the part within Bowen’s terms of reference.  Such restrictions would have 
ensured that the army’s failure to act on known, credible abuse allegations remained 
private.644  
 Despite hostility from Middle East Command and some offices in Whitehall, the 
Bowen inquiry reformed some interrogation and detention procedures. First, the inquiry 
resulted in the assignment of a civilian High Commission official to the Mansoura detention 
center for the purpose of documenting and acting upon detainee complaints. Before he left 
Aden, Bowen discussed the idea with Turnbull, who implemented it immediately. Each time 
that security forces transferred a detainee from Fort Morbut to Mansoura, the High 
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Commission representative would ask the detainee if anyone tortured, beat, or otherwise 
treated him cruelly. The High Commission official would then document the detainee’s 
complaints and follow up with an investigation. He was to report the results and make 
recommendations for further action to the Legal Adviser and Deputy High Commissioner. 
The rationale for handing responsibility for detainee complaints to a single individual and 
collecting those complaints immediately upon transfer was that past allegations often did not 
surface until several weeks or months after abuse occurred. Some detainees were afraid to 
accuse their captors while incarcerated, whereas others complained only when their cases 
arrived before the Review Tribunal during the mandatory review scheduled six months after 
detention. On other occasions detainees first raised allegations of abuse to third parties such 
as the Red Cross, sometimes well after the abuse occurred. Bowen believed that the creation 
of a systematic approach to collecting, categorizing, and acting on detainee complaints would 
permit faster investigations of abuse allegations. Soldiers could be questioned before the end 
of their deployments to Aden and medical records reviewed while the detainee still bore the 
physical marks of maltreatment.645 Assigning an official to record detainee allegations helped 
to screen out false or exaggerated complaints and ensured that interrogators knew that 
someone was watching their activities. 
On November 21, Turnbull implemented another Bowen-recommended reform by 
establishing a system for reporting detainee complaints to the Foreign Office on a monthly 
basis.  The monthly reporting requirement meant that officials in Whitehall could scrutinize 
soldiers’ and colonial officers’ responses to detainee abuse. Each report included an 
individual “case sheet” for every detainee.  Case sheets indicated personal details such as the 
detainee’s name, place of origin, and date of arrest, as well as the details of the complaint, 
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investigation conducted, and actions to be taken by the High Commission.646  The first report 
documented 15 complaints, 10 of which were first raised to Rochat during his visits in 
September and November 1966.  The remaining five complaints were reported to High 
Commission officials during November and December. Systematic documentation ensured 
that all allegations were investigated, but such investigations almost always determined that 
detainee complaints could not be substantiated.647 The inability to prove abuse, however, did 
not mean that abuse did not occur.648 
The High Commission’s policy toward ICRC involvement in detainee affairs shifted 
as a result of the Bowen reforms. Turnbull established formal protocols for handling Red 
Cross inspections. He also allowed Rochat access to previously off-limits facilities, although 
this was done according to a schedule set by High Commission officials.  Beginning with his 
January 1967 visit, Rochat was taken to Fort Morbut and allowed to examine the premises 
and observe the detainees, although Turnbull prohibited Rochat from speaking to detainees 
because they were still under interrogation. Security forces also provided Rochat with a list of 
all detainees held at the Mansoura facility.  He was allowed to interview each detainee 
individually.  Turnbull instructed the head of the detention center “to give M. Rochat any 
help he may require in recording allegations or complaints.” Turnbull insisted that Rochat 
submit all future reports “in the form of a written document” and that if detainees complained 
to Rochat, “a separate document should be submitted in respect of each case.” All allegations 
were to be submitted to a designated High Commission official, colonial civil servant A.C.W. 
Lee. Lee and the Assistant Legal Adviser maintained individual case files containing 
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evidence on each detainee’s allegations.  Lee then circulated the files to the Director of 
Intelligence and Director of Health Services for their assessment prior to final review by 
Timothy Oates, the Deputy High Commissioner. Oates would consult civilian attorneys from 
the Legal Adviser’s office and military lawyers from Army Legal Services on actions to be 
taken in response to the allegations.  Once Oates made a decision, Lee would inform 
Rochat.649 After the Bowen inquiry, colonial administrators took Red Cross inspections more 
seriously. The justification for this systematic approach to ICRC visits, however, resided in a 
desire to control what Rochat saw rather than a genuine commitment to increased 
transparency. 
The Bowen reforms resulted in the establishment of oversight mechanisms to monitor 
the treatment of detainees, but did not create external oversight. On March 18, 1967, Turnbull 
designated Legal Adviser Hugh Hickling as the authority for deciding whether detainee 
complaints required formal investigation. He then instructed the Aden Police Criminal 
Investigation Division (CID) to conduct the resulting inquiries. CID’s role as the 
investigating arm ensured that an organization independent from the interrogation and 
detention apparatus held responsibility for investigating abuse allegations.650 The result was a 
system in which civilian High Commission staff members monitored the actions of military 
interrogators and prison guards at Fort Morbut and Mansoura. A November 21 directive 
reinforced this system by requiring the Director of Intelligence to investigate his own staff 
members in detainee abuse cases.651  
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Despite the establishment of several interrogation oversight mechanisms, these 
reforms left Turnbull with decision-making authority over the conduct of investigations and 
how to respond to investigatory findings. The Bowen reforms required Turnbull to report 
allegations to the Foreign Office, investigate those allegations, and report the results of those 
investigations. But Turnbull controlled the information sent to the Foreign Office because all 
of the government bodies charged with conducting investigations reported to him. CID, the 
Director of Intelligence, the Legal Adviser, and the civilian High Commission official fell 
under Turnbull’s authority. The Bowen reforms established a sense of accountability in 
which colonial officers were expected to follow the procedures and guidelines established for 
them. But this “accountability” was largely self-imposed—officials monitored themselves.  
The only organization responsible for monitoring interrogation and detention that 
remained beyond Turnbull’s control was the ICRC. But Turnbull limited what ICRC 
delegates could do and see: André Rochat could visit the interrogation center, but British 
officials escorted him the entire time.652 ICRC reports on these investigations, however, 
remained private. If Rochat found evidence of torture or cruelty, colonial officials could rest 
assured that the Red Cross would not publicly release his discoveries. ICRC President 
Leopold Boissier later described the organization’s silence in such matters as necessary to 
obtain the “confidence of governments.” Red Cross delegates therefore made their criticisms 
known to governments privately and discreetly because, Boissier argued, “any indiscretion 
would cost [the ICRC] the confidence it needs and would close to it the internment camps 
and centres and the hospitals to which its delegates are privileged to have access.”653 The 
ICRC had gained greater access to prisons and interrogation centers as a consequence of the 
Bowen inquiry, but remained committed to its “rule of silence.”  
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Although the criticisms of Bowen’s post-inquiry report and the debate over the 
report’s public release had infuriated many military commanders and High Commission 
officials in Aden, the report generated several reforms. Besides the ICRC’s expanded access 
to interrogation and detention facilities, new oversight mechanisms such as the establishment 
of a centralized complaints system relied on the High Commission to scrutinize itself. 
Colonial officials, however, quickly reached the limits of their self-imposed oversight 
procedures. 
A Hollow Victory 
At first, the Bowen reforms seemed to have curbed interrogation and detention 
abuses. In January 1967 several detainees complained to the High Commission officer. They 
claimed that during transfer from Morbut to the detention facility, soldiers blindfolded them 
and beat them with rifle butts. In line with the new detainee investigation protocols, an 
inquiry began immediately. The army commander issued new orders to his soldiers designed 
to prevent such conduct in the future, but he also determined that “formal disciplinary action 
was not justified.”654 In February, a detainee complained that guards placed a hood over his 
head and pushed him against a wall. Guards commonly “hooded” a detainee prior to moving 
him throughout the facility. A doctor examined the detainee and found that his right forehead 
was swollen. The guard involved in the incident claimed that “the injury was caused by the 
detainee walking away when told to wait, and striking his head on a pillar.” Although 
Turnbull did not challenge the guard’s version of events, he instructed the guard force to stop 
hooding detainees except under “exceptional circumstances.”655 Turnbull proved willing to 
restrain some procedures such as hooding, but he and other officials refused to punish 
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soldiers for interrogation-related transgressions. Only one interrogator faced prosecution, but 
he was a civilian under civil, rather than military, jurisdiction. Meanwhile, an internal 
organizational crisis prevented Amnesty International from sustaining its “watchdog” role in 
enforcing British compliance with the Bowen reforms. Worse still, the ICRC discovered that 
as the Bowen inquiry faded from public view, torture of detainees resumed.  
British officials involved in interrogation controversies escaped punishment. The 
“three men” identified during the January-March 1966 police investigation and referenced 
again in the Bowen report were investigated but not prosecuted. The “three men”—named as 
Lieutenant Edmund Briffa de St. Vincent, Warrant Officer Second Class Joly, and Sergeant 
Knibbs—faced inquiries from the Royal Military Police Special Investigations Branch (SIB). 
SIB investigators interviewed over 200 members of the battalion that provided guards for the 
interrogation center, 10 doctors, 7 detention center staff members, 8 interrogators, and the 
“three men” themselves.  Of the 200 guards interviewed, 16 claimed to have witnessed the 
use of force against detainees. The decision of whether or not to prosecute the “three men” 
put MOD officials in a bind. Gerald Reynolds, Minister of Defence for the Army, lamented 
that he would face criticism regardless of his course of action. If the army did not prosecute 
the “three men,” he wrote, “we shall no doubt be accused of trying to ‘whitewash’ the people 
involved.” But if he proceeded with a court-martial “there will inevitably be a lot of dirty 
linen washed in public.”656 Attorneys from the Army Legal Services directorate decided that 
the available evidence was insufficient to bring any of the “three men” to trial on torture 
charges. But army lawyers also determined that “there is prima facie evidence of common 
assault.” Despite this evidence, Army Legal Services insisted “that a court martial would be 
unlikely to convict any of the three men” because the 16 guard force witnesses “would be 
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testifying to events 18 months old” and all members of the interrogation center staff “firmly 
denied” that detainee abuse occurred. In a letter to the Minister of Defence for the Army, the 
army’s Adjutant General, Major General Reginald Hewetson, concluded that “I do not 
propose to take disciplinary action of any kind against any of the ‘three men.’”657 Sir Richard 
Turnbull, Timothy Oates, and Tony Cowper—the three officials who Bowen criticized for 
their failure to quickly investigate abuse allegations—also escaped formal censure.658  
Only one colonial official faced prosecution for the abuse of detainees in Aden during 
the emergency. On March 29, 1967, a Fort Morbut doctor, following the Bowen-
recommended procedure of medically examining detainees on a daily basis, discovered that a 
detainee had two black eyes.  The detainee identified P.J. Hurr as the assailant. Hurr, an 
Arabic-speaking member of the Diplomatic Service assigned to Fort Morbut, was the sole 
civilian interrogator. He was therefore the only interrogator subject to civil law rather than 
military jurisdiction. Hurr admitted to slapping the detainee one time, but claimed that he 
slapped the man because the detainee became hysterical during the interrogation. Hurr denied 
that he beat the detainee and rejected the notion that his one slap could have caused the 
detainee’s injuries. Hickling reviewed the available evidence and determined that the 
evidence was sufficient to file charges. On April 24, the Aden Attorney General decided to 
prosecute Hurr.659 Don McCarthy noted the irony that “criticisms of interrogation have 
included the fact that the executive investigates itself and that interrogators are military,” but 
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in this instance “post-Bowen procedure has now worked admirably at the expense of the only 
civilian interrogator.”660 Hurr went to trial, but the court delivered a “not guilty” verdict.661   
Officials held mixed opinions on the Hurr case. Turnbull thought it “distasteful” to 
prosecute Hurr for “a momentary loss of temper,” but insisted that “the public interest in this 
case demands first and foremost that the carefully devised procedures we have ourselves 
elaborated to deal with these cases should be scrupulously and manifestly followed out.”662 
McCarthy concurred.  In a letter to Turnbull he declared that “after all your sufferings from 
Amnesty International, the Bowen report and so on it ill behooves anyone in London to 
complain about Hurr going to court.”663 Officials in London, however, also saw the case as a 
vindication of the Bowen reforms. Lord Shackleton, Minister for the RAF, believed that 
“there is clearly advantage for the Government to be seen to be following the procedure it has 
established for dealing with complaints by detainees.”664 In a letter to Robert Swann at 
Amnesty International, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs George Thomson applauded the 
Bowen reforms for ensuring “that a case of this kind does not get smothered.”665 The Hurr 
case appeared to demonstrate that British forces took the Bowen reforms seriously, but the 
failure to prosecute other interrogators suggested otherwise.  
The Bowen reforms were introduced at facilities such as Fort Morbut or Mansoura, 
but the new procedures did not extend to “unofficial” questioning conducted beyond the 
                                                            
660 FCO 8/238 McCarthy to Brenchley, April 25, 1967, p. 3. 
 
661 FCO 8/238 see copy of “Black-eye case envoy cleared,” Daily Express, May 12, 1967. 
 
662 DEFE 24/252 Turnbull to Foreign Office, April 22, 1967. 
 
663 FCO 8/238 McCarthy to Turnbull, April 29, 1967. McCarthy also attacked the High Commission’s “legal 
eagles” who, in his opinion, had overreacted to what should have been treated as “at worst a minor assault 
allegation.” 
   
664 FCO 8/238 Shackleton to Foreign Office, April 22, 1967. 
 
665 FCO 8/238 Thomsen to Swann, May 12, 1967. 
 
248 
 
formal interrogation system. Bowen’s inquiry never touched issues beyond Fort Morbut and 
Mansoura, such as whether British forces operated secret, undisclosed detention sites in 
Ahwar, Perim, Kamaran, and the Kuria Maria islands.666 One paratrooper recalled how his 
unit interrogated recalcitrant prisoners by having them “accidentally” fall down stairs.667 In 
1967, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders operated according to what has infamously been 
termed “Argyll Law.”  The battalion ran an independent, “unofficial” interrogation center in 
the basement of its headquarters building.  Soldiers from the reconnaissance platoon 
conducted raids to capture suspected insurgents and delivered them to the battalion’s 
“interrogators,” who often beat information out of their captives.668 Colonial authorities were 
not monitoring the Argylls’ “unofficial” interrogations, but neither was the organization most 
responsible for pressuring the British government into changing interrogation and detention 
procedures—Amnesty International.  By the summer of 1967, when “Argyll Law” was 
rampant, AI had disengaged from Aden.   
AI felt vindicated by the results of the Bowen report and triumphantly proclaimed the 
subsequent changes to British interrogation and detention policies. In December 1966, Eric 
Baker wrote to the group’s British members that “it is clear now that it was only Amnesty’s 
consistent pressure that finally exposed these facts to the public.” Having prodded the 
government into an investigation, however, Baker declared that “so long as action is in fact 
taken to change procedures, we have no wish to pursue the matter indefinitely.”669 In 
February 1967, the Amnesty International Bulletin ran a story entitled “Aden: Rastgeldi 
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Report Vindicated.” The article explained that after the publication of Rastgeldi’s report, 
Foreign Secretary George Brown dispatched Roderic Bowen to investigate the allegations. 
When Brown released the text of the Bowen report, the report became a “subject of intensive 
publicity both in the British press and on television” that was “overwhelmingly favourable to 
us.” An editorial in The Guardian applauded Amnesty’s efforts and the results of the Bowen 
report, claiming “the detention and ‘extremely grim’ interrogation centres have been opened 
up for a time to public scrutiny, and nothing is so strong a deterrent of torture.” 
Triumphantly, Amnesty leaders proclaimed that “almost all the recommendations in the 
Bowen Report to change existing procedures have been accepted.” Amnesty had prevailed, or 
so it seemed.670  
AI’s declaration of victory in the struggle for Aden prisoners’ rights masked a severe 
internal crisis—a crisis that reinforced Eric Baker’s December 1966 pronouncement that 
Amnesty had no interest in monitoring the treatment of Aden detainees “indefinitely.”671 
After reading the Rastgeldi report, Benenson felt compelled to visit Aden and see the 
situation for himself.  He returned extremely distressed with what he saw and went on 
“sabbatical” to a Trappist Monastery in France “to think things out.”672  He worried that 
British intelligence services—MI5 and MI6—were meddling in Amnesty’s affairs.  He 
accused the intelligence services of tapping Amnesty’s telephones and alleged that the 
Foreign Office had censored reports of British troops massacring 50 unarmed Adenis during 
a recent demonstration.673  News reports suggesting that the International Commission of 
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Jurists, headed by Amnesty board member Sean MacBride, received funds from the 
American Central Intelligence Agency further aroused Benenson’s suspicions.  Benenson 
began to doubt MacBride’s independence from government manipulation.674  MacBride 
rejected Benenson’s claims and complained of Benenson’s “erratic conduct.”675  Convinced 
that Robert Swann was somehow involved in a government conspiracy, Benenson labelled 
him “a secret British intelligence agent.”  To Benenson, Swann’s past record of employment 
with the Foreign Office contributed to Swann’s “conflict of loyalty” that jeopardized “the 
whole of Amnesty’s future.”676 Benenson himself was later implicated in a scandal for 
accepting government funds to support political prisoners in Rhodesia.677 
Despite Benenson’s accusations, throughout early 1967 Robert Swann advocated on 
behalf of Aden detainees more vigorously than any other Amnesty representative.  In 
January, Swann reached out to his Foreign Office contacts, Walter Padley and George 
Thomson.  Swann informed them of a complaint he had received from a detainee named 
Mohammad Ali Shamsher.  The complaint consisted of a signed affidavit sent to Amnesty’s 
London office in which Shamsher claimed that British soldiers tortured him while in custody.  
Swann asked Padley and Thomson to investigate the allegations and inform him of the 
investigation’s results.678 The investigation concluded several weeks later when the 
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investigating officer determined that the detainee’s allegations were unsubstantiated.679  
Swann complimented Thomson for “the speed with which these incidents have been 
investigated” and assured him that “your prompt action” allowed Amnesty to “avoid giving 
publicity to the allegations.”680 But Swann also insisted that “enquiries into allegations of ill-
treatment should not be made by those who have been accused, justly or unjustly, of 
responsibility for ill-treatment.”681 After Benenson’s attacks, however, Swann could not 
continue as Secretary General of the International Secretariat. Swann resigned, and with his 
departure AI’s defense of Aden detainees ended as well. 
Besides the internecine conflict aroused by Benenson’s suspicions, AI faced financial 
problems. While AI’s International Secretariat leaders celebrated the organization’s triumph 
in Aden, the Swedish section conducted an internal investigation of International Secretariat 
finances. On February 28, 1967, the Swedish section’s investigator, Göran Claesson, 
concluded that “the financing and, consequently, the functioning of the International 
Secretariat have met considerable difficulties.” Claesson believed that the difficulties “are—
or easily may become—detrimental” to the organization’s success.  He identified several 
problems such as the lack of defined processes for determining the organization’s spending 
priorities, no rules to guide the administration of finances for the organization’s various 
activities, and the shocking revelation that the Secretariat’s work “is carried on without a 
budget.” The lack of clearly defined administrative procedures and organizational 
responsibilities contributed to poorly managed finances. In addition, disorganized 
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management created problems with coordinating new projects. Claesson determined that the 
primary problem was a “lack of goals, standards, instructions and control measures.”682  
 AI’s International Executive Committee, which included representatives from 11 
national sections and the International Secretariat, met from March 11-12 in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, to solve the organization’s internal crisis. The meeting marked the end of Peter 
Benenson’s service as AI’s President. Committee members voted to create the new position 
of Director-General, which would supersede that of President.  The Director-General would 
serve as a chief executive and make decisions affecting the organization as a whole.  The 
committee chose Eric Baker, chairman of the British section, as the first Director-General.  
As a result of Göran Claesson’s investigation of the International Secretariat’s finances, the 
Executive Committee also established a series of smaller committees designed to recommend 
administrative and financial reforms.   Lastly, the International Executive Committee voted to 
initiate a discussion with several leading public affairs experts designed to “consider the 
relations between voluntary organisations such as Amnesty and government departments.” In 
a letter to AI supporters, Eric Baker wrote that the Elsinore meeting “might have ended in 
disaster.” Instead, the meeting produced “a unanimous determination” to set Amnesty on a 
path of reform so that it could become “more effective.”683 Amnesty emerged from the crisis 
intact, but had abandoned Aden human rights activism in the process.    
Unlike AI, the ICRC remained involved in Aden. Before the Bowen inquiry, Rochat 
had difficulty gathering information due to the efforts of Aden’s new head of intelligence, 
John Prendergast. Prendergast was a veteran of the conflicts in Palestine, Kenya, and Cyprus. 
He was the top Special Branch intelligence officer in the empire and was called out of semi-
retirement to take the helm in Aden. When he first interviewed Prendergast in September 
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1966, shortly after Prendergast’s arrival and before the Bowen inquiry began, Rochat found 
Prendergast impenetrable. When Rochat asked Prendergast to discuss prisoners’ humanitarian 
concerns, Prendergast replied that “I do not think we have problems of this kind” and denied 
that interrogators obtained confessions through violence. Based on Prendergast’s answers, 
Rochat concluded, Prendergast was either “absolutely not aware of any detail concerning 
F.M. [Fort Morbut],” or he “could not answer us” truthfully. Rochat was convinced that 
“‘reasons of state’ barred us from the way to the truth.”684 Prendergast’s expert 
obstructionism protected the interrogation apparatus from in-depth ICRC scrutiny, but this 
shield cracked once the government implemented the Bowen reforms. 
The Bowen reforms generated a sense of optimism within the ICRC. The ICRC 
determined that Bowen’s recommendations aligned closely with Rochat’s desire to improve 
detainees’ conditions by providing better oversight for interrogation operations. Rochat saw 
Britain’s acquiescence to periodic ICRC visits to both detention and interrogation facilities as 
an important positive step. When he visited Fort Morbut in February 1967, Rochat noted that 
abuses seemed to have declined. He reported that “despite some negative aspects, Fort 
Morbut is no longer a state within a state, fully autonomous. On the contrary, we feel that the 
situation is normalizing little by little.”685 It seemed that British forces were committed to 
improving detainee treatment, but Rochat’s rosy view soon proved illusory. 
In May 1967, as the Bowen inquiry faded from public view, Rochat discovered that 
torture had resumed at Fort Morbut. Rochat found that “incontestably, the scandalous 
practices of some interrogators are starting over again.” He described three categories of 
abuse: “Violence beyond what is acceptable” during interrogation, “using soldiers to increase 
detainee suffering outside of interrogation,” and sheer cruelty. This third category included 
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behaviors such as breaking a detainee’s nose and then spitting in the prisoner’s mouth; 
forcing them to stand naked; alternating between making detainees take cold showers and 
ordering them to stand in front of air conditioners; exposing prisoners to the sun for long 
hours; forcing detainees to stand on hot sand causing foot burns; prohibiting detainees from 
using the bathroom; and beating prisoners in the genitals. Although he did not believe that the 
detainees' stories represented 100% of the truth, Rochat was convinced that the detainees had 
not entirely manufactured allegations either. Of 37 Fort Morbut detainees who had 
complained of their treatment, Rochat assessed that 30 had been tortured. Finally, Rochat 
believed that British medical officers were complicit in the torture regime. He blamed the 
doctors for failing to effectively treat detainees’ injuries. Medical personnel preferred to 
believe that detainees had simply faked their injuries. In one case, two doctors had disagreed 
over how to treat a detainee’s injuries. When they finally operated on the prisoner, it was too 
late—the man remained disabled for life. Rochat concluded that Fort Morbut remained “the 
center of the problem.”686  
 As Rochat’s reports grew increasingly negative, British officials tried to undermine 
his assessments by discrediting him personally. One official, E.F.G. Maynard, called Rochat 
“neither impartial nor intellectually honest” and opined that “there seems to me clear 
evidence of bias on Rochat’s part in that each time he comes back to Aden he finds things a 
little worse.” Maynard seems to have discounted the possibility that things had, in fact, gotten 
worse. He charged that Rochat was “quite unable to bring a logical mind to bear on the 
relative credibility of terrorist detainees and British officials with a tradition of regard for 
human rights.” The detainees, Maynard insisted, “are briefed beforehand what to say to 
Rochat” which meant that “when he sees a continuing theme in the stories presented to him 
                                                            
686 ICRC B AG 225-001-005 Rochat Report No.7, Apr-May 67, pp.6-7. 
 
255 
 
by detainees this becomes to him evidence of a continuing pattern in our maltreatment.”687 
Humphrey Trevelyan, who succeeded Turnbull as High Commissioner, was more direct than 
Maynard. He told the Foreign Office that “we should dearly like to get rid of M. Rochat and 
find it difficult to believe that anyone could be worse.” Trevelyan asked if the Foreign Office 
could “insert a little poison into the ears” of Lady Limerick or Dame Ann Bryans—two 
senior figures in the British national Red Cross society—to convince the International 
Committee of the Red Cross that Rochat was “bringing their organization into disrepute.”688 
Despite British officials’ efforts, Rochat retained his position, which was more than could be 
said about Britain’s presence in Aden. 
Britain’s Labour government had committed to withdrawing from Aden before the 
Bowen inquiry, but the pace of withdrawal accelerated as violence intensified through the 
spring and summer of 1967. In February 1966, the government released a Defence White 
Paper which outlined Britain’s desire to remove its forces in Aden by January 1968, at which 
time the South Arabian Federation would achieve full independence. Britain’s goal was to 
avoid large-scale defense commitments while simultaneously preventing pro-Nasser groups 
such as the NLF and FLOSY from taking over the country. Britain was willing to commit to 
the Federation’s defense by providing military equipment to the Federal armed forces and 
stationing a bomber force at Masirah airbase—a pledge which the anxious Federal leaders 
viewed as unsatisfactory to protect the country from the insurgency within. Meanwhile, a 
power struggle broke out between the NLF and FLOSY. Committed to pan-Arabism, FLOSY 
wanted to incorporate the Marxist NLF into its ranks, but their opposing goals escalated into 
violence. Both sides continued to attack British forces as well. British troops responded with 
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curfews, large-scale security sweeps, and arbitrary searches. These measures further alienated 
many Aden residents.689 
The June 1967 Arab-Israeli war provoked additional anti-British violence because 
many in Aden perceived Britain as pro-Israel. On June 20, South Arabian Federation soldiers 
and police mutinied. They seized several neighborhoods across the city, including the large, 
heavily nationalist Crater district, where the mutineers killed 22 British soldiers after 
ambushing a patrol. With the relationship between Britain and the Aden populace 
deteriorating, the British government moved the date for South Arabian independence from 
January 1968 to November 1967. The Federal government collapsed in the wake of the 
mutiny, leaving the British High Commissioner to negotiate a transfer of power to their NLF 
adversaries. British troops evacuated Aden on November 29th.  On the following day, the 
NLF proclaimed independence for the newly christened People’s Republic of South 
Yemen.690 
Conclusion 
In addition to the ICRC’s attempts to protect detainee rights in Aden while privately 
reporting abuses to the British government, anti-torture activism came from British-based 
NGO Amnesty International and from dissenting voices within the High Commission. Even 
so, Hugh Hickling lamented in his unpublished memoirs, “the truth of this unhappy affair . . . 
was not, in spite of all our efforts, discovered.” Senior officials such as Turnbull, Oates, and 
Willoughby proved willing and able to cover up evidence of torture when suspicions surfaced 
from within the colonial bureaucracy, but they had to submit to an external inquiry once 
Amnesty International turned the torture allegations into a public issue in the UK. AI used a 
combination of private lobbying and public reproach to convince the Foreign Secretary to 
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order an investigation. The subsequent Bowen inquiry was not a whitewash, but its limited 
scope ensured that the danger of interrogation and detention reform remained low. Although 
it resulted in reforms to some aspects of the detention and interrogation system, the Bowen 
inquiry did not stop abuses. None of the servicemen suspected of having tortured detainees 
faced prosecution. Only P.J. Hurr, the Foreign Office diplomat who was under civilian 
jurisdiction, was tried and punished. Neither of the senior civil servants who Bowen 
criticized—Turnbull and Oates—faced sanction. 
Amnesty International’s efforts proved only partially effective. Caught in the midst of 
internal upheaval, AI disengaged from Aden as officials began to implement the Bowen 
reforms.  Amnesty’s withdrawal meant that subsequent problems—such as the failure to 
censure soldiers for “minor” violations of detainee treatment protocols, the failure to 
prosecute the “three men,” and the failure to prevent abusive interrogation practices from 
continuing—remained unresolved without an activist group to maintain pressure on the 
government. AI forced recalcitrant colonial officials onto the defensive, but did not eliminate 
torture in Aden.691 Amnesty’s leaders had declared a premature victory to focus on the 
organization’s internal crisis. After the Bowen inquiry, officials such as Turnbull, 
Willoughby, and Special Branch’s John Prendergast simply put the use of torture into 
hibernation until AI’s oversight—and therefore the likelihood of public censure—waned. 
Again, Hickling said it best: “neglect, delay, and an unwillingness to seem to act in a manner 
detrimental to those members of Her Majesty’s forces” meant that torture continued.692 As in 
Cyprus, a colonial intelligence apparatus which relied heavily on coercive interrogation 
practices had weathered the storm of public criticism by effectively obstructing rights 
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activists’ efforts. Brutal interrogations, however, became harder to hide during Britain’s next 
counterinsurgency campaign—the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
“A MORE TALKATIVE PLACE”: NORTHERN IRELAND 
Introduction 
As the Union Jack came down over Aden for the final time in November 1967, 
Britain’s departure from the “last post” of empire seemed to mark an end to two decades of 
counterinsurgency warfare. The British Army faced other challenges, notably Cold War 
commitments in West Germany.693 But by August 1969, the army was again operating against 
insurgents. This time, the conflict occurred within the United Kingdom—in Northern 
Ireland.694  
In examining the early period of the Troubles—from the army’s initial deployment in 
1969 to the implementation of a new strategy in 1976—this chapter advances three 
arguments. First, although military officers and civilian officials believed that the context of 
the Northern Ireland conflict differed from previous colonial wars, they reacted to the 
escalation of violence by implementing tactics similar to those used in Cyprus and Aden. 
This response can best be seen through the use of internment without trial and “interrogation 
in depth.”  
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Secondly, the use of harsh methods in Northern Ireland generated different public 
consequences than during the Cyprus and Aden wars. These measures stimulated the first 
sustained public debate on counterinsurgency practices in Britain since the end of the Second 
World War. Public controversy had a greater effect on the Northern Ireland conflict than the 
wars in Cyprus and Aden. During the Cyprus and Aden campaigns, British officials were able 
to contain the relatively limited efforts of small groups of activists. But during the Troubles, 
rights activism and legal proceedings challenging British conduct were pervasive and 
persistent as the war in Northern Ireland generated a host of government inquiries in addition 
to investigations conducted by advocacy groups.695  
Finally, this persistent public debate occurred because of Northern Ireland’s unique 
position within the British state and the specific historical moment in which the war began. 
As one officer said of the intense public scrutiny surrounding the use of brutal interrogation 
methods, “the world has become a more talkative place than it was when we used these 
techniques in colonial situations.”696 The world did change during the Troubles, but it is more 
important to note that these changes created the specific circumstances in which military 
leaders’ and civilian officials’ attempts to deflect public criticism—that is, by denigrating 
their accusers, shielding controversial practices from scrutiny, and protecting soldiers from 
judicial punishment—proved less successful than during the Cyprus and Aden conflicts. This 
confluence of circumstances included Northern Ireland’s constitutional positon as part of the 
UK; the growing influence of international human rights ideas and civil society 
organizations; the significant media presence in television, radio, and newspapers; as well as 
the capability of Northern Irish paramilitaries to strike England itself. These particular 
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conditions ensured that the Troubles remained a sensitive public issue in the UK and 
internationally. 
From Civil Rights to Civil War: The Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland 
After the 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War, in which the predominantly Catholic southern 
counties of Ireland obtained Dominion status, the six Protestant-majority counties of 
Northern Ireland remained a province within the United Kingdom in which Catholics faced 
systematic discrimination. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act established a devolved 
Parliament seated at Belfast’s Stormont Castle. Catholics tended to oppose the Stormont 
regime. The terms “Catholic,” “nationalist,” and “republican” were often used synonymously 
to describe their political positions. Protestants—also called “unionists” or “loyalists”—
tended to favor the existing arrangement. Unionists dominated Stormont and wished to 
remain part of the UK. Gerrymandering of electoral districts ensured that Protestants received 
greater per capita political representation than Catholics. Discrimination also occurred in the 
allocation of socialized council housing. Catholics often received smaller houses for larger 
families, whereas smaller Protestant families generally received larger or newer homes. 
Discriminatory employment practices meant that the civil service and police were 
overwhelmingly Protestant and large industrial employers tended to hire Protestants.697 
According to Brice Dickson, a prominent Northern Irish human rights lawyer and co-founder 
of the Committee on the Administration of Justice, such discrimination fueled a sense of 
disaffection among Catholics in which the denial of their political rights consequently 
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inhibited the Catholic minority from exercising their cultural, religious, and linguistic 
rights.698  
 It was in this context of legalized political, social, and economic alienation that the 
Northern Irish civil rights movement emerged. During the 1960s, opposition to the Stormont 
regime coalesced among the political left. The primary organization formed to advance civil 
rights for Catholics was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA). NICRA 
activists had close ties to a variety of left-wing organizations such as the Northern Ireland 
Labour Party, Communist Party of Northern Ireland, National Council for Civil Liberties, and 
the Campaign for Social Justice.699 Inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States 
and the protest movements that swept across Europe and the world in the summer of 1968, 
these activists saw themselves as part of a global struggle against capitalism and imperialism. 
They eschewed the “bureaucratic socialism” of the Old Left as well as entrenched republican 
and unionist groups that controlled state institutions. Radicalized by the politics of the 1960s, 
NICRA and its allies believed that the best way to initiate change was to provoke a reaction 
from the security forces. To these activists, any overreaction from security forces would 
expose what Daniel Cohn-Bendit, one of the leaders of the May 1968 protests in France, 
called the “latent authoritarianism” of the existing political systems of Western Europe and 
“open the eyes” of the people. Northern Ireland’s “1968 moment” began with an October 5 
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civil rights march in Londonderry.700 The Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), Northern 
Ireland’s Protestant-dominated police force, violently dispersed the marchers.701  
In August 1969, a confrontation over the Apprentice Boys march in Derry triggered 
the deployment of the British Army. During the summer of 1969, local officials decreed that 
unionist groups were allowed to march, but Catholic marches were banned. Adding further 
insult to the Catholic community, authorities approved the Apprentice Boys march route, 
which would take 15,000 Protestant marchers through part of the Catholic Bogside 
neighborhood. But as the march began, Catholics barricaded the entrances to the Bogside. 
Catholic and Protestant factions clashed as the RUC stood in the middle trying to maintain 
order. Several RUC armored cars were set on fire with petrol bombs. Both sides threw stones 
and bricks at each other and the police as RUC constables repeatedly charged with batons and 
shields to disperse the rioters. Catholic neighborhoods set up barricades, creating “no-go” 
areas for the police. Stormont’s laws no longer applied in these areas as republican 
paramilitaries such as the Irish Republican Army enforced law and order. On the morning of 
August 14, RUC Inspector General Anthony Peacocke officially requested that the army 
deploy to Londonderry. On the night of August 14, six people died as Protestants went on a 
rampage, burning entire streets in some Catholic areas. Attacks in Belfast increased as well, 
resulting in the August 15 decision to deploy troops to both Londonderry and Belfast.702 
British officials were reluctant to get involved in Northern Ireland because many 
perceived the province as a backwater with a complex web of local problems that could 
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easily turn into a quagmire. The Northern Ireland conflict posed a unique challenge for 
Britain. According to historian Stephen Howe, the British presence in Ireland resulted in “a 
strange constitutional hybrid” that was neither a colony nor entirely integrated into the United 
Kingdom.703 Formally, Northern Ireland was a constituent member of the United Kingdom, 
but this arrangement did not necessarily produce a shared identity. Republicans compared the 
province to a colony, perceiving themselves as freedom fighters struggling against imperial 
oppression. Unionists were emotionally attached to the idea of being British, but other 
Britons did not necessarily share their sympathies. For many in Westminster, the idea of 
being British involved the demonstration of perceived British culture values such as 
tolerance, respect for the rule of law, and moderation. To many in Britain, Northern Irish 
unionists appeared to have merely appropriated the symbols of this “Britishness.” Unionists 
could therefore fall into the cultural category of “Irishness,” which many Britons viewed as 
uncivilized, irrational, and dominated by emotions and passions. To their British countrymen, 
Ulster Protestants were therefore often regarded as backward and foreign.704 Direct 
involvement was not desirable. As then-Home Secretary James Callaghan described it, the 
government’s goal was to avoid being “sucked into the Irish bog.”705 Despite their preference 
of non-intervention, Westminster became increasingly involved in Northern Irish affairs once 
the decision was made to deploy the army.706 
When the army was first ordered to intervene in August 1969, military leaders 
recognized the conflict’s distinct circumstances and ensured that the army did not 
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immediately and unthinkingly deploy its full repertoire of repressive “colonial” 
counterinsurgency methods.707 As violence persisted into the summer of 1970, the army’s 
approach toward the local population hardened.708 The army’s presence initially appeared to 
have calmed the situation, but officials at Stormont and Westminster had different 
expectations for what the army was supposed to achieve. Relations between the troops and 
civilians of both sides entered a “honeymoon” period. For Protestants, the army’s presence 
indicated protection and security against Catholics. For Catholics, it meant that the 
overwhelmingly Protestant, and therefore biased, RUC was no longer patrolling the streets. 
Within government circles, however, the situation was more acrimonious as the army’s 
deployment exposed Stormont’s and Westminster’s divergent objectives. Stormont officials 
wanted the army on the streets so that they could “beat the Micks,” as journalist Desmond 
Hamill described it, whereas Westminster wished to restore law and order rather than keeping 
the “Micks” down. Different goals contributed to confusion in terms of what the troops were 
supposed to accomplish. Soldiers were deployed to “aid the civil power,” but military 
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commanders soon came to see their mission as far more than simply restoring order. To many 
commanders, the army appeared to have walked into the middle of a civil war.709  
The violence of 1969 created new enemies while rousing old ones. During the 
summer, the nationalist paramilitary Irish Republican Army (IRA) advocated political change 
but stopped short of ordering armed resistance. For many nationalists, this apparent failure to 
defend Catholic communities undermined the IRA’s credibility.  The IRA’s shift toward 
political action bothered some of the organization’s members. Tensions between these 
dissidents and existing commanders persisted into the winter, when the IRA Army Council 
voted to increase the organization’s involvement in politics by allying with left-wing 
nationalist groups. This decision infuriated the dissident faction. On December 18, dissidents 
established a new Provisional wing. The Provisionals believed that political action was 
meaningless without military force to back it up. In the future, the Provisionals would not 
back down as the Official IRA had.710  
Nationalist violence resumed after a March 1970 commemoration of the 1916 Easter 
Rising triggered three days of riots in Ballymurphy—the first major confrontation between 
soldiers and Catholics. On June 27, an Orange Order parade passed near Belfast’s Catholic 
Short Strand neighborhood. A Loyalist mob threw petrol bombs at a Catholic church, but 
PIRA responded with a vigorous defense.711 The ensuing five-hour gun battle, in which four 
Protestants were killed, achieved legendary status in republican circles.  Many people fled the 
fighting. Working class areas of both religions were hit hardest. In Belfast alone 30,000-
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40,000 people left their homes to live in areas filled with their co-religionists. Areas of mixed 
religion declined, creating sharp divisions between Catholic and Protestant zones.712  
 Confrontation in the Short Strand soon led to an operation that transformed the 
conflict and ended the army’s Northern Ireland “honeymoon”—the Falls Road curfew. After 
the Short Strand gun battle, British forces moved to intercept a shipment of weapons believed 
to have been delivered to an Official IRA safe house in the Lower Falls. On July 3, soldiers 
moved into the area to seize the weapons. But as troops left the neighborhood, an incensed 
crowd gathered and began throwing stones. PIRA initiated gun battles in the Falls Road and 
Ardoyne while the army deployed 3,000 soldiers to the area and imposed a three-day curfew. 
During the curfew, troops searched house-by-house with little regard for civilian property. 
Homes and businesses were damaged and, in the rioting that followed, four Catholics were 
killed. Although PIRA had done the fighting in areas around the Lower Falls, the arms dump 
seized by the British Army actually belonged to the Official IRA.713 In total, 5 people were 
killed, 15 soldiers and 60 civilians injured. The curfew proved militarily successful in that the 
army found over a hundred guns and home-made bombs, 250 pounds of explosives, and 
21,000 rounds of ammunition, but the operation failed politically. Journalist Desmond Hamill 
noted that after the curfew, relations between the Catholic community and the army changed 
from “sullen acceptance to open hostility.”714 PIRA recruitment soared and the Officials were 
galvanized into action.715 
 The army adopted harsher methods as violence escalated, including measures 
reminiscent of past colonial campaigns. By the end of June, the General Officer Commanding 
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in Northern Ireland (GOC NI) relaxed restrictions on rules of engagement concerning the use 
of lethal force.716 The 1970 Conservative Party electoral victory also influenced army 
attitudes. Catholics, The Guardian reported, insisted that “the Army attitude has toughened 
since the Conservatives came to power at Westminster” in July and that “soldiers are now 
going out of their way to provoke Catholic anger, and then responding harshly to it.”717 
Efforts to improve security proved counterproductive as cordon-and-search operations, 
checkpoints and roadblocks, fortified army garrisons placed in disputed neighborhoods, and 
aggressive responses to riots further alienated many Catholics.718 
 The army’s response to weekend riots in November 1970 was indicative of this “get 
tough” approach. After rioters wounded 41 soldiers and marines with petrol and nail bombs, 
commanders declared that in future confrontations where petrol or nail bombs were used, 
“soldiers will not wait to see what is thrown at them before responding with rifle fire.” 
Journalist Simon Winchester, sitting in the audience at the press conference where the 
announcement was made, noted that “all the army’s public relations staff at the conference 
were nodding in agreement with the CO’s phrasing and it must be assumed that this is the 
army’s latest attitude and one important aspect of its uncompromisingly tough policy.”719 
In March 1971, Northern Ireland Prime Minister James Chichester-Clark further 
emphasized the new approach by insisting that he would station army units in all “riotous and 
subversive enclaves.” The use of any lethal weapons by rioters—including guns, explosives, 
and petrol bombs—would result in what The Guardian described as “rigorously conducted 
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house-to-house searches.” Reporter Simon Winchester concluded that “the new tactics, which 
finally confirm that the army’s role in Northern Ireland has changed, probably irreversibly, 
from its initial ‘peace-keeping duties’ to the more familiar colonial role of ‘internal 
security.’” Inevitably, Winchester concluded, “massive security operations similar to the 
controversial Lower Falls ‘curfew’ of last July will follow any more disturbances.”720 
The army’s adoption of stronger security measures reflected the growing 
radicalization of political opinions in late 1970 and early 1971. Army commanders were well 
aware that the IRA was intent on provoking soldiers to respond to riots and protests with 
excessive force. The intent behind the IRA’s actions was to generate conflict between the 
security forces and the Catholic population, which would alienate Catholics from the army. 
The civil rights movement had faded into the background, eclipsed by the dictates of armed 
struggle. Despite knowledge of the IRA’s intentions, the army’s “get tough” policies played 
into the IRA’s hands. As troops implemented tougher policies, Catholics grew increasingly 
suspicious of the army and therefore provided less intelligence and support to the army than 
they had before. Many Catholics viewed the army’s actions as repressive and turned against it 
as republican paramilitaries increased their hold on Catholic neighborhoods through 
intimidation campaigns of their own. The result was what scholar Aaron Edwards termed “a 
negative equity” in which each side’s actions reinforced antagonism.721 Loyalist opinions 
hardened as well.  In the July 1970 UK general election, outspoken and controversial unionist 
Reverend Ian Paisley was elected to Westminster. On March 18, 1971, 3,000 loyalists 
marched on Stormont demanding that Stormont leaders deal more effectively and vigorously 
                                                            
720 Simon Winchester, “Tough new measures for Ulster riot areas,” The Guardian, March 3, 1971. 
 
721 Edwards, “Misapplying Lessons Learned?,” 308–312. 
 
270 
 
with IRA terrorism. On March 31, Chichester-Clark resigned as Northern Ireland’s Prime 
Minister.722 A stronger crackdown was coming. 
Internment and Interrogation 
The violence convinced many unionist politicians that stronger security measures 
were necessary—particularly the authorization of internment without trial. On July 8, 1971, 
Stormont PM Brian Faulkner’s tenuous attempt to compromise collapsed after British troops 
killed two rioters in Derry. Republican sympathizers demanded a public inquiry into the 
deaths, arguing that the men were unarmed when they were shot, but the government refused. 
In response, Stormont MPs from the moderate nationalist Social Democratic and Labour 
Party (SDLP) walked out of the assembly.723 Faulkner faced severe political pressure from 
unionists, including many within his own Cabinet, to order internment without trial.724 
Military leaders were skeptical about the use of internment. Chief of the General Staff 
General Sir Michael Carver and GOC NI Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo believed that 
internment would prove counterproductive. They thought that internment would merely 
antagonize nationalists. Faulkner also did not like the idea of internment for similar reasons, 
but felt that he would lose unionist support if he did not adopt a tougher stance on security 
policy. Tuzo suggested that a large-scale, but limited, arrest operation of around 100 key 
suspects would provide a useful alternative to internment. Such an operation would strike a 
strong blow against the IRA without appearing overly aggressive toward the Catholic 
community.725  
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On August 5, despite misgivings from army leaders, Faulkner asked Prime Minister 
Edward Heath for authorization to implement internment beginning on August 9. Heath 
acquiesced. Code-named Operation Demetrius, the internment plan involved large-scale 
battalion-sized sweeps of Catholic neighborhoods and targeted 464 IRA suspects. Troops 
searched houses with little regard for the occupants. Michael Farrell, a People’s Democracy 
activist, recalled how soldiers beat up almost everyone who had been arrested. During the 
sweeps, the army captured 304 of the 464 individuals on their target list.726 
 The order to begin internment without trial was enough to antagonize the Catholic 
community, but the army’s use of bellicose tactics exacerbated the situation. On August 17, 
nationalist MP John Hume complained of soldiers’ brutal treatment of civilians during 
searches of the Bogside in which three men were hospitalized with head injuries suffered 
during their arrest. One journalist concluded that “the army has tended to avoid 
confrontations, but it now appears to be adopting more aggressive tactics, charging and firing 
rubber bullets into the bystanders.”727 The army began dispatching larger patrols, but larger 
patrols led to more frequent and intrusive house searches, which created more confrontations 
with Catholics, therefore enflaming Catholic resentment. The IRA, particularly the 
Provisionals, also contributed to the army’s increased “toughness.”728 As they entered 
Catholic neighborhoods in Londonderry, soldiers faced petrol bomb attacks, stoning, and 
gunfire. On the day that Operation Demetrius began, five soldiers were shot and seven 
injured by stones or petrol bombs. One soldier was partially blinded after being hit in the face 
with a petrol bomb.729 Over the next four months, 30 soldiers, 11 police, and 73 civilians died 
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in gun battles, riots, or bombings.730 The army reacted by interning more suspects. Some were 
guilty, but many of those arrested were innocent—a fact which fueled the perception that, as 
one Catholic activist put it, the army was adopting “tougher and tougher methods of 
repression.”731  
Internment without trial alienated the vast majority of Catholics because it appeared to 
herald a return to past discriminatory practices. The army did not target any Protestant areas, 
and no Protestant paramilitary suspects were interned until February 1972. On August 12, 
Oliver Napier of the cross-community Alliance Party told the Irish News that “every 
Northern Ireland Catholic sees the introduction of internment as the abandonment of the 
reform programme and the end of the principle of equal citizenship.”732 On August 16, the 
SDLP launched a civil disobedience campaign which linked protests against internment with 
the housing problems that had originally motivated the civil rights movement. The 
campaign’s purpose, Stormont MP and SLDP member John Hume explained, was to 
demonstrate that Stormont no longer governed with Catholic consent. Organizers planned to 
hold rent and rate strikes in which occupants of publicly owned homes and tenants who paid 
rates to local authorities would refuse to pay. Denying revenue to the government in this way 
was meant to demonstrate the Catholic community’s rejection of Stormont’s authority. In 
Derry, activists claimed that 90 percent of Catholic households participated in the strike. In 
Dungiven, only two of 850 tenants paid their August rent. The chant of “no freedom, no rent” 
became the strikers’ rallying cry.733  
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Although internment stirred Catholic ire, the treatment of prisoners during 
interrogation aroused the nationalist community’s deepest anger.734 Although many of the 464 
men on the army’s initial arrest list were exposed to what journalist Ian Cobain described as 
“systematic rough-handling,” several internees had been identified for what MOD called 
“interrogation in depth.” Security officials believed that those pre-selected for interrogation in 
depth possessed vital information about the IRA’s organization and methods. Ultimately, 
RUC Special Branch, with military assistance, carried out these interrogations on 14 people 
through a special program code-named Operation Calaba.735  
Operation Calaba was built on the edifice of previous interrogation programs such as 
those implemented in Cyprus and Aden. In 1956, the military reorganized interrogation with 
the creation of the Interrogation Branch—a Joint Service organization with direct access to 
the War Office’s Director of Military Intelligence. Interrogation Branch primarily existed to 
conduct training courses. Due to operational experiences in colonial conflicts such as Kenya 
and Cyprus, Interrogation Branch began to incorporate interrogation methods designed for 
antiterrorism and counterinsurgency operations. In 1965, Interrogation Branch was renamed 
the Joint Services Interrogation Wing (JSIW). In addition, the Joint Intelligence Committee 
codified a set of interrogation principles—but not specific practices or procedures—in a Joint 
Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal Security Operations Overseas, dated February 
17, 1965. These principles included the imperative of undermining a prisoner’s confidence 
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and resilience through “psychological attack,” although the Joint Directive also prohibited 
“outrage upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and degrading treatment.” The Joint 
Directive was amended in 1967 after the release of the Bowen Report on interrogation in 
Aden, but the principle of “psychological attack” also remained in effect.736 Throughout the 
1960s, the JSIW was the sole organization capable of conducting interrogation training for 
internal security operations. After the Bowen Report recommended that civilians conduct 
interrogation during internal security operations, the JSIW established a training program in 
which military interrogators taught other military personnel as well as police Special Branch 
officers.737 
On March 17, 1971, RUC Special Branch requested interrogation training to improve 
its poor intelligence capabilities. The army was already aware of Special Branch’s 
limitations. In 1969, General Sir Geoffrey Baker, Chief of the General Staff, visited RUC 
Special Branch and wrote a report on his findings. He described Special Branch as “badly 
organised and run, with the result that speculation and guesswork largely replace 
intelligence.”738 Baker was experienced with the workings of intelligence organizations in 
colonial counterinsurgency campaigns due to his experience as Chief of Staff to the Director 
of Operations during the Cyprus Emergency. He was also author of the Baker Report on the 
Cyprus Emergency, the findings of which had influenced the colonial administration’s 
response to the Aden Emergency of 1963-67. On March 24, 1971, MOD and MI5 
representatives decided to send a member of the JSIW to Northern Ireland as an adviser and 
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several others to provide training assistance. Between four and six officers as well as six to 
eight NCOs participated in the training and advisory mission. Under the terms of the 
arrangement, military personnel were not to participate in interrogations. They were only to 
advise and provide technical support to the RUC.739 
To some senior officials, the introduction of internment provided an excellent 
opportunity to begin using interrogation in depth. The Vice Chief of the General Staff 
informed Defence Secretary Lord Carrington that internment, and the subsequent 
interrogation of interned prisoners, would yield vital intelligence. On August 10, Carrington 
and Home Secretary Maudling approved the military’s advise-and-assist role in RUC 
interrogations. MOD arranged for 12 military interrogators to provide “technical support and 
advice on all aspects of the operation,” in which 20 RUC Special Branch interrogators would 
conduct interrogations. An additional 26 constables from the RUC Special Patrol Group 
guarded the facilities.740 In a prophetic gesture considering the criticism that soon followed, 
the GOC informed RUC Special Branch that as long as Special Branch conducted 
interrogation in depth using only techniques taught by the military, the army would try to 
prevent the RUC from being blamed if interrogations generated negative repercussions. The 
commander of the military interrogation unit advising Special Branch was informed that 
humiliating and degrading treatment, violence, and torture were prohibited. In addition, all 
detainees were to be treated humanely and in accord with the principles of Article 3 of the 
1949 Geneva Convention concerning treatment of prisoners of war. These guidelines, 
however, were open to broad interpretation.741  
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Interrogators used interrogation in depth to impose their will on detainees by 
controlling every aspect of their existence. The process relied upon five techniques designed 
to disorient and frighten the prisoner while also heightening his desire to communicate with 
other humans.  The first of the five techniques was wall standing, in which detainees had to 
stand facing a wall with their arms raised. This method was supposed to reinforce discipline 
and control over the detainee, while also protecting guards from any violence committed by 
the detainee. The second technique was hooding—the placement of a black hood over the 
detainee’s head for prolonged periods—and was designed to limit a detainee’s ability to 
interact with other prisoners or identify where he had been taken for questioning. The third 
technique, subjecting detainees to white noise, made communication between detainees more 
difficult, kept them psychologically disoriented, and increased their sense of isolation. 
Fourth, detainees were deprived of sleep to further disorient them. Fifth, interrogators 
imposed a bread-and-water diet on detainees. Bread and water were offered at six-hour 
intervals, which contributed to a detainee’s disorientation—when fed more than three times a 
day, it would have been difficult for detainees to keep track of the time of day, therefore 
obscuring how long they had been in captivity.742 
In addition to the five techniques, prisoners chosen for participation in Operation 
Calaba were often subjected to physical violence. Between questioning sessions, RUC 
officers forced detainees to stand at a wall, often in stressful positions. Those detainees who 
failed to stand in the desired position were beaten. These sessions often lasted for hours. 
Documentation suggests that for 11 of the prisoners, time spent standing at the wall varied 
between 9 and 43 hours. During these standing sessions, detainees were prohibited from 
sleeping or speaking. When one man, James Auld, asked to use the toilet, he claimed that the 
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guards denied permission and slammed his head against the wall as punishment for speaking. 
Detainee Patrick McClean said that he was never permitted to use a toilet. Prisoners, he said, 
simply had to “wet where we lay.”743  
The Interrogation Inquiries 
As details of interrogation practices emerged in public, the subsequent uproar caused 
a government inquiry. Civil society groups such as the Association for Legal Justice spoke 
out about “new and disturbing elements” in the army’s treatment of prisoners and recorded 
statements from several detainees for possible use in future legal proceedings. On August 12, 
Catholic clergymen such as Cardinal Conway, Archbishop of Armagh, called for an 
investigation as well. A series of reports in the Irish News and Irish Press publicized specific 
allegations of brutal treatment related to the use of the five techniques. By August 20, press 
reports had convinced Prime Minister Heath to order an inquiry.744 The Irish government also 
pressured Britain to take action. On August 25, the Republic of Ireland’s ambassador 
formally requested a full and impartial inquiry. To the Irish government, no inquiry could 
qualify as “impartial” unless it included a non-British member.  The Irish ambassador 
informed British officials that his government would also consider formal action at the 
European Court of Human Rights. On August 31, Home Secretary Maudling appointed a 
three-person committee of inquiry under Sir Edmund Compton. The committee’s terms of 
reference were to investigate allegations of physical brutality committed by security forces 
against prisoners arrested after internment, including allegations concerning detainees 
subjected to the five techniques and prisoners who had been arrested under internment but 
who had not faced interrogation in depth.745  
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To Northern Irish nationalists and many in the Republic of Ireland, the Compton 
inquiry amounted to nothing more than a whitewash because of the committee’s composition, 
terms of reference, and findings. The Dublin government and nationalists in Northern Ireland 
opposed the committee on the grounds that the inquiry was not held in public, the committee 
members did not have full judicial powers, witnesses would not have legal representation, 
and the committee was comprised solely of British officials. As a result of nationalist 
dissatisfaction, all but one of the prisoners subjected to interrogation in depth boycotted the 
committee by refusing to testify. The committee’s equivocal findings, finalized on November 
3, 1971, made matters worse. Compton did not address the legality of the five techniques, but 
instead tried to differentiate between “brutality” and “ill-treatment” by casting these terms as 
different degrees of physical abuse. The committee found no evidence of physical brutality, 
but determined that physical ill-treatment had occurred in the form of forced wall-standing, 
white noise, sleep deprivation, and the bread-and-water diet.746 The committee also found that 
interrogations had followed the appropriate guidance regarding the treatment of detainees in a 
humane manner. The Compton report noted, however, that these rules were open to 
interpretation: “The precise application of these general rules is inevitably to some extent a 
matter of judgement on the part of those immediately responsible for the operations in 
question.”747 Ultimately, the report admitted that British forces had conducted physically 
violent interrogations through the use of the five techniques, but simultaneously denied that 
these measures constituted brutality or torture. 
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Prime Minister Heath also criticized the report, but from a different perspective—he 
believed that it went too far in accusing the security forces of ill-treatment. Heath called it 
“one of the most unbalanced, ill-judged reports I have ever read” and considered the number 
of ill-treatment cases “trivial” considering that over 300 people had been arrested. He further 
complained that the report did not put these actions into the “context of the war against the 
IRA.” To Heath, the allegations should have been dismissed because the prisoners had 
refused to testify before the committee. Finally, he believed that “the consequences of this 
report” would “infuriate Commanders in the Army, undermine the position of the soldiers 
and RUC in Northern Ireland, and produce grave international repercussions for us.”748 Heath 
felt that any admission of culpability would undermine the security effort.  
Hostile press coverage at home and abroad, the potential for a European Court of 
Human Rights case, and Heath’s angry reaction to the Compton report resulted in Home 
Secretary Reginald Maudling’s November 16, 1971 announcement of a second inquiry. 
Criticism of interrogation practices from Irish media—in both north and south—commenced 
soon after the implementation of internment, but the British press largely ignored the stories. 
This situation changed in September 1971, when the Sunday Times “Insight” team began 
publishing articles critical of the government’s internment and interrogation policies in 
Northern Ireland. Defending the decision, Maudling told the Commons that “the principles 
applied in the interrogation of suspects in Northern Ireland and the methods employed are the 
same as those which have been used in other struggles against armed terrorists in which 
Britain has been involved in recent years.” Even so, he continued, “Her Majesty's 
Government consider, however, that it would be right now to review them.” After Maudling’s 
announcement, Labour MP James Callaghan immediately compared the situation to Aden 
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and pressed Maudling on whether the security forces in Northern Ireland had exceeded their 
authority by employing interrogation techniques that were not permitted under the 1965 Joint 
Directive on Military Interrogation, which had been amended in 1967 after the Bowen 
Report. Maudling assured Callaghan that “I am entirely satisfied that the methods used have 
not gone beyond the rules.”749 Chaired by Lord Parker, the Lord Chief Justice of England, the 
resulting inquiry was intended to examine the extent to which British forces’ conduct in 
Northern Ireland conformed to established practices, and whether such practices were legal.  
As the Parker inquiry commenced, officials in the Ministry of Defence decided that 
the best way to convince commission members to allow interrogation in depth to remain in 
use was by casting the techniques as security measures rather than “softening up” 
procedures.750 On November 23, Permanent Under-Secretary of Defence Sir James Dunnett 
convened a meeting with Vice Chief of the General Staff Sir Cecil Blacker—who had 
commanded British forces in the 1964 Radfan campaign—as well as the Director-General of 
Intelligence and Intelligence Coordinator Sir Dick White, a former head of MI5. At the 
meeting, they discussed the extent to which the five techniques formed an integral part of the 
interrogation process. Each official believed that interrogation in depth was vital to the 
collection of useful intelligence and had proven valuable in past conflicts such as Cyprus and 
Aden. They determined that the three primary techniques of wall-standing, hooding, and 
white noise were essential elements of the interrogation process because the measures served 
both security functions—so that a detainee could not identify other detainees or harm 
interrogators—and helped to “soften up” prisoners prior to questioning.751 White described 
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how the techniques satisfied the vital “psychological attack” aspect described in the Joint 
Directive on Military Interrogation. The prisoner, according to White, “must be brought to 
realise that he is now entirely alone, and above all, completely severed from connections with 
his former comrades who can neither help him further nor condemn him nor exact reprisals 
upon him.” Despite their effectiveness for “softening up” prisoners prior to interrogation, 
White believed that techniques such as wall-standing, hooding, and white noise should be 
portrayed solely as security measures. MOD should not, in his view, present the procedures 
to the Parker commission as “softening up” measures because using the techniques for 
reasons other than security could “lay us open to possible charges of physical assault.”752 
When published in March 1972, the Parker inquiry’s results exposed a division within 
the committee over whether the five techniques were justifiable. In addition to Lord Parker, 
the commission also included Privy Counsellors John Boyd-Carpenter, a Conservative MP, 
and Lord Gardiner of the Labour Party. They were appointed to consider whether to amend 
interrogation procedures for terrorism suspects. After reviewing 25 written representations 
from the public, 10 from organizations, and hearing oral testimony from 33 witnesses, the 
committee members could not reach a consensus on their final recommendations. Instead, 
they submitted two reports—a majority report written by Parker and Boyd-Carpenter as well 
as a minority report authored by Lord Gardiner.753  
In the majority report, Parker and Boyd-Carpenter asserted the legality of the five 
techniques and claimed them to be morally justified because they proved effective. Parker 
and Boyd-Carpenter concluded that interrogation was legally limited to the procedures 
authorized by the Joint Directive on Military Interrogation. They insisted that the Joint 
Directive “fairly set out the obligations under the Geneva Convention and those to whom it is 
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addressed are enjoined to comply with them.” In addition, the majority report excused the use 
of the five techniques because “there is no doubt that when used in the past these techniques 
have produced very valuable results in revealing rebel organisation, training and ‘Battle 
Orders’.” The authors of the majority report claimed “we do not subscribe to the principle 
that the end justifies the means,” yet that was the position they adopted. Parker and Boyd-
Carpenter implied that the techniques themselves were not the problem. Instead, the 
techniques were only morally questionable if used improperly. According to the report, 
“There is of course a danger that, if the techniques are applied to an undue degree, the 
detainee will, either consciously or unconsciously, give false information.” But, the authors 
argued, “subject to proper safeguards limiting the occasion on which and the degree to which 
they can be applied, would be in conformity with the Directive.” The morality of the issue lay 
in the “intensity with which these techniques are applied and on the provision of effective 
safeguards against excessive use.” According to the majority report, as long as the techniques 
were effective in extracting information and used safely, their use was justifiable.754 
Lord Gardiner’s minority report highlighted the interrogation methods’ illegality. 
Gardiner agreed with Parker and Boyd-Carpenter that the Joint Directive was the key 
document requiring interpretation, but Gardiner argued that “if any document or Minister had 
purported to authorise them [the interrogation procedures], it would have been invalid 
because the procedures were and are illegal by the domestic law and may also have been 
illegal by international law.” Gardiner noted that the Joint Directive instructed interrogators 
“to follow the principles laid down in Article 3 of the Geneva Convention” of 1949, which 
prohibited “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading 
treatment.” Under domestic law, Gardiner continued, “where a man is in lawful custody it is 
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lawful to do anything which is reasonably necessary to keep him in custody but it does not 
further or otherwise make lawful an assault.” Wall-standing and forced hooding amounted to 
assault and were therefore “both a tort and a crime.” Deprivation of sleep and food 
restrictions fell into the same category, unless authorized as a punishment under prison rules. 
Gardiner surmised that “no Army Directive and no Minister could lawfully or validly have 
authorised the use of the procedures. Only Parliament can alter the law. The procedures were 
and are illegal.”755  
Besides legal considerations, Gardiner rejected the five techniques because of their 
effects on detainees’ health and well-being. Regardless of the information obtained through 
the five techniques, Gardiner argued, these methods created enduring, traumatic health 
problems. Eleven of the 14 detainees subjected to the five techniques reported physical 
injuries. Medical evidence indicated that at the noise level used during interrogation—85 
decibels—a temporary 8% loss of hearing was possible, as well as some permanent hearing 
loss. Mentally, medical research suggested that sensory isolation could induce artificial 
psychosis or episodes of insanity. Such psychological distress could last for months or years 
after interrogation. In addition, Gardiner noted, some of the men subjected to the five 
techniques had appeared cooperative from the beginning, suggesting that interrogation in 
depth was unnecessary. Information could have been obtained without resort to such harsh 
measures.756  
Because the five techniques were illegal, Gardiner concluded that the most pressing 
question was whether to recommend that Parliament pass legislation authorizing the 
techniques. His answer was a resounding “no” because of the moral dilemma inherent in the 
authorization of a degree of physical violence against suspects who may or may not be guilty 
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of a crime and because medical evidence indicated that the threshold at which physical or 
mental trauma could cause lasting harm varied tremendously from person to person. In 
essence, the techniques could not be used “safely,” as the majority report suggested.757 
The Parker inquiry majority report and the Compton report revealed the persistence in 
government of a tendency to disguise brutality by denying wrongdoing, protecting members 
of the Security Forces from legal censure, and manipulating public perceptions. The Compton 
report called interrogation methods “ill-treatment,” but fell short of labeling them as brutality 
or torture. The Parker majority report justified inflicting physical harm in the course of 
interrogation on the basis of doing it “safely” and within limits. This interpretation placed the 
onus of authority on lower levels of leadership, such as local commanders at the interrogation 
facility. By doing so, the majority report interpretation removed superior officers’ 
responsibility for subordinates’ actions. It absolved senior military and civilian leadership 
from accountability for possible “mistakes” that could result in serious injury to a prisoner or 
death. Similar attempts to justify British actions in Cyprus, in response to the Greek 
government’s applications under the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
Famagusta and Geunyeli incidents, as well as the decision to deny Red Cross access to the 
Radfan and the Bowen report in Aden, demonstrated a distinct continuity in the way in which 
successive governments—from Whitehall to the colonies—responded to public criticism over 
rights violations during counterinsurgencies.  
Despite the Compton and Parker inquiries’ limitations, the subsequent reports 
signaled a significant difference between how interrogation matters were dealt with during 
colonial wars of the 1950s and 1960s and the campaign in Northern Ireland. These inquiries 
resulted from and further stimulated public discussion of state violence. For the first time 
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since the Second World War, soldiers, bureaucrats, elected officials, and informed members 
of the public engaged in a substantive and persistent public debate over counterinsurgency 
violence such as coercing civilians and torturing prisoners. When compared with past 
colonial campaigns, holding two Parliamentary inquiries within six months on the same 
issue—especially one as sensitive as interrogation—was unprecedented. Nor did these reports 
end public debate. Instead, Lord Gardiner’s minority report emboldened the government’s 
critics. Lord Parker and Boyd-Carpenter argued in their majority report that as long as the 
techniques were used safely, they could continue. Lord Gardiner’s minority report challenged 
the validity of those rules and the majority report’s assumption of safety so vociferously that 
opponents of the government’s interrogation practices launched renewed criticisms. In 
Northern Ireland, Gerry Fitt, of the nationalist SDLP, called the minority report a “damning 
indictment” and suggested that many of those interrogated would pursue legal action against 
the British government. In Ireland, “the Parker proposals were rather coldly received by 
members of all three parliamentary parties, who felt that condemnation of the in-depth 
interrogation techniques should be complete and unequivocal.”758  
Criticism from the Irish government and Northern Irish Catholics left far-reaching 
repercussions. Irish government officials believed that public opinion in the Republic was 
such that people would not accept government inaction over internment and interrogation. 
Catholics in the north also wanted the Irish government to do something. The Compton and 
Parker reports had not improved this perception. On November 30, 1971, after the Compton 
report’s release, the Irish Cabinet resolved to take action against Britain for violating the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Such action, said Hugh McCann of the Irish 
Ministry of External Affairs, “would inevitably make the British much more careful in their 
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handling of detainees” and “would make it more difficult for them to make progress in the 
direction of a military solution.” If the British believed that a military solution was 
obtainable, McCann warned, “there would be less incentive for them to take unpalatable 
political action.”759 In December 1971, the Irish government lodged an inter-state application 
against the UK with the European Commission for Human Rights. Application 5155/71, as 
the Irish complaint was known, alleged that by ordering internment, Britain had violated 
Articles 5, 6, and 14 of the Convention, which protected an individual’s rights to liberty, a 
fair trial, and right to be free from discrimination.760  
Faced with the prospect of proceedings before the European Commission for Human 
Rights and the deteriorating political situation in Northern Ireland, Heath spied the 
opportunity to make a political concession on the use of the five techniques while retaining 
the option of employing harsh methods in the future. He believed that the situation in 
Northern Ireland was desperate and required drastic action to alleviate nationalist resentment 
over the internment and interrogation controversies.761 With the publication of the Parker 
reports, Heath admitted that the five techniques had been officially approved. Furthermore, 
he stated that the techniques would no longer be used. The Joint Directive on Military 
Interrogation was also updated, with a new version approved by the Joint Intelligence 
Committee in June 1972. Yet despite these admissions, Heath insisted that the five techniques 
had saved innocent lives. He refused to concede that the techniques were illegal or 
inappropriate.762 In doing so, Heath had done what his forebears in Cyprus and Aden had 
not—placed specific legal restrictions on the use of force during interrogation operations.  
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Heath had multiple reasons for banning the five techniques.763 One reason was the 
desire to prevent interrogators from facing domestic prosecution. The Parker Committee 
concluded that at least some of the five techniques amounted to common assault under 
English law. But in Northern Ireland—which was a separate jurisdiction—the five techniques 
were the subject of a pending court case. Since they did not wish to prejudice the decision of 
a court, the Parker Committee did not offer a judgment on the five techniques’ legality in 
Northern Ireland.764 Although the Parker Committee managed to side-step the question of 
legality in Northern Ireland, Heath’s government had to consider the potential consequences 
if the court case ended unfavorably. Sir Burke Trend summarized the government’s available 
options: “If the recommendation [of the majority report] is not accepted, those taking part in 
the [interrogation] operation would be legally at risk.” Interrogators could therefore face civil 
claims and, possibly, criminal charges. If the government did not accept the majority report, 
ministers who wished to legally protect members of the Security Forces implicated in the 
interrogation controversy would have to justify their actions by overcoming Lord Gardiner’s 
powerful moral objections. “The implication of this dilemma,” Trend continued, “is that 
Ministers might well feel that they could not for some time . . . authorise the use of 
techniques of this kind in support of interrogation.”765 MOD and Home Office officials also 
sought to protect servicemen who could face civil or criminal charges. MOD and the Home 
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Office agreed that in civil actions, the government would “continue to protect the identities of 
the individuals concerned and their costs and any damages would be paid by the Crown.” In 
terms of criminal cases, “if the possibility of a more serious penalty such as imprisonment 
was involved we should resort to an Act of Indemnity on an individual basis.”766 Interrogation 
could continue, but to prevent potential legal action against individual interrogators, the five 
techniques would have to go. 
A public repudiation of the five techniques would undermine allegations at the 
European Commission of Human Rights that the British government had officially tolerated 
torture. By disassociating itself from the five techniques, Britain could better defend its 
position at Strasbourg. According to the Attorney General, “the risk that the Commission 
would, at the end of the day, make a finding, on the complaint of ill-treatment, which would 
seriously affect the reputation of Ministers or the Army would accordingly be substantially 
reduced.” Disclosing sections of the Joint Directive, newly revised based on the Parker 
report, to the European Commission would provide “substantial evidence of practical steps 
taken by the United Kingdom administration to prevent ill-treatment, which would rebut the 
allegation of official toleration.”767 When the Irish government’s case was finally heard in 
1976, British lawyers argued that the application should be terminated because Britain had 
already conducted an inquiry and Heath had already ordered an end to the five techniques.768 
There was also the practical consideration that much useful intelligence had already 
been collected. Internment and interrogation in depth led to an intelligence boon 
as  interrogators could now use the information they received from questioning captured IRA 
operatives to identify Provisional and Official IRA organizational structures, operational 
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plans, possible targets, and capabilities. One MOD assessment determined that approximately 
75% of weapons found since the introduction of internment came from information gathered 
directly or indirectly through interrogation in depth and that “ten of these men provided large 
quantities of information of great value to the security forces.”769 In short, Operation Calaba 
was a massive military success. By the time the five techniques were abandoned, the security 
forces had developed a much stronger understanding of the threat they faced and could act 
against both the Provisional and Official IRA much more effectively than previously.770 The 
government had realized by December 1971 that a military solution was not sufficient—a 
political arrangement was necessary to end the violence. Heath had to accept the sectarian 
divide as a fact of life and find a political solution that incorporated sectarian politics into a 
mutually agreeable framework.771 By acquiescing to nationalist sentiments on the issue of 
interrogation in depth, Heath could appear willing to compromise on political initiatives.  
Heath’s search for a political solution suffered a tragic setback when, on January 30, 
1972, soldiers from the Parachute Regiment killed 14 people during a Londonderry protest 
march in one of the most significant incidents of the Troubles—Bloody Sunday. After the 
introduction of internment, NICRA planned a protest march in Derry. The march attracted 
thousands of participants. British troops expected that the march would descend into violence 
because IRA attacks had recently increased. Between January 28-30 alone, soldiers 
encountered 13 shooting incidents in Londonderry.772 Early in the day, some protesters 
initiated violent confrontations with soldiers, including stone-throwing and rifle fire. By late 
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afternoon, the senior British commander, Brigadier MacLellan, authorized Lieutenant 
Colonel Derek Wilford of 1st Battalion, The Parachute Regiment, to mount an arrest 
operation targeting violent protestors. Wilford dispatched his Support Company to conduct 
the arrests, but Support Company went beyond the area in which MacLellan had authorized 
Wilford to make arrests. Upon entering Rossville Street, soldiers from Support Company 
opened fire on several unarmed civilians who had not been involved in the earlier 
confrontations.773  
  Coming in close succession after internment and the interrogation controversies, 
Bloody Sunday further alienated Northern Irish nationalists, infuriated many in the south, and 
provoked paramilitary attacks from both factions of the IRA. Father Edward Daly, a Catholic 
priest in Derry, recalled that many Catholic youths grew increasingly militant as a result of 
Bloody Sunday.774 To Sean Collins, a 10-year-old boy who witnessed the events, “Bloody 
Sunday changed a lot of things for me. Up to that day I always believed that the British Army 
were the good guys. All my innocence in that regard was lost. I had no illusions about what 
the Brits were like and I had no sympathy when I heard subsequently about British soldiers 
being shot.”775 Another witness, Pauline Ferry, described her recollection of the events as 
“just the shock of it all—the shock that live gunfire was used at such a big crowd.”776 Shock 
and alienation could also describe the reactions of many in the Republic. Jack Lynch, 
Taoiseach of the Republic of Ireland, declared a national day of mourning.777 On February 2, 
nearly 20,000 people gathered around the British Embassy in Dublin. Some within the crowd 
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petrol bombed the embassy.778 In addition, both the Provisional and Official IRA launched 
offensives against British forces. An Official IRA attack on The Parachute Regiment’s 
headquarters in Aldershot killed 7 people.779 Meanwhile, the Provisionals planted a car bomb 
on Donegall Street, in Belfast’s city center, that killed six and wounded 150.780  
In March 1972, Heath imposed Direct Rule on Northern Ireland because Stormont 
leaders proved unwilling to make the reforms necessary to stop the fighting. In the aftermath 
of Bloody Sunday, Stormont Prime Minister Brian Faulkner told Heath that internment 
should continue as a means of promoting security. Faulkner also opposed political moves 
such as guaranteeing Catholic inclusion in government and did not want to pursue the option 
of a coalition unionist-nationalist government. When the SDLP refused to participate in any 
cross-party conference toward a political agreement, Heath lost confidence in the Stormont 
system. Stormont now lacked legitimacy not only in the eyes of the Catholic minority, but 
also from the perspective of the British Cabinet.781 On March 22, the Cabinet voted to 
suspend Stormont’s authority and placed a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in charge. 
Heath appointed William Whitelaw as the first Northern Ireland Secretary. Whitelaw had a 
seat in the UK cabinet and ruled through the Northern Ireland Office.782 
Violent clashes throughout the months following Bloody Sunday, which culminated 
in the Provisional IRA’s July 21 “Bloody Friday” bombings in central Belfast, elicited a 
large-scale military response from the British Army. The following day, 2,000 soldiers raided 
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Catholic neighborhoods throughout Belfast. Two days after the bombing, General Sir 
Michael Carver, Chief of the General Staff, decided that the Bloody Friday attacks amounted 
to a significant escalation. He decided to mount Operation Motorman—the reopening of “no-
go” areas in nationalist neighborhoods. Motorman was the largest military operation since the 
1956 Suez Canal intervention. It involved 22,000 regular army troops and 5,300 from the 
UDR.783 The goal was to tear down barricades erected in Catholic “no-go” areas as well as 
Protestant neighborhoods, opening those areas to increased army patrolling and government 
control. Paramilitary resistance from both nationalist and unionist groups was minimal, 
although British troops had anticipated fierce firefights. Within days, Motorman had 
succeeded in its objective of reestablishing control over the “no-go” areas.784 
  Security operations throughout 1971-72 severely strained both factions of the IRA. 
Internment without trial provided British forces with the ability to arrest anyone they 
suspected of paramilitary sympathies. As in Cyprus and Aden, brutal interrogation methods 
in Northern Ireland generated a windfall of intelligence that security forces used against 
republican paramilitaries to good effect during Operation Motorman. Driven out of no-go 
areas in the cities, the IRA increased operations along the border with the Republic of 
Ireland.785 But these British military gains came with significant political costs. Internment 
without trial, interrogation in depth, and the break-up of “no-go” areas during Operation 
Motorman contributed to the near-total alienation of nationalists and unleashed an 
unrelenting flood of public scrutiny—scrutiny which would grow throughout the 1970s.786 
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Debating the Troubles 
Public debate over military methods in Northern Ireland endured because the war’s 
context differed from colonial conflicts such as Cyprus and Aden in four key ways. The first 
was constitutional. Northern Ireland’s status as part of the United Kingdom meant that 
residents had political representation at Westminster. Unlike Cyprus, Aden, or other colonies, 
Northern Ireland was a political constituency with a direct influence on British electoral 
politics. This distinction bore significant consequences for public debate over the conflict 
because both Northern Irish nationalists and unionists could wield influence in Parliament in 
a way that Greek Cypriots or Arabs in Aden never could—they could get elected. 
Northern Irish nationalist members of the House of Commons used Westminster as a 
forum for promoting political reforms in Northern Ireland. Gerry Fitt, the MP representing 
West Belfast, attended an October 5, 1968 civil rights rally in Derry and was famously beaten 
by the RUC in front of several television cameras. Images of blood streaming down his head 
were broadcast across Britain and Ireland.787 Bernadette Devlin, Catholic civil rights activist 
and leading member of the radical student group People’s Democracy, routinely and 
energetically attacked British security policy in Northern Ireland. Elected to the House of 
Commons in a 1969 Westminster by-election, at age 21 Devlin was the youngest woman ever 
elected to Parliament. Devlin attracted significant media attention when she used her maiden 
speech to attack the Stormont regime. In doing so, she defied the tradition of MPs delivering 
uncontroversial maiden speeches.788 The pressing need for political reform highlighted by 
Opposition MPs contributed to the government’s 1973 white paper initiative entitled 
Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. The white paper advocated a system of 
                                                            
787 Coogan, The Troubles, 73. 
 
788 Hansard, HC Deb April 22, 1969 vol 782 cc281-288. 
 
294 
 
proportional representation, devolved government, and formal relationships between 
Northern Ireland and the south. This path toward reform eventually came to fruition during 
the 1973 Sunningdale conference, although the resulting power-sharing executive collapsed 
due to unionist resistance.789  
Unionists also exerted influence at Westminster. Most MPs from Northern Irish 
constituencies came from the majority unionist community. After the February 1974 election, 
for instance, unionists won 11 of Northern Ireland’s 12 Westminster seats. Unionists, too, 
used Westminster as a platform to pursue their agendas. Ulster Unionist Party MPs often 
aligned with the Conservative Party in Westminster politics. MPs such as Robin Chichester-
Clark played an important role in facilitating cooperation between Westminster unionists and 
Britain-based Tories. This close relationship was strained in Mach 1972, when the 
Conservative government imposed Direct Rule. But unionist MPs kept close relations with 
hardline Tories such as Julian Amery and sympathetic backbenchers. Unionists at 
Westminster were therefore able to maintain pressure on the Heath government throughout 
the early 1970s. Some unionist political figures, such as the firebrand Reverend Ian Paisley, 
were more willing to accept Direct Rule.790 Perhaps best known for militant, anti-Catholic 
sermons, Paisley used his seat to campaign against the Sunningdale power-sharing agreement 
as an unwanted step toward a united Ireland and objected to UK membership in the European 
Economic Community. He advocated for a strong security apparatus in Northern Ireland and 
a return to devolved government by majority rule. Dissention within unionist ranks over the 
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future of political devolution meant that Ulster unionists’ influence at Westminster declined 
during the 1970s.791 
A second difference between colonial contexts and the war in Northern Ireland was 
that the beginning of the Troubles coincided with international transformations in the field of 
civil society and human rights. Populist and radical politics were at the forefront of the waves 
of global protests in 1968.792 Human rights concepts also experienced a resurgence which 
began in the late 1960s and accelerated throughout the 1970s. Historian Samuel Moyn 
described this process in Eastern Europe as a “moralization of dissent.”793 In Western Europe 
and the United States, left-wing activists and political parties embraced the moral language of 
human rights and used it to serve domestic or foreign policy purposes. Human rights issues 
achieved a particularly high profile in the United States during the second half of the 1970s 
under President Jimmy Carter.794 For British politicians, the question over whether the UK 
should incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights emerged as a political issue 
after the UK’s accession to the European Communities in 1973.795 Human rights law also 
gained prominence in British and European politics. The European Commission on Human 
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights had delivered few jurisprudential decisions 
during the 1950s and 1960s. These decisions, however, established important precedents for 
European human rights law and outlined the scope and responsibilities of the European 
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Commission and European Court of Human Rights. By the 1970s, these institutions were 
established and began to expand their purview.796 This global revival and re-appropriation of 
human rights ideas had a profound, transformative effect on international politics and 
inspired greater support for ideas of justice and universal individual rights.. 
The war in Northern Ireland proved to be one of the British government’s most 
pressing human rights concerns, but British politicians often found themselves on the 
receiving end of rights criticisms. During and after the internment and interrogation 
controversies of 1971-72, activists in Northern Ireland continued to denounce British security 
measures through pamphlets and reports documenting perceived abuses. NICRA complained 
about the army’s persistent patrolling, claiming that “massive British Army presence in anti 
unionist areas is a harassment in itself” because “constant foot patrols and speeding army 
vehicles” conveyed the impression that soldiers behaved “like an army of occupation.” The 
army was “not accepted as a peacekeeping force, and in the people’s eyes they have taken the 
place of the hated Royal Ulster Constabulary.”797 One report recorded the events of a series 
of army searches from January 12 to 14, 1972 in the New Lodge Road community. 
According to NICRA, “everyone, men, women and children were searched without 
exception, many so frequently over the three days that they had forgotten how often houses 
were searched.” Search operations enraged the New Lodge Road residents because “men 
were arrested in an area where almost every young male has at one time been arrested and 
interrogated by the Army or Police. Some of these men were subject to the most cruel 
torture.” The document included a statement from Gerrard McAttamney, who complained 
that he had been beaten by being “made to run a gauntlet of soldiers who pushed and hit as I 
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ran.” He was later handed over from army to RUC custody, where constables asked him 
whether he had any complaints against the army for his treatment. “I was so terrified,” 
McAttamney said, “I said no and signed a document saying so.”798 
Other NGOs also contributed to the chorus of critics attacking British security 
practices. The Association for Legal Justice joined with NICRA to submit a report entitled 
British Government Violations of Human Rights in N. Ireland. The report was intended to 
present evidence indicating that British forces had committed a “consistent pattern of gross 
and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” The authors 
argued that internment without trial violated right to liberty and security of the person, 
unlawful killings routinely occurred in Catholic working class neighborhoods, and prisoners 
were subjected to physical and psychological brutality during interrogation. The Association 
for Legal Justice insisted that the British government was applying a “military solution to a 
political problem” through persistent intimidation of the local population, the use of 
excessive force, discriminatory treatment of Catholics, and the absence of effective domestic 
legal remedies.799 Judicial proceedings mattered little, as security forces would often re-arrest 
individuals outside the courtroom after they had been acquitted. Under internment without 
trial, those arrested could be held indefinitely.800 
In October 1973, Amnesty International’s Irish Section organized a conference on the 
abolition of torture. One speaker at the conference, Professor D. Russell Davis of the 
Department of Mental Health, Bristol University School of Medicine, criticized the Joint 
Directive on Military Interrogation. The Irish Times reported Davis as saying that “the 
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official comments were confused, even if not contradictory.” Davis described how the Joint 
Directive stated that “successful interrogation . . . calls for a psychological attack” yet 
simultaneously prohibited “outrage upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and 
degrading treatment.” Such statements, Davis said, reflected “serious naivety and obtuseness 
in psychological matters on the part of the authors of the joint directive.” More troubling, he 
noted, was that none of the Joint Directive’s guidelines specified precise limits on the 
methods available to interrogators. The permissibility and appropriateness of one procedure 
or another would, by this standard, come down to a matter of opinion. Other critics of 
interrogation methods in Northern Ireland used the conference to voice their arguments 
against brutality and torture. Catholic priests Denis Faul and Brian Brady argued that the 
Compton report was particularly flawed because it did not include testimony from detainees 
subjected to the five techniques—although those detainees had refused to cooperate with 
Compton.801 
Amnesty’s interest in torture allegations from Northern Ireland formed part of a broad 
initiative. On December 3, 1973, Amnesty published a 224-page Report on Torture 
addressing torture as a government-sponsored phenomenon around the world. The document 
was part of Amnesty’s global Campaign for the Abolition of Torture and preceded the 
organization’s international Conference for the Abolition of Torture, held in Paris in 
December 1973. The Report on Torture exposed a lack of legal remedies for torture victims 
in several countries including Northern Ireland. Examining allegations made against over 60 
countries, the Report amounted to a “world survey of torture” and an indictment of 
communist regimes, right-wing dictatorships, and democratic states alike.802 In February 
1974, building on its anti-torture campaign, Amnesty announced its intention to adopt several 
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prisoners held in Northern Ireland. Amnesty asked for the Association for legal Justice and 
NICRA to submit a list of names for potential sponsorees. The Guardian reported that 
Amnesty would continue to support adopted prisoners until “the weight of public opinion 
forces the British Government to free the prisoner.”803 
In Britain, activist groups critical of government policies included the left-wing 
Troops Out Movement (TOM) and the British Society for Social Responsibility in Science 
(BSSRS). TOM campaigned for a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and self-
determination for Ireland as a whole. TOM was formed in September 1973 by left-wing 
student activists, trades unionists, and Irish expatriates living in Britain. British military 
intelligence believed that the organization had close ties with various Marxist groups such as 
the International Marxist Group and Socialist Workers’ Party.804 The group’s first major 
event was a public meeting in Fulham Town Hall, after which the movement spread 
throughout England, Scotland, and Wales over the next several years.805 BSSRS was an 
organization of left-wing scientists, scholars, and engineers. Active in causes such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and maintaining close links with TOM’s leadership, 
BSSRS published a 1974 report which criticized the Compton report as “a blatant cover up” 
and described the psychological aspects of interrogation. According to BSSRS, the security 
forces’ interrogation methods led to “long-lasting traumatic neuroses comparable with shell-
shock caused by over-long intense combat in war-time.” Moreover, BSSRS claimed, “the 
Army must have known that this was the likely effect of their methods—certainly this was 
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predicted by a number of non-Army psychologists and psychiatrists as soon as the 
interrogation methods became public knowledge.806 
Although NGOs actively promoted human rights in Northern Ireland, prominent 
government figures supported human rights through legal reform. Labour peer Lord 
Brockway developed close relationships with Northern Irish civic organizations such as 
NICRA and the Campaign for Social Justice.807 In 1971, Brockway chastised the government 
for adopting internment, demanded public trials for the internees, and called for “a 
constructive political plan for civil rights, no religious discrimination, proportional 
representation, and an urgent economic plan to end the appalling unemployment and housing 
difficulties.”808 Throughout the Northern Ireland conflict Brockway advocated the creation of 
a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland to end discrimination. His Bill of Rights received 
support from the National Council for Civil Liberties and NICRA, among others.809 Another 
advocate of law reform and author of the Parker inquiry’s minority report, Lord Gardiner, 
chaired the 1975 Gardiner Committee, which found that detention without trial was necessary 
for reducing violence but deemed the way these procedures operated in practice as “totally 
alien to ordinary trial procedures.” Gardiner believed that too much evidence depended on 
hearsay, in camera sessions, and the use of screens and voice scramblers to cloak witnesses’ 
identities. This system, according to Gardiner, had tarnished the judicial process in Northern 
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Ireland and needed to be replaced. His findings led to the government’s decision to eliminate 
internment.810 
Unlike the Cyprus and Aden conflicts, human rights activism resulted in the 
establishment of government institutions designed to promote human rights. Created under 
the Sunningdale Agreement, Northern Ireland’s Standing Advisory Commission on Human 
Rights (SACHR) was the first government-appointed human rights body established in the 
United Kingdom. It survived the collapse of the Sunningdale power-sharing executive and 
released its first annual report in 1975. Although nationalist activist groups such as NICRA 
initially responded skeptically to the creation of SACHR and many right-wing politicians 
reacted with outright hostility, rights activists’ opinions shifted as SACHR adopted political 
positions in line with their aspirations.811 SACHR’s 1977 annual report insisted that 
legislation was the best way to protect rights in Northern Ireland. Entitled, “The Protection of 
Human Rights by Law in Northern Ireland,” the report suggested that the European 
Convention on Human Rights could form the basis of a domestic Bill of Rights. Advocacy 
for a Bill of Rights remained a core element of SACHR’s platform for the next two decades. 
The European Convention later formed the basis for the 2000 UK Human Rights Act.812 
Internationally, British policymakers faced pressure from Irish-Americans in the 
United States. The Northern Ireland conflict generated significant sympathy among working 
class Irish-Americans, many of whom were first- or second-generation immigrants. Support 
for republican groups took the form of monetary donations which sometimes funded 
paramilitary activities, particularly through the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID). 
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But Irish-American interest in the conflict also resulted in the 1974 establishment of the Irish 
National Caucus by Catholic priest Father Sean MacManus. MacManus was born in Northern 
Ireland and left the island in 1972 before settling in Washington, D.C., where he began his 
career as a lobbyist. Irish-American lobbyists became increasingly active during the late 
1970s and early 1980s on issues of justice and human rights. They gained influence in both 
houses of Congress through the advocacy of Congressman Tip O’Neill and Senator Ted 
Kennedy. In 1977, joined by Senator Daniel Moynihan and New York Governor Hugh Carey, 
these politicians issued a “Saint Patrick’s Day declaration” which denounced violence in 
Northern Ireland and called for a new political initiative to bring peace. Many Irish-American 
groups lobbied for the release of the Birmingham Six—Irishmen arrested, falsely accused, 
and convicted of having committed the 1974 Birmingham pub bombings. Sixteen years after 
their conviction, the Birmingham Six were released after human rights lawyers discovered 
that police had fabricated evidence.813 
Allegations of British human rights violations routinely surfaced at the United 
Nations and the increasingly active European Commission for Human Rights. UN Economic 
and Social Council Resolution 1503 of 1970 authorized the Sub-Commission on Prevention 
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to appoint a working group on issues which 
“appear to reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human 
rights.” As the Northern Ireland conflict escalated through the early 1970s, human rights 
petitions began to arrive. In July 1973, NICRA and the Association for Legal Justice 
submitted information concerning security force violations of civil and political rights. These 
two documents went before the working group in September 1973, creating a potentially 
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embarrassing situation for the British government. Diplomats at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO) noted that “these two communications, and the way in which 
the UN deals with them, are of very considerable importance to HMG.” For Britain, the Sub-
Commission’s reaction to the NICRA submission was of primary importance because it was 
“a potentially more embarrassing document” than the Amnesty report.814 
At the UN, British policy attempted to reconcile the competing interests of promoting 
human rights internationally while simultaneously mitigating criticism of domestic British 
actions in Northern Ireland. Officials at the FCO believed that British policy should promote 
Cold War aims by encouraging UN human rights bodies to more effectively investigate 
human rights violations in communist countries. According to the FCO, “such procedures are 
valuable in helping to ensure respect for the norms laid down in conventions and declarations 
in the human rights field.” By strengthening UN human rights machinery over the long-term, 
Britain could strike a blow at communist states. But Britain’s short-term objective “to secure 
a satisfactory outcome” on discussions of human rights violations in Northern Ireland 
encouraged a different response. The FCO report concluded that “HMG is already under very 
considerable pressure at the European Commission on Human Rights as a result of the Irish 
State Case and many individual petitions, and adverse decisions in these cases would be to 
the detriment of HMG’s overall policies in Northern Ireland.” In this context, “discussion of 
human rights in Northern Ireland, particularly on ‘torture’, at the UN can only act as 
encouragement to those elements opposed to peaceful change in Northern Ireland to attempt 
to embarrass HMG further through international institutions.” FCO officials concluded that 
on human rights issues in Northern Ireland, “the short-term objective must outweigh the 
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longer term considerations.” British officials should therefore do their utmost to ensure that 
discussions of Northern Ireland at the UN were kept to “a bare minimum.”815 
The British government proved highly uncooperative when called before the 
European Commission for Human Rights. When the Irish government’s 1971 application 
concerning the five techniques came before the European Commission, Britain refused to 
identify the locations where the techniques were used—the Commission and the public 
believed that Palace Barracks was the site of interrogation, but it was actually Ballykelly 
airfield. As the inquiry continued into 1974, Britain prohibited the Commission from 
interviewing army and police witnesses in Strasbourg, citing security reasons. Instead, 
Commission representatives had to interview British witnesses at a secure airfield in Norway. 
British witnesses testified from behind a screen, where only the Commission delegates and 
lawyers could see them. To complicate matters further, the British government introduced its 
witnesses using alphanumeric ciphers rather than names. None of the witnesses admitted that 
any wrongdoing had occurred.816 Furthermore, the government instructed witnesses not to 
answer questions about methods of interrogation despite the fact that detailed accounts of the 
five techniques had been published in many newspapers and books.817 As legal scholar Brian 
Simpson concluded, “plainly, there was something deeply embarrassing to conceal.”818 
Concealing embarrassing details, however, was more difficult given the media context in 
which the war was fought. 
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A third difference between Northern Ireland and colonial wars was that media 
coverage of the Troubles in the UK and abroad was more pervasive—and critical—than 
previous colonial conflicts because of the widespread availability of television, radio, and 
newspapers. According to Lord Carrington, Heath’s Defence Secretary, “every action was 
carried out in the glare of television publicity.”819 In addition to regular news broadcasts, 
between August 1969 and December 1972 British television shows such as Granada’s World 
in Action, Thames’ This Week, as well as BBC1’s Panorama, Talkback, and 24 Hours 
broadcast over 30 programs on specific aspects of the Troubles. Programs explored the civil 
rights struggle, investigated the army’s role in the conflict, profiled key public figures such as 
loyalist Reverend Ian Paisley and nationalist MP Bernadette Devlin, described the various 
social tensions and political factions in the north, and analyzed the radicalization of politics. 
London Weekend Television aired several episodes of The Frost Programme in which host 
David Frost—best known for his high-profile interviews of U.S. President Richard Nixon and 
Rhodesian leader Ian Smith—discussed significant events such as the imposition of Direct 
Rule with Catholic and Protestant audiences in Belfast. Many British journalists, such as 
David Beresford and Peter Taylor, were unafraid of critiquing paramilitaries and politicians 
of all parties to the conflict. The BBC also developed an often contentious relationship with 
government officials who sought to shape the war’s public narrative.820  
Violence in Northern Ireland also spurred greater interest in the origins of the conflict. 
From October to December 1972, BBC2 aired a ten-part series on Irish history. Other 
programs examined the partition of Ireland in comparison with partitions elsewhere in the 
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world.821 In Ireland, national broadcaster RTE aired news, documentaries, and investigative 
reports on the conflict. BBC and RTE also operated nationwide radio programs. In addition to 
television and radio, Northern Ireland could boast 30 newspapers, two of which had 
province-wide circulation. Every major political party also had a newspaper or newsletter of 
some kind, such as Sinn Fein’s An Phoblacht. The Republic of Ireland had six national 
newspapers and over 20 regional newspapers, all of which placed a strong emphasis on 
reporting Northern Irish affairs during the conflict. In the UK, national newspapers and 
tabloids regularly carried stories on Northern Ireland.822 According to one scholar of the 
conflict, such intense media attention meant that the “Northern Ireland conflict received more 
domestic and international press coverage than any of the emergencies in remote parts of the 
world.”823 
Northern Irish representation in Westminster, the emergence of a broad global human 
rights consciousness, and media saturation meant that controversial counterinsurgency 
policies and practices remained susceptible to criticism. A fourth difference between the 
Cyprus and Aden campaigns and the war in Northern Ireland ensured that proponents of 
tough security measures also found a receptive audience: Unlike armed groups in all previous 
post-1945 counterinsurgencies, Northern Irish paramilitaries attacked the British homeland. 
These attacks began with the October 1971 IRA bombing of the London Post Office Tower. 
The most notorious of these attacks, such as the 1975 Birmingham pub bombing and the 1986 
attack on the Conservative Party conference at the Brighton Grand Hotel, were committed by 
republican paramilitaries, but unionists also contributed to the violence. Loyalist 
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paramilitaries bombed pubs in predominantly Irish neighborhoods, such as the December 
1975 pub bombing in Kilburn, London, and the 1979 bombing of an Irish pub in Glasgow.  
Irish paramilitary violence in Britain often inspired politicians who sought to 
implement harsh security policies. The 1973 Diplock Commission resulted in new legislation 
establishing “scheduled offences” in which suspects could be tried without juries. The idea 
was to prevent paramilitary groups from intimidating jurors, but juryless trials also deviated 
from UK legal norms.824 In the wake of PIRA’s November 1974 Birmingham pub bombings 
which killed 21 and injured 184, many within the British public worried about future violence 
or screamed for vengeance. The Times called the bombings an “Act of War.” In this climate 
of fear and anger, then-Secretary of State Roy Jenkins introduced legislation for a Prevention 
of Terrorism Act which would grant security officials broad authorities to counter republican 
paramilitary activities in the UK.825 One MP justified the legislation on the grounds that “the 
nation as a whole is facing the gravest threat that it has faced since the end of the Second 
World War.”826  
In addition to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, some politicians and members of the 
public clamored for the reintroduction of capital punishment for terrorist offences. The death 
penalty was suspended in Britain in 1965 and eliminated for Northern Ireland in 1973. But in 
June and July 1974, bombings at the Houses of Parliament and Tower of London led to an 
impassioned debate in the Commons. Conservative MP Michael Ancram said that although 
he had supported abolishing the death penalty, “I have since been convinced . . . that while 
abolition was right for the crime dealt with then, we are now faced with a totally different sort 
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of situation.” Terrorism, Ancram continued, “is not a crime just against the person but a 
crime against humanity.” Fellow Tory Sir Patrick Cormack argued that recent events have 
made many Britons wonder “whether the time has come for a change.” The Attorney General 
for Northern Ireland, Peter Rawlinson, also supported reintroducing the death penalty. In 
contrast, Liberal MP Christopher Mayhew insisted that “there is no evidence that the 
execution of terrorists lessens terrorism or prevents it growing. On the contrary, we have 
many examples in history of precisely the opposite.” Mayhew cited the executions of Irish 
nationalist James Connolly after the 1916 Easter Rising and American abolitionist John 
Brown on the eve of the American Civil War as evidence that capital punishment could 
create martyrs and “did nothing to stop the killing.”827 
The 1974 Birmingham pub bombings sparked further debate. On November 21, the 
day of the bombings, Conservative MPs Jill Knight and Hal Miller pressed their party to 
again consider introducing capital punishment. To another Tory, William Rees-Davis, 
“whatever view one takes of a death penalty, those who are enemies of the realm deserve to 
be dealt with swiftly and executed.”828 In December, both Houses of Parliament debated the 
death penalty. The Conservative Lord Bourne announced that “I have always backed the 
death penalty for war against the State” and categorized the IRA’s activities as exactly that.829 
The government held firm and did not reinstate capital punishment during the 1974 death 
penalty debate. But the fact that the debate occurred at all revealed that republican terrorism 
at home had convinced some within British society to consider extraordinary measures. 
Debates over counterinsurgency methods in Northern Ireland were therefore not a 
straightforward assertion of emerging human rights norms as a means of restraining the 
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conduct of the war, but a give-and-take over the extent to which the protection of human 
rights and the imperative of preserving the state’s ability to maintain order overlapped or 
conflicted. Many within government sought to strike a balance between ensuring security and 
preserving human rights. Lawmakers gave wide-ranging powers to security forces through 
measures such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Even staunch opponents of brutality, such 
as Lord Gardiner, believed that detention without trial, which contradicted the basic goals of 
the judicial system, was a necessary practice for limiting violence. It was the military, 
however, that lay at the heart of this struggle to balance security with rights. 
Responding to Scrutiny 
The army’s response to the specific circumstances of the Troubles combined an 
aversion to scrutiny with a desire to adopt rights-sensitive methods as a means of mitigating 
further criticism and gaining operational advantages. Army leaders responded to public 
criticism in much the same way as they had reacted to scrutiny during the Cyprus and Aden 
conflicts: Officials often portrayed those making accusations as republican propagandists and 
denied legal liability. But military commanders also recognized many of the differences 
between Northern Ireland and past colonial wars. Northern Ireland’s constitutional status as a 
formal part of the United Kingdom and the rising global human rights consciousness of the 
late 1960s and 1970s meant that legal issues and rights considerations played a larger part in 
shaping operations in Northern Ireland than Cyprus or Aden. Pervasive media coverage and 
paramilitary groups’ capabilities for launching attacks beyond Northern Ireland ensured that 
the war was fought in front of a broad international and domestic audience. These 
circumstances contributed to the assignment of Civil Representatives to each brigade, tactical 
changes, and public relations training programs.  
Many complaints of harassment or brutality were false or sensationalized, but 
regardless of truth, members of the security forces often perceived allegations against them as 
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part of a propaganda campaign designed to undermine nationalist support for the government. 
In 1972, GOC NI Lieutenant General Sir Harry Tuzo described complaints against the British 
Army as “smoke without fire.”830 A later GOC NI, Lieutenant General Frank King, described 
allegations of army repression as “stories spread by propagandists.” From the army’s 
perspective, military success seemed to breed complaints against army conduct. For example, 
when deployed to the Ardoyne neighborhood of Belfast in 1973, 3rd Battalion, The Parachute 
Regiment adopted an aggressive approach to security. The Paras increased patrols and 
searches, which generated a greater number of arrests. Residents made frequent complaints of 
harassment and brutality at the hands of the soldiers, but none of the allegations were proven. 
Meanwhile, the Paras’ efforts resulted in a significant decline in shooting incidents and 
bombings. The Grenadier Guards encountered a similar pattern during their tour of duty in 
1974—propaganda appeared to increase as stone-throwing and shootings declined.831 In the 
aftermath of Bloody Sunday, Colonel Maurice Tugwell, the head of public relations in 
Northern Ireland, denigrated journalists who condemned the army’s response to the protest. 
Tugwell told the BBC that “it is absolute rubbish for anybody to suggest that there were no 
gunmen or that the gunmen had not fired first.”832 Tugwell later described the Sunday Times’ 
critical reports on army conduct as “building castles on sand.”833 
As in the Cyprus and Aden campaigns, officials often shielded soldiers from 
accountability before the law. When faced with criminal or civil claims filed against security 
forces, RUC investigators limited the number of cases that went to court. Few of these cases 
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resulted in convictions. From March 1972-September 1974, the RUC initiated 502 
investigations into criminal allegations against the army and UDR. Prosecution occurred in 
56 cases, but only 17 resulted in convictions.834 Sometimes claims would not even reach the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, who was responsible for prosecuting soldiers and police 
charged with breaking the law. Police officers conducting criminal investigations into fellow 
members of the security forces did not forward the results of all investigations to the DPP. 
The DPP quickly notified the Chief of the General Staff that investigators had been “using 
their own discretion . . . very liberally.” Most allegations concerned assault charges. In cases 
where soldiers were found guilty, the courts usually imposed fines and suspended sentences 
rather than prison time. Soldiers convicted for common assault usually paid fines in the range 
of £25-100.835  
Judges’ decisions could also protect security forces by establishing lenient legal 
precedents. Regarding murder and manslaughter charges, the House of Lords’ verdict in the 
1976 McElhone case legitimized the “shot trying to escape” defense. To Northern Irish 
human rights lawyers, this case established a precedent that permitted soldiers and police to 
use lethal force with little fear of judicial consequences. A soldier shot and killed a man who 
ran away from the soldier’s patrol as the patrol approached. The soldier believed that he 
could either allow the man to escape, or he could shoot the man to prevent his escape. The 
soldier decided to open fire and killed the man. At trial, the court found that the soldier had 
acted with “reasonable” force. After referral to the Court of Criminal Appeals, the case came 
before the House of Lords. Law Lords agreed that the use of force was reasonable, and 
clarified the point of law that “if a plea of self-defence is put forward in answer to a charge of 
murder and fails because excessive force was used though some force was justifiable, as the 
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law now stands the accused cannot be convicted of manslaughter.”836 Prominent Northern 
Irish defense attorney Tony Jennings wrote that the decision gave security forces “a licence to 
kill.”837 Northern Irish lawyer Brice Dickson assessed that this decision allowed security 
forces “to operate with virtual impunity when applying lethal force against suspected 
terrorists.” The high standard necessary to obtain a murder conviction and the lack of any 
intermediate punishments for crimes such as manslaughter meant that few soldiers and police 
officers were convicted of the excessive use of lethal force.838  
In civil cases, Ministry of Defence lawyers refused to admit that the government bore 
legal liability for injuries or deaths caused by the security forces. MOD attorneys contested 
cases that they were likely to win while settling out of court in cases the government would 
most likely lose. Between 1971 and 1974, aggrieved civilians filed an average of between 
108 and-155 claims per month against the army. By January 1975, MOD had faced 6,000 
claims, settling 410 out of court. Family members of those killed on Bloody Sunday 
submitted a total of 13 civil complaints. The Attorney General assessed that of those 13 cases 
the government had “no prospect” of successfully defending four of them, were unlikely to 
succeed in defending three more, and had a “reasonable chance” of winning four. The 
Attorney General and Secretary of State for Northern Ireland concurred that the best course 
of action was “to pay sums of money into Court, without admission of legal liability, in 
respect of the first seven cases, and to fight the remainder.”839 Out-of-court settlements 
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minimized publicity by avoiding press coverage of drawn-out legal proceedings. The 
disadvantage of settlements, however, was that such payments implied that British forces 
were guilty of violations even though in point of law the government did not admit legal 
liability.840  
The frequency with which soldiers had to appear in court led to several changes in 
tactics and training programs. One initiative sought to improve troops’ courtroom 
performances. The army recognized that when testifying in court, “some soldiers, particularly 
amongst the junior ranks, give a poor impression” which “is attributed to lack of confidence 
and clarity of speech.” As a result, HQ Northern Ireland requested that soldiers undergo a 
short course in “oral development” before appearing in court. The army’s Director of 
Personal Services asked the UK Land Forces and British Army of the Rhine headquarters to 
arrange such courses, but with the caveat that “there should be no discussion of the evidence 
relating to the particular case” although “general instruction on court procedure could be 
worthwhile.”841 In September 1972, the army launched a two-day pilot course in “oral 
development for potential military witnesses at civil courts in Northern Ireland” designed to 
“to improve the confidence and clarity of speech” for soldiers “called upon to give evidence 
in civil courts.” The course involved situational exercises in which soldiers practiced giving 
testimony and responding to cross-examination. Instructors videotaped these sessions to play 
before the class so that they could discuss individual performances. In addition, students 
heard lectures on “the technique of speaking up in court” and “hints on observation.” 
Instructors noted happily that “there was a visible and marked improvement by all the 
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students” and “the course was also regarded as being particularly effective by the students 
themselves.”842  
Problems with the military’s public image were not limited to junior soldiers in the 
courtroom, as staff officers at HQ Northern Ireland realized that many officers also lacked 
public relations skills. During the early 1970s, officers posted to HQ Northern Ireland did not 
receive the same public relations-oriented training as line battalions deploying for four-month 
rotational tours. The headquarters therefore lacked officers capable of serving as spokesmen. 
In September 1973, HQ Northern Ireland identified a need for 20 officers to complete “TV 
training.” The RUC similarly lacked trained spokespersons and requested to send 20 officers 
of their own to army short courses.843 By 1975, mandatory pre-deployment training for unit 
commanders at company and battalion level included “TV interview technique” courses, 
while all unit press officers and those serving as second-in-command at company level and 
above received public relations training.844 
The army developed new measures designed to minimize lawsuits over property 
damage resulting from house searches. Hundreds of house searches were conducted on a 
weekly basis. The numbers varied during the first half of the 1970s, but in 1974 the number 
of house searches conducted by the army in Northern Ireland averaged 600-800 per week.845 
The average in Belfast alone surpassed 500 searches per week. British forces realized that 
slow, overly-bureaucratic processes for compensating individuals who suffered property 
damage during the course of security operations engendered resentment from civilians. The 
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army wanted to deploy “repair squads” to quickly fix any damage caused by army searches 
and empower local units to authorize small-claim settlement payments of up to £25.846 To 
liaise with local communities and coordinate quick compensation schemes, Northern Ireland 
civil servants were seconded to the army. The first of these “Civil Representatives” was 
appointed in summer 1971.  By 1973, every brigade in the province had a principal adviser 
and several deputies.847 Through the Civil Representative program, by January 1976 civilians’ 
wait time for receipt of settlement payments dropped from an average of 10-13 days to 5 
days.848 Military tactics also changed. Some units, such as the oft-criticized Paras, began 
filming searches with video cameras. Video footage could be used as evidence in court to 
counter false or exaggerated allegations. But the technique of filming house searches was also 
likely to prevent soldiers from smashing furniture or harassing locals because soldiers knew 
that their actions were on film, too.849 
Despite these adaptations, some senior leaders resisted what they saw as legal 
intrusions into military operations by advocating practices that had been used during colonial 
campaigns but had not been employed in Northern Ireland. In 1974, GOC NI Lieutenant 
General Frank King described to the Attorney General how many commanders objected to 
what they saw as legal impediments to military operations. King complained that “the 
domino effect of one prosecution following on after another in close succession, all given full 
press coverage, with perhaps several soldiers receiving jail sentences, I believe would be little 
short of disastrous” for soldiers’ morale. King suggested three solutions which reflected his 
desire to wage the Northern Ireland war in a manner more consistent with past campaigns. 
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First, he advocated placing soldiers under military jurisdiction “in cases arising out of strictly 
operational assignments.” He noted that “in the context of operations overseas, this has long 
been accepted.” King’s second solution was to reconsider the criteria for determining whether 
to prosecute a soldier. He wished to terminate cases arising out of operational situations prior 
to court proceedings “except where there is the clearest indication of gross misbehavior.” 
King’s third and final point was to reconsider the principle of law that allows a person to use 
force in self-defense. Legally, soldiers who used force did so under the same restrictions as a 
private citizen using force for self-defense.850 To King, this approach was flawed because “it 
implies an unwillingness to act aggressively” and “implies conceding much of the initiative 
to the other side.” Failure to seize the initiative was “anathema to basic military tactics and 
operational planning.” Soldiers, he believed, should be asked to take the fight to the enemy—
a task which required fewer legal restraints.851  
According to King, military influence over legal proceedings provided the only 
certain solution for maintaining morale and seizing the initiative. He continued to advocate 
legal leniency during his tenure as GOC. In November 1974, he asked the Attorney General 
to reduce the charge against one soldier from murder to manslaughter because he believed 
that a murder charge would have greater adverse effects on morale. The Attorney General 
refused, but the soldier was acquitted at trial. King also objected to payments of civil 
compensation claims. He insisted that out-of-court settlements demoralized soldiers because 
such payments rewarded individuals involved in terrorism.852 But King’s views contrasted 
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with those of the new Labour government which came to power after the 1974 general 
election. 
The new government asked Lord Gardiner to lead a study of how to wage the 
Northern Ireland conflict with respect for civil liberties and human rights. The Gardiner 
Committee’s subsequent report continued the argument Gardiner put forth in the Parker 
minority report. He called for reinstating trial by jury, criticized the prison system’s 
“appalling” conditions, and asserted that “detention cannot remain as a long-term policy.” 
Gardiner also noted that “the prolonged effects of the use of detention are ultimately inimical 
to community life, fan a widespread sense of grievance and injustice, and obstruct those 
elements in Northern Ireland society which could lead to reconciliation.” Yet Gardiner 
concluded that the degree of violence in the province meant that he could not recommend the 
immediate elimination of detention without trial. Gardiner held human rights in high esteem, 
but he was not blind to the grave threat that Northern Irish paramilitaries posed. After the 
Gardiner Committee report, the Labour government developed a new strategy for Northern 
Ireland.853 
Convinced of the need to abandon many of the counterinsurgency methods employed 
since 1969, incoming Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees adopted a strategy 
of “Ulsterization.” Based on the 1976 report of a Home Office working group, Rees 
abandoned practices which had alienated the Catholic community, such as internment without 
trial and high-profile patrolling, in favor of an approach which placed the RUC in the lead. 
The plan was to maintain law and order through policing and the legal system. Rather than 
drawing on colonial counterinsurgency experiences, this strategy was based on the West 
German and Italian governments’ experiences countering European terrorist groups such as 
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the Baader-Meinhof gang and Red Brigades.854 Under Ulsterization, the army largely 
redeployed to secure rural border areas, support the clandestine collection of intelligence, and 
conduct special operations against specific, known IRA targets. High-visibility daily patrols 
would fall to the RUC and Ulster Defence Regiment. Through Ulsterization, Rees hoped to 
reduce Catholic alienation and achieve a political settlement.855  
Conclusion 
From 1969-76—the period before Labour’s strategic shift— many within the British 
Army responded to rights advocacy in much the same way as they had during colonial 
campaigns such as Cyprus and Aden. But the specific historical moment in which the 
Troubles erupted meant that Northern Ireland was, indeed, a “more talkative place” than the 
colonies. Policies such as internment without trial and interrogation in depth drew 
particularly strong condemnation from rights groups, legal advocates, republican 
sympathizers, international organizations, foreign governments, and domestic political critics. 
To an unprecedented extent, rights activism in Northern Ireland generated substantive, 
persistent public discussions in Britain over counterinsurgency methods that continued 
throughout the Troubles. These discussions, however, proved polarizing as the threat of 
paramilitary violence spilled over from Northern Ireland into the rest of the UK. 
The prevalence of human rights debates from the late 1960s onward placed the 
security forces under greater public pressure than they had faced during the Cyprus and Aden 
wars. The Heath government proved willing to order a series of formal inquiries into rights 
abuses, but these inquiries were flawed. The Compton committee on interrogation produced 
an equivocal finding that relied on legal semantics. The committee insisted that while 
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physical “ill-treatment” of detainees was illegal in Britain, the success of these methods in 
support of counterinsurgency objectives meant that such treatment was not immoral. The 
subsequent Parker committee majority report also failed to address the legality of the five 
techniques. Only Lord Gardiner’s minority report asserted that British actions were illegal 
and immoral under all circumstances. On the use of excessive force during Bloody Sunday, 
the Widgery report amounted to a whitewash. 
The army response to public scrutiny during the Troubles reflected past experiences in 
post-1945 colonial wars. Court decisions and police investigations served to protect soldiers 
accused of violating the law. In the realm of civil claims, MOD provided compensation 
payments to end court proceedings quickly, therefore reducing the potential for long, drawn-
out bouts of negative publicity. Attitudes of senior leaders such as Lieutenant General King—
who wanted to loosen the legal restraints on his soldiers—mirrored British approaches in 
Cyprus and Aden. As historian Huw Bennett concluded, the authorities in Northern Ireland 
“were willing to cooperate and bend the rules in a manner hardly consistent with the demands 
of an impartial justice system.”856 Those who supported tough security measures, such as 
interrogation in depth or the removal of legal restrictions on soldiers’ conduct, asserted the 
primacy of military considerations over law and rights at a time in which domestic and 
international publics grew increasingly aware of and interested in protecting human rights. 
Tension between human rights and security policies remained central to public debate 
throughout the Troubles. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
Human rights activism played a critical role in shaping the conduct of British 
counterinsurgency in Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland, but not necessarily by 
“restraining” coercive practices. During the Cyprus and Aden conflicts, British forces 
established legal regimes which permitted a wide range of violence against the civilian 
population and detained combatants alike. When rights activists tried to expose these 
brutalities, the standard response from senior colonial officials and military officers was to 
deny wrongdoing, hide or manipulate evidence, and undermine their accusers’ credibility. 
This trend continued into Northern Ireland, but resistance to rights abuses reached a new 
level of intensity during the Troubles. Increasingly pervasive rights activism contributed to an 
enduring public debate over counterinsurgency policy. The fact that a variety of rights actors 
shaped counterinsurgency policies and operational decisions demonstrates that the diverse, 
global rights milieu of the 1950s-1970s was closely related not only to intellectual, social, 
cultural, and political developments, but also to changes in warfare. Human rights activists 
therefore added another dimension to the counterinsurgency battlefield, challenging British 
officials with moral and legal arguments.  
Human Rights on the Battlefield 
Human rights activism was an important factor in each of these conflicts, but not 
always because of international law. Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
included a provision that protections for non-combatants applied during “non-international 
armed conflict” as well as international wars. But British legal officers simply insisted that 
agreements such as the Geneva Conventions—the cornerstone of international humanitarian 
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law—did not apply to colonial emergencies.857 The European regional human rights regime 
likewise remained weak during the 1950s and 1960s. According to some historians, the 
emergence of human rights as a key element of post-1945 international legal regimes actually 
weakened international law because documents such as the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Geneva Conventions were unenforceable.858 In the three conflicts examined 
here, the notable absence of international legal sanctions against Britain seems to suggest that 
this assessment is accurate.  
Although few means of enforcing international law existed during the 1950s and 
1960s, activism based on human rights norms shaped British counterinsurgency practices. 
During the Cyprus Emergency, the Greek government’s applications under the European 
Convention failed to produce formal legal sanctions against Britain, but colonial officials 
were conscious of operating in the “Shadow of Strasbourg” and acted to protect security 
forces from scrutiny. Colonial administrators established the Special Investigation Group not 
to provide accountability, but to prevent allegations from gaining credibility. Other measures 
such as the manipulation of judicial inquiries revealed the extent to which colonial authorities 
could easily shield abuses and excesses. Yet officials could not act with complete impunity 
because they knew that Greek Cypriot lawyers would challenge their actions.  
In the Radfan, British officials again knew that their actions would come under 
scrutiny, but they were able to keep the International Committee of the Red Cross’ prying 
eyes away from the devastation caused by Britain’s scorched earth campaign. When detainee 
abuse allegations arose in Aden, the ICRC and Amnesty International recognized that the 
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allegations bore at least a kernel of truth. Perhaps motivated by his experiences in Cyprus, 
Amnesty co-founder Peter Benenson pushed to ensure that an official investigation occurred. 
Amnesty’s efforts succeeded in convincing the British government to order an inquiry. 
Headed by Sir Roderic Bowen, the resulting inquiry admitted, in a very circumspect manner, 
that some abuses had probably occurred.859 Colonial officials introduced reforms to the 
interrogation center at Fort Morbut, but torture resumed after the Bowen Inquiry and 
Amnesty’s disengagement from Aden. Activists had succeeded in raising the issue of 
detainee abuse and had also succeeded in obtaining regular Red Cross access to Fort Morbut, 
but activists’ efforts inadvertently inspired colonial authorities to hide their abuses more 
effectively.  
The Cyprus and Aden experiences also suggest that official attitudes toward rights-
based criticism shifted between the end of the Cyprus conflict in 1959 and 1963, when the 
war in Aden began. In Cyprus, a division emerged between officials in Cyprus and in London 
over whether organizations from outside the British government would be permitted to 
investigate British actions. London officials were willing to allow the European Commission 
inquiry, whereas colonial authorities in Cyprus adamantly resisted. But in Aden, some 
colonial officials seemed more willing to investigate abuses in an attempt to eliminate them. 
Questions emerged from within the High Commission and Middle East Command. Hugh 
Hickling and Don McCarthy, for instance, grew suspicious over the treatment of detainees. 
The willingness of some British officials to question the actions of others and accept scrutiny 
in the form of a formal inquiry ordered by the Foreign Secretary suggests that rights activists 
had managed to gradually chip away at protections which the colonial state had erected 
around interrogators.860 
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Activists’ efforts likewise met with mixed success in Northern Ireland. The use of 
coercive interrogation methods such as the “five techniques” and internment without trial 
outraged Northern Irish nationalists, a broad swath of the public in the Republic of Ireland, 
and many within the UK. Rights-based challenges to the government’s conduct of the 
Northern Ireland war also came from Britain’s radical Left, European statesmen, and the 
Irish-American lobby in the United States. As a result, the Troubles ignited a substantive 
public conversation about counterinsurgency practices that convinced British officials to 
abandon the five techniques and, eventually, internment. Interrogation and detention policies, 
however, continued to generate controversy and remained politically sensitive as the war 
continued.  
Public discussion and debate moved the government to take action in response to 
human rights complaints more frequently than in Cyprus or Aden, but officials largely 
avoided punishing rights violators. A 1978 Amnesty International investigation discovered 
evidence that from 1976-79, members of the RUC had severely and systematically beaten 
prisoners at three prisons while police doctors covered up medical evidence of the abuse. 
Amnesty recommended a full public inquiry. Under pressure from human rights activists, 
Members of Parliament, as well as British and Irish journalists, then-Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland Roy Mason ordered a private inquiry headed by Crown Court judge Harry 
Bennett.861 The Bennett committee proposed several interrogation and detention reforms, but 
none of the interrogators or doctors faced criminal charges.862 The Bennett report did not 
explicitly state that RUC constables had abused prisoners, which allowed Mason to 
simultaneously implement interrogation reforms while claiming that the abuse allegations had 
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not been proven. Some within the RUC, such as Deputy Chief Constable Jack Hermon, 
supported initiatives to increase police accountability, but these initiatives had limited effect. 
The RUC was dominated by a Janus-faced culture in which police commanders publicly 
upheld official rules and regulations while privately accepting routine minor deviations from 
those regulations.863  
Whereas activists’ appeals to human rights norms formed the basis of most 
complaints during the Cyprus and Aden conflicts, the strengthening of European human 
rights law during the 1970s bore significant consequences for the conduct of the war in 
Northern Ireland. Early cases such as the Commission’s decisions on the two Cyprus 
applications of the 1950s suggested that European human rights institutions would allow 
member states wide latitude in emergency situations. This situation changed beginning in the 
1970s. The European human rights system gained prestige as many prominent legal figures 
served on the Commission or the European Court of Human Rights. Once legitimized in this 
way, the Commission and Court began asserting their newfound status. The result was a 
proliferation of European case law regarding human rights and internal conflict. Once the 
Commission and Court began acting more aggressively on individuals’ claims in the 1970s, 
the government faced a flood of Troubles-related legal actions outside of British courts.864 
Between 1971 and 1998, the Commission dealt with over 65 cases concerning the application 
of the European Convention on Human Rights to court proceedings, detention practices, 
police investigations, and the use of force in Northern Ireland.865 
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The entrenchment of human rights law during the 1970s did not automatically result 
in an effective legal regime capable of restraining wartime violence. In a cautious 1978 
decision, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the “five techniques” of Britain’s 
1971-72 interrogation program constituted inhuman and degrading treatment but fell short of 
“torture.”866 In the same case, the Court also supported the right of the state to impose order 
during times of unrest by ruling that a public emergency threatening the life of the nation 
existed in Northern Ireland and that the British government had not exceeded its powers by 
implementing special security measures. According to legal scholar Brice Dickson, the 
Court’s decision “sent a subliminal message to the UK government that it could continue to 
tolerate heavy-handed interrogation tactics without having to worry too much about 
international opprobrium.”867 Dickson lamented that such rulings did not do more to reduce 
rights violations. For lawyers, courtroom verdicts are the benchmarks of success. But from a 
military perspective, activists’ efforts could shape the conduct of these wars even when 
formal legal judgments went against them. The adoption of Ulsterization provides one such 
example. 
From 1976 onward, Britain’s strategic shift toward Ulsterization marked a conscious 
effort to bolster popular perceptions of the state’s legitimacy through the rule of law. Under 
Ulsterization, police forces took the lead in security operations, with the army serving a 
supporting role. The complementary policy of “criminalization” was intended to treat 
paramilitary violence as a criminal, rather than a political, problem and punish offenders 
through the court system. This change reflected ministers’ realization that internment had 
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popularized the republican cause and boosted paramilitary recruitment.868 Successive British 
governments sought a negotiated settlement to the Northern Ireland conflict and did not want 
the Troubles to be a major political issue in the UK. Maintaining a certain degree of 
sensitivity to rights activism was one way to promote a peaceful, negotiated political solution 
to the conflict. As the desire for a negotiated settlement grew among London policymakers, 
the army implemented increasingly strict restraints such as the tightening of restrictions on 
the circumstances in which troops were legally permitted to use lethal force.869 
The problem with this rule-of-law approach was that British actions often proved 
inconsistent. Adopting the notion of “police primacy” in security operations and reducing the 
military presence proved problematic because these measures placed the Protestant-
dominated RUC and UDR in the forefront of security operations often oriented toward the 
Catholic minority. Attempts to use the court system to prosecute paramilitaries also failed to 
assuage republican resentment. The implementation of non-jury Diplock Courts to try 
terrorism cases and the use of anonymous informants—“supergrasses”—to achieve 
convictions in court undermined British claims to political legitimacy by subverting 
democratic practices.870 When the courts proved too cumbersome, some officials skirted the 
justice system entirely. Allegations of a “shoot-to-kill” policy and questions over security 
force collusion with loyalist paramilitaries soon surfaced during the 1970s and 1980s.871 
                                                            
868 Neumann, Britain’s Long War, 97. 
 
869 Frank Ledwidge, Losing Small Wars: British Military Failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2011), 184. 
 
870 Steven Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-Terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995); John Jackson, “Vicious and Virtuous Cylces in Prosecuting Terrorism: The Diplock 
Court Experience,” in Guantanamo Bay and Beyond: Exceptional Courts and Military Commissions in 
Comparative Perspective (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 225–44; and John D. Jackson 
and Seán Doran, Judge Without Jury: Diplock Trials in the Adversary System (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 
1995). 
 
871 Anne Cadwallader, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland (Cork, Ireland: Mercier Press, 2013) and 
Geraghty, The Irish War: The Hidden Conflict between the IRA and British Intelligence, 116–132. 
 
327 
 
“Shoot-to-kill” seemed to provide a way for security forces to avoid the judicial process by 
ensuring that paramilitaries never make it to trial.872 The army and police were also accused 
of colluding with loyalist paramilitary groups to commit illegal murders. The most infamous 
collusion case was that of Pat Finucane, a Catholic Belfast human rights lawyer murdered by 
loyalist paramilitaries in 1989. Military personnel provided intelligence that loyalist 
paramilitaries used to plan Finucane’s murder. When a police informant tried to warn his 
handlers of the impending murder, constables took no action to stop it.873  
Since the end of the Troubles, the British government has struggled to seriously 
examine the conflict’s checkered human rights legacy. In 2002, the British and Irish 
governments appointed former Canadian Supreme Court Judge Peter Cory to investigate four 
murder cases concerning collusion between British security forces and loyalist armed groups. 
Cory recommended that the British government conduct public inquiries into each case.874 
But following Cory’s recommendations, Parliament quickly passed the 2005 Inquiries Act, 
which limited the scope of any potential inquiry. According to Amnesty International UK 
Director Kate Allen, “the government will be able to control what the public founds out, and 
what it doesn’t.” Therefore, “the government has placed itself beyond public scrutiny.”875 In 
other instances, public inquiries have produced highly critical assessments of security forces’ 
conduct. The extensive 12-year Bloody Sunday Inquiry chaired by Lord Saville, which lasted 
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from 1998-2010, conclusively determined that soldiers had fired on an unarmed, nonviolent 
crowd.876 A 2012 government inquiry implicated members of the security forces in 
Finucane’s murder. Prime Minister David Cameron subsequently described the degree of 
state collusion in Finucane’s death as “shocking.”877  
Human rights issues remain central to the legacy of the Troubles. Rights activism has 
become entrenched in Northern Irish society and politics. According to one scholar, both 
unionists and nationalists have embraced human rights activism as a kind of “war by other 
means.”878 In the realm of law, the legacy of the Troubles has resulted in several legal actions. 
In the wake of the 2010 Bloody Sunday Inquiry, the government opened a new investigation 
into soldiers’ conduct. In 2015, police arrested a former Paratrooper for his role in the Bloody 
Sunday shootings.879 In December 2014, the Irish government requested that the European 
Court of Human Rights revise its 1978 judgment on Britain’s use of the “five techniques” 
during interrogation. This move occurred after an Irish television documentary aired in June 
2014 which alleged that the British government purposely misled the European Court and 
that UK Cabinet officials authorized use of the five techniques.880 The first step in this 
process began on June 4, 2015, when the Belfast High Court granted permission for the 
                                                            
876 Lord Saville, Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. London: HMSO, 2010. Available online at 
http://webarchive. nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http:/report.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org/.  Accessed 
November 22, 2015. 
 
877 “Pat Finucane murder: 'Shocking state collusion', says PM” BBC News. December 12, 2012. 
http://www.bbc.com/ news/uk-northern-ireland-20662412. Accessed September 4, 2015. 
 
878 Jennifer Curtis, Human Rights as War by Other Means: Peace Politics in Northern Ireland (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 4. 
 
879 “Bloody Sunday: Ex-soldier arrested over Londonderry shootings.” BBC News. November 10, 2015. 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-34775466. Accessed November 21, 2015. 
 
880 Evidence came to light in the RTÉ television documentary The Torture Files. See “Hooded Men: Irish 
Government Bid to Reopen ‘Torture’ Case,” BBC News. December 2, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
northern-ireland-30296397. Accessed November 21, 2015; and Susan McKay, “The Torture Centre: Northern 
Ireland’s ‘Hooded Men,’” Irish Times, July 25, 2015. 
 
329 
 
claimants in the original case to seek judicial review.881 These recent public inquiries and 
legal actions demonstrate that the brutality of colonial counterinsurgency practices was not 
simply locked away at the Hanslope Park archive as Britain withdrew from its empire—it 
persisted into the Northern Ireland conflict and beyond.  
Contemporary Conflict and the Moral Challenge of Human Rights 
The role of human rights on the battlefield has changed significantly since the 1970s 
as formal legal mechanisms grew increasingly influential. Legal scholars have observed an 
“increasing acceptance that the rules of international law are the foundation upon which the 
rights of states rest, and no longer merely limitations upon states’ rights which, in the absence 
of a rule of law to the contrary, are unlimited.”882 Attempts to restrict state powers have 
contributed to the emergence of “a general trend towards the application of the rules and 
principles regarding international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict.”883  
This process began as human rights law overlapped with international humanitarian 
law through a series of post-Second World War revisions to the Geneva Conventions. The 
1949 Geneva Conventions protected individuals’ right to a fair trial and humane treatment 
while stipulating that the Conventions’ protections applied during non-international armed 
conflict—such as civil war—as well as international wars.884 European colonial powers and 
the Cold War superpowers largely ignored this measure. As a result, in 1968 the UN General 
Assembly passed Resolution 2444 calling for the revision of international humanitarian law 
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to ensure “respect for human rights in armed conflicts.”885 Protracted discussions between 
state parties to the Geneva Conventions and the International Committee of the Red Cross 
eventually produced the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Reflecting 
the experience of anticolonial wars, the first protocol applied international humanitarian law 
to “armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien 
occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of self-determination.”886 
The second protocol expanded protections for combatants and civilians in non-international 
armed conflicts, but states refused to include language in the protocol which would have 
extended the same protections for international armed conflict to all forms of non-
international armed conflict.887  
In Britain, the passage of the UK Human Rights Act strengthened the judiciary’s 
power to enforce human rights law. Passed in 1998, the Act came into force two years later. It 
was in part the product of lobbying by civil society organizations such as Charter 88, which 
believed that the British government held too many unchecked powers and that limiting the 
government’s power required a formal enumeration of basic rights.888 But the Act’s origins 
can also be found in the Northern Ireland peace process.889 Both nationalist and unionist 
communities perceived comprehensive protections of fundamental rights as a means of 
protecting their interests. In 1995, the British government committed to establishing a legal 
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guarantee to protect each community’s civil, social, and cultural rights. As part of the 1998 
Belfast Agreement that ended the Troubles, the British government pledged to incorporate 
the European Convention into UK domestic law. The passage of the Human Rights Act 
meant that the European Convention would apply to army and police conduct throughout the 
UK, including Northern Ireland.890 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, Britain’s involvement in the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars further transformed the landscape of human rights law by raising the 
question of whether human rights legislation applied outside of the UK. The case of Al-Skeini 
v. MOD, which was eventually appealed to the European Court of Human Rights as Al-Skeini 
v. UK, generated one of the most significant jurisprudential decisions arising out of post-9/11 
wars. In this case, relatives of six deceased Iraqi civilians initiated civil proceedings against 
the Ministry of Defence. Five of the deceased had been killed by British soldiers while on 
patrol in 2003. The claimants alleged that British soldiers had detained and tortured the sixth 
civilian, a man named Baha Mousa, who subsequently died in British custody. According to a 
post-mortem examination, Mousa suffered 93 separate injuries including a broken nose and 
four fractured ribs. In January 2004—in a manner reminiscent of the way that MOD handled 
civil cases in Northern Ireland—the MOD announced that it had paid compensation to 
Mousa’s family but did not admit legal liability for his death. An inquiry which ran from 
2008-2011 later confirmed that soldiers had beaten Mousa, placed him in stress positions, 
deprived him of sleep, and kept him hooded for 24 of the 36 hours during which he was in 
custody—all methods which had been used previously in Northern Ireland. Soldiers had also 
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used these practices on several other detainees at the prison.891 The victims’ family members 
also asked for the court to review the MOD’s failure to investigate the deaths.892  
The legal point at issue in the Al-Skeini case concerned the extraterritoriality of the 
1998 UK Human Rights Act and, by extension, the European Convention on Human 
Rights—that is, whether this legislation applied to the conduct of British soldiers outside of 
British territory. According to Article 1 of the European Convention, member states must 
respect the rights and freedoms described in the Convention and apply those rights “to 
everyone within their jurisdiction.”893 In December 2004, the High Court ruled that neither 
the 1998 Act nor the European Convention applied to the first five deaths because those 
individuals were killed while British soldiers were on patrol and therefore the deaths did not 
occur within the UK’s jurisdiction. But in the Mousa case, the High Court ruled that the 1998 
Act and, by extension, the European Convention, applied because Mousa died in British 
custody. The case was appealed twice, reaching the Supreme Court in the House of Lords for 
decision. In June 2007, the House of Lords concluded that the five individuals killed during 
the patrol were not under UK jurisdiction, but that Baha Mousa was within the UK’s 
jurisdiction. The Lords ruled that as a legally recognized space under British control, UK law 
applied to British military prisons no matter where in the world they were located.894 
The House of Lords determined that the European Convention applied to the actions 
of British soldiers on military bases in Iraq, but a 2011 European Court of Human Rights 
ruling on the Al-Skeini case pushed the concept of extraterritoriality further. In what one 
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commentator called “a landmark judgment,” the Court ruled that the European Convention 
applied not only to the actions of British soldiers at the detention center, but also to the 
soldiers’ conduct while on patrol.895 This decision was based on the understanding that the 
Convention applied if the state exercised “effective control of an area outside that national 
territory.” Furthermore, the Court noted that “the obligation to secure, in such an area, the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control.” Because 
British forces controlled many of the powers normally associated with a sovereign 
government in Iraq, the Court concluded that the Convention applied to soldiers’ conduct in 
Iraq wherever they were—not solely on British military installations. Based on this judgment, 
the jurisdiction of European human rights law could extend to battlefields beyond Europe.896  
The European Court’s ruling in Al-Skeini v. UK contrasted sharply with arguments put 
forth in the early 2000s by Bush administration lawyers in the United States. Administration 
lawyers insisted that American laws applied only within the physical boundaries of the 
United States, therefore detainees could be held indefinitely outside of the U.S. at sites such 
as Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This interpretation extended to the treatment of detainees beyond 
U.S. borders and was used to justify the operations of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
“Black Sites” in which detainees were subjected to torture. Although the U.S Supreme 
Court’s 2006 ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld prohibited the use of military commissions to 
prosecute detainees, the Bush administration’s refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions to 
captured enemy combatants after 9/11, the use of indefinite detention at Guantanamo Bay, 
and the approval of so-called “enhanced interrogation” techniques contributed to the 
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emergence of an interrogation and detention system which legalized methods now widely 
regarded as torture.897 When CIA health professionals criticized the interrogation program on 
medical grounds, psychologists from the American Psychological Association’s ethics 
committee coordinated with CIA and Defense Department officials to ensure that the APA’s 
code of ethics did not preclude psychologists from participating in “enhanced interrogation” 
programs. Such attempts to distort professional ethical guidelines are reminiscent of colonial 
officers’ efforts to manipulate emergency regulations to their advantage.898  
Beyond detention and interrogation, human rights issues emerged during the Iraq and 
Afghanistan wars over problems such as the excessive use of force and “collateral damage” 
to civilians. Senior British commanders did not provide as much oversight on the use of lethal 
violence in Iraq and Afghanistan as they had in Northern Ireland.899 Employing guided 
missiles capable of precision strikes, American drone attacks increased dramatically during 
the first years of the Obama administration. In 2008, President Obama’s first year in office, 
an estimated 298 people were killed by drone strikes—more than the total killed during the 
last four years of the George W. Bush administration combined. The number of deaths from 
U.S. drone attacks peaked in 2010, when 849 were estimated to have been killed.900  
Drone strikes may have degraded the operational capabilities of violent extremist 
groups like Al Qaeda, but American reliance on airstrikes has generated a moral backlash. 
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According to some scholars, an armed drone’s advantages—the ability to loiter for hours 
above a target, the precision of guided munitions, and low risk due to the lack of a human 
pilot—present a “moral hazard.” The high likelihood of hitting a target and low risk to human 
operators means that drones have lowered the threshold at which policymakers in the United 
States will sanction the use of lethal force.901 A result of this temptation is that strikes have 
been authorized against targets that were not always positively identified. Because of these 
difficulties, the CIA initiated a program of “signature strikes” in which drone operators 
launch an attack based largely on circumstantial evidence such as suspicious activity in 
known terrorist sanctuaries or communications intercepts which suggest that insurgent 
activity is taking place. Such attacks have killed many insurgents, but have also resulted in 
the deaths of civilians and, in some cases, American hostages.902 The apparent injustice of 
civilian deaths and lack of redress for victims’ families has contributed to bitterness and 
anger toward American security policy in places such as Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Yemen.903  
Despite the anger and injustice felt by many who live under the drones, some 
contemporary commentators reject the wartime relevance of legal and moral considerations 
such as human rights. American journalist Robert Kaplan claims that the greatest morality in 
international affairs is the cold amorality of classical political realism. He argues that “the 
rare individuals who have recognized the necessity of violating such morality, acted 
accordingly, and taken responsibility for their actions are among the most necessary leaders 
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for their countries.”904 Former British Army officer Rob Johnson concurs with Kaplan’s 
belief that moral questions concerning human rights and international law are an unnecessary 
impediment to operations. To Johnson, legal concerns place troops in a straightjacket of 
restrictions.905  
But those who view law and rights as nothing more than a hindrance to successful 
military operations misunderstand the importance of moral appeals in contemporary conflict. 
Emile Simpson, a strategic studies scholar and former British Army officer, links the tension 
between physical and moral victories to the production of strategic narratives. Simpson 
argues that in a world defined by contemporary globalization, in which communication 
across continents has become easier than ever before, no belligerent wages war without a 
public explanation of why it is fighting and what it hopes to achieve—this is the strategic 
narrative.  Such narratives must appeal to its intended audience rationally, emotionally, and 
morally. Wartime objectives must appear logical and the reason for fighting must elicit 
supporters’ passions or neutrals’ sympathies. But reason and emotion can sometimes justify 
extreme measures. Moral concerns act as a check against excessive brutality. In 
contemporary conflicts, international human rights norms and laws shape moral 
considerations. An effective strategic narrative therefore requires a moral explanation of the 
conflict. For Simpson, moral arguments are part of strategy.906 
Fighting in a morally unacceptable manner can prove counterproductive. Simpson 
describes this dynamic by examining the Russian Army’s actions in Chechnya during the 
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1990s and the Sri Lankans Army’s 2006-09 campaign against the separatist Tamil Tigers. 
Both the Russians and Sri Lankans employed brutal methods against their adversaries and 
largely succeeded in establishing an acceptable level of security. But human rights violations 
committed in the process of achieving security objectives undermined Russian and Sri 
Lankan victories in the eyes of much of the international community while also fomenting 
resentment among defeated populations. According to Simpson, “the moral high ground, 
once evacuated, is very hard to regain.”907 Moral choices therefore generate military and 
political consequences on the battlefield and beyond.  
Debates over interrogation, detention, and drone strikes highlight the centrality of 
moral issues in contemporary warfare, but such questions are not solely a twenty-first century 
phenomenon. This study has demonstrated that moral decisions based on human rights 
influenced military operations during the end of empire and beyond. From the decolonization 
era to the post-9/11 “war on terror,” such choices have played an important role in the 
conduct of war. But it is also naïve to think that human rights are simply a set of supposedly 
“pure” and impartial ideals. The Cyprus, Aden, and Northern Ireland campaigns 
demonstrated that during the wars of decolonization and after, adversaries and third-party 
actors have routinely mobilized human rights concepts to serve their own purposes. These 
objectives may be self-serving, altruistic, or some combination of the two. Regardless of how 
or why they were mobilized, human rights became part of the topography of war—the terrain 
of the battlefield. And like terrain, human rights may be used to one’s advantage or ignored to 
one’s peril. 
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